reported. We think entries so made, with the evidence of the foreman that they made true reports, and of the person who made the entries that he correctly entered them, are admissible. It is substantially by this method of accounts that the transactions of business in numerous cases are authenticated. and business could not be carried on and accounts kept, in many cases, without great inconvenience, unless this method of keeping and proving accounts is sanctioned. In a business where many laborers are employed, the accounts must, in most cases, of necessity, be kept by a person not cognizant of the facts, and from reports made by others. The person in charge of the laborers knows the fact, but he may not have the skill, or for other reasons it may be inconvenient that he should keep the account. It may be assumed that a system of accounts based upon substantially the same methods as the accounts in this case is in accordance with the usages of business. In admitting an account verified as was the account here, there is little danger of mistake, and the admissibility of such an account, as legal evidence is often necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

"We are of opinion, however, that it is a proper qualification of the rule admitting such evidence that the account must have been made in the ordinary course of business, and that it should not be extended so as to admit a mere private memorandum, not made in pursuance of any duty owing to the person making it, or when made upon information derived from another who made the communication casually and voluntarily, and not under the sanction of duty or other obligation."

"Service marks" on an original telegram indicating that it was sent are admissible together with the testimony of the operator to show the sending and receiving of the message: St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 78 Ark. 1, 93 S. W. 58. But the time card of a street-car conductor is not admissible to show the time when an accident occurred in a suit for personal injuries: Lucas v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 56 App. Div. 405, 67 N. Y. Supp. 833. A report made by an insurance agent to his company of his daily business is not admissible to support the agent's contention that they were without knowledge of the existence of other insurance covering the same property when they issued their policy of insurance: Strauss v. Phenix Ins. Co., 9 Colo. App. 386, 48 Pac. 822.

2. Train-sheets and Railway Inspection Reports.-Records of entries made in the usual course of business on "train-sheets" by a train dispatcher from reports telegraphed to him by station agents as to the time of the arrival and departure of trains are admissible in evidence to show the position and place of a train at a certain time: Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Daniel, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1146, 91 S. W. 691, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1190; Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 584, 94 S. W. 26; Donovan v. Boston etc. R. Co., 158 Mass. 450, 33 N. E. 583; Big River Lead Co. v. St. Louis etc. Co., 123 Mo. App. 394, 101 S. W. 636; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N. C. 42, 107 Am. St. Rep. 517, 50 S. E. 452.

The record-book of an inspector of cars or locomotives is not admissible as original evidence of the facts stated therein, but such a book may be used by the inspector who made the entries therein for the purpose of refreshing his memory: Baltimore etc. Ry. Co. v. Tripp, 175 Ill. 251, 51 N. E. 833; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Barrett, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1755, 66 S. W. 9; Hoffman v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 60, 41 N. W. 301; Hicks v. Southern Ry. Co., 63 S. C. 539, 41 S. E. 753. If the original memoranda of locomotive engineers or inspectors are shown to be lost, other memoranda made from original slips by a clerk whose duty it was to make them, and shown by the evidence of such person to be correct, are admissible in evidence: Manchester A. Co. v. Oregon R. Co., 46 Or. 162, 114 Am. St. Rep. 863, 79 Pac. 60.

3. Livestock Registers and Herd-books.—Books of pedigree, such as livestock registers and herd-books, kept by associations which make it their business to register the pedigree information of animals, and which books are looked to as authority on such questions, are held admissible, but on the ground that they are books of a historical character and as belonging to the same class of evidence which is receivable in matters of pedigree concerning human beings: Kuhns v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 528, 22 N. W. 661; Citizens' Rapid Transit Co. v. Dew, 100 Tenn. 317, 66 Am. St. Rep. 754, 45 S. W. 790, 40 L. R. A. 518. But a mere private catalogue giving the history of the sire of a horse is not regarded as a book of pedigree, and is not admissible on the ground that the statements therein are mere hearsay: Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Frazee, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1273, 71 S. W. 437. A certificate of registration of a cow in the Holstein-Friesian Association of America, given by the holder to a person who purchased the cow, though admissible as a verbal act of representation between the parties, is not admissible in a suit by the last owner of the cow against a railroad company for the killing of the cow: Austin etc. R. Co. v. Saunders (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 128.

