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lie parade—he would always require us to say “so many present or accounted for," whether there were fifty present or 100 present. So, Mr. President, this Committee takes pleasure in saying or reporting all publications required to be published have been published by the Secretary.
Moved and seconded that the report be received and filed, and on being put before the Association by the Chair was carried.
The Secretary submitted the report of the Secretary and Treasurer and same was adopted and approved, and ordered spread of record on the minutes of the Association, which is accordingly done in the following words and figures : To The President and Members of The Bar Association of
As Secretary and Treasurer of the Association, I submit the following report for the period ending June 23rd, 1913:
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS.
Debits. Cash balance from last year ..
$ 615.18 Collections from admission fees, annual dues and other sources to date
Credits. Disbursements as per vouchers exhibited
Balance on hands ...
$ 551.76 Respectfully submitted,
CHAS. H. SMITH,
Secretary and Treasurer. We have examined the books, papers and accounts of the Secretary and Treasurer and find the same to be correctly kept. There is a balance on hand, as per his report of June 23, 1913, of $551.76.
Proper receipts have been taken for disbursements and disbursements have been made for proper accounts. Respectfully submitted. This June 26, 1913.
CHAS. N. BURCH,
Chairman of Central Council. Recess until 2 o'clock.
Mr. Acklin :—Since I have had the honor of being a member of this Association for over thirty years, it has been the custom of the Association to alternate the President between the three Grand Divisions of the State, and it has also been the custom of the Association to suggest, through the Bar of that Grand Division, the name of some one acceptable to the Association, as President. I therefore, in accordance with the precedent so long established, move you, Mr. President, that you appoint a committee of five, to suggest the name of our next President, if I can get a second to that motion.
Moved that the motion be tabled; motion seconded and by an aye and nay vote same was carried, and the Chair declared the motion tabled.
The President:-I take pleasure in introducing to you the next speaker of this meeting, a distinguished lawyer from the middle section of the State, who is the first of the speakers on this occasion to live in the State of Tennessee.
We are delighted to have with us Hon. John Bell Keeble, well known, not only as a member of this Association, but as a member of the Bar throughout the State. He needs no introduction to you. I present to you, gentlemen and ladies, Mr. Keeble.
INFLUENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL ON AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE. : By JNO BELL KEEBLE, OF NASHVILLE. I find that the subject which is upon the program is a far broader and more dignified subject than I am able to live up to in this paper.
It would be impossible, even though I possessed a much larger fund of information, and a very much stronger grasp of the development of this country's history from a constitutional standpoint, for me to give adequate expression to the influence that John Marshall has had upon the development of the constitutional character of our government.
It has been my experience, that every year I live and devote any time at all to the study of any case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, dealing with the powers of the Federal Government, I realize some new influence or power that was exerted by the great Chief Justice.
I, therefore, have confined this paper to the consideration of certain cases, with an attempt to show how these cases have influenced the history and development of the Federal Union.
The study of the life and character of John Marshall is a fascinating one. One of the greatest lessons that can be derived from it, is the refutation of the proposition that soldiers, and men who occupy positions in public life, as presidents and senators, are the only persons whose influence can be felt in years to come, and are the only persons who can render such service to their fellow citizens as to escape oblivion.
On the other hand, the labors of John Marshall, and the recognition which he is today receiving as a powerful influence upon the history of the country, is indicative of the fact that frequently, in the more silent and less observed walks of national life, is being laid the foundation for a monument that in generations to come, may tower above many monuments the foundations of which are laid in more public places and in the presence of loud and popular acclaim.
There is another striking lesson to be learned from the character of Marshall, as indicated in his decisions, which, in my judgment, places him in a position of superiority when compared with even the greatest of his contemporaries, from
the standpoint of the judging public. That one thing is this: The absence of the spectacular; the absence of any trait of the demagogue; the absence of any apparent desire to establish himself or his reputation; the absence of bitterness and envy towards those who disagreed with him, and the great tolerance and respect he had for the views of other men.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss several of the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall that have admittedly made great impressions upon the nature of government in general, and upon the nature and power of the Federal Government in particular. No other one man has made such an impression upon both of these phases of our governmental and national affairs as Marshall.
One of the earliest cases to which I shall refer, is the case of Marbury against Madison, decided in 1803. This case is of particular interest at this time, when the entire national life has been disturbed, and great interest created by the constant assaults made upon the Courts, and particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, because of the fact that repeatedly legislative enactments have been declared void, as beyond the constitutional powers of legislative bodies.
It is well known, that under the English system, Parliament is supreme; and while England is supposed to be a government with a Constitution, nevertheless the violation of any guarantee of the Magna Charter, or the bill of rights, or any other phase of recognized constitutional guaranty, must yield to the legislative will. The acts of Parliament are the law, and the remedy of those who constitutional guarantees are infringed is political. Relief must be sought by an appeal to the people, rather than by an appeal to the Courts. However, it is generally well known that the English Constitution is said to be unwritten, as distinguished from the Constitution of the United States, which is in one document proposes to grant powers and to express definite limitations upon the government itself.
It cannot be definitely stated, perhaps, that when this instrument was fashioned, or adopted, it was generally understood that there should be a system of constitutional limitations, that placed in the power of the Courts to overthrow the final expressions of the legislative body, and to abrogate the statutes of Congress, upon the ground that they infringed upon the personal rights guaranteed to citizens. Nevertheless, there is room for believing that, at least in the minds of many, this was the conception of the matter.
Two great questions were always considered in discussing this question. In the first place, here was a government over people subject to other sovereignties. A government, the powers of which depended upon an instrument granting the powers. Naturally, subsequently, as we know too well, issue arose between the States and the Federal Government. Congress, for instance, was given the exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce. When was the enactment of Congress a regulation of interstate commerce, and when was it a transgression of the rights of the States? Who was to decide such questions, and how were they to be decided ?
In the second place, the American people were thoroughly educated upon the proposition, that constitutional rights, no matter how well recognized theoretically, were practically valueless to the minority either numerically or in power.
Hamilton, in the Federalist, upon one phase of this proposition, said, in duscussing the powers of the judiciary:
"What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of State Legislatures, without some constitutional mode of observance of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind, and no man of sense will believe, that such prohibition would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State Laws, or an authority of the Federal Courts to overrule such as might be manifest contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the former, and I presume will be most agreeable to the States."