produce the greatest happiness, and wisdom to direct it towards deferving objects.

It is the misfortune of men who are warm in the progress of a system of their own contriving, to impofe upon themselves by taking words for ideas; and when once they are poffeffed of a favourite opinion, they endeavour to make all objections give way to their leading propofitions. Thus, Dr. Brown's fagacity quickly difcovered the defects of the former definitions of virtae, and his learning and ingenuity furnished him with arguments to invalidate them; but his imagination was fo heated with his own, which he has pronounced to be juft and adequate, that he' overlooked its imperfections.

He was fo tranfported by his enthusiastic theory, that he has endeavoured to make every thing bend to his principles. He has even been hurried fo far, as to attempt ferioufly and foberly to argue all private friendship out of the world, as incompatible with the production of the public good, or greatest happiness.

A moment's reflection, nay, an appeal to his own breast, would have fuggefted, that fuch limitted Beings as we are, cannot, in a moral fenfe, promote the public good otherwife than) by discharging our duty to individuals. If every one acts for the good of the little community he is connected with, the good of the public will neceffarily follow and thus private friendship will be made the bafis of public felicity. It belongs only to the capacious view of Almighty Providence, to difcern the good of the whole, and then defcend to parts: but man, as Pope fays,

Muft rife from individuals to the whole.

It is obfervable, that Dr. Brown, and indeed the other definers of virtue, feem to confider it only as it regards our duty towards our fellow-creatures. But perhaps this is arrogating too much to the excellence of our own fpecies. There are undoubtedly obligations from us to inferior Beings. To ufe those of the brute creation, who toil for our pleasure, or labour for our profit, with hard and ungrateful treatment, is a fpecies of inhumanity, which all men allow to be derogatory from virtue; and we cannot pass the streets without hearing the authors of wanton cruelty towards the dumb creation execrated for their barbarity.

As we do not hesitate to declare, that all the definitions which have been hitherto given of virtue, are vague and ambiguous, it may properly be imagined, that we are about to offer one of our own, which we have the vanity to obtrude as entirely fatiffactory and unexceptionable: But this is more than we presume.

What

What Virtue is, may perhaps be better understood than expreffed. Nevertheless, among fo many unsuccessful efforts of the Learned, to define it, we fhall not blush to hazard one more fruitless attempt to explain fo important a subject.

Virtue then, as we humbly conceive, is no other than "That' "Principle by which our Actions are INTENTIONALLY directed to produce Good towards the feveral objects of our free "Agency."

We agree with Dr. Brown, that thofe actions which we de-7 nominate virtuous, have not any abfolute and independent, but a relative and reflected beauty; and the fource from whence they derive their luftre, is, as we apprehend, the INTENTION which guided them. If well intended, whether they produce good or evil, they are equally virtuous. The producing good or evil are the accidents, the INTENTION to produce good, is the effence of virtue. And this is the criterion, or teft, by which Virtue is to be determined.

We could produce many other arguments in fupport of the theory we have endeavoured to establish; but we are fenfible, that the pleasure of the fubject has already carried us beyond our limits, and led us into confiderations, perhaps, foreign to the article. The matter of our Inquiry, however, will be a fufficient apology for the digreffion. It is an Inquiry which all good men will pursue with delight, and applaud our humble endeavours to remove the dangerous opinion, that a noble Writer, eminent for learning, and diftinguifhed for his defence of rorality, fhould have attempted to feparate Virtue from Religion.

R-d

A Refutation of the Work intitled, Remarks on the King of Pruffia's Manifeftoes of War, Circular Letters, and other Me-moirs publifhed fince the Commencement of the War to the prefent Time. Tranflated from the French Edition, published by Authority at Berlin. 4to. 3s. G. Woodfall.

G

ERMAN Quarrels, and German Controverfies, are proverbial expreffions, to fignify, the first, a quarrel without cause, the fecond, a controverfy without end.- -This before us has already lafted long, and extended far; nor has the profpect as yet any termination. However, refpect to the public, which Princes are not always in a humour to regard, being pleaded on both fides, as the reafon for prolonging it, it would not become the public to be weary till they are. It is,

however,

however, with the parties concerned in it, as with all others in the like circumstances, they can fee nothing favourably but what favours themselves: they are reciprocally angry for reciprocal trefpaffes; and they have equally contributed to convince the world, that Billingsgate is not the only place where people give one another their own. Fallacies, fictions, prevarications, falfhoods, and all the offenfive expreffions of which the French or German languages are capable, the Austrian charges on the Pruffian. Lies, calumnies, impudence, the Pruffian retorts upon the Auftrian. Each thinks he can never fay enough for his Client, or against his Adverfary. Hence every circumstance, how minute foever, is brought to account, and the whole is fpun into detail without end.

To the phlegm of Germany, this may, perhaps, be grateful; but to the impatience of England it is far otherwife. We wart to know every thing, it is true; but then if knowlege is not to be attained almost as eafy as if it flowed from infpiration, we grow tired of the pursuit, and in difguf- give it over.

In conformity, therefore, to this national impetuofity, and in full affurance that this, like other controverfies of the kind, when once the fword is drawn, can be decided by the fword only, we fhall dispatch this article, perplexed and entangled as it is, in the moft compendious manner poffible.

Says the Auftrian: "On the previous explication of a quef"tion like this, inconteftibly depends the juftice of the conclu"fions that flow from it, in regard to the parties actually at "war in the empire of Germany. It confifts only in this, viz. "Which of the two has been the firft in making extraordinary "preparations for war, and by that means has occafioned the "dreadful diforders that have arifen."