VI. Admissibility of Books and Records of Corporations, Lodges and Similar Organizations.

a. By-laws. "The by-laws of a private corporation, as well as the entries in its books, are not, strictly speaking, records. A record is a written memorial made by a public officer authorized by law to perform that function; the memorial being intended to serve as evidence of something written said or done: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

"The written or printed by-laws of a private corporation are documents; and the general rules as to the production and proof of documentary evidence apply to them": Knights etc. of America v. Weber, 101 Ill. App. 488. Hence by-laws of corporations, lodges and fraternal insurance organizations are admissible when properly proved in all cases where these provisions have relevancy to the cause of the action: Star Loan Assn. v. Moore, 4 Penne. (Del.) 308, 55 Atl. 946; Frank v. Morrison, 58 Md. 423; Schubert Lodge v. Schubert etc. Verein, 56 N. J. Eq. 78, 38 Atl. 347; Herman v. Supreme Lodge, 66 N. J. L. 77, 48 Atl. 1000; Page v. Knights etc. of America (Tenn. Ch.), 61 S. W.

1068; Cotton Jammer's etc. Assn. v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. 367, 56 S. W. 553.

b. Minute-books and Other Books of Record.-The records of a Masonic lodge are admissible to show what action was taken by that body in adopting a deed made by one of its officers: Leach v. Dodson, 64 Tex. 185. And in a suit against a surety company on a policy of insurance issued by it as a protection against embezzlement, the books and records of the lodge are admissible to show the condition of affairs existing between the lodge and the officer who was insured: Union Pacific Lodge v. Bankers' Surety Co., 79 Neb. 801, 113 N. W. 263. Entries in the minutes of a lodge have also been allowed as evidence of collateral facts where they were made over thirty years previously, on the theory that they are similar to ancient documents under such circumstances: Howard v. Russell, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S. W. 525. But recitals in the minute-book of a lodge as to the age of a member have been rejected as hearsay and not admissible as proving pedigree: Connecticut etc. Ins. Co. v. Schwenk, 94 U. S. 593, 24 L. ed. 294.

Minute-books of corporations are, of course, when properly authenticated, evidence on behalf of the corporation of the transactions shown by the minutes to have taken place at the meeting: Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 24 Am. St. Rep. 894, 6 South. 46, 9 South. 265; Booth v. Dexter Steam Fire Engine Co., 118 Ala. 369, 24 South. 405; Smith v. Woodville etc. Min. Co., 66 Cal. 398, 5 Pac. 688; Howard Ins. Co. v. Hope Mutual Ins. Co., 22 Conn. 394; Brower v. East Rome Town Co., 84 Ga. 219, 10 S. E. 629; Fitch v. Penckard, 5 Ill. 69; Vawter v. Franklin College, 53 Ind. 88; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Eakins, 30 Iowa, 279; Morris v. Morton's Exr. (Ky.), 20 S. W. 287; Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426, 23 N. E. 311, 6 L. R. A. 342; United Growers Co. v. Eisner, 22 App. Div. 1, 47 N. Y. Supp. 906; Wyss-Thalman v. Beaver Valley Brewing Co., 219 Pa. 189, 68 Atl. 187.

Self-serving declarations in the minutes of a corporation are not evidence in favor of the corporation against third parties. Thus the court in Dolan v. Wilkerson, 57 Kan. 758, 48 Pac. 23, said: "Its books and records are under its own control, and third persons are not chargeable with knowledge of entries made therein. Entries of the character stricken out by the court are of a self-serving character, and cannot be used to establish the rights of the corporation against third parties. While the entries might be received in evidence in disputes between members of the corporations or against the corporations, they cannot be used in its favor unless they are made competent by legislative enactment: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 493; 1 Wharton on Evidence, sec. 662; Angell & Ames on Corporations, sec. 679; Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R. 29, 8 Am. Dec. 628; Wetherbee v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. 501; Haynes v. Brown, 36 N. H. 545."

