APPRAISERS ON LEVY OF EXECU-

upon the application of the bankrupt, be
TION.

stayed to await such determination, pro-

vided there was no upreasonable delay in
An officer's return of a levy of execution

endeavoring to obtain the discharge. A
upon real estate, certified with regard to

creditor whose claim accrued before the
the appointment of the appraisers, who

debtor went into bankruptcy brought a
by statute were to be three disinterested

suit against him on the claim two years
freeholders of the town, as follows:-

after ihe bankruptcy proceedings com-
“ And thereupon, the creditor having

menced, and while they were pending and
appointed A. B., and the debtor neglect-

before a discharge had been obtained.
ing and refusing to appoint or to agree on The debtor did not ask that the suit be
one or more appraisers, I applied to C. D.,

stayed, but only for leave to plead his dis-
a justice of the peace,

who desig-

charge when it should be granted. Six
nated E. F. and G. H., all indifferent

months later the defendant without objec-
freeholders of said town, appraisers,”. &c.

tion went to trial on another issue. Judg.
Held to be a sufficient return that A. B.

ment having been rendered against him
was an indifferent freeholder of the town,

he filed a motion in error. Held-1. That
as well as E. F. and G. H. Donahue v.

the bankrupt act did not require a stay of
Coleman.

464

the suit except upon the debtor's applica-
APPRENTICE.

tion, and that his application for leave to

plead his discharge when obtained could
See BINDING OUT.

not be regarded as an application for a

stay of the suit. 2. That if it was to be
ASSESSMENT BY CITY.

so regarded, yet it did not follow that it

was error to proceed with the trial six
See City IMPROVEMENT, 1; RAILROAD months afterwards by consent of both
COMPANY, 11.

parties. 3. That as it did not appear upon

the record that the bankruptcy proceed-
ASSIGNEE OF CLAIM.

ings were still pending at the time of the

trial, the court could not assume that
An assignee of a claim, who has paid no they were so pending, and predicate error
consideration for it but seeks to recover

upon such assumption. Rood v. Sterens.
for the benefit of the assignor, can not
maintain a suit upon it in his own name 2. Whether, as at the time of the trial two
under the statute, Gen. Statutes, p. 417,

years had elapsed after the bankrupt had
sec. 6. Bixby v. Parsons.

483

a right to apply for a discharge, and the

delay was not explained by him, there
ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE DEBT

had not been unreasonable delay in the
BY GRANTEE.

matter: Quære.
See MORTGAGE, 2, 3.

BILL OF PARTICULARS.
ATTACHMENT. .

1. A bill of particulars under a general
See FOREIGN ATTACHMENT, 2.

count or counts in a declaration, limits

the proof to the items named in the bill.
ATTORNEY AT LAW.
Zacarino v. Pallotti.

S6

45

p. 193, sec. 7,) provided that the parents

CHARGE OF JUDGE.
and guardians of apprentices, and the
selectmen where the apprentices were The statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 442, sec. 2,)
bound by them, should inquire into their provides that the charge of the court on
treatment by their masters, and if they questions of law shall, in certain cases,
should find the latter guilty of any per- be in writing, and after the verdict shall
sonal abuse or neglect, they might make be filed with the clerk. The judge
complaint to a justice of the peace, who charged in such a case in writing, and
should cause such masters and appren- the court immediately after the rendition
tices to come before him, and should of the verdict adjourned for the day.
reconcile them if able, and if not might The next morning the judge, intending
at his discretion bind both to appear to file the charge with the clerk, was
before the Superior Court, which, if it unable to find it. Held not a sufficient
found the master guilty, might discharge reason for granting a new trial, in the
the apprentice from his service. Held absence of any claim in the motion that
that the proceeding authorized by this act any injury or inconvenience to the party
was a civil and not a criminal one. Fenn had resulted. Kingsley v. Johnson. 462
v. Bancroft.

216
2. And held that the selectmen of a town

CITY IMPROVEMENT.
had no power to institute such proceed-
ings in cases where the apprentice had 1. A statute was in force from January 1st,
been bound out by the parent or guardian. 1875, to June 24th of the same year, when

ib. it was repealed, which provided that when
3. Nor where bound out by the selectmen any owner of land adjoining a highway
of another town.

ib. should sustain damage to his property

by a change of grade by the town, city or
BOND, (PROBATE).

borough, the corporation should be liable

to pay him the amount of the damage,
See CONSERVATOR, 3.

the same to be ascertained in the same

manner as upon the laying out of high-
BOUNDARY LINE THROUGH LONG

ways. Shortly before the act came into
ISLAND SOUND.

force the common council of a city
ordered a change of grade on a street

on which the plaintiff owned property.
The object of the joint commission for the
settlement of the boundary line through

