things that, according to the ancient Fables, The most precious things have the most pernicious Keepers ;) it was fo, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that should design to make Axioms Convertible, if he make them not withal Circular, and Non promovent, or incurring into themselves: but the Intention was excellent.

yet

The other Confiderations of Method, concerning Propofitions, are chiefly touching the utmost Propofitions, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for every Knowledge may be fitly faid, befides the Profundity, (which is the truth and fubftance of it, that makes it folid,) to have a Longitude and a Latitude; accounting the latitude towards other Sciences, and the Longitude towards Action; that is, from the greatest Generality to the most particular Precept: the one giveth Rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Province of another, which is the Rule they call Kalavrò; the other giveth Rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should defcend: which latter I find paffed over in filence, being in my Judgment the more material; for certainly there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the Inquiry. We fee remote and fuperficial Generalities do but offer Knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius's univerfal Map is to direct the way between London and York. The better fort of Rules have been not unfitly com

pared to glaffes of steel unpolished, where you may see the Images of things, but first they must be filed: fo the Rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how Crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the Inquiry whereof feemeth to me deficient.

There hath been alfo laboured and put in practice a Method, which is not a lawful Method, but a Method of Imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in fuch manner, as men may speedily come to make a shew of Learning who have it not fuch was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that Art which bears his name; not unlike to fome Books of Typocofmy, which have been made fince; being nothing but a Mass of words of all Arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the Art; which Collections are much like a Fripper's or Broker's Shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.

Now we descend to that part which concerneth the Illuftration of Tradition, comprehended in that Science which we call Rhetoric, or Art of Eloquence; a Science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is inferior to Wisdom, (as it is faid by GOD to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this Faculty, Aaron fhall be thy fpeaker, and thou shalt be to him as GOD:) yet with people it is the more mighty: fo Solomon faith, Sapiens Corde appellabitur Pru

dens, fed dulcis Eloquio Majora reperiet; fignifying, that profoundness of Wisdom will help a Man to a Name or Admiration, but that it is Eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the Emulation of Aristotle with the Rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their Works of Rhetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of Eloquence in the Orations of Demofthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the Precepts of Eloquence, hath doubled the progreffion in this Art; and therefore the Deficiences which I fhall note will rather be in fome Collections, which may as Handmaids attend the Art, than in the Rules or use of the Art itself.

Notwithstanding, to stir the Earth a little about the Roots of this Science, as we have done of the reft; the duty and Office of Rhetoric is, to apply Reafon to Imagination for the better moving of the will. For we fee Reason is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three Means; by Illaqueation or Sophifm, which pertains to Logic; by Imagination or Impreffion, which pertains to Rhetoric; and by Paffion or Affection, which pertains to Morality. And as in Negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by Importunity, and by vehemency; fo in this Negotiation within ourfelves, men are undermined by Inconsequences, folicited and importuned by Impressions or Obfervations, and transported by Paffions. Neither is the Nature of Man fo unfortunately built, as that those

Powers and Arts should have force to disturb Reafon, and not to establish and advance it: for the end of Logic is, to teach a form of Argument to fecure Reason and not to entrap it; the end of Morality is to procure the Affections to obey Reason, and not to invade it; the end of Rhetoric is, to fill the Imagination to fecond Reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of Arts come in but Ex obliquo, for Caution.

And therefore it was great Injuftice in Plato, though springing out of a juft hatred of the Rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of Rhetoric but as a voluptuary Art, resembling it to Cookery, that mar wholesome Meats, and help unwholesome by variety of fauces to the pleasure of the tafte. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honeftly than he can do or think: and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad fide in Causes of eftate, therefore he was ever inveighing against Eloquence and good speech; knowing that no man can speak fair of Courses fordid and base. And therefore as Plato faid elegantly, That Virtue, if fhe could be feen, would move great love and affection; so seeing that she cannot be fhewed to the Senfe by corporal shape, the next degree is to fhew her to the Imagination in lively representation: for to fhew her to Reafon only in fubtilty of Argument, was a thing ever derided in Chryfippus and

many of the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp difputations and Conclufions, which have no Sympathy with the will of Man.

Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to Reason, it were true, there fhould be no great use of perfuafions and infinuations to the will, more than of naked propofition and proofs; but in regard of the continual Mutinies and Seditions of the Affections,

Video meliora, Proboque;
Deteriora fequor:

reafon would become Captive and fervile, if Eloquence of perfuafions did not practise and win the Imagination from the affections part, and contract a Confederacy between the Reason and Imagination against the Affections; for the Affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as Reason doth. The difference is, that the Affection beholdeth merely the prefent; Reason beholdeth the future and fum of time. And therefore the Present filling the Imagination more, Reafon is commonly vanquished; but after that force of Eloquence and perfuafion hath made things future and remote appear as prefent, then upon the revolt of the Imagination Reason prevaileth.

We conclude, therefore, that Rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than Logic with Sophistry, or Morality with Vice. For we know the Doctrines of Contraries are the fame, though the use be oppofite. It ap