legacy to A and left legacies to B and C, who were not mentioned in the trustdisposition. No relatives in necessitous circumstances were found. Held (1) that the trust-disposition and codici falling to be read together as one will, A was not entitled to share in the residue, not being a beneficiary, but that B and C were so entitled, and (2) that the trustee was not bound to hold any portion of the residue for behoof of necessitous relatives of the testatrix. Pollok (Taylor's Trustee) v. Robinson and Others, p. 270. Succession-Will-Construction--Expenses of Education. Atestator directed his trustees "to pay the expenses necessary for the education of my children; and it is my desire that my sons A. and J. should have a university education suitable to prepare them for whatever profession they may adopt." A had graduated as a Bachelor of Medicine, and was in practice near Leeds. He was studying at Leeds University for an additional diploma in Public Health, which he could not enter for until he held his present degree and had been in practice for at least a year. He called upon the trustees to defray his expenses in connection with the Public Health degree. Held that the trustees were not bound to pay these expenses, in respect that they were not incurred by A in preparing himself for the profession which he had adopted. Dick's Trustees v. Dick, p. 325.

Election-Approbate and Reprobate Invalid Appointment in Settlement Containing Provisions to Objects of PowerChallenge of Exercise of Power. "The doctrine of approbate and reprobate in Scotland and the doctrine of election in England are the very same thing under different names. They depend upon a principle which in its comprehensiveness and simplicity was put by Lord Eldon in the House of Lords in the Scotch case of Ker v. Wauchope thus-'It is equally settled in the law of Scotland and of England that no person can accept and reject the same instrument."" A testa

trix conveyed to trustees "all and sundry the whole estate and effects . . . which shall belong to me at the time of my decease or over which I may have power of disposal by will or otherwise," and declared that she was acting "in exercise of all powers of disposal, apportionment, or otherwise competent" under the trustdisposition and settlement of her father. She destined the trust estate in certain shares to her children in liferent and their children in fee. The funds coming from her father's estate belonged in fee under his settlement to her children, although subject to her liferent and her power of appointment, and her exercise of the power of appointment by giving the children merely a liferent and their children the fee was held to be a bad exercise. Held (rev. judgment of the First Division) that although the funds coming from her father's estate were separable from the testatrix's own funds, yet her children could not claim the right

H.

conferred upon them in the former under his settlement and at the same time take a benefit in the latter under her settlement, but were put to their election; and this obligation to elect was not affected by the interest given in the testatrix's estate being declared alimentary, Scots law differing herein from English law, nor by there being no declaration that such interest was in lieu of any claim on the fund coming from the father's estate, while there was such a declaration as to legitim and the marriage-contract funds. Crum Ewing's Trustees v. Bayly's Trustees and Others, p. 401. Succession - Special Destination — Subsequent General Settlement — Revocation. By disposition dated May 1878 Mrs L. and spouse disponed certain heritable sub jects in Cupar to H. and spouse in conjunct fee and liferent, and to the longest liver of them in fee and their assignees, whom failing to the children of their marriage equally. Hay mount, the dwellinghouse of H. at Cupar, was built on part of the subjects thereby disponed. died in 1907 predeceased by his wife and survived by one son and three daughters. He left a trust disposition and settlement dated 10th July 1907, whereby he left his whole estate to trustees for division among his family in certain specified proportions. The settlement contained no express clause of revocation of the special destination in the disposition. It, however, inter alia, made the following provision:-"I wish my family and their aunt Miss J. H. to reside together at Haymount; and I direct my trustees to apply the whole or any part of the revenue of my estate, including profits of business, for the maintenance of my daughters and their said aunt while residing together, . . . and that until my youngest daughter is twenty-one years of age, and as long thereafter as may be considered suitable." Held that the settlement, in respect of the provision therein contained with regard to residence at Haymount, revoked the special destination in the disposition of 1878. Henderson's Trustees; Petitioners, p. 424. Vesting "Nearest in Kin”—Destination to A in Liferent and A's Issue in Fee, whom Failing to B, whom Failing to B's Issue, and whom Failing to Testator's Nearest in Kin-Vesting Subject to Defeasance. A testator, after giving an alimentary liferent of a sum of £1000 to a grandchild, Barbara Johnston, continued "In the second place, I hereby direct and appoint the said trustees; after the death of the said Barbara Johnston, to make payment of the foresaid principal sum of £4000, after deducting therefrom all necessary charges, duties, and expenses of management of the trust, to and amongst the lawful child or children to be procreated of the body of the said Barbara Johnston, and that in such shares and proportions as she the said Barbara Johnston may direct

