Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth. on her part did not require the judgment and thoughtfulness which would be expected of an adult under the same circumstances, and she is entitled to recover, if, under the circumstances, she exercised that degree of care which under like circumstances would reasonably be expected of a girl of her years and capacity. See Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis., 300; Plumley v. Birge, 124 Mass., 57; and Linck v. Scheffel, 32 Ill. App., 17. Other errors are complained of, in the rejection of testimony, but, as they are not likely to again occur, they will not be considered. For the reasons indicated, the judg ment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. CASE 43-INDICTMENT FOR FAILURE TO GIVE SIGNALS AT PUBLIC CROSS ING. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth. APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT. THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL R. R. Co. WAS CONVICTED FOR FAILING TO GIVE SIGNALS OF THE APPROACH OF A TRAIN TO A PUBLIC CROSSING-DEFENDANT APPEALS-AFFIRMED. TRAIN INSIDE CITY LIMITS-CROSSING OUTSIDE. Held: Under section 786, Kentucky Statutes, regulating the giving of signals at public crossings, outside of city limits, the required cignal must be given within fifty rods of every crossing, outside the town or city, whether the engine when it arrives within fifty rods of the crossing is inside or outside of the limits of the town or city. J. S. WORTHAM, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT. 1. The statute provides that "bell shall be rung or whistle sounded outside of incorporated cities or towns, etc." The converse of Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth. this must be true, that such signals need not be given inside such limits. 2. A penal statute can not be extended by implication or construction; it can not be made to embrace cases not within the letter, although within the reason and policy of the law. 3. It is the Legislature, and not the court, which is to define a crime. Sutherland on Stat. Construction, secs. 349, 350; Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon., 73; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Com., 20 L. R., 748; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Com., 20 L. R., 990; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Com., 13 Bush, 388; Kentucky Statutes, sec. 786. PIRTLE & TRABUE, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT. 1. It is totally inadmissible to extend the operation of a penal statute upon an inference or hypothesis that the Legislature has overlooked some case when it would have provided for it, if its attention had been called to it. W. S. CHELF, COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY, FOR APPELLEE. 1. The public crossing is the thing that this statute was intended to protect, and the only reasonable construction of it is, that the signals must be given at the required distance, whether the engine at the time is outside or inside the town. 2. All statutes shall be construed with a view to carry out the intent of the Legislature. Kentucky Statutes, sec. 459. OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE BURNAM-AFFIRMING. Appellant was indicted in the Grayson Circuit Court for failing to give the signals required by section 786 of the Kentucky Statutes of the approach of its south-bound passenger train to the place where its track crosses the public highway known as the "Leitchfield and Hartford Road." The trial resulted in a verdict against appellant, and this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment rendered pursuant thereto, and involves the construction of the section of the statute on which the indictment is predicated, which reads as follows: "Every company shall provide each locomotive engine passing upon its road with a bell of ordinary size, and steam whistle, and such bell shall be rung or whistle sounded outside of incorporated Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth. cities or towns at a distance of at least fifty rods from the place where the road crosses upon the same level any highway crossing, at which a sign-board is required to be maintained, and such bell shall be rung or whistle sounded continuously or alternately until the engine has reached such highway crossing, and shall give such signals in cities and towns as the legislative authorities thereof may require." It appears from the testimony that the crossing in question is a short distance outside of the limits of the town of Leitchfield, and that the track of appellant before reaching this crossing is for some distance within the city limits of the town, and that, when a locomotive engine coming from the north arrives within fifty rods of this crossing, it would be inside of the town limits, but that, when coming from the south, when it arrives within fifty rods of the same crossing it is outside of the town limits. It is the contention of appellant that the statute does not require that the crossing signal should be given for this crossing on trains coming from the north, as the fifty rods before the crossing is reached is within the limits of an incorporated city. We do not think that the stat ute is susceptible of this construction. It provides that the bell shall be rung or whistle sounded at a distance of at least fifty rods from the place where the railroad crosses a public highway upon the same level at every crossing outside of incorporated cities and towns. Whether the engine when it arrives at the 50-rod limit is inside or outside of the limits of the town is immaterial. The fact determining the duty of the railroad company is the location of the crossing. Section 773 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that signal boards shall be erected and constantly maintained at each public highway where it City of Middlesboro, &c., v. New South Brewing & Ice Co. is crossed by the railroad at the same level, but that such boards need not be put up in cities or towns unless required by the legal authorities thereof. Inside of incorporated cities and towns, the statute leaves the char acter of signals to be given to the legislative authorities thereof; clearly showing the purpose of the Legislature to regulate the character of signals to be given at all crossings outside of incorporated cities and towns, and their further purpose to leave this matter to the authorities of the city where the crossings are within the town limits. As the instructions given upon the trial in the court below were in accordance with these views, the judgment is affirmed. CASE 44-ACTION FOR INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN THE COLLECTION OF City of Middlesboro, &c., v. New South APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT. JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT APPEALS-REVERSED. MUNICIPAL TAXATION-EXEMPTION OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISH MENT. Held: 1. Where a corporation located its plant in a city under 1 City of Middlesboro, &c., v. New South Brewing & Ice Co. of the exemption to institutions already established, and the exemption can not apply to one which has been operated for several years although only partially established. 3. Exemptions from taxation are regarded in derogation of common right and therefore are not to be extended beyond the exact and express . requirements of the statutes strictly construed. 4. The tax collector was properly enjoined from levying upon plaintiff's real estate before he had exhausted the personal property. T. G. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT. 1. Under an ordinance of the city which provides that all manufac turing establishments, and their machinery shall be exempt from municipal taxation for a period of five years from the time of their establishment in the city, the plaintiff is exempt from city taxes for said period. 2. The appellee was not prejudiced by any action taken by the board of supervisors of the city. 3. If appellee has any right of exemption from taxation by appellant for the year 1894, it has so completely failed to show it that this court should reverse the judgment of the lower court. Sections 3 and 170, Kentucky Constitution; Sections 3490 and 3542, Kentucky Statutes; Board of Council of Frankfort v. Mason Foard & Co., 18 Ky. Rep., 545. G. W. SAULSBERRY, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE. 1. The city ordinance, under which appellant claims to be exempt, does not apply to appellee and was never so intended. Sections 3 and 170, Kentucky Constitution, and sub-sec. 32; Section 3490, Kentucky Statutes; Section 116, Original Charter City of Middlesboro; Vol. 1, page 688, acts 1899 and 1890; 6 Cranch, 87; Bailey v. Com., 11 Bush, 691; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; Galloway v. Webb, Hardin, 325. OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE HOBSON-REVERSING. By the original charter of the city of Middlesboro, which became a law March 14, 1890 (Sess. Acts 1889-90, vol. 1, p. 688, section 116), it was provided: "The provisions of this charter as to ad valorem taxation shall not apply to any tools or machinery belonging to manufac tories or to any raw material for manufacture or goods manufactured in said city, for a space of five years from |