A motive to this previous consultation with the senate, probably was a desire to throw upon the senate, as far as possible, the responsibility of accepting a proposition for the surrender of territory south of 54 deg. 40 min., against which he and his friends had so strongly committed themselves.

The dividing line established by the treaty was on the 49th degree of latitude, from the Stony Mountains west to the middle of the channel which separates Vancouver's island from the continent; thence southerly through the middle of the channel and of Fuca's straits to the Pacific ocean: the whole of the channel and straits south of that parallel to be free and open to both parties; also the great northern branch of the Columbia river, from that paallel to the main stream, and the said stream or river down to the ocean, were to be open to the Hudson's Bay company and to the subjects of Great Britain trading with the same The treaty was sent to England for ratification by that government, where it was ratified, and ratifications were exchanged; and was proclaimed by the president on the 5th of August, 1846.

Notwithstanding the spirit with which a large portion of the friends of the administration contended for the whole or none” of Oregon, it is believed that few, upon calm consideration, indulged regrets that Mr. Polk had yielded to what was supposed to be the prevailing sentiment of the nation at large, and had given his official sanction to the treaty. Much credit was awarded to Messrs. Webster, Calhoun, and Benton for their instrumentality in bringing about the adjustment. The emphatic announcement of Mr. Webster, that the United States would never consent to take less than the line of the 49th degree, and that upon this point men of all parties in this country were agreed, probably aided much in drawing from the British ministry the proposition for settlement. The early and vigorous opposition of Mr. Calhoun to the course of the radicals of his own party in the senate, was not without effect. Then the great speech of Mr. Benton, at that particular juncture, when both governments paused to consider what course next to pursue, removing all ground for persisting in the refusal to accept the line of the 49th degree, doubtless contributed much to induce Mr. Polk to submit the proposition to the senate. Thus, to the combined efforts of these three distinguished senators is the country indebted, in no small degree, for averting the calamity of a sanguinary war, which, there is little reason to doubt, would have been the consequence of an adherence, on the part of the executive, to his original purpose.

The reasons upon which Mr. Benton based his concession, to Great Britain, of the territory beyond the 49th degree, will be found in the following extract from a speech delivered by him in the senate, January 12 1843:

« Mr. Benton said he would not restate the American title to that country: it had been well done, by others who had preceded him in debate. We would only give a little more development to two points -the treaties of 1803 and 1819; the former with France, by which we acquired Louisiana; the latter with Spain, by which we acquired all her rights on the north-west coast of America, north of 42 degrees. By the first of these treaties, we became a party to the tenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, between France and England; the treaty of peace of 1714, which terminated the wars of Queen Anne and Louis XIV, and settled all their differences of every kind in Europe and America, and undertook to prevent the recurrence of future differences between them. The tenth article of this treaty applied to their settlements and territories in North America, and directed commissaries to be appointed to mark and define their possessions. These commissaries did their work. They drew a line from ocean to ocean, to separate the French and British dominions, and to prevent future encroachment and collisions. This line began on the coast of Labrador, and followed a course slightly south of west to the centre of North America, leaving the British settlements of Hudson Bay to the north, and the French Canadian possessions to the south. This line took for a landmark the Lake of the Woods, which was then believed to be due east from the head of the Mississippi; and from that point took the forty-ninth parallel of latitude indefinitely to the west. The language of the line is ' indefinitely;' and this established the northern boundary of Louisiana, and erected a wall beyond which future French settlements could not cross to the north, nor British to the south.

“As purchasers of Louisiana, the treaty of 1803 made us party to the tenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, and made the forty-ninth parallel the same to us and the British which it had been to the French and the British; it became a wall which neither could pass, so far as it depended upon that line.”

CHAPTER LXIX.

THE

TARIFF

ACT OF 1816.--THE WAREHOUSE SYSTEM. -ESTABLISHMENT

OF THE SUB-TREASURY.

For months before the meeting of congress in December, 1845, indications were given of an attempt against the tariff of 1842, and the protective system. The president and the secretary of the treasury, (Mr. Walker,) were both opposed to those two features of that tariff so obnoxious to anti-protectionists generally—the minimum priuciple and specific duties; and the gains known to have accrued to the anti-tariff party, had given protectionists strong premonitions of a successful attack upon their favorite policy.

As had been intimated, the message, in discussing the tariff question, made a violent assault upon the act of 1842. “By the introduction of minimums, or assumed false values, and by the imposition of specific duties, the injustice and inequality of that act, in its practical operations on different classes and pursuits, are seen and felt.” Many of the duties, the president said, under the operation of these principles, ranged from one per cent. to more than two hundred per cent. It was so framed as to throw much the greatest burden on labor and the poorer classes. Articles of prime necessity, or of coarse quality and low price, used by the masses of the people, were subjected to heavy duties, while articles of fine quality and high prices, used by the rich, were lightly taxed. He therefore recommended the abolition of specific duties and minimums, and the adoption of ad valorem duties, with a general modification and reduction of the rates of duty. Congress might discriminate in arranging the duties on different articles; but the discrimination should be within the revenue standard, and be made with the view to raise money for the support of government. His views of a revenue standard were thus given :