and appoint by any deed or writing under her hand, and failing her exercising that power and faculty then to and amongst her lawful child or children equally if more than one. In the third place, in the event of the death of the said B. J., my grandchild, without lawful issue of her body, or if such issue being born shall predecease her, then and in that case I direct and appoint the said trustees to divide the trust funds under their management into two equal parts, and make payment to Mrs J. J., my daughter, whom failing to her lawful children equally, whom also failing to my nearest in kin equally, of one just and equal half thereof. And to Mrs I. Laird, my daughter, whom failing to her lawful children equally, whom also failing to my nearest in kin, of the other just and equal half thereof." Barbara Johnston having died unmarried and predeceased by the testator's two daughters and their issue, held that the "nearest in kin" entitled to the fund were those having that character at the death of the liferentrix, not of the testator, there being no vesting subject to defeasance. Johnston's Trustees v. Dewar and Others, p. 582.

Succession - Writ-Testament - CodicilHolograph Writing. In the repositories of a deceased person there were found (1) a formal trust disposition and settlement, dated 29th October 1910, signed by the deceased and formally attested, which bore to revoke all previous testamentary writings, (2) a draft of the trust-disposition and settlement, signed by the deceased and dated 27th October 1910, and (3) an informal writing, holograph of the deceased, consisting of a list of names with sums of money placed opposite to them and headed legacies, dated 28th October 1910, signed by the deceased and bearing the words "in terms of my last will of even date." No will of the deceased dated 28th October 1910 was found. Circumstances in which held, after a proof, that the informal writing was a valid and operative testamentary writing of the deceased and a codicil to his trustdisposition and settlement. Chiene v. Tait's Trustees, p. 609.

Trust Faculties and Powers Power of Disposal by Mortis causa Deed

Marriage Contract of Disponee of Power, Prior in Date to the Gift of the Power and Conveying Acquisita and Acquirenda-Exercise of Power. Hunter and Another v. Alexanders, p. 761.

Vesting-Vesting Subject to Defeasance-Defeasance on Either of Two Contingencies - Conditional Institution of Children of Predeceasing BeneficiaryLiferent to Widow of Beneficiary Predeceasing without Children, and Direction to Pay on her Death among Surviving Beneficiaries and Issue of Predeceasers. A testator directed his trustees to allow his widow a liferent of his estate, and on her death legated and bequeathed and directed his trustees to make payment to his sons nominatim of certain specified sums, and legated and bequeathed and

directed and appointed his trustees to divide and pay and make over the residue to and among his whole children nominatim, "declaring that in the event of the death of any of my said sons before the time of payment... leaving lawful children, I direct and appoint my said trustees to hold and apply the interest or annual produce of said legacies or shares of residue bequeathed to such deceasing son or sons for" behoof of the children, and to pay to them equally on the youngest attaining twenty-one years, "and should any of my said sons die without leaving lawful issue survived by any wife he or they may marry, I direct and appoint my said trustees to pay over the interest or annual produce of said legacies or shares of residue to such deceasing son's widow during her lifetime as an alimentary provision allenarly, and upon her death I direct and appoint my said trustees to divide and pay over the fee of said legacies bequeathed to such deceasing son or sons to and among my surviving children and the issue of deceasers, share and share alike, per stirpes. Held that the legacy and share of residue destined to each son vested in him a morte testatoris, but subject to defeasance in the event of his predeceasing the liferentrix either leaving issue or survived by a widow. Coulson's Trustees v. Coulson and Others, p. 814. Succession-Construction of Testamentary Writings-Erroneous Belief of Testator

