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that curse of blindness which, since the frightful schism in religion, was impending over mankind,-of all that blood of brethren which, in the course of a century and a half, was yet to be shed in France and Spain, in the Low Countries, in England and Germany, upon the battle-field and upon the scaffold.

During the few years that immediately preceded the breaking out of the war, Charles laboured with indescribable and quite inexhaustible patience at the work of peace and concord. He was supported by several scholars of both parties, who were the most respected for their learning, their moral dignity, and their spirit of equity. But he laboured in vain. The hostile leagues of the Catholic and the Protestant princes grew more and more violent in their opposition. Actions were daily multiplied, which, irrespective of religion and the church, no emperor could tolerate, who would be emperor in more than the name. On no occasion did Charles display so much the full force of his character and military talent as in this Smalcald war. At the opening of the campaign, his situation appeared utterly desperate; but while his confidence, we may even say his cheerfulness, rose with the danger itself,-while he knew how, by his personal qualities, by his kindness, and affable familiarity, to inspire his soldiers with a confidence that enabled them to achieve impossibilities,—an indescribable blindness and confusion, on the other hand, seem to have overpowered the leaders of the Smalcald league. As the leader of his party, the Landgrave had often given proofs of his courage and prudence; but now, on the decisive day of danger, he too deceived the confidence that all had placed in him. After the battle of Mühlberg, where Charles unexpectedly triumphed over the greatest danger that ever menaced him, it was the expression of his inmost feeling, when, alluding to Cæsar's celebrated phrase, he wrote, "I came, I saw, and God conquered." Incredible was the impression produced both in and out of Germany by this sudden, unexpected turn of things. Germany, everything, as though smitten by a supernatural terror, submitted to him without terms or conditions. To the rest of Europe he appeared a great hero, who, extricating himself from a most perilous situation, had achieved in the space of a few months, and without any resources but what

In

his invincible courage gave him, a complete military and moral conquest of Germany, at that period still deemed the first and most powerful of all countries. Every name of honour was heaped upon him, and he was paralleled with Cæsar and Alexander.

An embassy from the czar of Muscovy, and another from the khan of Tartary (the shah of Persia had before sent an embassy to congratulate him on his accession to the throne), served the more to exalt him in the eyes of the multitude as the first monarch of Europe.

In the first moment of victory he could have acted and ruled in Germany according to his pleasure; for the attachment to him was great, and great was the number of his faithful friends and servants, while such as had been his foes were smitten with terror. It was the right moment radically to change the Germanic constitution, if such had been his wish. He might have done so, too, without violation of right; for, which of the belligerent princes had not themselves, in one way or another, violated the constitution? He was entitled to consider all the ancient relations terminated, and a totally new state of things introduced, since the belligerent princes had even ceased to recognise him as emperor, and had styled him simply Charles of Ghent. But of success and victory he made no other use than to forward more effectually the work of religious peace, at which he had so long and so zealously laboured, but without a prosperous result. And with how much conscientiousness did he do this! He failed because he was so far exalted above his contemporaries, because these participated so little in his mild and magnanimous sentiments, because in his sense of justice he stood single and alone in his age; but can this be made a subject of reproach? By cautious forbearance he was able to hinder the conflict from assuming precisely the name and character of a religious war. Neither was it one in reality; not merely because a Protestant prince sided with Charles, while some Protestant as well as Catholic ones remained neutral; but because the very method of waging hostilities (a method indeed which in succeeding times was by no means imitated) proved that it was not a religious war. Everything good and great, even if it apparently fails, produces its unfailing and indestructible effects. Thus while in France and Eng

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land blood was flowing in torrents, in Germany, even after the attempted reunion had proved impossible, a religious peace, at least between the Catholic and Protestant parties, was still possible, and even subsisted for half a century. But to whom was Germany indebted for this blessing but to the emperor Charles, who made such unwearied efforts to bring about a religious pacification? These attempts had the effect not only of softening the sentiments of a few of the better disposed, but also of developing the conditions of a religious peace, and of an order of things so new to the world. The ultimate rupture of the peace at the close of half a century, and the breaking out of a most tremendous war, cannot be .adduced as derogating from this benefit; for if the spirit of Charles had been more responded to, if he had but awakened similar sentiments to his own in Germany, never would a thirty years' war have been enkindled. Here, however, he also committed one great political error. Being once more in a position where decided measures alone, where one of two opposite courses alone absolute severity or unconditional clemency-could effectually accomplish his object, he selected a middle path, bounded on either hand by jus tice and mercy. This remark is applicable to his conduct towards all the belligerent princes, but chiefly towards the elector John Frederick of Saxony. Alba conjured him, if he would not grant Saxony to his brother as a fief, lest he should draw down upon himself the charge of thirsting after conquest, at least to partition it, to erect its cities into free cities of the empire, and to divide its different provinces among the different petty princes. If he would not even do this, he entreated him to restore the whole province intact to the elector John Frederick, who might perhaps be entirely gained over by such magnanimity, but in no case to confer it upon Maurice. The faithful Ferdinand, too, was against Maurice; but it was all in vain, Charles had given his word; he fulfilled it, and was fearfully deceived.

