:

any man can explain it which is the cafe of. all fimple ideas and it is not at all necefJary to define more particularly what it is. however,

Confcioufness is neither a mere abftra&t name, nor a power of exciting or occafioning different modes in a foreign substance, but a real quality, truly and properly inherent in the fubject itself, the thinking fubftance.

Some ingenious perfons in the present age bave indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the immediate exercife of his omnipotence, may make matter think: notwithstanding it be impoffible that thinking, should result naturally from any compofition or divifion of the original properties of matter. I suppose they meant, that to matter difpofed in a certain manner, and put into fome particular modes of motion, omnipotence could fuperadd the power of thinking.—But that any mode of motion fhould be thinking itself; when all the matter supposed to be in that motion is acknowledged otherwife to be void of thought: this is fuch an extravagant abfurdity, as may justly caufe wonder how it should ever enter into the heart of any rational man; especially

i See Locke of human understanding, B. iv. c. iii. §. 6.

in an age, wherein philofophical knowledge bas received fo confiderable improvements.* - farther,

Unless matter were effentially confcious, that is, unless it were effentially indued with actual thinking; it might be proved from its divifibility, that no fyftem of it in any poffible compofition or divifion, could ever be an individual confcious being; that is, could ever either actually think, or attain a capacity of thinking. Befides,

Defects, difcompofures of the brain &c. do not prove that the foul itself is a bodily organ; but only that it acts upon, or is acted upon by, bodily organs; and is affifted by them, as inftruments in its operations. Experience fhews us, that the fight is bettered by good telefcopes, and the bearing by inftruments of conveying founds; but not that those inftruments therefore bear or fee: that all fenfation is bettered by good organs of sense; but not that the organs themselves are fenfible : that imagination and memory depend on the brain; but not that the brain imagines or remembers. The organs of the fenfes are entirely

2

P. 170. 171. comp. Coward's fearch after fouls, Vol. ii, Obfervations on Nicholls. p. 48.

P. 174.

entirely diftinct from one another; but the thing which perceives by thofe different organs, is one and the fame thing; one thinking being, which every man calls himfelf-All its -powers, are the powers of the whole, and all its actions, are the actions of the whole.-And if this one fubftance has no parts that can act separately, it may as well be conceived to have none that can exift feparately; and fo to be abfolutely indivifible. Moreover,

If my prefent consciousness, be nothing but a mode of motion in the fleeting particles of my brain and Spirits; this confciousness will be as utterly destroyed at the diffolution of my body, as if the very fubftance of my body was annihilated: and it would be just as poffible for the fame individual person to be created again, after an abfolute annihilation, as to be restored again after fuch a diffolution.

a P. 175, 176.

P. 195, 196.

e*

Dr.

* I will not with-hold from the eye of my reader, a reply, which Dr. Coward makes to Dr. Sherlock's quere, viz. How that which is immaterial, can either be produced out of matter; or be lodged in matter as its subject? Thought, notions,

and ideas, fais he, are produced in the head, by the motion of material spirits amongst the Cephaline organs, feilfully framed by God, and fitted for that very purpose of producing thoughts and ideas in the perfons or heads of men.

B 2

But

* Search after Souls, V. II. p. 21. of Observations on Sherlock's difcourfes.

Dr. Clarke's obfervations do ferve to fhew, that consciousness is the principle in man, which

But what fais the ingenious Mr. PRICE? Our ideas of morality have not the fame original with thofe of fenfible qualities.a -Right and wrong are in the objects themselves: and not only certain effects in us, which might have varied, if the Author of nature had fo pleased. Right and wrong are real qualities of action, which do not depend on the particular frame and structure of our bodies. What we have a power of difinaly perceiving, which power, is, the understanding.i

Senfation and reflexion not the only fources of ideas. The intuition of the mind, the faculty that difcerns truth, is a spring of new fimple ideas.

And he farther fhews, that inftinct is a more imperfect means than experience of supplying defects of knowledge, and that sçepticifm builds on the fource of dependence on inflinct."

What then are the ideas we can form of Dr. Coward's reply? Thoughts, notions produced in the head, by the motion of material Spirits among the Cephaline organs. The motion of material fpirits producing ideas and thoughts, is inconceivable. Far more easy to imagine, thoughts, notions, ideas may occafion different motion of material spirits: they are a more adequate caufe to fuch mechanical effect of material motion; than material motion can be to the effect of intellectual operations.

The utmost discovery which the Doctor has made concerning his material foul, perhaps we have in his obfervations on Dr. Nicholls; where having mentioned fpirits fo fubtle as to pass through one's hand, a board, a plank, nay penetrate marble, and enter into the moft firmly laminated and hard

a Review of principal queftions, p. 12. • P. 18.

i P. 14, 17.

bodies

e P. 13.

u See p. 41.

which distinguishes his perfonality or individuation, fecures his fameness or identity, and gives his ability of fruition.- Or, as this has to do with confiftency and unity of aim and intention; and has been illuminated by TRUTH, supplied and supported by the exercises of reafon, fo the principle has ferenity and fatisfaction in all its operations. On the reverse, confciousness in man not

bodies of brafs and iron; he thinks, the spirits of blood may have greater fubtilty: and then adds, That there is no more difficulty in producing intellect, by material means, into a fubject capable of it, than there is in producing life into, and in, fuch matter as has a capacity for receiving of it.a

But what does this, either illuftrate, or prove? if he defigns it as an illuftration, then he must intend, we should have diftinct ideas of life and intellect and yet, this will not agree with his definitions; as we shall anon be informed. But if they are both one and the fame thing, the reafoning is but nugatory and trifling. Nay, he immediately confeffes, that no man has any notion of the communication of life. There was never any man that did, nor is there like to be any mere man that can, give or act life to, or in, any created being whatsoever. Which is an explicite acknowledgment of an abfolute ignorance of any data which will prove, that intellect is at all capable of being produced by any material means. And fo far leaves us quite as much uninformed, aș if he had made no ufe at all of this illuftration. However, we have an opportunity of comparing this opinion of Dr. Coward's, with the above obfervations of Dr. Clarke,

2 Search after &c. Vol. II. p. 42. of observations.