Provision for Executors to Receive Price on an Arranged Sale of Heritage Held by Separate Testamentary Trustees when, as Matter of Fact, no such Arrangement. A testator, by separate trustdisposition confirmed by his will, conveyed to trustees a certain heritable estate. His will conveyed his general estate to his executors, and in a codicil to it he directed them-"I direct and empower my executors to pay for the fishing rights which I have agreed to purchase from Mr Ian Bullough of Meggernie, and I authorise them to receive for my estate the amount to be paid by Mr Ian Bullough for the farms of Cashlie and Dalchoirlich." The fishing was wanted for, and the farms were part of, the heritable estate conveyed by the separate trust-disposition, which, however, contained no reference to the proposed transaction. The testator was in the belief he had completed a binding agreement for it. As matter of fact he had not done so. The other party to the proposed transaction remained, however, willing to carry it out, and the trustees holding the heritable estate under the separate trust-disposition subsequently did so with the consent of the Court. Held, in a question between the executors and the trustees of the heritable estate, that the former were not entitled to the balance fund receivable on the completion of the transaction, but that the latter were bound to hold it as a surrogatum pro tanto for the farms disponed. Currie's Executors v. Currie's Trustees, p. 854.

Succession-Faculties and Powers--Power of Appointment Exercise of Power Appointment of Strangers-Consent of Objects-Validity. A testatrix, who had under her father's settlement a power of appointment among her children of a share of his estate, directed her trustees to hold one-half for one of her sons in liferent, and on his death to divide it among his children. Held that the exercise of the power, being invalid in respect of the introduction of strangers thereto, could not be rendered valid by the son's consenting to the exercise subsequent to the death of the testatrix. Mackie v. Mackie's Trustees, &c., July 4, 1885, 12 R. 1230, 22 S. L. R. 814, considered and distinguished. Watson and Others (Macgillivray's Trustees) v. Maxwell (Macgillivray's Curator) and Others. p. 887.

Will-Husband and Wife-Mutual

Settlement Revocability - Exercise in Settlement of Power of Appointment by Wife-Invalid Exercise-Right of Wife to Exercise Power by Codicil subsequent to Husband's Death. A wife, who had under her father's settlement a power of appointment of a share of his estate, executed along with her husband a mutual settlement containing an exercise of the power, which was subsequently held to be invalid. Held that, though the mutual settlement was contractual, the wife was nevertheless entitled to make a new exercise of the power by codicil executed subsequently to the death of the husband. Watson and Others (Macgillivray's Trustees) v. Maxwell (Macgillivray's Curator) and Others, p. 887.

Legacy-Satisfaction -- Debitor non presumitur donare Proof - Extrinsic Evidence. In a deed of separation between spouses, A, the husband's father, bound himself to pay to his daughter-inlaw during her life an annuity of £1000 terminable on the reconciliation of the spouses. He afterwards executed a trustdisposition and settlement by which he directed his trustees to pay her an alimentary annuity of £1000 restricted to £250 in the event of her re-marriage. In a letter to her brother, written upwards of a year after the date of his settlement, a holograph copy of which was found in his (A's) repositories, he stated that after his death the provision secured to Alice (his daughter-in-law) was £1000 a-year, reducible to £250 in the event of her contracting a second marriage. In reply to this letter her brother wrote saying that he considered the arrangement just and fair. Held that on a sound construction of the deeds, and without taking into consideration the terms of the testator's letter above referred to, the annuity conferred by the trust-disposition and settlement was in substitution of that conferred by the deed of separation. Opinion per curiam that it was unneces sary to determine whether the letters referred to were or were not competent evidence of the testator's intention. Campbell's Trustees v. Campbell and Others, p. 908.

