APPRAISERS ON LEVY OF EXECU-
TION.

An officer's return of a levy of execution
upon real estate, certified with regard to
the appointment of the appraisers, who
by statute were to be three disinterested
freeholders of the town, as follows:-
"And thereupon, the creditor having
appointed A. B., and the debtor neglect-
ing and refusing to appoint or to agree on
one or more appraisers, I applied to C. D.,
a justice of the peace,
who desig-
nated E. F. and G. H., all indifferent
freeholders of said town, appraisers," &c.
Held to be a sufficient return that A. B.
was an indifferent freeholder of the town,
as well as E. F. and G. H. Donahue v.
Coleman.

APPRENTICE.

See BINDING OUT.

ASSESSMENT BY CITY.

464

2.

upon the application of the bankrupt, be
stayed to await such determination, pro-
vided there was no unreasonable delay in
endeavoring to obtain the discharge. A
creditor whose claim accrued before the
debtor went into bankruptcy brought a
suit against him on the claim two years
after the bankruptcy proceedings com-
menced, and while they were pending and
before a discharge had been obtained.
The debtor did not ask that the suit be
stayed, but only for leave to plead his dis-
charge when it should be granted. Six
months later the defendant without objec-
tion went to trial on another issue. Judg-
ment having been rendered against him
he filed a motion in error. Held-1. That
the bankrupt act did not require a stay of
the suit except upon the debtor's applica-
tion, and that his application for leave to
plead his discharge when obtained could
not be regarded as an application for a
stay of the suit. 2. That if it was to be
so regarded, yet it did not follow that it
was error to proceed with the trial six
months afterwards by consent of both
parties. 3. That as it did not appear upon
the record that the bankruptcy proceed-
ings were still pending at the time of the
trial, the court could not assume that
they were so pending, and predicate error
upon such assumption. Rood v. Stevens.
45

Whether, as at the time of the trial two
years had elapsed after the bankrupt had
a right to apply for a discharge, and the
delay was not explained by him, there
had not been unreasonable delay in the
matter: Quære.

BILL OF PARTICULARS.

1. A bill of particulars under a general
count or counts in a declaration, limits
the proof to the items named in the bill.
Zacarino v. Pallotti.
36

2. A declaration in general assumpsit con-
tained among other statements of in-
debtedness a demand upon an account
stated and one for goods sold and deliv-
ered. A bill of particulars was filed
stating only items of indebtedness for
money lent, for money paid out for goods,
and for work and labor. Held that a
demand for goods sold at an agreed price
could not be proved, either as an account
stated, as there had been no previous
account, or under the allegation as to
goods sold, as the bill of particulars con-
tained no item of that kind.
ib.

p. 193, sec. 7.) provided that the parents
and guardians of apprentices, and the
selectmen where the apprentices were
bound by them, should inquire into their
treatment by their masters, and if they
should find the latter guilty of any per-
sonal abuse or neglect, they might make
complaint to a justice of the peace, who
should cause such masters and appren-
tices to come before him, and should
reconcile them if able, and if not might
at his discretion bind both to appear
before the Superior Court, which, if it
found the master guilty, might discharge
the apprentice from his service. Held
that the proceeding authorized by this act
was a civil and not a criminal one. Fenn
v. Bancroft.
216
2. And held that the selectmen of a town
had no power to institute such proceed-
ings in cases where the apprentice had
been bound out by the parent or guardian.
ib.

3. Nor where bound out by the selectmen
of another town.

BOND, (PROBATE).

See CONSERVator, 3.

ib.

1. The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 20, ch.
13, part 5, sec. 5,) provides that a person
arraigned for any offence punishable by
imprisonment for life, may challenge per-
emptorily ten jurors, and for any offence
the punishment of which may be in the
state prison for less than life, four jurors.
Held that a crime which might in the
discretion of the court be punished by
imprisonment for life or for a term less
than life, was to be regarded as punish-
able by imprisonment for life, and that a
person arraigned for such a crime was
entitled to a peremptory challenge of ten
jurors. State v. Neuner.
232
2. Where a prisoner has failed to exhaust
his right of peremptory challenge, it is no
ground for granting him a new trial that
a challenge for cause was improperly
overruled. State v. Smith.