The elector John Frederick gained, during his captivity, the respect, nay, the friendship of Charles. The latter was at first more irritated against him than against any, because he opposed the most unbending resistance of all to his attempts at church reunion. Even during his captivity, John Frederick, after ceding many considerable territories for himself

and his heirs, refused to subscribe Charles's formula of reunion, the Interim, because he considered it contrary to his religion and his conscience. The Landgrave, on the contrary, could he have obtained his liberty on that condition, showed a readiness to comply. This very constancy of John Frederick was a result and a proof, if not of a comprehensive understanding, at least of an honest heart. Charles's interest, too, for the conscientious prince may have, perhaps, increased, the more he felt himself deceived in Maurice, his favourite up to this period.

When this prince, who was also a general of his, turned against him, surprised and forced him to fly, Charles at last perceived that his object, namely, the avoidance of a schism in the church, was impracticable. From this moment he abandoned to his brother Ferdinand the task of concluding a treaty, adapted to the actual posture of affairs, as well as to the state of ecclesiastical schism, henceforth unavoidable, and also committed to his care all the affairs of Germany. We should err in supposing that, because he had no means of resistance on the first moment of surprise, he was, therefore, altogether without resources. In a few months, through the active cooperation of his sister Maria, he stood at the head of an army more than fifty thousand strong. That it would not have been difficult for him to draw even Protestant princes over to his side, we see by the example of one of the most enterprising among them, the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg, who entered into his service. Charles always found still very great support in Germany. Had he but chosen to employ that powerful army in Germany to avenge himself upon Maurice, and to reinstate the elector John Frederick, he would still have easily gained the upper hand. Had he but yielded in respect to religion, all Germany would even then have rallied round him. But this was precisely what he could not, and would not, do. When he saw that the desired reunion, on which he had wasted so many years of labour, was, in the prevaling temper of minds, utterly impracticable, he lost all interest in Germany; and from that period we perceive in him a decided repugnance and indifference towards all German affairs.

In retaining the two princes, John Frederick and the Landgrave, in captivity, Charles had no other object in view than

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for a season to deprive of influence, the two individuals, whereof the one by his inflexible obstinacy, the other by his restless activity, stood most in the way of the much-desired ecclesiastical reunion, until such reunion had become in itself sufficiently consolidated. With regard to the Landgrave, Charles was so far from miscalculating in this matter, that that prince, even during his captivity, offered to accept the Interim; and after recovering his freedom, did not even appear to be the same man, but had lost his characteristic energy and courage, and all his former authority. Many unjust censures have been cast on Charles for retaining the Landgrave in captivity, which are now proved to be utterly unfounded. The emperor was wholly free from blame in the matter; the fault lay with the negotiators, who had promised to the Landgrave more than the former knew and approved of. In regard to his policy, however, his conduct may, perhaps, deserve censure in this as in several other cases, because, in a period of violent revolution and universal contest, he did not always adopt the most decisive course, but had only too often recourse to moderate and halfmeasures. Yet, on the whole, the reunion Charles attempted failed, not on account of a few erroneous measures, but because the division, the ferment, and the exasperation of minds was too universal.

Maurice had set himself up to be the protector of German freedom; but the voice of the people was not with him. Neither was it well possible that it should be, as duplicity is never forgiven by the public. In the very same sense as Maurice, the king of France called himself the guardian of German freedom, while he was seizing some cities of the empire, which Maurice, in a treaty of alliance, just as if the empire were already his, had dared to give up to him. To resist this encroachment Charles led his army, taking up arms for the last time in defence of the honour and inviolability of the empire, as well as the security of his beloved Netherlands. Here, also, he was unsuccessful, being unable to recover Metz. In his retreat, however, he survived the great victory of St. Quentin, in the reign of his successor, which on the quarter towards France seemed to guarantee complete security, and even something more.

Charles now realized the wish he had long cherished, of