Succession-" Heirs, Executors, and Successorswhomsoever." Atestatrixdirected her trustees to pay and make over the residue of her estate, which consisted of moveables, to "the eldest son of ... my late daughter, whom failing to and in favour of such eldest son's heirs, executors, and successors whomsoever.' The testatrix was predeceased by her grandson, the primary legatee. Held, in a special case, that the residue of the testatrix's estate fell to be divided equally between a son and daughter of the said grandson, being his next-of-kin and heirs in mobilibus, and did not fall to be paid to the grandson's executrix to be administered under his will. Baron de Mauley and Another (Lady Kinnaird's Trustees) v. Ogilvy, p. 917.

Testament-Partial Intestacy-Provision to Widow in Full of her Legal Claims--Right of Widow to Jus Relictæ out of Undisposed Estate. A testator by a settlement disposing of his whole estate directed his trustees to pay the annual income thereof to his wife, and in the event of her entering into a second marriage to pay her one-third of the annual income. He further directed that the balance of income forfeited by his widow on re-marriage should fall into the capital of his estate until the period of division, which was the date of her death, should arrive. The settlement, which was signed by the testator's wife as well as by himself, contained a clause in which the wife accepted of the provisions in her favour in lieu of terce, jus relicta, and every other claim competent to her through her husband's death. The testator died in 1881, and his widow thereafter received payment of her conventional provision. She re-married in 1894. In 1902 the direction to accumulate the balance of income set free by her re-marriage became inoperative under the Thellusson Act (39 and 40 Geo. III, cap. 98), and the balance thereafter fell into intestacy. Held, in a special case, that the clause in the settlement whereby the wife accepted the provisions in her favour in lieu of her legal rights was to be regarded as having been intended solely for the protection of the settlement, and that the widow, in addition to her conventional provision, was entitled jure relicta to one-half of the proportion of income falling into intestacy Naismith v. Boyes, July 28, 1899, 1 F. (H. L.) 79, 36 S. L. R. 973, followed. Sim v. Sim, December 18, 1901, 4 F. 944, distinguished. M'Gregor's Trustees v. Kimbell, p. 950.

Special Destination -- Revocation— Effect on Special Destination of General Disposition. By his settlement a testator revoked "all and every previous will or settlement" made by him, and conveyed to his daughter his whole property, means, and estate, heritable and moveable, real and personal, wherever situated or by whom held. At different periods during his life he had settled particular properties and certain policies of insurance upon his daughter, partly for her own behoof and partly in trust for

her children. At the time of his death the deeds of settlement relating thereto were in the hands of his agents-all of them being testamentary and revocable. In addition to the property so destined the testator left considerable estate, none of which, however, was in other hands than his own. In a special case, held that the special destinations had been effectually revoked by the terms of the settlement. Turnbull's Trustees v. Turnbull's Trustees, p. 1033. Succession--Faculties and Powers--Power of Appointment-Invalid Exercise of Power -Restriction of Fiar's Interest_to_Liferent-Election-Approbate and Reprobate. By his antenuptial marriage contract A assigned £18,000 to trustees for behoof of the children of the marriage in fee, in such shares and subject to such conditions and restrictions as he should appoint, with power to him to restrict the share of any of the children to a liferent and to settle the fee on their offspring. By his trust-disposition and settlement A directed his testamentary trustees to hold the residue of his estate for behoof of his children in liferent and of their children per stirpes in fee, "in such proportions . . . and subject to such restrictions, limitations, and conditions" as the children might appoint. He further provided that the £18,000 was to be treated as falling under this purpose, and that the provisions of the settlement were to be in full of his children's right to legitim, and also in full of the provisions conceived in their favour in the marriagecontract. One of A's children, B, having died without issue, a question arose as to his (B's) interest in his father's estate, and as to the validity of A's exercise of the power of appointment. Held (1) that A had not validly exercised the power, in respect that while the marriage-contract allowed him to reduce a child's interest to a liferent for the purpose of giving the fee to his issue, he had in his settlement gone beyond that and empowered the child to restrict to a liferent the interest of his (the child's) issue and to confer a fee on the grandchildren; but (2) that B could not set aside the provisions of the settlement quoad the marriage-contract funds and at the same time avail himself of its provisions quoad the residue of the estate, but was bound to elect between them. Crum-Ewing and Others (Lord and Lady Inverclyde's M.-C. Trustees) v. Lord Inverclyde and Others, p. 1062.

