32. Inftitutiones Calculi Differentialis. Auctore L' Eulera. 49. 33. Traité du Calcul Integral, par M. de Bouganville. 4to. Seconde 34. Recherches fur differens points importants du Syfteme du Monde, 36. Hiftoire de la France, par M. l'Abbé Velley, 12mo. tom. 3 & 37. Le Fils Naturel, Comedie en 5 Actes, par M. Diderot, 12mo. 38. Les Interets de la France mal entendus, 3 vol. 12mo. Paris 39. Oeuvres diverfes de M. J. J. Rouffeau de Geneve, 2 vol. 12mo. 40. De la Manoeuvre des Vaiffeaux, par M. Bouguer, 4to. Paris 1757- 41. Memorie degli Intagliatori in Pietre duri, 4to. Vaillant. 42. Obras efcogidas de Don Francifco Quevedo-Villegas con un Vo- 43. Fr. Donii Vita & Commercium Epiftolicum fol. Vaillant. 44. Commentaires fur la Defenfe des Places traduits du Grec d'Aneas 45. Connoiffance des tems pour l'année 1758. Paris. Nourse. 46. Collection Academique, compofée des Memoires, Actes ou Jour- 47. Traité de la Culture des Terres, par Du Hamel de Monceau. 50. Opere pofthume di P. Giannone in Difefa della fua ftoria civile di 51, Campagnes du Marechal de Luxembourg des Annees 1690, 1691, THE MONTHLY REVIEW, For FEBRUARY, 1758. Abubeker to Zelim. Occafioned by a late Defence of the Earl of Shaftesbury's Writings, &c. Folio, 6d. Sandby. HERE is not any particular, perhaps, in which we are TH more inferior to the antients, than in the art of controverly. The philofophers of old, however widely they differed in opinion, generally oppofed each other with candor, goodnature, and at leaft an apparent zeal for truth. Among us, controverfy is degenerated into wrangling, and rather tends to perpetuate differences by irritating reflections, than to enforce conviction by temperate reasoning. It was a laudable practice among the antients, to hold public debates on the maft interesting fubjects, which they canvasled with an amiable freedom of difquifition; and, confequently, grew patient of contradiction. We, on the contrary, being little accuftomed to reafon out of our clofets, are dogmatical in our tenets, and fo tenacious of our opinions, that we receive the moft diftant token of diffent as an affront to our understandings. This malignant pertinacity, has been moft obfervable in our religious controverfies. To recount the numerous fectaries which have started up among us fince the reformation, would weary recollection. It will be fufficient to obferve, that though they have all in general agreed, that it is the duty of religion to inculcate charity and moderation, yet their practice has by no means correfponded with their principles. Inftead of endea vouring to convince each other by fair and candid arguments, they have perplexed the subject with wilful mifrepresentations, and inflamed debate with acrimonious invectives. VOL. XVIII. H They They have been evidently actuated by the pride of opinion, more than a charitable zeal for piety. Charity, invites Converts by mild perfuafion: Pride, keeps Profelytes at a diftance, by its arrogance and prefumption. The religious difputes among us of late years, have been chiefly between the Believers and the Freethinkers. They who are, or at leaft fancy they are, Believers, ftigmatize every one with the name of Infidel, whofe measure of belief does not rife to the fame ftandard with their own. They, on the contrary, who are, or at least imagine they are, Freethinkers, brand every one with the name of Bigot, who is not as great a Latitudinarian as themselves. In this fpecies of religious controverfy, we are to class the Letter from Abubeker to Zelim, now under our confideration. This little piece was occafioned by two letters, which appeared in the London Chronicle. The one * was written from Zelim to Selima, to perfuade her against the principles of Lord Shaftesbury's philofophy, as incompatible with the belief of a Deity, and the doctrine of Chriftianity. The other †, figned Rufticus, is an answer to the foregoing, tending to rescue Lord Shaftesbury from the unjuft imputations which Zelim had laid to his charge; and contains fome fevere reflections on the Orthodox, which in decency, perhaps, had been better fuppreffed. The letter before us warmly efpoufes Zelim's tenets, in oppo. fition to Rufticus, and ridicules Lord Shaftesbury's notions of the Deity. But in order to ridicule them, he has been firft obliged to mifrepresent them, and make them the foundation of unnatural inferences. He fuppofes himself in a dream, viewing the most lovely landskip fancy can draw; and taking advantage of his Lordfhip's expreffions with regard to the Deity, whom he calls the Supreme Beautiful, and the Supreme Good, the Letter-writer breaks into the following rhapfody:- Does not goodnefs imply kindnefs-benevolence-affection-pity-infinitely produced into art? And that no envy-no malevolence-no irreconcileable anger, can dwell, or find place in, the Supreme Mind? Does not every object I fee confirm this? Do I not alfo, in myself, enjoy every good that my nature is capable of? Is not his "rain alfo on the juft and unjuft?" Does not he equally provide for the herds now in the vale below? Does even the ant • under my foot find herfelf neglected by this our common pa• rent? And fhall I ever fear that he can be provoked to withdraw his kindnefs from me, or need to be fupplicated and fought See Cronicle, O. 25 +See Do. Nov. 8. • after