another place: If I fpake, faith he, with the tongues of Men and Angels, and had not Charity, it were but as a Tinkling Cymbal; not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the Tongues of Men and Angels, but because, if it be fevered from Charity, and not referred to the good of Men and Mankind, it hath rather a founding and Unworthy glory, than a meriting and substantial Virtue. And as for that Cenfure of Solomon, concerning the excefs of Writing and Reading Books, and the anxiety of Spirit which redoundeth from Knowledge; and that Admonition of St. Paul, That we be not feduced by vain Philofophy; let those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby human knowledge is confined and circumfcribed; and yet without any fuch contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the Universal nature of things; for these limitations are three the first, That we do not fo place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality : the second, That we make application of our Knowledge, to give ourselves repofe and contentment, and not diftaste or repining: the third, That we do not prefume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the Mysteries of God. For as touching the first of these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the fame Book, where he faith: I faw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness; and that the wife man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the

fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned, that the fame mortality involveth them both. And for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which refulteth from knowledge, otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge, and wonder (which is the feed of knowledge) is an impreffion of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing Conclufions out of their Knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vaft defires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then Knowledge is no more. Lumen ficcum, whereof Heraclitus the profound faid, Lumen ficcum optima anima; but it becometh Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped and infused in the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly paffed over: for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain Philosophy: for the contemplation of GOD's Creatures and Works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themfelves), knowledge, but having regard to GOD, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly faid by one of Plato's school, That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the Sun, which, as we fee, openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial Globe;

but then again it obfcureth and concealeth the stars and celeftial Globe: fo doth the Senfe difcover Natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up Divine. And hence it is true, that it hath proceeded, that divers great Learned men have been Heretical, whilft they have fought to fly up to the fecrets of the Deity by the waxen Wings of the Senses. And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to Atheism, and that the ignorance of second caufes fhould make a more devout dependence upon GOD, which is the first cause; First, it is good to ask the question which Job afked of his friends: Will you lie for GOD, as one man will do for another, to gratify him? For certain it is that God worketh nothing in Nature but by second causes and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere impofture, as it were in favour towards GOD; and nothing else but to

Now draw Заст

offer to the Author of Truth the unclean facrifice the

of a lie. But farther, it is an affured Truth, and a Conclufion of Experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of Philofophy may incline the mind of man to Atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to Religion for in the entrance of Philosophy, when the fecond Causes, which are next unto the fenfes, do offer themselves to the mind of Man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce fome oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then, according to the Allegory of

the Poets, he will easily believe that the highest Link of Nature's Chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's Chair. To conclude, therefore, let no man, upon a weak conceit of Sobriety, or an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well ftudied in the Book of GOD's Word, or in the Book of. GOD's Works; Divinity or Philosophy; but rather let Men endeavour an endless Progrefs or proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply both to Charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to oftentation; and again, that they do not unwifely mingle or confound thefe Learnings together.

And as for the disgraces which Learning receiveth from Politicians, they be of this Nature; that Learning doth soften men's minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of Arms; that it doth mar and pervert Men's difpofitions for matter of government and policy; in making them too curious and irrefolute by variety of reading; or too peremptory or positive by strictnefs of rules and axioms; or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples; or too incompatible and differing from the times, by reason of the diffimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men's travails from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it doth bring into States a relaxation of difcipline, whilst every Man is more ready to argue, than to obey and execute.

Out of this conceit, Cato, furnamed the Cenfor, one of the wifeft men indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the Philofopher came in Embaffage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness and Majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open Senate, that they should give him his dispatch with all speed, left he should infectand inchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and Customs of the State. Out of the fame conceit, or humour, did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his Country, and the disadvantage of his own profeffion, make a kind of separation between policy and government, and between Arts and Sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the Grecians; Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, Ha tibi erunt artes, &c. So likewife we see that Anytus, the accufer of Socrates, laid it as an Article of charge and accusation against him, that he did, with the variety and power of his discourses and difputations, withdraw young men from due reverence to the Laws and Customs of their Country; and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious Science, which was, to make the worse matter seem the better, and to fupprefs truth by force of eloquence and speech.

But these, and the like imputations, have rather a countenance of gravity, than any ground of Juf