Summary Cause. See Sheriff. Summary Ejection. See Process. Superior and Vassal-Railway-Statutory Title-Compensation to Superior for Loss of Casualties-Date at which Compensation Falls to be Assessed-Interest-Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict. cap. 19), sec. 80, 107-111, and 126. In 1846 a railway company acquired certain lands by compulsory purchase under the Lands Clauses' Act 1845. The

proprietor having refused to grant a conveyance, the company in 1847 deposited the compensation found due and took possession. On the proprietor's death in 1874 the company obtained from his heir a conveyance in statutory form, which they recorded in 1875. In 1903 the superiors brought an action against the company for compensation for loss of casualties. Held (1) that the execution of the statutory title in 1875 destroyed the superior's rights of superiority in the lands taken, giving to him as from that date a right to compensation therefor-a right which was not barred by the promoters having in the meantime obtained access to the land-and (2) that the pursuers were entitled to interest on such compensation from 1903, the date when their demand was made. Dissenting Lord Johnston, who was of opinion that the recording of the statutory title did not affect the obligation on the company to pay the feudal charges, and that these (so far as not prescribed) subsisted till they had been redeemed, and that accordingly the pursuers were entitled to recover (a) such charges down to the date of their redemption, and (b) compensation for their loss, with interest on such compensation from 1903, the date when the company were called upon to redeem. Fraser (Fraser's Trustee) and Others v. the Caledonian Railway Company, p. 76. Superior and Vassal. See Bankruptcy. Suspension. See Justiciary Cases-Sheriff.

Tenancy. See Removing-Valuation Cases.
Tacit Relocation. See Master and Servant.
Taciturnity. See Personal Objection.
Taxation. See Expenses.
Tender. See Expenses.

Testament. See Succession.

Theft. See Justiciary Cases.

Tied Houses." See Inland Revenue. Title. See Property.

Trade Incorporation. See Burgh. Trade Union-Relations of Central Excecutive and Local Branches-Power of Branch to Incur Liability Binding Funds of Union. A Trade Union consisted of combinations of labourers which were enrolled by the Executive of the Union as local branches. The business of the Union was carried on by the branches subject to a general control by the Executive. The branches had no separate funds of their own, but the funds of all the branches were the common property of the Union. Under the rules of the Union no person had power to incur financial responsibility in name of a branch unless with the special authority of the branch or the branch committee. One of the branches of the Union, which had power to appoint its law agent, appointed A B its agent and guaranteed his costs in the event of his fighting a case unsuccessfully. A B, with the sanction of the Branch Committee, raised an action at the instance of a member of the Branch against his employers. This action was unsuccessful. Held that under the guarantee A B

was entitled to sue the Trade Union for his account. Mackendrick v. National Union of Dock Labourers in Great Britain and Ireland, p. 17.

Trade Union-Trade Union Act 1871 (34 and 35 Vict. cap. 31), sec. 4-Action for Refund of Accident Bonus Benefit Paid to Member-Competency. The rules of a trade union provided that any member permanently disabled by accident should receive an accident bonus benefit, which he should be obliged to refund in the event of his resuming work at his trade. It was further provided that at the time of receiving the benefit he should sign an agreement binding himself to refund. Held (diss. Lord Johnston) that an action by a trade union to recover from a workman accident bonus benefit was competent and did not come within sec. 4 of the Trade Union Act of 1871. Baker v. Ingall, [1911] 2 K.B. 132, approved. Wilkie v. King, p. 1057.

