a self-insurer. The court held that a contract previously entered into and continuously maintained was no bar to legislation, and could have no right of existence contrary to a new law; also that the right to withdraw approval of a self-insurer was properly provided for by the law, and that a duty to do so devolved upon the commission as a result of the amendment. Such amendment being within the power of the legislature, and in line with "the purpose and intent of the constitution and the law to create and maintain one insurance fund, to be administered by the State," no injunction would issue (Thornton v. Duffy, 124 N. E. 54). This apparently ends the conflict arising from the effort to establish exclusive State insurance in Ohio.

Other States offer a variety of options, even specifically saying, as in Michigan, that the purpose is to make a comparative test as to the value and desirability of the different forms. Where a State fund is provided, and subscription thereto is made the essential condition of conduct of an industry, questions of alternative rights are of course foreclosed. This is the case with the Washington statute, and the Supreme Court of the United States in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington (243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260) considered the form of a general but graduated tax upon industry as being a proper method of securing the efficient working of the law. The act forbids the employer to deduct any part of the insurance premium payable by him to the State fund from the wages or earnings of his workmen. As to this, the court saw a possible serious question as to the unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract if the provisions "were to be construed so broadly as to prohibit employers and employees, in agreeing upon wages and other terms of employment, from taking into consideration the fact that the employer was a contributor to the State fund, and the resulting effect of the act upon. the rights of the parties." Inasmuch, however, as there was no intimation that the clause had been so construed, the court declined to "assume in advance that a construction will be adopted such as to bring the law into conflict with the Federal Constitution."

Options are given under the New York law, the employer being permitted to insure in a State-administered fund, or in an authorized corporation or association, or to maintain self-insurance, 30called, by furnishing satisfactory proof to the State commission of his financial ability to make such payments as might be anticipated in the conduct of his business. In the last-named case the commission may, in its discretion, require the employer to deposit securities of a kind prescribed by the statute, in an amount to be determined by the commission. Assuming that the method of self-insurance would be open to all employers on reasonable terms, it was held that the other modes of insurance might constitutionally be prescribed as optional alternatives, the rights of the employers not being thus in

terfered with; while, assuming that the State commission would be diligent in requiring the employer either to furnish satisfactory proof of his ability, or to write insurance in suitable companies, the employee could not be regarded as injuriously affected in a constitutional sense by the granting of options to the employer (New York Central Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247).

The industrial commission of Utah (as in several other jurisdictions) is authorized to fix the premium rates for companies writing compensation insurance. The power of the legislature to pass such a law was denied by an employer, who claimed that the act was unconstitutional in this respect: that the legislature could not delegate the rate-fixing powers to a commission; and that in any case there was no power under the act to fix rates for private companies. The supreme court of the State overruled all these contentions, relying on a decision of the United States Supreme Court relative to the power of a State agency to fix fire insurance rates (German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 409, 36 Sup. Ct. 618), adding that the case is even stronger here, inasmuch as compensation insurance is affected with a public interest. Too low a rate would jeopardize safety, while too high a rate would be an imposition. A proposed participating policy was also ruled out as being a method for avoiding the rates prescribed by the commission (Scranton Leasing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 170 Pac. 976).

The same court had before it the question of the nature of the act as compulsory or elective, and whether the industrial commission could compel an employer to insure his liabilities under the act, or otherwise comply with its provisions. It was held that the act was compulsory, and that the commission was acting within its powers when it sought a mandate to compel conformity to its provisions (Industrial Commission v. Daly Mining Co., 172 Pac. 301). Suing to recover the premiums due was not the proper procedure, as contended by the company, but the commission was entitled to a mandate to compel insurance, where in its discretion it concludes that such security of the employees' right is needed.

The California commission ruled an insurance policy in effect on its delivery and during its existence, even though no premium is paid thereon. The law makes the employer and insurer jointly liable for compensation payable under any policy, and a failure of the former to pay and of the latter to collect his premium is a personal matter between the two parties and does not bar the employee's rights. Quite similar is a ruling construing the Iowa statute to the effect that under the law of that State the employer is primarily liable to the injured employee regardless of any arrangement which he may have with the insurer to carry the risk. He may protect himself by insurance, and, indeed, is required to do so; but if for any reason

the insurance company is not able to carry out its contract, the injured person or his beneficiaries still have direct recourse to the employer for the amount of compensation due.

