ful and cheerful temper of mind. This will not only increase the vigour of their efforts, but greatly add to the probability of success.

Let us ever bear in mind the extensive benefit which may result from our bringing one child to choose and "hoid fast that which is good." Have we not reason to hope that it will be a blessing, not only to himself, but to his children, and his children's children? Does not the result of universal experience; do not the records of history and biography. in addition to the express commands of Scripture, afford abundant encouragement for females diligently to exercise their powers in the education of children-powers which appear peculiarly given to fit them for the performance of this important duty? How many eminent, how many excellent men, have attributed their most valuable attainments to the impressions made on their minds, by the early care of female relatives, and more especially by that of mothers!

A mother, providentially possesses advantages for obtaining over her children an influence, which may be as powerful and durable, as it is mild and attractive; an influence, which may prove to them a guide and defence through the temptations and difficulties of life, when she, herself, has escaped from them all; and which, if it do not fully accomplish the good she desires, will yet "hang on the wheels of evil." It may confidently be believed, though she may have to wait" many days," that her conscientious endeavours will return in blessings upon herself, and upon her children; and that the fruits, whether earlier or later, will abundantly prove "that her labour has not been in vain in the Lord." pp. 171-174.

Were we to add a word further, it would be to apologize to the excellent but unknown author of these "Hints," for suffering her work to reach a second edition,* before we had done our best to promotes its extensive circulation. We indulge the hope, however, that this tardy recommendation will not prove an inineffectual one. We know of no greater service which can be performed through the medium of the press, than is rendered by judicious, practical, unassuming works of the description of the present; and we know of no qualities more admirable than those which are so amply displayed in it, a warm and enlightened piety, and supreme good sense.

* We have just seen advertised, a third edition.

Art. IX. Familiar Lectures on Moral Philosophy. By John Prior Estlin, LL. D. 2 vol. 8vo. pp. 721. London. 1818.

THESE volumes contain the course of moral and religious instruction which their late Author addressed to his pupils. They convey a favourable inspresssion, we dare say a just impression, of the mildness and philosophical elevation of Dr. Estlin's character; and at the same time exhibit considerable talent, judgement, and taste. The style is unaffected and perspicuous, and much of the sentiment advanced, is as sound and important as it is well expressed. But in bestowing this willing commendation, it will not be imagined that we are recommending to our young readers the perusal of a work, which, professing to treat of religion, exhibits nothing more of the Christian system than a reflected light, serving to render more specious, but not more efficient, the Deism of Socrates and Epictetus. But neither should we feel at all solicitous to prescribe the perusal of these Lectures. For while truth is always strongest in the simple and uncontroversial form of simple declaration, disbelief of any kind, is strong only in the attitude of attack; and Socinianism may very safely be left to expose its own nakedness, whenever its defenders, unadvisedly laying aside the weapons of offence, set forth the sum of their faith in a positive shape. In fact, we are rarely presented with uncontroversial Socinianism. And this circumstance seems to imply the consciousness on the part of its advocates, that the meagre negation, if left passively to be subjected to comparison with the Bible, would quickly fall into forgetfulness. It is not therefore such books as Dr. Priestley's Institutes of Theology, or Dr. Estlin's Familiar Lectures, or a few others of the same inoffensive character, that will make proselytes to Socinianism. We shall not, on the present occasion, enter upon the topics of this controversy: as, however, it has been alluded to, our readers will think the following observations, taken from the ninth lecture, pertinent, as well as, in themselves, just and important.

The great principles of belief and practice ought, indeed, to be settled in our minds in early life; so that there should seldom, if ever, be any necessity on our own account, of entering into any arguments whic may be brought against them. The existence, perfections, and providence of God, the truth of the Christian religion, and the great rules of morality and virtue, are subjects, concerning which we should settle our opinions as soon as we are capable of understanding the arguments on which they are founded. We should avoid a light, fluttering, and uncertain turn of mind, ever ready to change its foundation, and to be carried about with every wind of doctrine. Cool reflection, a solid judgment, and an accurate discrimination, with a lively sense of religion, which consists in the union of all the finer affections of the human mind, is our best security against this mental

infirmity. It has been the particular aim of some modern systems, and in this they have but too well succeeded, to throw a cold and chil ling hand upon all the devout affections, and to freeze the purest and clearest current of the soul. Hence, the copious and increasing torrent of infidelity. We must expect to meet in the world, with per sons who will attack what comes recommended to us with almost the strength of first principles, and who will bring their own prejudices and caprices for new and solid arguments. By persons whose minds have received a shock, in consequence of having changed the opinions which they had imbibed in early life, and which have lost their stay by giving up the religious principle; by those who have connected ideas of absurdity with religion, because they have been falsely taught to consider certain absurd doctrines as doctrines of religion; by the superficial and unthinking; by the conceited and affected, who consi der themselves as the wisest persons in the world; and by those who love to distinguish themselves by the singularity of their sentiments; as well as by the vicious, who reject the evidence because they like not the doctrine; by all of this description we may expect to find objections brought against Revelation, and perhaps against the great truths of natural religion. A little reading, or thinking, and a great deal of conceit, will make a man a sceptic, or an infidel. What is called a free thinker, might often with more propriety be called a half thinker. It becomes every friend of religion, therefore, who is ne. cessarily a friend to the best interests of man, to be ready to give to every one that asketh him, a reason of the hope that is in him; and, I trust, it will be the concern of each of us to do it always with charity, always with affection for those who think differently from ourselves, if they be honest and sincere, which will sometimes be the case, even with the greatest unbelievers; and always with meekness and fear.'

