ing care to inform him, that when I interpret exalting in such a sense as men exalt God, in opposition to another sense of exalting to an higher place or dignity, I could not be supposed to mean, that the Father is inferior to Christ, as men are inferior to God: it must be great maliciousness to insinuate that I had any such meaning. But as inferiors may exalt superiors in the sense of extolling, or praising; so undoubtedly may equals exalt equals in the same sense of extolling or praising; and thus God the Father exalted his coequal Son.

V. Upon a remark of mine", or rather not mine, in relation to the construction of two Greek words, (eis dóavo,) this gentleman, full of himself, breaks out into "wonder, that some men of great abilities and great "learning can never be made to understand grammar P." These men that our writer so insults over, as not understanding grammar, are, we should know, such men as Beza, Grotius, Schmidius, and the top critics; who unanimously assert that is is often put for iv, and some admit it even in this very text. This gentleman is pleased to deny that one is ever put for the other. I might very justly decline entering into that dispute, because, as it happens, our learned grammarian confirms the construction he finds fault with in this text, by the very instance brought to confute it; which, if it does not show want of grammar, shows want of thought.

His words are: "If I mean to affirm that a man is in "the field, I can with equal propriety of speech say ei“ther that he is ἐν ἀγρῷ, οι εἰς ἀγρὸν, because the sense, "in this case, happens to be the same whether I say that "he is in the field, or that he is gone, or carried, into the "field." Admitting this to be so, then I hope is dóžav may as well signify in the glory, because the sense, in this case, is the same, whether Christ be said to be in the glory, or gone into the glory; that glory which he had

• Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 361.

• Phil. ii. 11. VOL. IV.

P Observations, p. 20.

F

"before the world was," and into which he reentered after his passion and ascension, which is called "entering into "his glory," Luke xxiv. 26. This is sufficient for me, in regard to the text I am concerned with.

As to this author's new rule of grammar, (which happens to do him no service,) I may leave it to the mercy of the critics; who perhaps may take it for a vain conceit in matter of criticism, as he has discovered many, both in divinity and philosophy: the same turn of mind will be apt to show itself in like instances in all. I know not whether this gentleman will be able, upon the foot of his new rule, to give a tolerable account of the use of the preposition is in such examples as here follow: eis Tòv κόλπον, John i. 18. εἰς ὃν εὐδόκησεν, Matt. xii. 18. εἰς ᾅδου, (Suppl. οἶκον,) Acts ii. 31. εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων, Acts vii. 53. εἰς τὸ γῆρας, Gen. xxi. 2. He must suppose, at least, something understood (as in his other instance, gone into, or carried into) beyond what is expressed, to make the preposition is stand with equal propriety: and so he must solve by an ellipsis what others solve by a change of prepositions. Which at last is changing one phrase for another phrase, or using one form of speech instead of another which would be clearer and more expressive. To me it seems, that the easier and better account is that which our ablest critics hitherto have given; that one preposition or particle may be, and often is, put for another which may be owing to several accidental causes among the different idioms of various languages borrowing one from another. To instance in quia, or quoniam, for quod, by a Grecism: for since it happens that őri may sometimes signify this and sometimes that, these two renderings by degrees come to be used one for the other. The like might be observed in many other cases of the same kind: but I am not willing to weary the reader with grammatical niceties, of small importance to the point in hand.

VI. To an assertion of mine, namely, that there was no impossibility, in the nature of the thing itself, that the

Father should be incarnate, (an assertion which all that have professed a coequal Trinity have ever held, and still hold,) only it is not so suitable or congruous to the first Person to have been so: to this the gentleman replies, "Do not the reader's ears tingle?" And he goes on declaiming for a whole page of repetition. This is the gentleman, who in his preface enters a caveat against making "applications to the passions of the ignorant;" as if he meant to engross the privilege entirely to himself.

VII. In the next page, (p. 29.) he seemed disposed to give some answer to an observation of mine, that by voluntary economy the exercise of powers common to many may devolve upon one chiefly, and run in his name 9. After some fruitless labouring, as we may imagine, to make some reply, out comes a scrap of Latin, from an old comedy, Quid est, si hæc contumelia non est ? which, if the reader pleases, he is to take for an answer.

