Another fault incident commonly to Learned men, which may be more probably defended than truly denied, is, that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particular perfons: which want of exact application arifeth from two causes; the one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquifite obfervation or examination of the Nature and cuftoms of one perfon: for it is a speech for a Lover, and not for a wife man: Satis magnum alter alteri Theatrum fumus. Nevertheless I fhall yield, that he that cannot contract the fight of his mind, as well as difperfe and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a fecond cause, which is no inability, but a rejection upon choice and judgment; for the honest and just bounds of obfervation, by one perfon upon another, extend no farther but to understand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful Counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man's felf: but to be fpeculative into another man, to the end to know how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of Integrity, fo towards Princes or Superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, which is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon Princes, is in the outward Ceremony barbarous, but the Moral is good for men ought not by cunning and bent obfervations to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of Kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be infcrutable. There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted in learned Men, that they do many times fail to obferve decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in fmall and ordinary points of action, so as the Vulgar fort of Capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this confequence doth often deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was faid by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of his own mouth; but, being applied to the general state of this question, pertinently and justly; when, being invited to touch a Lute, he faid, He could not fiddle, but he could make a fmall Town a great state. So, no doubt, many may be well seen in the paffages of Government and Policy, which are to seek in little and punctual occafions. I refer them also to that which Plato faid of his Master Socrates, whom he compared to the Gallipots of Apothecaries, which on the outfide had Apes and Owls and Antiques, but contained within fovereign and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that to an external report he was not without fuperficial levities and deformities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And fo much touching the point of manners of learned men. But in the mean time I have no purpose to give allowance to fome conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers Profeffors of Learning have wronged themselves, and gone too far; fuch as were those Trencher Philofophers, which in the later age of the Roman State were ufually in the houfes of great Perfons, being little better than folemn Parafites; of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the Philofopher that the great Lady took to ride with her in her Coach, and would needs have him carry her little Dog, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the Page scoffed, and faid, That he doubted, the Philofopher of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic. But above all the rest, the gross and palpable flattery, whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas faith, Hecuba into Helena, and Fauftina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and eftimation of Learning. Neither is the modern dedication of Books and Writings, as to Patrons, to be commended: for that Books, such as are worthy the name of Books, ought to have no Patrons but Truth and Reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to entitle the Books with their Names: or if to Kings and great perfons, it was to fome fuch as the argument of the Book was fit and proper for: but these and the like Courses may deferve rather reprehenfion than defence. Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of Learned men to men in fortune. D For the answer was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in mockery, How it came to pass that Philofophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of Philofophers? He answered foberly, and yet sharply, Because the one fort knew what they had need of, and the other did not. And of the like nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dionyfius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet; whereupon Dionyfius ftaid, and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterward some person, tender on the behalf of Philosophy, reproved Aristippus, that he would offer the Profeffion of Philofophy fuch an indignity, as for a private Suit to fall at a Tyrant's feet: but he answered, It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionyfius, that had his ears in his feet. Neither was it accounted weakness, but difcretion in him that would not difpute his beft with Adrianus Cæfar; excufing himself, That it was reafon to yield to him that commanded thirty Legions. These and the like applications, and stooping to points of neceffity and convenience, cannot be difallowed; for though they may have some outward baseness, yet in a Judgment truly made, they are to be accounted fubmiffions to the occafion, and not to the perfon. Now I proceed to thofe errors and vanities. which have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the Learned, which is that which is principal and proper to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not to make a juftification of the errors, but, by a cenfure and separation of the errors, to make a juftification of that which is good and found, and to deliver that from the afperfion of the other. For we fee, that it is the manner of men to fcandalize and deprave that which retaineth the State and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate: as the Heathens in the Primitive Church used to blemish and taint the Chriftians with the faults and corruptions of Heretics. But nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadverfion of the errors and impediments in matters of Learning, which are more fecret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto fuch as do fall under or near unto a popular observation. There be therefore chiefly three vanities in Studies, whereby Learning hath been moft traduced. For those things we do esteem vain, which are either false or frivolous, thofe which either have no truth, or no use: and those persons we esteem vain, which are either credulous or curious; and curiofity is either in matter or words: fo that in reason, as well as in experience, there fall out to be these three distempers, as I may term them, of learn 3 ing; |