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tation, by the house, of the result of the mission, and its determination, if it should prove unavailing, to sustain the executive in any ulterior measures that might be deemed necessary.

One of the reasons assigned by Mexico for not presenting to its congress the convention providing for the settlement of claims, was the belief that the king of Prussia would decline the office of arbitrator in case of the disagreement of the commissioners. The president, in his next annual message to congress, December, 1839, considered this reason unsatisfactory; but he did not hesitate, in the most conciliatory spirit, to receive it in explanation; and he had consented to a new convention, sor which purpose Mr. Ellis had been directed to repair to Mexico; and diplomatic intercourse had been resumed. In 1842, a treaty was concluded, the ratifications to be exchanged at Washington, within three months from its date, if congress should be in session ; if not, then within one month after the commencement of the next session. The amount awarded to claimants, as stated by the president in his message in December, 1842, was $2,026,079, leaving a large amount of claims, submitted to the board too late for consideration, still to be determined The first payment, $270,000—the interest on the sum awarded-was to be made the 30th of April, 1843. The whole was to be paid in five years, quarterly, in gold and silver, in the city of Mexico.

At the last session of congress under Mr. Van Buren's administration, few acts of great importance were passed.

A new issue of treasury notes was authorized, not to exceed five millions at any one time outstanding. The sum of $75,000 was appropriated for the survey of that part of the north-eastern boundary line which separates the states of Maine and New Hampshire from the British provinces.

The most prominent characteristic of Mr. Van Buren's administration, was its consummation of what was begun by his predecessor—the separation of the government from the banks, or, as it has been termed, the “divorce of bank and state;" a policy which existed just long enough to prostrate the party which brought it into being; which expired with the elevation of the opposing party-was revived with the restoration of “the democracy;" and has since continued, through changes of administration, undisturbed; having received the general acquiescence of the popular will, if not the positive approval of the public judgment.

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CHAPTER LXI.

INAUGURATION OF GENERAL HARRISON.—HIS DEATH.—INAUGURATION OF

MR. TYLER.-EXTRA SESSION OF CONGRESS.-BANK VETOES. —DISSOLC

TION OF THE CABINET.

General HARRISON was inaugurated as president of the United States, on the 4th of March, 1841. On no similar occasion, probably, was there ever a greater concourse of people, or a more enthusiastic expression of popular feeling. The inaugural address was one of more than ordinary length. It contains a review of the leading features of our political system, points out the evils which have grown out of the administration of the government, and what he considered defects in the constitution.

General Harrison apprehended "less danger to our institutions from usurpation, by the government, of power not granted by the people, than from the accumulation, in one of the departments, of that which was assigned to others. Limited as are the powers which have been granted, still enough have been granted to constitute a despotism, if concentrated in one of the departments. This danger is greatly heightened, as it has always been observable, that men are less jealous of encroachments of one department upon another, than upon their own reserved rights.”

One of the defects of the constitution, he considered to be the eligi. bility of an individual to a reëlection as president. One mode of correction, however, was in the power of every president—the refusing to accept the office for a second term.

There was also danger to public liberty “from a misconstruction of that instrument as it regards the powers actually given.” He proceeds to apply this remark to the veto. He says: “I can not conceive that, by fair construction, any or either of its provisions would be found to constitute the president a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claimed, from the power to recommend, since, although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And although there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate decision there can be no difference. In the language of the constitution, all the legislative powers' which it grants "are vested in the congress of the United States. It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is not included in the whole.

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be said, indeed, that the constitution has given to the execu: tive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body by refusing to them his assent. So a similar power has necessarily resulted from that instrument to the judiciary; and yet the judiciary forms no part of the legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between these grants of power : the executive can put his negative upon the acts of the legislature, for other than want of conformity to the constitution, while the judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. But the decision of the judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every instanco where the veto of the executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of congress. The negative upon the acts of the legislative, by the executive authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others of a similar character, however, it appears to be highly expe

and if used only with the forbearance and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the union."

A provision so apparently repugnant to the leading democratic principle, that the majority should govern, could not, he thinks, have been intended by the framers to justify the exercise of this power in the ordinary course of legislation. He says: “It is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained, that the president, placed at the capital, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people, than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interests, duty, and affection. To assist or control congress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the president. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six presidents, and two of them were members of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to congress by either of the presidents above referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied upon that want of conformity to the constitution, or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment.”

One object of the veto power, he presumed, was to secure " a just and equitable action of the legislature upon all parts of the union.” Congress might favor particular classes of people, or local interests. " It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose situation

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and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the executive department, constituted by the constitutión. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, state, and subdivision of the union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend, the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the constitution to the executive of the United States, solely as a conservative power: to be used only, 1st, to protect the constitution from violation; 2dly, the people from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood; and, 3rdly, to prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of the minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I may observe that I consider it the right and privilege of the people to decide disputed points of the constitution, arising from the general grant of power to congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, that repeated recognitions under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, accompanied by indications in different modes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, afford to the president sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.'”

He adverts to the power of the president “as the sole distributor of all the patronage of the government. The framers of the constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a period it would become a formidable instrument to control the free operations of the state governments.” It is not difficult to perceive to whom and to what measures the following extract was intended to apply : “But it is not by the extent of its patronage, alone, that the executive department has be. come dangerous, but by the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power, to bring under its control the whole revenues of the country. The constitution has declared it to be the duty of the president to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the commanderin-chief of the armies and navy of the United States. If the opinion of the most approved writers upon that species of mixed government, which, in modern Europe, is termed monarchy, in contradistinction to despotism, is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our chief magistrate to stamp a monarchical character on our government, but the control of the public finances. And to me it appears strange indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire control which the president possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all

mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal.

“I am not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safe keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the treasury from the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the unhallowed union of the treasury with the executive department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our republican institutions, and that created by the influences given to the executive through the instrumentality of the federal officers, I pro

Ι pose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the constitution, not to have made the officer at the head of the treasury department entirely independent of the executive. He should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the legislature. I have determined never to remove a secretary of the treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both houses of congress.

Never, with my consent, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of executive will.” He also discusses the question of the currency.

The idea of making it exclusively metallic, however well intended, appears to me to be fraught with more fatal consequences than any other scheme, having no relation to the personal rights of the citizen, that has ever been devised. If any single scheme could produce the effect of arresting, at once, that mutation of condition by which thousands of our most indigent fellowcitizens, by their industry and enterprise, are raised to the possession of wealth, that is one. If there is one measure better calculated than another to produce that state of things so much deprecated by all true republicans, by which the rich are daily adding to their hoards, and the poor are sinking deeper into penury, it is an exclusive metallic currency. Or if there is a process by which the character of the country for generosity and nobleness of feeling may be destroyed by the great increase and necessary toleration of usury, it is an exclusive metallic currency."

He deprecates the agitation of the question of slavery, and thus inculcates a spirit of forbearance: “Our citizens must be content with the exercise of the powers with which the constitution clothes them. The attempt of those of one state to control the domestic institutions of another, can only result in feelings of distrust and jealousy, and are certain harbingers of disunion, violence, civil war, and the ultimate de. struction of our free institutions. Our confederacy is perfectly illus

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