“It becomes important to understand distinctly what is meant by a revenue standard, the maximum of which should not be exceeded in the rates of duty imposed. It is conceded, and experience proves, that duties may be laid so high as to diminish or prohibit altogether, the importation of any given article, and thereby lessen or destroy the revenue which, at lower rates, would be derived from the importation. Such duties exceed the revenue rates, and are not imposed to raise money for the support of government. If congress levy a duty for revenue of one per cent. on a given article, it will produce a given amount of money to the treasury, and will incidentally and necessarily afford protection or advantage, to the amount of one per cent, to the home manufacturer of a similar or like article over the importer. If the duty be raised to ten per cent., it will produce a greater amount of money, and afford greater protection. If it be still raised to twenty, twenty-five, or thirty per cent., and if, as it is raised, the revenue derired from it is found to be increased, the protection or advantage will also be increased; but if it be raised to thirty-one per cent., and it is found that the revenue produced at that rate is less than at thirty per cent., it ceases to be a revenue duty. The precise point in the ascending scale of duties at

which it is ascertained from experience that the revenue is greatest, is

i the maximum rate of duty which can be laid for the bona fide purpose of collecting money for the support of government. To raise the duties higher than that point, and thereby diminish the amount collected, is to levy them for protection merely, and not for revenue. As long, then, as congress may gradually increase the rate of duty on a given article, and the revenue is increased by such increase of duty, they are within the revenue standard. When they go beyond that point, and, as they increase the duties, the revenue is diminished or destroyed, the act ceases to have for its object the raising of money to support government, but it is for protection merely.

“It does not follow that congress should levy the highest duty on all articles of import which they will bear within the revenue standard; for such rates would probably produce a much larger amount than the economical administration of the government would require. Nor does it follow that the duties on articles should be at the same or a horizontal rate. Some articles will bear a much higher revenue duty than others.”

The message was followed up and sustained by the report of the secretary of the treasury. The secretary said the revenue for the first quarter of the year was about two millions less than for the same quarter last

year. This decrease he ascribed to the diminution of the importation of some highly protected articles by the substitution of rival domestic products. The average of duties upon dutiable imports had been, during the nine remaining months of the first year, under the tariff of 1842, about 37 per cent.; for the year ending June, 1844, 33 per cent.; for 1845, about 30 per cent.; the diminished per centage being caused by the increased importation of some goods paying lighter duties, and the decreased importation of others bearing the higher duties. The revenue from ad valorem duties the last year had exceeded that from specific duties, although the average of the former was only about 23 per cent., and the average of the latter, about 41-presenting another strcng proof that lower duties increase the revenue.

The secretary had adopted, in suggesting improvements in the revenue laws, the following principles: 1st. No more should be collected than was necessary for the actual wants of the government. 2d. No duty should be imposed on any article above the lowest rate which would yield the most revenue. 3d. Below such rate, discrimination might be made, descending in the scale of duties; or, for imperative reasons, the article might be made frce from duty. 4th. The maximum revenue duty should be imposed on luxuries. 5th. Minimums and specific duties should be abolished, and ad valorem duties substituted-guard

ing against fraudulent invoices and undervaluation, and assessing the duty upon the actual market value. 6th. The duties should be so im. posed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the union, and upon the different classes.

A horizontal scale of duties—that is, a uniform rate upon all articles --was not recommended, because that would be a refusal to discrimi. nate for revenue, and might sink the revenue below the wants of the government. Some articles would yield the largest revenue at rates which would be wholly or partially prohibitory in other cases. Luxuries, as a general rule, would bear the highest revenue duties; but even some very costly luxuries, easily smuggled, would bear but a light duty for revenue; whilst other articles of great bulk and weight, would bear a higher duty for revenue. There must be discrimination for revenue, or the burthen of taxation must be augmented, in order to bring the same amount of money into the treasury. Hence it was difficult, he said, to adopt any arbitrary maximum which would answer in all cases.

The report of the secretary was immediately subjected to a severe criticism, both in and out of congress. Mr. Andrew Stewart, of Pennsylvania, on the question of referring that part of the message relating to the tariff, moved to instruct the committee to report, as the sense of this house, that the tariff of 1842 ought not to be disturbed."

The secretary had pronounced the tariff of 1842 unconstitutional, because it exceeded the revenue limit. A tariff bill, he said, was a bill for raising revenue, which was the only proper object of such a bill. “Whenever it departed from that object, in whole or in part, either by total or partial prohibition, it violated the purpose of the granted power.” Mr. Stewart referred to the messages of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, all of whom had emphatically recommended the protection of domestic manufactures. He also read the following lucid exposition from the second annual message of president Jackson :

“ The power to impose duties upon imports originally belonged to the several states. The right to adjust these duties, with a view to the encouragement of domestic industry, is so completely identical with that

power, that it is difficult to suppose the existence of the one without the other. The states have delegated their whole authority over imports to the general government, without limitation or restriction, saving the very inconsiderable reservation relating to the inspection laws. This authority having thus entirely passed from the states, the right to exercise it for the purpose of protection does not exist in them; and, consequently, if it be not possessed by the general government, it must be extinct. Our political system would thus present the anamoly