improved navigation by facilitating the means of difcovering the longitude at fea, but has likewife provided, in the last feflion of parliament, for the adequate encouragement of all thofe, who fhall be found to have made any ufeful attempts towards that important purpofe.

Having thus examined the prefent general complexion of Europe, and the particular afpect towards each other of the feveral great political bodies that compofe it, we fhall next proceed to take a furvey of the ftate of British affairs in the Eaft Indies, being the only foreign affairs of any European power worth our notice, at leaft by what we know of them, with fufficient certainty to ground a narrative upon. It might be expected, that we should begin with a relation of the parliamentary pro

ceedings here in England, and the commotions in our North-American fettlements, to which they have given rife, as matters of far greater importance. But it is for this very reafon we choose to speak laft of them, as, by fo doing, we fhall be better able to connect them properly together, and do them all the juftice their importance deferve.-Befides, it will be only adjufting the order of our narrative to the order of time, moft of the EaftIndia tranfactions, we have to relate, having happened before there appeared any fettled refractoriness in our North-American colonies to comply with the injunctions of the mother-country; and being previous even to any proceedings in the mother-country to give the leaft colour to fuch refractorinets in her colonies.

A

GAINST European invaders the cause of one Afiatic prince is the caufe of all; and could they be blind enough not to fee this of themfelves, there never, furely, exifted a man better able to convince them of it, than the late Nabob of Bengal, Mir Coffim Aly Cawn. The driving of him, therefore, into the territories of a neighbouring nabob

was rather removing the fire, than extinguishing it. Indeed, the fate alone of fo intelligent and enterprifing a man was enough to fill all the princes of that vaft country with the jufteft apprehenfions for their own fafety and independence.

Defperate, therefore, as the condition of Mir Coflim's affairs might appear to be by the accounts, with which we concluded our laft vo

lume,

lame, we were very far from thinking that of the company's fo permanently happy, as not to promife very foon, and even without the creation of any new nabob, fome fresh matter to this part of our work. As long as any part of Mir Cofim's army remained on foot, it was impoffible the English forces thould enjoy any refpite; at the fame time that, in purfuing these remains through to extenâve a country, they were liable to lose more men, than they could be fuppofed to do by the fword of a much more numerous Indian enemy in a pitched battle.

Upon thefe principles, we muft allow, that Sujah Doula acted a very wife part in not admitting into his country the remains of Mir Coflim's army, as long as it could be kept together, or even in finall parties in the territories of Bengal, or any other territor es than his own. Indeed, it was doing right, at any rate, to keep himself quiet for fome time, by almost any means, befides that of giving up his friend, fince time alone might be expected to bring about many more events to the prejudice of the English, than that of the Indian affairs.

Accordingly, we do not find that Sujah Doula took any part against the English, except that, if it can be called fo, of giving fhelter to Mir Coffim, and to Somers, who fo barbarously murdered that Nabob's prisoners at Patna, and his afterwards refusing to give them up. For, as to his drawing an army into the field, which we are likewife informed he did, it was probably within his own territories, and juftified, befides, by the near

approach of the English to them He is reprefented to us, however, as fuing for a renewal of peace, which the company's fervants in India might, perhaps, confider as broken by thefe meatures.

But, on whatever principle Mir Coflim's allies might think proper to keep themfelves quiet, it was not long before time brought about an event fufficient to tempt them to action. This was the fudden death of Major Adams, whofe name alone might be confidered as the palladium of the company's military affairs in that part of the world. Accordingly, the fame fhip, which brought to England an account of that unexpected event, brought likewife that of Mir Coffim's not only being in the field at the head of a body of Indoftans, but of his having actually cut off a fmall party of our men, and his fending their heads, by way of triumph, to king Shah Zada, and the nabob Sujah Dowla. The time was now come, when thefe princes thought they might as openly ef poufe Mir Coflim's caufe, as the latter heretofore had protected his perfon; and for that purpose they immediately drew into the field an army of fifty thousand men, with a train of artillery, fuch as might be fuppofed to follow an European army of equal numbers.

But Major Adams, moft fortunately for the Company's affairs, was fucceeded by another officer, who, as far as the accounts we have of him reach, feems to have acted with all that spirit and ability, which his predeceffor in command poffeffed in fo eminent a degree.

This officer was Major Fedor
Monro,

Monro, of the king's forces. He no fooner heard of the enemy's troops being gathered together, than he immediately marched up to them. His forces did not amount to more than nine thousand men in the whole, of which not one seventh part were Europeans. The number of the enemy was extremely great; but they were Indian troops, fuch as the most confummate military abilities are requifite to render formidable in any proportion to their numbers, and fuch abilities were not to be feared in Mir Coffim himfelf, and fill lefs in his friends or their generals. It is very ftrange, however, that having fo often experienced the ill confequence of meeting the Englih in pitched battle, and fo lately the advantage of attacking them by furprize and in fmall parties, he did not prevail on his allies carefully to avoid the former kind of warfare, and abide entirely by the latter.

Major Monro came up with the Indian army at a place 22d Oa. called Buxard, on the 1764 river Camnatlary, about one hundred miles above Patna, and found them, as had been for fome time paft ufual with them, encamped with all the advantages nature and art could bestow. Before them lay a morafs judiciously lined with cannon, that, whichever way the Engglifh fhould move, either forward to pafs the morafs, or fideways to double it, could not but greatly gall them in their approach; and the troops themfelves extended fo far, as greatly to outflank any line of battle, into which it was poffible for the major to form his few forces. Befides, at one end of

this morafs, there ftood a small wood, from which the Indians, sheltered by the trees, might fire with great advantage on their naked enemies; and they, accordingly, took care to occupy it with a fufficient body. This was probably the only end by which the Indians apprehended any danger of the morafs being doubled; it was, at leaft, on this end only we find that any attempt was made to come at them. The morafs, it is to be prefumed, extended too far the other way to require any additional affiftance.