Books of a corporation are admissible in a controversy between it and its members in matters pertaining to its corporate acts, but where the corporation deals with its members as with other individuals, such

books are governed by the same rules which obtain with respect to individuals: Norman etc. Supply Co. v. Ford, 77 Conn. 461, 59 Atl. 499; Lowry Nat. Bank v. Fickett, 122 Ga. 489, 50 S. E. 396; Trainor v. German-American Sav. etc. Assn., 204 Ill. 616, 68 N. E. 650; North River Meadow Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 22 N. J. L. 424, 53 Am. Dec. 258; South Hampton v. Fowler, 52 N. H. 225; Chesapeake etc. Ry. Co. v. Deepwater Ry. Co., 57 W. Va. 641, 50 S. E. 890.

Thus, in condemnation proceedings, a corporation's books are admissible to show that its entire capital stock has been subscribed in order to show that it comes within the requirements of a statute which the whole of its capital stock to have been subscribed in order to be allowed to condemn land: State v. Superior Court, 44 Wash. 108, 87 Pac. 40. But a certified copy of a corporation's report of its financial condition is not evidence of the truth of the statements contained in such report: Whitaker v. Miller, 63 N. J. L. 587, 44 Atl. 643.

KIMBALL v. SALT LAKE CITY.

[32 Utah, 253, 90 Pac. 395.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Change of Grade of Street, Property Owner's Right to Recover for.-If, through grading as previously done on a street, a grade is established and property graded accordingly in such a manner as to diminish the value of property fronting thereon, the owner may recover of the municipality to the extent that such diminution exceeds the direct benefit from the improvement causing the damage, if the constitution of the state provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. (p. 861.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Grade of Streets, Damage to House Built Before the Adoption of the Constitution.-Under constitutions providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, the fact that a house had been constructed near a public street before the adoption of the constitution does not preclude its owner from recovering all damages sustained by him from the grading of the street after the constitution went into effect. (p. 863.)

INTEREST ON DAMAGES.-In an action to recover damages for the grading of a public street to the injury of a property owner, he is entitled to recover the damages sustained up to the time when the grading was completed, with interest to the date of the trial. (pp. 863, 864.)

Ogden Hiles and H. J. Dininny, for the appellant.

King, Burton & King and S. Russell, for the respondents.

256 FRICK, J. This action was instituted by the plaintiffs, respondents in this court, against the defendant city, appellant, to recover consequential damages to real property caused by public improvements made by appellant in changing a street grade in front of respondents' property. The

property in question was used as a residence, and was materially affected by a fill of about ten feet in front thereof. The respondents filed a claim against the city for damages as provided by law, which was denied, and hence this action. The case was tried to a jury, which awarded damages to respondents, upon which the court entered judgment, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

The appellant assigns various errors, but they all may be condensed into the following: (1) Error in allowing any damages; (2) error in the allowance of interest on the amount allowed by the jury from the date of presentation of the claim to the city; and (3) error in giving certain instructions to the jury by the court.

The first alleged error arises as follows: The property in question was improved some time during 1889 or 1890 by erecting a dwelling-house with all modern conveniences thereon. In 1884, as the evidence discloses, the city established a certain grade in front of the property which changed the natural or surface grade, but no attempt was ever made by the city to make the street conform to the grade as established by it. This grade, if it had been adhered to, would not have materially affected respondents' property. In the year 1903 the appellant changed the grade as established in 1884, and the filling in of the sidewalk and street in front of respondents' property was made to conform to this later 257 grade. It is urged by the appellant that the first grade was a mere "paper grade"; and, as nothing was attempted under it, it was in effect the same as if no grade had been established. It is further contended that the city had a right to establish or fix one grade changing the original or surface grade without becoming legally liable for consequential damages to property injuriously affected thereby, if such change was reasonably and carefully effected. No complaint being made in that regard, it is urged that appellant is not liable in this case.

This claim is based upon section 282, Revised Statutes of 1898, which in effect provides that the cities of this state shall be liable for consequential damages to property in case the established grade is changed after improvements have been made upon the property in conformity with a prior established grade. Section 282 was passed in 1896 (Laws 1896, p. 120, c. 36), after the adoption of the constitution of this state, and evidently for the purpose of harmonizing the statutes of this state with section 22 of article 1 of the constitution, which provides: "Private property shall not