Subject to mention either under this heading or under that of course of employment is a case (Bayer v. Bayer, 158 N. W. 109), in which an employee of a carpenter was injured while doing some work for the latter's brother in an undertaking in no way connected with the business of the injured man's employer. The employer was insured against the risks of his business, and the insurance company was joined in the defense against the enforcement of an award made by a committee of arbitration and approved by the industrial accident board of Michigan. The arbitrators had said that the only question involved was whether the employee was under the employer's control and was paid by him; but the court ruled that the policy was expressly and effectively limited to cases of employment "in the operation of and in connection with the business herein stated." The order of the board for the payment of the award was therefore vacated.

The relation of accident insurance, carried by the injured man, to insurance in the State fund, was considered in a Washington case, the supreme court of the State holding that accident insurance was a matter of private contract, and the law fixing an amount of compensation payable for industrial injury neither affected such a contract nor was affected by it (Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153).

Incidental questions relating to State funds were passed upon by the Attorney General of the United States, who held that policies issued by a State fund are exempt from the special tax levied by the war-revenue act of October 3, 1917; also that State funds are not subject to the law requiring the payment of an income tax (31 Op. A. G., 308).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF CANADA.

PROGRESS OF LEGISLATION.

Compensation legislation in Canada has an earlier origin than in the United States, due undoubtedly to the influence of Great Britain. The British act of 1897, extended in 1900, and replaced by an act of 1906 is of a type quite distinct from that adopted by any of the United States. However, it very naturally furnished a model for the earlier legislation of the Provinces which first took action of this kind. Following is a list of the Provinces having laws of this type, arranged in chronological order of the enactment of the original law:

The act of British Columbia of 1902 continued in force until 1916, and that of Alberta of 1908 was not superseded until 1918. New laws were enacted in Nova Scotia and Manitoba in 1915 and 1916, respectively.

Arbitrators and judges of courts were the recourse for the settlement of disputes under the older laws, and the very limited recoveries provided fell far short of the liberality of the law of Ontario, for instance, which Province first came into line in 1914 with a law patterned after the United States type rather than that of Great Britain. Some of the Provinces appointed commissions to investigate the workings of statutes in the States before revising existing legislation or enacting new laws. This has been influential in establishing throughout the two adjacent countries a system of legislation closely comparable in many aspects. The later laws are administered by special boards in most instances, Yukon Territory being an exception. The statute of Quebec has remained without essential revision since its enactment in 1909, and therefore does not represent the more recent compensation practices. Prince Edwards Island and Saskatchewan are as yet without any compensation legislation, the so-called compensation law of the latter Province being in fact a liability statute.

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Beginning with the year 1914, when the Province of Ontario enacted its first law, there is a notable uniformity of legislation throughout the Dominion. Except in Yukon Territory the scope of the laws is determined by the enumeration of the classes of employments to which they apply, though provision is made in most of the laws for the addition of other classes by the action of the boards. The laws are compulsory in their application, and all except Manitoba, Quebec, and Yukon maintain exclusive insurance funds for the payment of benefits, for which the Province assumes liability. All except Quebec and Yukon compensate for enumerated industrial diseases. Administrative boards are of long tenure (during good behavior until retirement for age at 75, except in British Columbia, where the term is 10 years), and have practically full and final power for the determination of cases arising under the acts. The boards are distinctively compensation boards, and not general industrial commissions, though they are given certain powers for accident prevention in British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Ontario, and of inspection of premises in the foregoing and in Alberta and New Brunswick as well.

An act of the Dominion Parliament of 1918 provides that employees of the Federal Government killed or injured in their work shall come under the compensation law of the Province in which the accident occurred.

On the following pages will be found analyses of the various laws of the same form as for the laws of the various States. The full text of the laws also appears following those of the various States.