Says the Pruffian: It is of little importance to know, which of the parties in arms began the warlike preparations, if we do ⚫ not examine the motives of the prefent war. Has the court of Vienna actually concluded an unjust alliance with another Power, against the King? Has that Court, with a view to the conC queft of Silefia, endeavoured to kindle, by unlawful methods, a war between Pruffia and the Ruffians? Has that Court put • itself into a fituation, by concerting meafures that have been discovered, for attacking the King with its own forces joined to thofe of its allies; or of obliging his Majefty to make use of the firft acts of hoftility? Has not a difcovery of those ⚫ defigns authorized the King to make ufe of the steps we have feen him take? This is what the Court of Pruffia had to prove: this is what the Court of Vienna had to defend.' And it is certainly fo. This is a fair and full state of the Question.

in difpute: and that of the Auftrian is, on the contrary, as partial and difingenuous. It was apparent to all Europe, that the Emprefs-Queen would never fleep in peace, till she had done her utmost to wreft Silefia out of the powerful hand which had wrefted it from her; and that if Silefia was worth holding at fuch an expence, his Pruffian Majefty could only hold it, by keeping up a force fufficient to deter her from attempting it.

Thus the two Courts, notwithstanding they were nominally at peace with each other, were in a state of reciprocal diffidence and apprehenfion: and what has happened is no more than what was always expected.

The unjuft alliance referred to by the Pruffians, is that of May 22, 1746, between the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg; by the fourth fecret article of which it is thus ftipulated. "If "the King of Pruffia firft broke the Peace of Drefden, by act"ing in an hoftile manner against the Emprefs-Queen, or in attacking in an hoftile manner the Emprefs of Ruffia, or the Republic of Poland, the rights the Emprefs-Queen has ceded "to Silefia, fhall revert to her again, and the two Empreffes "shall each give fixty thousand men to make a conquest of it."

How unjuft this article was, has been already manifested in the former part of this controversy. The unlawful methods taken to kindle a war between Ruffia and Pruffia, to bring this unjuft treaty into operation, are also explained, and proved by documents not to be contested. The Auftrian Minifter Pretlack boafted to the Minifter of Saxony, Vitzthum, "That in a se"cret interview with the Emprefs of Ruffia, he found means, "by confident communications on the part of his Court, to inspire "her with fentiments, that have carried her enmity to fuch a "height, that, according to that Ambaffador's belief, there "wanted but very little to make her rage burft out in fome act "of violence." Bernes alfo, the Auftrian Minifter at Berlin, thus writes to Pretlack, May 27, 1747: "That the secret Re"fcript which he found means to get addreffed by the Court of "Ruffia to the Count de Kayferling, its Envoy at Berlin, had "already produced a good effect. That this Minifter had de"manded of the Minifter at Berlin, that the Ruffian deferters, "who entered into the territories of Pruffia fhould be delivered "up; and that he, Kayferling, had been extremely irritated at "his meeting with a refufal." Pretlack again brought the Ruffian Minister to charge the Count de Kayferling, "not to men"tion in his difpatches the military difpofitions of the King of "Pruffia fo fuperficially as he had hitherto done, but to repre"fent them as much more dangerous." Bernes alfo informed the Emprefs-Queen, July 22, "That he had encouraged the faid "Kayferling

Kayferling to fpeak with more force in his dispatches, relating to the Pruffian affairs." And that the latter, according to his ufual principles, had faid in reply, "He ought rather to "mitigate than inflame the quarrels of Courts, and to endea

vour to keep them all upon an amicable footing.' In confequence of these and the like falfe infinuations, it is acknowleged by Pretlack, in a letter of May 30, 1747," The Empress of Ruffia had kept on foot for ten months, ninety thousand men "in Livonia, to affift the Court of Vienna."

The like artifices, it is affirmed, were alfo made ufe of, after the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, and with the like effect as before. It was infinuated to the Emprefs of Ruffia, that the fucceffor to the Crown of Sweden fought for an opportunity of introducing abfolute Monarchy into that kingdom, by the affiftance of Pruffia; and Waingarten, the Auftrian Secretary, was ordered to follow the example of Pretlack, in prompting Kayferling to make the great armaments of Pruffia a ftanding article in his dispatches. It is urged, that these proceedings were carried to such an excess of wickedness, that the Count de Bernes did not blush at the end of the year 1749, to defire the Count de Puebla, the Auftrian Minifter at Berlin, to infinuate to the Sieur Grofs, the Envoy of Ruffia, "That a confpiracy "was formed in Sweden against the perfon of the Empress of "Ruffia, in which the King of Pruffia was concerned; with a "view, that the faid Envoy, by fending advice of it to his "Court, might, by that means, raife the hatred against Pruffia -"to its greatest heighth."

It is further faid, that, notwithstanding his Pruffian Majesty had, by his firm and moderate conduct, avoided all occafion for a rupture, the Court of Vienna fo far fucceeded in their practices on the Empress of Ruffia, that in the year 1750, the first recalled her Envoy from Berlin, and afterwards ordered the Pruffian Minister to leave Petersburg, which put an end to all correspondence between the two Courts. That the fame influence ftill prevailing, it was established as a maxim of state, in the feffion held at Mofcow on the 14th and 15th of May, 1753, "That they ought not only to oppose all further increase of the "King of Pruffia's power, but alfo to endeavour, with all their "forces, to reduce the Houfe of Brandenburg to the ancient " and moderate state in which it has been placed; and that it "fhould be done not only in cafe Pruffia fhould attack Hano"ver, but alfo when they fhould judge it neceffary themselves "to declare and begin a war againft Pruffia." And in a subsequent council held at Petersburg, October 7, 1755, the former refolution was further amplified and corroborated as follows.

That, taking for a bafis the first resolution of the last grand

❝ council,