in violence, and the Fox in guile, as of the Man in virtue and Juftice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was firft, and the expofition then devifed, than that the Moral was firft, and hereupon the Fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chryfippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the affertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient Poets; but yet that all the Fables and fictions of the Poets were but pleafure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of thofe Poets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the latter Schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his Fables had no fuch inwardnefs in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.

In this third Part of Learning, which is Poefy, I can report no deficience. For being as a plant that cometh of the luft of the earth, without a formal feed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind: but to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expreffing of affections, paffions, corruptions, and cuftoms, we are beholding to Poets more than to the Philofophers' works; and for Wit and Eloquence, not much less than to Orators' harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the Theatre. Let us now pass on to the Judicial Place or Palace of the Mind, which we

are to approach and view with more reverence and attention.

The Knowledge of Man is as the waters, fome descending from above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light of Nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of Nature confifteth in the Notions of the mind and the Reports of the Senses: for as for Knowledge which Man receiveth by teaching, it is Cumulative and not Original; as in a water that, besides his own spring-head, is fed with other Springs and Streams. So then, according to these two differing Illuminations or Originals, Knowledge is first of all divided into Divinity and Philofophy.

In Philofophy, the contemplations of Man do either penetrate unto GOD,-or are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three Knowledges, Divine Philofophy, Natural Philofophy, and Human Philofophy or Humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple Character, of the power of GOD, the difference of Nature, and the ufe of Man. But because the diftributions and partitions of Knowledge are not like feveral lines that meet in one Angle, and fo touch but in a point; but are like branches of a Tree, that meet in a ftem, which hath a dimenfion and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to difcontinue and break itself into Arms and boughs therefore it is good, before we enter into the former diftribution, to erect and conftitute

one universal Science, by the name of Philosophia Prima, Primitive or Summary Philosophy, as the Main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which Science whether I should report as deficient or not, I ftand doubtful. For I find a certain Rhapsody of Natural Theology, and of divers parts of Logic; and of that part of Natural Philofophy which concerneth the Principles; and of that other part of Natural Philofophy which concerneth the Soul or Spirit: all these strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other Sciences, advanced and exalted unto fome height of terms, than any thing folid or fubftantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the fame things are handled but in several respects. As for example, that Logic confidereth of many things as they are in Notion, and this Philosophy as they are in Nature; the one in Appearance, the other in Existence; but I find this difference better made than pursued. For if they had confidered Quantity, Similitude, Diverfity, and the rest of those External Characters of things, as Philosophers, and in Nature, their inquiries muft of force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling Quantity, speak of the force of Union, how and how far it multiplieth Virtue? Doth any give the reason, why fome things in Nature are so common, and in fo great Mass, and others fo rare, and in so small quantity? Doth

any, in handling Similitude and Diversity, affign the cause why Iron should not move to Iron, which is more like, but move to the Load-ftone, which is less like? Why in all Diversities of things there should be certain Participles in Nature, which are almoft ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mete and deep filence touching the Nature and operation of thofe Common adjuncts of things, as in nature; and only a refuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a Writing of this Nature, I avoid all subtilty, my meaning touching this Original or Univerfal Philofophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by Negative: That it be a Receptacle for all fuch profitable obfervations and Axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of Philofophy or Sciences, but are more common and of a higher Stage.

Now that there are many of that kind, need not to be doubted. For example: is not the rule, Si inæqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia, an Axiom as well of Juftice as of the Mathematics and is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive Justice, and Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter fe conveniunt, a Rule taken from the Mathematics, but fo potent in Logic as all Syllogifms are built upon it? Is not the observation, Omnia mutantur, nil interit, a contemplation, in Philofophy thus,

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that the Quantum of Nature is eternal? in Natural Theology thus, that it requireth the fame Omnipotence to make somewhat Nothing, which at the first made nothing fomewhat? according to the Scripture, Didici quòd omnia opera, quæ fecit Deus, perfeverent in perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wifely and largely discourseth concerning Governments, that the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them ad Principia, a rule in Religion and Nature, as well as in Civil administration? Was not the Perfian Magic a reduction or correfpondence of the Principles and Architectures of Nature to the rules and policy of Governments? Is not the precept of a Musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the Trope of Mufic, to avoid or flide from the clofe or Cadence, common with the Trope of Rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the Quavering upon a stop in Mufic the fame with the playing of Light upon the water?

Splendet tremulo fub Lumine Pontus.

Are not the Organs of the senses of one kind with the Organs of Reflection, the eye with a glass, the Ear with a Cave or Strait determined and bounded? Neither are these only fimilitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the fame footsteps of Nature, treading or printing upon several Subjects or Matters. This Science, there