Hengehold v. City of Covington. shall be construed together, so as to give effect to both. We think this rule should be applied in this case to the general law as to the powers of local boards, and the city charter expressly authorizing the municipality to enact regulations in that behalf, it follows, therefore, that the city is authorized to make additional reasonable regulations to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases. The only remaining question, therefore, is, whether a regulation, empowering three members of the board, or the health officers elected by the board, to order the removal of a smallpox patient, is a reasonable regulation. We think it is, especially as there is provided an appeal to the board, and a requirement of action by the board itself, upon a certificate by the attending physician, that the removal would endanger the patient's life. In such cases the necessity for immediate action is imperative, and it is not unreasonable to permit the health officer, or less than a quorum of the board, to order such removal in a case where it does not appear that the removal would endanger the patient's life. For the reason given the judgment is affirmed. Whole court sitting. Cavanaugh v. Wilson, CASE 101-ACTION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND-JUNE 19. Cavanaugh v. Wilson. APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, LAW AND EQUITY DIVISION. JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT APPEALS. REVERSED. APPEAL-REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT-RESTITUTION BY PURCHASER AT EX- Held: 1. Where a judgment was reversed on the ground that de- H. M. LANE FOR APPELLANT. BURTON VANCE FOR APPELLEE. (No briefs in record.) OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE HAZELRIGG-REVERSING. 108 759 f133 779 In March, 1888, Riley and others obtained judgment in the Louisville chancery court against Catherine Cavanaugh, the present appellant, for something less than $2,000. From this judgment she prosecuted an appeal to this court without supersedeas, and on June 4, 1892, this. Cavanaugh v. Wilson. court reversed the judgment, deciding that appellant, Cavanaugh, did not owe any part of the judgment rendered. Cavanaugh v. Riley, 19 S. W., 745. When the case went back it was dismissed as against appellant, pursuant to the opinion and mandate of this court. But in the meantime, to-wit, in April, 1889, certain real estate of Mrs. Cavanaugh had been sold under executions on the judg ment of March, 1888, and bought by appellee, Willson, at the price of $2,213, the amount of the execution debts, interest, and costs. Willson was the attorney of Riley and others in the suits against Mrs. Cavanaugh under a contract securing to himself a fee equal to one-fourth of the amount received, and he appears also to have bought up the claim of the execution creditors, and to have thus paid off the purchase price of the property. In January, 1891, he obtained a deed for the property from the sheriff; and thereupon, on a motion of the chancery court, he obtained on April 13, 1891, judgment for possession. From the order awarding possession, Mrs. Cavanaugh prosecuted an appeal to this court. On this appeal this court said: "As this record now appears to us, the various judgments were valid, unsatisfied, and unreversed, and, as the plaintiffs appear to have been entitled to the executions that issued, the sale was regularly made, and the deed properly executed, the lower court was bound to adjudge the purchaser, Willson, entitled to the writ of possession." The judgment for possession may accordingly be affirmed. Cavanaugh v. Willson, 35 S. W., 918. It may be noted here that while this appeal was disposed of after the reversal in this court of the judgment of March, 1888, that fact did not appear in the record, and could not, because the judgment for possession appealed from was rendered a year and some months before the reversal of the March, 1888, judgment. Cavanaugh v. Wilson. This fact appears in the opinion, because it is, in substance, recited that the judgments in favor of Riley and others on which the executions issued, and under which the sale of Mrs. Cavanaugh's property was made, were, so far as the record disclosed, valid, unsatisfied, and unreversed. When Mrs. Cavanaugh appealed from the judgment in Willson's favor, for the possession of the property, in April, 1891, she executed a supersedeas bond, with certain sureties, by means of which she kept the purchaser out of the possession awarded to him from April 13, 1891, until May 10, 1896, to his damage, as it appears from the proof, in the sum of about $3,500. After the affirmance, therefore, of the judgment for possession, in May, 1896, appellee, Willson, brought the present suit against Mrs. Cavanaugh and her sureties on the supersedeas bond for the damages secured by the covenants of the bond. For answer and counter-claim, Mrs. Cavanaugh set up in detail what we have above stated briefly, and contended that by reason of the reversal of the judgment under which her property was sold, and the decision of the court of last resort, in substance, that her property had been sold to pay, not her own but other parties' debts, she was, as against the plaintiffs in the executions and their attorney and privy, Willson, entitled to a restitution of the value of her property in the way of damages, and that value she avers was $16,000, for which she prayed judgment. By consent, the law and facts were submitted to the court, and, upon hearing, the claim for restitution and damages was rejected, and judgment rendered for Willson for the sum of $3,053, with interest from December, 1897. We have, then, this rather startling situation discov ered by this litigation: Mrs. Cavanaugh was the owner of certain residence and business property of the value, ac 1 Cavanaugh v. Wilson. cording to the court below, of $10,000, or, according to her estimate, of the value of $16,000. This property is taken to pay debts for which she is in no way responsible, but which, at most, amount only to $2,200, and in addition she is made to account in money for rents on the property to the extent of some $3,000, accruing in large measure after it had been finally determined that her property had been sold to pay debts she did not owe. And it is particularly to be noted that the groundwork on which has been erected this entire superstructure of wrong is the unconscionable transaction by which property of the value of some $10,000 was sold for $2,213. At the outset it is important to notice briefly the grounds on which the learned judge, who enters an elaborate opinion, has refused every relief to appellant. After reciting that "it is admitted Mrs. Cavanaugh was not liable in any way, nor was her property, for the debt or claim asserted in the action in which her property was seized and sold," the learned judge said: "In subsequent proceedings between the plaintiff in this action [Willson] and the defendant [Mrs. Cavanaugh] the court of appeals held that the plaintiff [Willson] acquired at said sale a good title against Cavanaugh to said property, notwithsanding the judgment against Cavanaugh, under which her property had been sold by the sheriff and purchased by Willson, was erroneous, and subsequently reversed." This language apparently indicates that the court held on the appeal of the suit by Willson for possession that, notwithstanding the judgment under which the property was sold was erroneous and subsequently reversed, still Willson obtained a good title; whereas, we had seen, the only thing determined on that appeal was that as the record there before the court disclosed a valid and unreversed judgment, un |