Before the work was commenced he peti-

tioned the council to annul the order; the
Long Island Sound between this state and
New York, was not to change the line,

petition was referred to the road commis-
but to determine where it was. The pre-

sioners, and the case opened for a re-hear-

ing before them; after a hearing the
sumption is that the line has always been

commissioners recommended that the
as thus determined, unless the contrary

order be affirmed, and it was afterwards
appears. Elphick v. Hoffman. 331

affirmed by the council and the work

commenced. The petition was made, the
CHALLENGE.

case re-heard, and the final action of the

council had, while the statute was in
1. The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 20, ch. force. The plaintiff bad under the city

13, part 5, sec. 5,) provides that a person charter a right of appeal from the order
arraigned for any offence punishable by of the council to the Superior Court, but
imprisonment for life, may challenge per- did not avail himself of it because of the
emptorily ten jurors, and for any offence provision of the statute for his compensa-
the punishment of which may be in the tion. After the repeal, the city refusing
state prison for less than life, four jurors. to take any steps for ascertaining his
Held that a crime which might in the damage under the statute, he brought an
discretion of the court be punished by action at law for damages. Held-1. That
imprisonment for life or for a term less the rights of the parties were determined
than life, was to be regarded as punish- by the law as it existed when the change
able by imprisonment for life, and that a of grade was undertaken or entered upon,
person arraigned for such a crime was it being the presumption that they acted
entitled to a peremptory challenge of ten in view of the law, respectively accepting
jurors. State v. Neuner.

232 the privileges which it conferred and the
2. Where a prisoner has failed to exhaust liabilities which it imposed. 2. That the

his right of peremptory challenge, it is no work was to be regarded as undertaken
ground for granting him a new trial that when the final order of the common
a challenge for cause was improperly council was made. 3. That the ascertain-
overruled. State v. Smith.

376 ment of the damages in the mode provi-

ded by the statute, was a proceeding for the principal had been appointed con-
the city to take advantage of if it desired, servator, would estop the obligors from
and that, having taken no steps for the denying the legality of the appointment.
purpose, it could not be heard to claim

ib.
that the plaintiff could recover compensa- 3. But where the bond given was an ordi-
tion only through such a proceeding. nary administrator's bond, with the name
4. That the plaintiff could recover his of the ward inserted in the place of that
damages in an action at law. Healey v. of the intestate, but with no other altera-
City of New Haven.

394

tions to adapt it to the case of a conser.
2. The plaintiff claimed that the city offi- vator, describing the ward as the deceased,

cials at the time when he could have and stating, as the duties to be performed,
appealed from the final order, stated to all those of an administrator, and none of
him that he was entitled to damages those of a conservator except so far as
under the statute and promised that they they happened in part to be the same as
should be paid by the city. Held that those of an administrator, it was held
they were not agents of the city for the that the bond was void as being insensible
purpose of making any representations or and uncertain.

ib.
promises on the subject, and that the city 4. The disability of a person over whom a
could not be affected by their acts in that conservator is appointed in this state,
respect.

ib.

does not follow him when he removes to

another state. Gates v. Bingham. 275
COMMITTEE IN CHANCERY, 5. A contract made by such a person in

another state, being valid and binding in
Where a committee has left undecided the state where made, is equally so in
certain questions of fact on which evi- this state.

ib.
dence has been received by them, it is not 6. And it makes no difference that the
the proper course for the court to hear person contracting with him in another
evidence and decide the questions, but state knew that he had a conservator in
the report should be re-committed for a this state.

ib.
further finding by the committee upon
the evidence already received. McArthur CONSTRUCTION OF DEED AND CON-
V. Morgan.

347

TRACT,
COMPOSITION.

1. C, who owned a tract of land, agreed

with B that he would hold it for one year
1. Any private agreement with a debtor
under which a creditor signing a compro-

subject to B's order and at any time
mise agreement is to have an advantage

within the year give him a deed of it on
over other creditors, is void. Buldwin v.

his paying him $17,403 with interest. In
Rosenman.

105

consideration of this B agreed that if he
2. And it does not alter the case that the

privilege conveyed and stating a covenant 6. Upon a sale of a chattel by a lottery the
of the crantor as follows:-Which privil- chattel came into the defendant's hands,
ege shall consist of the right to pond back he claiming to hold the successful ticket.
the water of the river to a point (describ- The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of
ing it;) with the right to use all the water the ticket and to strengthen his title pro-
now used or which may hereafter be used cured a bill of sale of the chattel from
at the two privileges owned by the grantor. the person who had put it up for sale. In
And the grantor doth hereby covenant an action of trover brought by the plain-
that the grantee and his assigns shall at tiff to recover of the defendant the value
all times have as much water to use ag of the chattel, it was held that the law
will be required, with a properly con- would not aid the plaintiff to enforce a
structed breast-wheel, to run six com- title growing out of such a transaction,
plete sets of woolen machinery during and that his position was not aided by
twelve hours in each working day; pro- the bill of sale, since the former owner
vided the dam of the grantee be properly himself could not have recovered back
graveled and kept in repair, and provided the property.

ib.
there be water enough in the pond to
furnish this quantity without reducing COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
the head at the grantor's mills. Held
that the description of the right granted 1. The act of 1881, (Session Laws, 1881,
as a right to use “ all the water" &c., ch. 61,) provides that the county commis-
was to be taken in connection with, and sioners in each county sball, upon the
was qualified by, the covenant of the recommendation of the selectmen of the
grantor, and that the grant was of only town where the business is to be carried
sufficient water to run six sets of machin- on, license suitable persons to sell intoxi-
ery for twelve hours each day. Fitch v. cating liquors in suitable places in said
Belding.

