love which these sufferings expreffed, and how far man, in imitation of his Saviour, can bless thofe who curfe him, and return good for evil.

We cannot, indeed, behold the example but at a diftance; nor confider it without being struck with a sense of our own debility: every man who compares his life with thi divine rule, inftead of exulting in his own excellence, will fmite his breast like the publican, and cry out, "God be merciful to me a finner!" Thus to acquaint us with ourselves, may, perhaps, be one use of the precept; but the precept cannot, furely, be confidered as having no other.

I know it will be faid, that our paffions are not in our power; and that, therefore, a precept, to love or to hate, is impoffible; for if the gratification of all our wishes was offered us to love a ftranger as we love a child, we could not fulfil the condition, however we might defire the reward.

But admitting this to be true, and that we cannot love an enemy as we love a friend; it is yet equally certain, that we may perform thofe actions which are produced by love, from a higher principle: we may, perhaps, derive moral excellence from natural defects, and exert our reason instead of indulging a paffion. If our enemy hungers we may feed him, and if he thirsts we may give him drink: this if we could love him, would be our conduct; and this may ftill be our conduct, though to love him is impoffible. The Chriftian will be prompted to relieve the neceffities of his enemy, by his love to God: he will rejoice in an opportunity to express the zeal of his gratitude and the alacrity of his obedience, at the fame time that he appropriates the promises and anticipates his reward.

But

But though he who is beneficent upon thefe principles, may in the fcripture fenfe be faid to love his enemy; yet something more may ftill be effected: the passion itself in fome degree is in our power; we may rife to a yet nearer emulation of divine forgiveness, we may think as well as act with kindness, and be fanctified as well in heart as in life.

Though love and hatred are neceffarily produced in the human breast, when the proper objects of these pasfions occur, as the colour of material fubftances is neceffarily perceived by an eye before which they are exhibited; yet it is in our power to change the paffion, and to caufe either love or hatred to be excited, by placing the fame object in different circumftances; as a changeable filk of blue and yellow may be held fo as to excite the idea either of yellow or blue.

No act is deemed more injurious, or 'refented with greater acrimony, than the marriage of a child, efpecially of a daughter, without the confent of a parent: it is frequently confidered as a breach of the strongest and tendereft obligations; as folly and ingratitude, treachery and rebellion. By the imputation of thefe vices, a child becomes the object of indignation and refentment: indignation and refentment in the breaft, therefore, of the parent are neceffarily excited: and there can be no doubt, but that these are species of hatred. But if the child is confidered as ftill retaining the endearing foftnefs of filial affection, as ftill longing for reconciliation, and profaning the rites of marriage with tears; as having been driven from the path of duty, only by the violence of paffions which none have always refifted, and which many have indulged with much greater turpitude; the fame object that before excited indignation and re

fentment,

fentment, will now be regarded with pity, and pity is a fpecies of love.

Those, indeed, who resent this breach of filial duty with implacability, though perhaps it is the only one of which the offender has been guilty, demonstrate that they are without natural affection; and that they would have prostituted their offspring, if not to luft, yet to affections which are equally vile and fordid, the thirft of gold, or the cravings of ambition: for he can never be thought to be fincerely interested in the feli. city of his child, who, when fome oft he means of happinefs are loft by indifcretion, fuffers his refentment to take away the reft.

Among friends, fallies of quick refentment are extremely frequent. Friendship is a conftant reciprocation of benefits, to which the facrifice of private interest is fometimes neceffary: it is common for each to set too much value upon those which he bestows, and too little upon thofe which he receives; this mutual mistake in fo important an estimation, produces mutual charges of unkindness and ingratitude; each, perhaps, profeffes. himself ready to forgive, but neither will condefcend to be forgiven. Pride, therefore, ftill increases the enmity which it began; the friend is confidered as felfish, affuming, injurious and revengeful; he confequently becomes an object of hatred; and while he is thus confidered, to love him is impoffible. But thus to confider him, is at once a folly and a fault: each ought to reflect, that he is, at least in the opinion of the other, incurring the crimes that he imputes; that the foundation of their enmity is no more than a mistake; and that this mistake is the effect of weakness or vanity, which is common to all mankind; the character of

both would then affume a very different afpect; love would again be excited by the return of its object; and each would be impatient to exchange acknowledgements, and recover the felicity which was fo near being loft.

But if after we have admitted an acquaintance to our bofom as a friend, it should appear that we had mif. taken his character; if he should betray our confidence, and use the knowledge of our affairs, which perhaps he obtained by offers of service, to effect our ruin; if he defames us to the world, and adds perjury to falfehood ; if he violates the chastity of a wife, or feduces a daughter to prostitution; we may ftill confider him in fuch circumstances as will incline us to fulfil the precept, and to regard him without the rancour of hatred or the fury of revenge.

Every character, however it may deferve punishment, excites hatred only in proportion as it appears to be malicious; and pure malice has never been imputed to human beings, The wretch, who has thus deceived. and injured us, fhould be confidered as having ultimately intended, not evil to us, but good to himself. It should also be remembered, that he has mistaken the means; that he has forfeited the friendship of Him whofe favour is better than life, by the fame conduct which forfeited ours; and that to whatever view he facrificed our temporal intereft, to that alfo he facrificed his own hope of immortality; that he is now feeking felicity which he can never find, and incurring punishment that will laft for ever. And how much better than this wretch is he, in whom the contemplation of his condition can excite no pity? Surely if fuch an enemy hungers, we may, without fuppreffing any paf

fion,

fion, give him food; for who that fees a criminal dragged to execution, for whatever crime, would refuse of cold water?

him a cup

On the contrary, he whom God has forgiven muft neceffarily become amiable to man: to confider his character without prejudice or partiality, after it has been changed by repentance, is to love him; and impartially to confider it, is not only our duty but our intereft.

Thus may we love our enemies, and add a dignity to our nature of which pagan virtue had no conception. But if love our enemies is the glory of a Christian, to treat others with coldness, neglect, and malignity, is rather the reproach of a fiend than than a man. Unprovoked enmity, the frown of unkindness, and the menaces of oppression, should be far from those who profefs themselves to be followers of Him who in his life went about doing good; who inftantly healed a wound that was given in his defence; and who, when he was fainting in his laft agony, and treated with mockery and derifion, conceived at once a prayer and an apology for his murderers, Father, forgive them; they know not what they do.

No.