See Jurisdiction.
Tramway. See Valuation.

Transfer of Business. See Insurance.
Trespasser. See Reparation.

Trust-Charitable Trust-Petition by Private Trustees for Authority to Transfer Trust to ex officio Trustees. A testatrix by her trust-disposition and settlement conveyed her whole estate to certain individuals as trustees, and, inter alia, directed them "to hold and apply the sum of £1000 for providing an endowment for two bursaries for Highland students attending the Free Church College, Glasgow, and also to hold and apply the sum of £2000 and the interest thereof for the purpose of increasing the incomes of the poorer ministers of the Free Church of Scotland in the Highland districts, which sum shall be applied in such manner and in such sums as to my trustees shall seem proper." The trustees presented a petition to the Court for authority to transfer the two said trust funds of £1000 and £2000 to the Financial Board of the said College and the General Trustees of the said Church respectively, both ex officiis. The Court, after a report, indicated that the permissibility of the proposed transference depended on whether the new trustees proposed were committees of a "constitutional" and "permanent" character, whose existence was not liable to be terminated by a mere resolution, and remitted back to the reporter to further adjust the schemes, and on his supplementary report, in which in the first scheme the General Trustees of the United Free Church were substituted as proposed trustees in place of the Financial Board of the College, approved of the schemes under which in each case the General Trustees of the United Free Church became the trustees. Williamson and Others (M'Grouther's Trustees), Petitioners, p. 220.

Settlement Accumulations - Thellusson Act (39 and 40 Geo. III, cap. 98), sec. 1. A testator left a sum of money for forming a public library, reading

room, and museum, and "authorised and empowered" the trustees to set apart and accumulate the annual interest, or such portion thereof as they might think expedient, for the purpose of erecting a suitable building. No power was given to encroach on capital. Held that if the trustees, in order to get sufficient money for the erection of the building, chose to go on saving after twenty-one years, that was not struck at by the Thellusson Act, for the trust deed did not direct accumulations. Scott Moncrieff and Others (Lindsay's Trustees), Petitioners, p. 470. Trust-Breach of Trust-Maladministration-Compromising Threatened Action --Annuities not Made Charge on Heritage. Circumstances in which held (rev. judgment of the Second Division) that a trustee had not been guilty of maladministration so as to render himself personally liable, although the entire trust funds had now disappeared, and he had paid in 1898 a considerable sum to compromise proceedings against the trust threatened at the instigation of certain disinherited children of the truster, and had borrowed money on the heritable estate for this purpose without the annuities payable under the trust deed being made a charge upon it. Buchanan and Spouse v. Eaton, p. 481.

See Right in Security-Succession. Trustees. See Succession.

Ultra vires. See Company - Friendly
Society.
Undervaluation of Stock. See Company.
Underwriters, Attempted Fraud on. See
Justiciary Cases.

Vacation. See Process.

Validity of Charge. See Diligence-Patent. Valuation Tramway Valuation of Tramway by the Assessor of Railways and Canals- Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Amendment Act 1867 (30 and 31 Vict. cap. 80), sec. 3. The Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Amendment Act 1867section 3-enacts-"In ascertaining the yearly rent or value. . . of the lands and heritages in any parish, county, or burgh belonging to or leased by any railway company, and forming part of the undertaking of such company, onehalf of the expenses incurred in maintaining or repairing the permanent way of railways, and charged to revenue in the published accounts of such railway company for the year preceding that for which the valuation is made, shall be allowed by the Assessor of Railways and Canals as a deduction before the cumulo yearly rent or value of each railway is fixed, provided that such assessor is satisfied that such expenses have been truly expended in maintaining or repairing the permanent way of each such railway. Held that the word "railway" as used in the section of the statute included "tramway," and that the yearly rent or value of a tramway fell to be ascertained by the Assessor of Railways and Canals.