The question which has heen so much discussed, and it may be added, so often obscured, relative to the ground of moral obligation, Dr. Estlin states in a way, not expressly objectionable, except in one respect which we shall notice; but yet he stops short, as we think, of an accurate and satisfactory elucidation of the subject.

The question,' he remarks, to be discussed, is, not how the idea of moral obligation arises, or what it is which we are bound by the constitution of our nature, as before described, to perform; but plainly and simply this, Why am I obliged to act in such a particular manner? What is the ultimate reason or motive which, on an attentive consideration of the subject, should influence me to act in this rather than in that manner? To this question the following answers are given by different writers on subjects of morals. Because, 1. It is agreeable to the will of God. 2. To the eternal and necessary fitness of things. 3. It is the dictate of the moral sense. 4. It is the dictate of common sense. 5. Your own understanding represents such an action as right; and of course that you ought to do it. 6. It is agreeable to the truth of things. 7. It is conducive to your own great est good upon the whole. And, 8. It is conducive to general utility?

But, the question is, not from what principle we act immediately, but ultimately; or, if we express it in the most general terns possible, what is the true principle of virtue, or that which renders virtue obligatory? The fact is, that in the early periods of life we always act upon the principle of self interest ; and it is not till the upderstanding is arrived at considerable maturity, that we can act upon more enlarged and disinterested principles if the question therefore were, What is the motive which first influences a human being the answer would be, a regard to his own private happiness; for a considerable progress must be made in intellectual improvement before he can comprehend his own future and more remote happiness, or the happiness of others.'

Dr. Estlio proceeds to remark briefly upon the above named schemes: the first, supported by Leibnitz and Warburton ; the second, by Grotius, Clarke, and Balguy ; the third, by Dr. Hutcheson, and David Fordyce; the fourth, by Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald ; the fifth, by Cudworth, Butler, and Price; the sixth, by Wollaston; the seventh, by Puffendorff, Soame Jenyus, Dr. Johnson, Mr. Cooper, and Dr. Paley : and then says

• To me it appears, that all his (Mr. Cooper's) arguments would hold with equal force, if the word private were omitted, snd happiness, universal happiness, and consequently our own included, were considered as the only true foundation of moral obligation. I cannot see that the difficulties which press upon the other schemes, are applicable to this. It is a sufficient answer to the question, Why am I obliged to act in this particular manner? It is conducive to happiness ; it is conducive to my own highest happiness, taking in a future state; and it is conducive to the happiness of the whole universe. This is surely the noblest principle upon which we can act; it is indeed to be ó fellow-labourers with God,” to “ act upon the divine plan; and to form to his, the relish of our souls :" it is supposing the spring of action in all intelligent beings, from the highest to the lowest, to be the same. It is uniting self-love and social; and in all cases preserving the connection between duty and happiness.' Lecture V.

Whatever answer may be given to this question, Why am I obliged to act in this or that manner? it will still leave room for a second, and a third demand, before we arrive at first principles on the subject of morals. Indeed, it seems to have respect rather to the form, than to the substance of virtue, to use the words in their logical acceptation ; and to imply a reference of the mind, in putting the question, more to a supposed sanction or penalty attached to the rule of morals, than to the principle which makes conformity to the rule to be intrinsically good, that is to say, to be truly virtuous. This question may be answered according to any one of the above named schemes, without even approaching to an explanation of the true nature of virtue. And any one of them may be adopted, and an artificial conformity to the

rule of morals, may to a high degree be the result, while yet no progress is made in the attainment of true virtue. There seems to us, therefore, to be an entire misapprehension of the subject, insaying

• With respect to all these schemes we may observe, not only that they ultimately coincide, but that a person may be equally vicious who adopts, or acts upon, any one of them; and that not only different persons may generally refer their conduct to different principles, but that the same person may sometimes act upon one, and sometimes upon another principle.'

It is true, that in a world of moral agents, destitute, for the most part, of the principle of true virtue, order, tranquillity, and decorum are preserved, and the exterior benefits of morality are procured, by the operation of various motives : that is to say, by a regard to certain considerations, implying a tacit or explicit process of reasoning.

reasoning. And so, using the term, virtue, in a vulgar sense, it may be granted, that men, influenced by different considerations may be equally virtuous. But (if we might so express it,) true virtue is not consequent to a' Because. As it is spontaneous, so, it is uniform, and invariable in its principle. A moral agent may be slaped into the form of virtue, by this or that artificial process; but he can be good, only as God is good. In goodness there are infinite degrees, but no genera. We cannot, therefore, believe, that the philosophy of morals bas reached ultimate positions, while it remains undetermined wherein consists the goodness of moral agency; or while it continues to be supposed, that morality, though it be one in its matter and form, is variable in its principle and motive.

In considering, severally, tbe answers given to the questions, · Why am I obliged to conform to a certain rule?' each brings us home, by a different route, only to the primary physical law of our constitution - the instinctive desire of individual wellbeing. But it cannot be supposed, that this physical law,-involuntary in its operation,---is at all of a moral nature ; nor does there appear to be any thing more than a natural or intellectual excellence, even in the most complete and well instructed obedience to it. It must not be forgotten, that the instinctive desire of individual well-being, is brought into disproportionate exercise, and acquires a depraved energy, in the present system of mixed and revocable good and ill, where self-preservation is greatly dependent upon its activity. But it is easy to form the idea of a state of well-being that should be both perfect and inadmissible, in which this instinct might be superseded, or become latent. The goodness of beings in such a state would not be motived, but spontaneous; they would not be good by calculation, any more than they would be happy by the inflected consciousness of personal well-being. Vol. XIII. N. S.

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