VIII. From page 39th to 47th, this writer goes on declaiming about the supposed absurdity of the Father's appearing according to the ancients.

Bishop Bull', and after him, I have particularly, fully, and distinctly considered that whole matter, and have answered every thing that has been or can be brought in the way of reason or argument, against the divinity of God the Son from that topics. Yet this writer, applying only to the passions of the ignorant, and roving in generals, displays his talent for eight or nine pages together. And among other Fathers, he is weak enough to bring St. Austin in, as voucher for the absurdity of the Father's being sent, appearing, &c. For verily, if St. Austin, who undoubtedly believed there was no natural impossibility*,

Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 383.

Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 3. Breves Animadv. in Gilb. Cler. p. 1044, &c. * Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 270. Second Def. vol. iii. p. 123 to 130. * Solus Pater non legitur missus, quoniam solus non habet auctorem a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Et ideo non propter naturæ diversitatem, quæ in Trinitate nulla est, sed propter ipsam auctoritatem, solus Pater non dicitur missus. Non enim splendor, aut fervor ignem, sed ignis mittit sive splendorem, sive fervorem. August. contr. Serm. Arian, c. 4.

but only great incongruity in the thing, could yet use such a strong expression of it as absurdissime", what consequence can be drawn from the expressions of other Fathers, which scarce any of them come up to this? But St. Austin was professedly for the Father's appearing, and objects only against his being sent; which this writer seems not to know. I have remarked upon him before in relation to Tertullian in this very matter, nor need I add more *.

IX. There is a sentence in my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 158. (repeated, in sense, p. 164, 165.) which has happened to fall under the displeasure of this gentleman. My words are:

"What has supremacy of office to do with the notion "of supreme God? God is a word expressing nature and "substance: he is supreme God, or God supreme, that "has no God of a superior nature above him. Such is "Christ, even while he submits and condescends to act "ministerially." To the former part of this passage we have the following smart repartee: "What has supre"macy of office, or authority and dominion to do with "the notion of supreme man.-Is not man (in the same

way of reasoning) a word expressing nature and sub"stance? Quam ridicule !" p. 50. Now, for my part, I never heard of supreme man. Man is the word upon which the argument turns; for which reason I have thrown out supreme King, or Governor, as not pertinent. And as no supremacy of office can make one man more truly or more properly man, or man in a higher sense of the word man; so it seemeth to me that no supremacy of office can make God the Father more truly God, or God in a higher sense than is God the Son. There was no

" Pater non dicitur missus; non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat si voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam visibiliter apparere, absurdissime tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut a Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, missus diceretur. August, de Trin. lib. iv. c. 28, 32.

* See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 270. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 124, &c.

great reason for the gentleman's bursting out into merriment upon it, with his quam ridicule: but perhaps his infirmity, as usual, overcame him.

66

X. To a well known plea on our side, that God could not be God merely in the sense of dominion, having been God from everlasting, and before dominion commenced, the Observator thus speaks: "But is it in reality no cha"racter of dominion, no relative character, to have in "himself an essential power from eternity to eternity, of producing what subjects he thinks fit, and of destroy"ing what subjects he thinks fit, and of producing new "subjects of his government at pleasure? Was ever such "trifling in serious matters?" Truly, I think not, if the last part be intended for an answer to the first; as any stranger might judge, who knows not that both come from the same hand. This gentleman is so taken up with grammar, it seems, that he has forgotten the first elements of logic; which will teach him that relate and correlate always rise and fall together. Where can the relative character be, while as yet there is supposed to exist but one term of relation? It is true, God can make to himself new relations by making new creatures when he pleases: but when he had as yet, for an eternity backwards, no relation to any creature at all, none being created, I humbly conceive he was under no such relative character, nor had any dominion; consequently could not be God in the sense of dominiony. This writer therefore might have spared his ridicule for a more proper occasion, had the gaiety of his heart permitted him to think seriously of the matter. As to what he has farther upon the same question, it is no more than repetition of what I fully answered long ago. And the main of the question was before given up in the Replya: as I observed also my Second Defence b.

in

y See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 171.

* First Defence, vol. i. p. 34, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 171.