the same manner to inquire the form of a Lion, of an Oak, of Gold; nay, of Water, of Air, is a vain pursuit but to inquire the forms of Sense, of voluntary Motion, of Vegetation, of Colours, of Gravity and Levity, of Density, of Tenuity, of Heat, of Cold, and all other Natures and qualities, which, like an Alphabet, are not many, and of which the effences, upheld by Matter, of all Creatures do confift; to inquire, I fay, the true forms of these, is that part of Metaphyfique which we now define of. Not but that Phyfic doth make inquiry, and take confideration of the same Natures: but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the forms. For example; if the cause of whiteness in Snow or Froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the fubtile intermixture of Air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but vehiculum forma. This part of Metaphyfique I do not find laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not: because I hold it not poffible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the Root of all error, have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recefs from particulars.

But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as deficient, is of the reft the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all Knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the concep

tion of Truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of Vita brevis, ars longa; which is performed by uniting the Notions and Conceptions of Sciences for Knowledges are as Pyramids, whereof Hiftory is the Basis. So of Natural Philosophy, the Bafis is Natural History; the Stage next the Bafis is Phyfique; the Stage next the Vertical point is Metaphyfique. As for the Vertical Point, Opus quod operatur Deus à principio ufque ad finem, the Summary Law of Nature, we know not whether Man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true Stages of Knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the Giant's Hills:

Ter funt conati imponere Pelio Offam,

Scilicet, atque Offa frondofum involvere Olympum. But to those which refer all things to the Glory of GOD, they are as the three acclamations, Sancte, Sancte, Sancte; holy in the description or dilatation of his works; holy in the connection or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore the fpeculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did afcend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth to be Metaphyfique; as that which confidereth the fimple forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety.

The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of Metaphyfique, is that it doth enfranchise the power of Man unto the greatest liberty and poffibility of works and effects. For Phyfique carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of Nature; but Lata undique funt fapientibus viæ: to fapience, which was anciently defined to be Rerum divinarum et humanarum fcientia, there is ever choice of Means for Phyfical caufes give light to new invention in Simili materia. But whofoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost poffibility of fuperinducing that Nature upon any variety of matter; and fo is less restrained in operation, either to the Basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more Divine fort, elegantly describeth: Non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum. The ways of fapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance.

The second part of Metaphyfique is the inquiry of Final Caufes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of Sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the Sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in Phyfical Inquiries, hath intercepted the fevere and

diligent inquiry of all Real and Phyfica lCauses, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and fpecious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further Discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon. that fhore, but by Ariftotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of difcourfing causes. For to fay that the hairs of the Eye-lids are for a quickfet and fence about the Sight ; or that the firmness of the Skins and Hides of living Creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the Columns or Beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living Creatures are built; or that the leaves of Trees are for protecting of the Fruit; or that the Clouds are for watering of the Earth; or that the folidnefs of the Earth is for the ftation and manfion of living Creatures, and the like, is well inquired and collected in Metaphysique; but in Physique they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but Remoras and hinderances to stay and flug the ship from further failing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the Phyfical Causes hath been neglected, and paffed in filence. And therefore the natural Philofophy of Democritus and fome others, (who did not suppose a mind or Reafon in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs of Nature, which they term Fortune) seemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us, in particularities of Phyfical

causes, more real and better inquired than that of Ariftotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final caufes, the one as a part of Theology, and the other as a part of Logic, which were the favourite Studies refpectively of both thofe perfons. Not because those final caufes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excurfions into the limits of Phyfical caufes hath bred a vastness and folitude in that Track. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and Borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is an Enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that the Hairs about the eye-lids are for the fafeguard of the fight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that Pilofity is incident to Orifices of Moisture; Mufcofi fontes, &c. Nor the cause rendered, that the firmnefs of Hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and fo of the rest: both Causes being true and Compatible, the one declaring an Intention, the other a Confequence only.

Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politician, that can make other men the Inftruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that

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