376

CHARGE OF JUDGE.

The statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 442, sec. 2,)
provides that the charge of the court on
questions of law shall, in certain cases,
be in writing, and after the verdict shall
be filed with the clerk. The judge
charged in such a case in writing, and
the court immediately after the rendition
of the verdict adjourned for the day.
The next morning the judge, intending
to file the charge with the clerk, was
unable to find it. Held not a sufficient
reason for granting a new trial, in the
absence of any claim in the motion that
any injury or inconvenience to the party
had resulted. Kingsley v. Johnson. 462

CITY IMPROVEMENT.

1. A statute was in force from January 1st,
1875, to June 24th of the same year, when
it was repealed, which provided that when
any owner of land adjoining a highway
should sustain damage to his property
by a change of grade by the town, city or
borough, the corporation should be liable
to pay him the amount of the damage,
the same to be ascertained in the same
manner as upon the laying out of high-
ways. Shortly before the act came into
force the common council of a city
ordered a change of grade on a street
on which the plaintiff owned property.
Before the work was commenced he peti-
tioned the council to annul the order; the
petition was referred to the road commis-
sioners, and the case opened for a re-hear-
ing before them; after a hearing the
commissioners recommended that the
order be affirmed, and it was afterwards
affirmed by the council and the work
commenced. The petition was made, the
case re-heard, and the final action of the
council had, while the statute was in
force. The plaintiff had under the city
charter a right of appeal from the order
of the council to the Superior Court, but
did not avail himself of it because of the
provision of the statute for his compensa-
tion. After the repeal, the city refusing
to take any steps for ascertaining his
damage under the statute, he brought an
action at law for damages. Held-1. That
the rights of the parties were determined
by the law as it existed when the change
of grade was undertaken or entered upon,
it being the presumption that they acted
in view of the law, respectively accepting
the privileges which it conferred and the
liabilities which it imposed. 2. That the
work was to be regarded as undertaken
when the final order of the common
council was made. 3. That the ascertain-
ment of the damages in the mode provi-

ded by the statute, was a proceeding for
the city to take advantage of if it desired,
and that, having taken no steps for the
purpose, it could not be heard to claim
that the plaintiff could recover compensa-
tion only through such a proceeding.
4. That the plaintiff could recover his
damages in an action at law. Healey v.
City of New Haven.
394
2. The plaintiff claimed that the city offi-
cials at the time when he could have
appealed from the final order, stated to
him that he was entitled to damages
under the statute and promised that they
should be paid by the city. Held that
they were not agents of the city for the
purpose of making any representations or
promises on the subject, and that the city
could not be affected by their acts in that
respect.

COMMITTEE IN CHANCERY,

ib.

3.

4.

5.

6.

the principal had been appointed con-
servator, would estop the obligors from
denying the legality of the appointment.

ib.

But where the bond given was an ordi-
nary administrator's bond, with the name
of the ward inserted in the place of that
of the intestate, but with no other altera-
tions to adapt it to the case of a conser-
vator, describing the ward as the deceased,
and stating, as the duties to be performed,
all those of an administrator, and none of
those of a conservator except so far as
they happened in part to be the same as
those of an administrator, it was held
that the bond was void as being insensible
and uncertain.

ib.

The disability of a person over whom a
conservator is appointed in this state,
- does not follow him when he removes to
another state. Gates v. Bingham. 275
A contract made by such a person in
another state, being valid and binding in
the state where made, is equally so in
this state.

ib.

And it makes no difference that the
person contracting with him in another
state knew that he had a conservator in
this state.
ib.

COMPOSITION.

347

1. Any private agreement with a debtor
under which a creditor signing a compro-
mise agreement is to have an advantage
over other creditors, is void. Baldwin v.
Rosenman.
105
2. And it does not alter the case that the
creditor endorsed the composition notes
given by the debtor to the other creditors.
ib.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See SALE, (CONDITIONAL), 3.

CONSERVATOR.

1. The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 18, ch.
4, part 1, sec. 1,) provides that courts of
probate may appoint a conservator over
the person and estate of any person inca-
pable of managing his own affairs, on the
written application of the selectmen of
the town or of any relative. Held that
such an application was necessary to give
the court jurisdiction, and that an ap-
pointment made on the application of
a private person not a relative was void.
Hayden v. Smith.