after by hecatombs, to deprecate his wrath? By no means. "My fong fhall always be that of praife and thanksgiving," " and "my mouth shall ever be open" to extol his love: but fhall not injure that love fo much, as to deprecate a wrath which the Supreme good is not capable of retaining against his ' creatures.' - But the principles of Lord Shaftesbury's philofophy do not feem to juftify this farcafm. His Lordfhip fays, that the "Deity is regarded either in the way of his power, or of his " excellence. "If," fays he, "the Deity is ferved through hope "or fear, felf-love is predominant, and the creature is vicious "and defective; if through honour and love, on account of the "excellence and amiableness of his nature, it raises the affection "towards virtue: the Divine Prefence creates a fhame of guilty "actions, and herein perfect theifm is conducive to virtue, and atheifm deficient. "The love of life," fays his Lordship, " is an obftacle to piety: and refignation, grounded on the expectation of infinite "reward, is no proof of virtue. But if by the hope of reward "be understood the defire of virtuous enjoyment, this is not derogatory from virtue, nor any felfifh principle." His Lordship adds, "that notwithstanding the injury this fel"fish paffion does to virtue, yet the principle of fear of future punishment, and the hope of future reward is in many cafes a great fupport to virtue." 66 66 He fays likewise, "That the hypothefis of perfect Theifm, that "whatever the order of the world produces, is, in the main, "both just and good, muft needs create the highest constancy "in any state of fufferance, and make us fupport whatever hard"fhips are to be endured for virtue's fake." It appears from thefe extracts, that Lord Shaftesbury is not the author of fuch abfurd and impious notions, as may render men fearless of provoking the Deity, or indifferent about deprecating his wrath, when confcious they have offended him. Is it to be conceived, that he who ferves the Deity through honour and love, on account of the excellence and amiableness of his nature, can be without an earneft defire of rendering himself acceptable in his fight; without anxious fear of giving him offence, and without fervent fupplication to obtain forgiveness of his faults, and reconcile himself to the Being he adores? Wherever there is love, there is a degree of fear. We are naturally afraid of offending, or of doing any thing which may leffen us in the efteem of an object we admire as excellent and H 2 amiable; 100 amiable; and if we are conscious of any act by which we may have incurred difpleasure, we are impatient and miferable till by fupplication, and tokens of repentance, we have expiated the of fence, and are reftored to favour. But this is not that flavish kind of fear which deters base minds from evil, by their apprehenfions of the Deity's power. To a rational creature, who has made a free exercife of his faculties, it is punishment enough to have offended an excellent and amiable Being. A rational agent does not abstain from ill, because he trembles left the power of the Deity fhould avenge his tranfgreffions; but the fole confideration which reftrains him is, left he should be agonized with the consciousness of his own turpitude, which muft neceffarily throw him at fo great a distance from the divine object of his love and adoration. Such an one will regard the Deity with reverential awe, but not with abject terror. He will view the lovely landskip which the Letter-writer has painted, with pleafing transport, and pious thankfulness. He will behold the scene of horror and devaftation* He which enfues, with folemn composure and religious awe. will know that every scene in nature, is the work of the Creator's power. He will admire his greatnefs, and acknowlege his goodnefs, in all and though the fweet ferenity of the azure sky will moft delight his fenfes, yet even amidst the terrors of the tempeft he will admire the Majefty of the Almighty, and conclude, that all the dreadful confufion around him, tends to promote fome divine purpose, infinitely wife and just. But however tremendous the power of the Deity may appear, it has no fhare in influencing the will of a rational and virtuous agent. His duty to the Supreme Being arifes from nobler principles. The light of reason furnishes him with convincing proofs of the perfection of the Deity: he perceives his own ideas to expand beyond the narrow circle of mortality, and to aspire at fomething more than worldly enjoyments. From hence he derives affurance of immortality; this gives him an earnest of that excellence of which at prefent he has but a faint conception, and which he labours to deferve, by doing all things which he deems acceptable in the fight of that divine Being whom he regards as fuperintendent over all his actions. Indeed, where the intellects are weak, and the affections corrupt and depraved, there the power of the Deity is the only confideration which can properly influence the will. And the hope of future reward, and dread of future punishment, are neceffary • Abubeker (the Author) by way of contraff to his pleafing landfkip, afterwards paints a foene of horror; reprefents himself as feized with a religious dread; and tells us, that he called his favou rite philofophy to his aid in vain. to |