468 county. Held that under the act the

commissioners have a discretion to grant
CONTEMPT.

or refuse licenses to persons recommended

by the selectmen. Batters v. Dunning.
See PLEADING, 1.

479
2. And having this discretion the exercise
CONTINUANCE.

of their judgment in the matter can not

be controlled by a mandamus.
See PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUANCE. 3. The act of 1881 provides that the county

commissioners in each county shall con-
CONTRACT, (CONSTRUCTION OF). stitute a court for the trial of causes for

the revocation of licenses granted in the
See CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.

county for the sale of intoxicating liquors,

and shall have sole and final jurisdiction
CONTRACT, (UNLAWFUL).

of such causes; that accused persons

shall be cited to appear before them by
1. A penalty implies a prohibition though complaint of any informing officer, ac-

there are no prohibitory words in the companied by a summons signed by com-
statute. Funk v. Gallivan.

124 petent authority; that upon proof of
2. Every contract made for the doing of violation of the law with regard to the

anything that is prohibited by statute is sale of such liquors they may revoke the
void, though not made so in terms by the license; and that the chairman of the
statute.

ib. board, while it is in session, shall have
3. Courts will not lend their aid to enforce all the powers of justices of the peace

such contracts while executory, nor for holding court to compel the attendance
the recovery back of property where exe- and secure the testimony of witnesses.
cuted, but if both parties are in pari Held that this statute does not constitute
delicto it leaves them where it finds them. the county commissioners a court within

ib. the meaning of the constitution of the
4. In the application of this rule it is state, and that it is not therefore uncon-

necessary to give to either party the right stitutional in not providing for a trial by
to plead or prove the true nature of the jury in the first instance or on appeal.
transaction in bar to an action founded La Croix v. County Commissioners. 591
upon it.

ib. 4. The county commissioners being only a
5. It follows that possession acquired from board and not a court, a writ of prohibi-

an unlawful transaction or by an unlaw- tion can not be issued against them by
ful contract fully executed, will often the Superior Court, for such a writ lies
avail the party holding it as a sufficient only against an inferior judicial tribunal.
title.
ib.

ib.

ib.
COURT.

he intended to give bis title to M, was

decisive as to that act being a delivery of
A statute passed in 1881 provided that the the deed, and that the question whether

August term of the Superior Court in upon all the facts it had been legally
Windham County should be held in delivered was not open to this court. ib.
Windham, provided that a convenient
place for holding the court there should See CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS and Con-
be furnished without expense to the

TRACTS; DEED, (REFORMATION OF,) 2, 3;
county. Before this all the terms were

HUSBAND AND WIFE, 5; INSOLVENT
by law held at Brooklyn. Held that

DEBTOR, 1.
until a place for holding the court had

DEED, (REFORMATION OF).
been furnished at Windham, and estab-
lished by the actual holding of the court 1. Where the language of a deed fails, by
there, Brooklyn remained the proper mistake of the draftsman, to properly
place for the return of writs for the

describe the property intended to be con-
August term. Edwards v. Ide. 507

veyed, a court of equity can reform it.
Cake v. Peet.

501
DAMAGES.

2. A deed, after describing particularly

certain lands in S, proceeded as follows:
See New TRIAL, 1.

“ Also all such other lands as I own

or have any interest in in said S, refer-
DEBTOR, (IMPRISONED).

ence being had to the land and probate

records." Held that, upon proof that the
See IMPRISONED DEBTOR.

grantor agreed and intended to convey by

the deed an interest in an ore bed in s
DEED.

wholly disconnected from the lands de-

scribed, and that both parties supposed
1. A deed of land was left by a grantor at the language used sufficient for that

his death undelivered. Held that no purpose, a court of equity would so re-
effect could be given to it by proof of form the deed as to make it include that
declarations of the grantor, made while interest.

ib.
making his will, that he regarded the 3. Whether that interest would have
deed as a testamentary disposition of that passed under the deed as it was: Quære.
part of his property. Goodwin v. Keney.

563 4. And held that proof of the grantor's
2. The placing a deed on record with the declaration at the time, that he intended

intent that it should pass the title to to convey his interest in the ore bed and
the grantee constitutes a legal delivery. desired the deed to be so drawn as to con-
Moore v. Giles.

570

vey it, was admissible in support of an
3. The law presumes an acceptance by the application for a reformation of the deed.
grantee, where he is benefited by the

ib.