CHAPTER XV.

AFTER THE SIEGE.

THE old capital of New France was brought immediately under British rule by the capitulation of Quebec on the 18th of September, 1759, which was signalised by the ceremonies described in the concluding part of the last chapter, when the Bourbon lilies were lowered to make way for the meteor flag of England. The account of the Siege of Quebec would be incomplete without a glance at the conditions produced by the ascendancy of the new flag. So also it might be premature to proceed to a description of Quebec under British rule, without a brief review of those remarkable tactics of the 13th September, 1759, which compelled the change of allegiance.

The attempts which have been made to rob the victorious British General of the honour due him for the triumph of his country's arms, both upon the Plains of Abraham and in the fall of Quebec, are simply so many illustrations of the fact that no talents, however exalted, and no successes, however great, can expect to escape the shafts of malice and envy. There have been efforts to claim for others the credit due to Wolfe alone for the plans of the British victory of the 13th of September, while some have attempted

to show that faulty and illadvised tactics on the part of his gallant rival were responsible for the French defeat, rather than any special mark of genius on the part of Wolfe himself. The ungenerous treatment of the British Commander by those who would steal his laurels for another is only exceeded by the utter lack of generosity and fair play accorded to Montcalm's memory by many of those in whose cause he yielded up his life. The idea of genius, whether on the part of Wolfe or of any of his brigadiers, having had anything to do with the victory, is seriously scouted by others, who gravely declare that "if" anyone of ten or twelve different occurrences had never happened, Wolfe's victory would have been turned into a defeat and his reputation as a General completely ruined. Such futile attempts to rob the hero of Quebec of his great military repute are simply puerile, and in order to complete the reductio ad absurdum, it only remains for those advancing such claims to maintain the position. that if Wolfe had never visited Canada at all, the French army would not have been defeated by him upon the Plains of Abraham.

A reference to a letter written by the British General to his uncle on the 9th of May, 1759, furnishes undoubted proof that the plan of attack by which Quebec fell into the possession of his army, was altogether his own, since he announced it more than four months previous to putting it into execution. In this letter, which contains a description of Quebec, these remarkable words occur,—“ I reckon we shall have a smart action at the passage of the River St. Charles, unless we can steal a detachment up the

River St. Lawrence and land them, three, four or five miles or more above the town and get time to entrench so strongly that they won't care to attack."

Wolfe, it will thus be seen, had a definite plan in view from the commencement of the campaign, from which he did not deviate in spite of the many offers of advice. To him the profession of arms was a serious one, and in his letters he often expressed regret that the regulations of the service did not permit the young officer to obtain a more ample knowledge of the art of war. In his own case he made up for this deficiency by making as deep a study as possible of the nature of the country which was about to become the scene of his operations. It was thus that he was enabled, a month before the fleet and army appeared before Quebec, to indicate, not only the exact method by which Quebec was eventually taken, but also the place where his daring plan was carried into effect on the morning of the 13th of September. He expected to be able to land at Montmorency and force his way into the town by the River St. Charles. His operations at Montmorency were unsuccessful, and it was only his ill health that prevented him from earlier carrying out his second plan, which he considered too dangerous to entrust to others. (1)

Again, on the 18th of July, Wolfe reconnoitred the north shore above the town from the opposite side of the river, and seemed to think a landing possible. Major Dalling

(1) My ill state of health hinders me from executing my own plan ; it is of too desparate a nature to order others to execute."-From letter of August 30th, 1759, addressed by General Wolfe to Admiral Saunders.

went up three miles that afternoon in order to took for the most convenient places on the north shore for the ascent of the troops. (1)

The efforts to take from Wolfe the credit of the original plan of his great achievement was thought, no doubt, to be facilitated by his official secretivness regarding it. This reticence was one of the most remarkable features of his tactics and was, in fact, essential to their success. Those who have striven to rob him of the honour which is his due have attributed to mere luck the circumstance that his scheme of drifting down the river in boats and landing at the Foulon was not known to the deserters who left his army for the French camp on the day before the battle. There was no luck about the affair at all. Wolfe's success was altogether due to his own carefully considered precautions. But for his admirable discretion in keeping all the details of his plan to himself until the very last moment, his project might have been revealed to the enemy and disastrously foiled. Even his brigadiers were in ignorance of the place of attack and landing until a few hours before the attempt was made, and never seem to have understood the appearance of instability and irresolution which Wolfe's studied reticence constantly gave to his tactics. On October 5th we find General Murray dwelling upon this feature of his Commanding Officer's policy in a letter to General Townshend. (2) If the successful plan had been that of either of the brigadiers instead of being that

(1) Vol. V, page 172.

(2) Vol. V,, page 206,