The first appearance of fuch a fituation was alone fufficient to make major Monro defer an attack, till it could be properly explored. He, therefore, on the day of his arrival in fight of the enemy, encamped himself, but near enough to them to be but juft out of the reach of their cannon; contenting himself with making the proper difpofitions for readily forming his line of battle in cafe of any fudden emergency.

This precaution was far from being fuperfluous; for going out the next morning by day-break to reconnoitre the enemy, in order to attack them the day following, he found them already under arms. Upon this, returning to his camp, he called in all his advanced pcfts and grand guards; ordered the drums to beat to arms; and, in lefs than twenty minutes after, was, in confequence of the wife difpolitions made the day before, fortunate enough to fee his line of battle completely formed.

The Indians began to cannonade the English at nine o'clock in the morning;

morning; and, half an hour after, the action. became general. The morafs in the front of our troops prevented their moving forward for fome time, by which means the great number of the enemy's canno, which were as well levelled as judicioutly difpofed, galled them very much. This obliged major Monro to order a battalion of feapoys, with one gun, from the right of the first line, to move forward to filence one of the Indian batteries, which played upon his flank; and foon after t: detach to its fupport another battalion from the fecond line. Thefe battalions having bad the defired fuccefs, the major ordered both the lines to face to the right, and keep marching, in order to clear the left wing of the morals; and when that was done, to face to their former front, the right wing wheeling up to the left, in order to clear the fmall wood that was upon their right. Then the first line moved forward, keep ing a very britk cannonade. While this was doing major Monro fent orders to major Pemble, who commanded the second line, to face it to the right about, and follow the firft. But that officer faw the propriety of that movement fo foon, that he began to put it in execution, before he received major Monro's orders. Immediately after both lines pushed forward with fo much ardour and refolution, at which time the fmall arms began, that the enemy foon after began to give way, and a little before twelve their whole army was put to flight, leaving foco men on the fpot, with 130 pieces of cannon, a proportionable quantity of military ftores, and all their tents ready pitched,

at the comparatively small expence to the victors of 32 Europeans, and 239 Indians kil ed, and 57 Furopeans and 473 Indians wounded.

Nothing now remained in the enemy's poffeffion at this fide of the river but a fingle fort, called Chanda Geer; but, then, it was a place exceedingly trong by its fituation; and, as it appeared afterwards, ftill ftronger by the courage and fidelity of the Indian officer who commanded in it. This fort ftood on the top of a high and fteep hill, or rather rock, fituated on the very banks of the Ganges, one hundred and fifty miles above Patna, by which, in all probability, it might have been kept conftantly fupplied with provifions: and as to military fores, it could, on account of the height and fteepness of the hill on which it food, want none, as long as any ftones remained to pour down upon the affailants.

The only probable method of reducing fuch a place feemed to be that of undermining it, and blowing it up from the foundations along with the garrifon; or pouring into it fuch thowers of ftones and bombs as might render it untenable. Thefe, at leaft, would have been the methods taken with it in Europe. But major Monro, whether he wanted the neceffary ftores for operations of this kind, or men proper to conduct them, or both; or whether he did not dream himself, or thought the Indians would never dream, of those cheap and ready weapons of defence, of which their hill was compofed; or, in fhort, fuppofed that they might be furprifed in the

night,

night, when, as in a time of perfect truce, it is ufual with them, or was, at leaft, till the Europeans taught them better, to fleep in the greateft fecurity in the neighbourhood of an enemy †, he ordered the walls of it to be battered; and, as foon as a practicable breach was made, the governor fhewing no figns of any intention to furrender, fent a party to ftorm it in the nighttime.

If the English thought to furprife the Indians, they must have been themfelyes terribly furprifed. For they found them not only awake, but prepared to receive them. Fracticable as the breach might be in ittelf, the afcent to it, difficult enough without any additional obftacie, was rendered ab folutely impracticable, by the torrents of flones which the Indians fent down with hands and feet, while the English had both employed merely in endeavouring to get at them; thus buying the wretched affailants under the rubbifh made by then own cannon. Such, however, was the spirit that prevailed in our troops, or rather fuch the fenfe of thame exited by this repulfe, that they renewed the attack the next night, but with no better fuccefs.

In these attempts we had many private men killed, and a great many officers wounded; more, perhaps, on the whole, than the gaining a pitched battle would have coft us. The major, therefore, finding that this was a place which no art was requifite to defend, though a great deal to take it, if

at all expugnable; and that, confequently, it must be as ftrong in the hands of undifciplined Indians, as it could be in thofe of the best European veterans, thought proper to withdraw the forces he had fent against it, and referve them for fome fervice, in which their conduct might be useful, and their courage would not be entirely thrown away.

This fervice the Nabob Sujah Doula was, in the mean time, preparing to throw in their way. For, though an army of his had been fo lately and fo completely youted, we now find him at the head of another; whether compofed of the remains of the first, of which no doubt great numbers escaped, or of fresh men, we are not told. Be that as it will, he feems this time to have acted with more caution; at length, no doubt, inftructed by the many overthrows the Indian troops had received by fighting in bodies too large for the head, which was to guide and animate them. Though not a little elated by our late ill fuccefs againft his fort, inftead of marching up to our troops, which the major had encamped under the wails of Baneres, in hopes, we may prefume, of the nabob's being foolhardy enough to take that ftep, he contented himfelf with fending parties of his flying horfe to fkirmish with our advanced posts, and kept his main body, with the artillery, at fifteen miles diftance. And by this conduct of his, he, in the end, reaped one great advantage; which

was,