83
2. It seems however that a recital in a
bond given on such an appointment, that

1.

TRACT.

C, who owned a tract of land, agreed
with B that he would hold it for one year
subject to B's order and at any time
within the year give him a deed of it on
his paying him $17,403 with interest. In
consideration of this B agreed that if he
did not take the land and it should not be
sold by C for enough to pay that sum and
interest, he would pay C such sum as,
with what he should get for the land,
would make up the amount of $15,000 and
$2,403, with interest on the latter sum;
but that he was not to pay more than the
$2,403 and interest unless he should elect
to take the land and pay the full price.
Held that the obligation assumed by B
was not to pay the $2,403 in case he did
not take the land, but only, in case of a
sale by C, to make up to him the differ-
ence between the price for which he sold
and the full price, but not exceeding the
$2,403 and interest; and that therefore C
could not maintain a suit against him on
the contract until he had made a sale of

the property. Cowles v. Buckingham.

121

2. D, owning a large mill pond and the
land below on both sides of the stream,
and two mills which were supplied by a
canal with water which returned to the
stream below, sold a mill site to Rat a
still lower point, the deed describing the

privilege conveyed and stating a covenant
of the grantor as follows:-Which privil-
ege shall consist of the right to pond back
the water of the river to a point [describ-
ing it; with the right to use all the water
now used or which may hereafter be used
at the two privileges owned by the grantor.
And the grantor doth hereby covenant
that the grantee and his assigns shall at
all times have as much water to use as
will be required, with a properly con-
structed breast-wheel, to run six com-
plete sets of woolen machinery during
twelve hours in each working day; pro-
vided the dam of the grantee be properly
graveled and kept in repair, and provided
there be water enough in the pond to
furnish this quantity without reducing
the head at the grantor's mills. Held
that the description of the right granted
as a right to use "all the water" &c.,
was to be taken in connection with, and
was qualified by, the covenant of the
grantor, and that the grant was of only
sufficient water to run six sets of machin-
ery for twelve hours each day. Fitch v.
Belding.

CONTEMPT.

See PLEADING, 1.

CONTINUANCE.

See PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUANCE.

468

6.

1.

Upon a sale of a chattel by a lottery the
chattel came into the defendant's hands,
he claiming to hold the successful ticket.
The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of
the ticket and to strengthen his title pro-
cured a bill of sale of the chattel from
the person who had put it up for sale. In
an action of trover brought by the plain-
tiff to recover of the defendant the value
of the chattel, it was held that the law
would not aid the plaintiff to enforce a
title growing out of such a transaction,
and that his position was not aided by
the bill of sale, since the former owner
himself could not have recovered back
the property.
ib.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

The act of 1881, (Session Laws, 1881,
ch. 61,) provides that the county commis-
sioners in each county shall, upon the
recommendation of the selectmen of the
town where the business is to be carried
on, license suitable persons to sell intoxi-
cating liquors in suitable places in said
county. Held that under the act the
commissioners have a discretion to grant
or refuse licenses to persons recommended
by the selectmen. Batters v. Dunning.
479
2. And having this discretion the exercise
of their judgment in the matter can not
be controlled by a mandamus.
ib.
3. The act of 1881 provides that the county
commissioners in each county shall con-
stitute a court for the trial of causes for
the revocation of licenses granted in the
county for the sale of intoxicating liquors,
and shall have sole and final jurisdiction
of such causes; that accused persons
shall be cited to appear before them by
complaint of any informing officer, ac-
companied by a summons signed by com-
petent authority; that upon proof of
violation of the law with regard to the
sale of such liquors they may revoke the
license; and that the chairman of the
board, while it is in session, shall have
all the powers of justices of the peace
holding court to compel the attendance
and secure the testimony of witnesses.
Held that this statute does not constitute
the county commissioners a court within
the meaning of the constitution of the
state, and that it is not therefore uncon-
stitutional in not providing for a trial by
jury in the first instance or on appeal.
La Croix v. County Commissioners.
4. The county commissioners being only a
board and not a court, a writ of prohibi-
tion can not be issued against them by
the Superior Court, for such a writ lies
only against an inferior judicial tribunal.
ib.

591