of others. How much are the best perfons liable to fuffer from the follies of the unthinking; from the ill-nature, the rage, the fcorn of the malevolent; from the cold and penurious hardheartedness of the unfeeling; from perfecutions, for the fake both of religion and honefty; from ill returns to conjugal, to parental, to friendly affection; and from an innumerable train of other evils, to which the most amiable dif⚫ pofitions are usually the most fenfible. It is no lefs undeniable, that the natural confequences of Virtue are interrupted by the ftruggles of our paffions; (which we may overcome rewardably, though very imperfectly; or, if we live to overcome · more perfectly, we may not live to enjoy the victory;) by ficknefs, pain, langour, want; and by what we feel from the death, or the sufferings, of those with whom we are most nearly connected. We are often, indeed, afflicted by many of thefe things, more than we ought to be. But concern for fome, at least our own failings for inftance, is directly a duty'; for others, it is vifibly the inftrument of moral improvement; ‚ for more still, it is the unavoidable refult of our frame: and they who carry it too far, may, on the whole, be good cha racters; and even they who do not, in any confiderable de· gree, may however be extremely wretched. How then can Virtue be its own reward to mankind in general, or, indeed, a proportionable reward to almoft any man? Or how, unless the view be extended beyond fuch a scene of things, the certain means of happiness? The originally appointed means of C happiness it undoubtedly is: but that it fhould be an effectual and infallible means to creatures fo imperfect, paffing through fuch a difordered world, is impoffible, without a ftate of fu⚫ture reward; and of this the gospel alone gives us full affurance.

By rejecting the doctrine of recompences in another life, the Stoics were reduced to the extravagance of fuppofing felilicity to be enjoyed in circumftances which are incapable of it. That a good man ftretched on a rack, or repofing on a bed of rofes, fhould enjoy himself equally, was a notion which could gain but few profelytes; and a fad experience, that pain was an evil, fometimes drove their own difciples from the thorny ⚫ afperities of the portico, to the flowery gardens of Epicurus."

This reafoning appears to be fo ftrong and cogent, and the doctrine here inculcated, is of fo amiable and fatisfactory a nature, that it cannot fail to engage the heart, at the fame time that it convinces the judgment. Certainly if we take away the expectation of future recompence, there will then be little excitement left, either to do good, or to fuffer evil. The Stoical tenet, that Virtue is its own reward, is indeed more splendid, and

more

more flattering to the pride of men. And perhaps fome ele⚫vated minds may have fufficient force to purfue Virtue for itself; fome probably may, without regard to future expectations, practice moral goodnefs merely from the delight they take in the difcharge of thofe duties which Reason points out for their purfuit: and, however Sophifts may folve this motive into a fpecies of felf-love, they cannot deftroy the dignity of the principle. But if to this noble difpofition, we add the belief of future reward,. how much more perfect is the fyftem? Admitting even that fuch belief does not ftrengthen our obligations to Virtue, yet it muft certainly enlarge the pleasure, and confirm us in the habit of doing good.

But if the Recompence, of which the Gofpel gives us affurance, is fuch an additional incitement for us to do good, we may venture to fay, that it is the greateft, and the only encouragement which can enable us to endure evil. Whence can we gain refignation to bear the fufferings and calamities to which we are, to appearance, often undefervedly expofed, but from the affurance that they are neceffary to compleat the hidden purposes of Providence, and that they are intended as so many trials of our fortitude, which will be rewarded hereafter.

The Writer having expofed the folly of rejecting the doctrine of Recompenfes, proceeds to remark, that no fect of Philofophers ever fo dogmatically prefcribed, or fo frequently committed, Suicide, as thofe very Stoics who taught, that the pains and fufferings which they ftrove to end by this act of rebellion against the decrees of Providence, were no evils: which was undoubtedly a moft egregious abfurdity.

The Stoic Philofophy, adds our Author, infults human nature, and difcourages all our attempts, by enjoining and promifing a perfection in this life, of which we feel ourselves incapable. The Chriftian religion fhews compaffion to our weaknefs, by prefcribing to us only the practical task of aiming continually at further improvements; and animates our endeavours, by the promise of a divine aid, equal to our trial.

Having thus analyzed the Stoical fyftem, and with an accurate and impartial hand laid open its imperfections, the ingenuously confeffes, that Specifying thus the errors and defects of fo celebrated a fyftem is an unpleafing employment: but in an age, fond of preferring the gueffes of human fagacity before the unerring declarations of God, it seemed on this occafion neceffary to obferve, that the Chriftian Morality is agreeable to Reafon and Nature: that of the Stoics, for the molt part, founded on notions intelligible to few; and which 6 none could admit, without contradiction to their own hearts.

• They

They reafoned, many times, admirably well, but from falfe principles and the nobleft of their practical precepts, being built on a fandy bafis, lay at the mercy of every frong temp

•tation*.

Nevertheless, the candid and judicious Writer acknowleges, that- Their compofitions may be read with great advantage, as containing excellent rules of felf-government, and of focial behaviour; of a noble reliance on the aid and protection of Heaven, and of a perfect refignation and fubmiffion to the Divine Will: Points which are treated with great clearness, and with admirable fpirit, in the leffons of the Stoics; and though their directions are feldom practicable on their princi ples, in trying cafes, they may be rendered highly useful in fubordination to Chriftian reflections."

After paying this grateful tribute to Stoical merit, our Author clofes her admirable Introduction with the following pertinent and ftriking obfervations, addreffed to the two claffes of Unbelievers, who doubt, or difpute, the truth of Christianity.

If, among those, who are fo unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the truth of Christianity, any are prejudiced against it by the influence of unwarrantable inclinations: fuch per fons will find very little advantage in rejecting the doctrines of the New Teftament for those of the Portico; unless they think it an advantage to be laid under moral reftraints, almoft equal to those of the Gofpel, while they are deprived of its encouragements and fupports. Deviations from the rules of fobriety, juftice, and piety, meet with fmall indulgence in the Stoic writings: and they, who profefs to admire Epictetus, unless they pursue that feverely virtuous conduct which he everywhere prescribes, will find themselves treated by him with the utmoft degree of fcorn and contempt. An immoral character is, indeed, more or lefs, the out-caft of all fects of Philofo phy and Seneca quotes even Epicurus, to prove the univerfal obligation of a virtuous life. Of this great truth, God never left bimfelf without witness. Perfons of diftinguifhed talents and ⚫ opportunities feem to have been raifed, from time to time, by Providence, to check the torrent of corruption, and to pre • ferve the sense of moral obligations on the minds of the multitude, to whom the various occupations of life left but little

If this work, as it deferves, undergoes a fecond edition, we would recommend it to the Writer to confider, whether it would not be better to use the words flight impreffion, inftead of ftrong temptation. The former feem to have a more natural reference to the fandy bafts, and will fupport the figure, without impairing the fenfe.

REV. June, 1758.

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• leifure

• leifure to form deductions of their own. But then they want❝ed a proper commiffion to enforce their precepts: they intermixed with them, through falfe reasoning, many grofs miftakes; and their unavoidable ignorance, in feveral important 'points, entangled them with doubts, which easily degenerated into pernicious errors.

• If there are others, who reject Chriftianity from motives of ⚫ diflike to its peculiar doctrines: they will fcarcely fail of en⚫tertaining more favourable impreffions of it, if they can be prevailed on, with impartiality to compare the holy Scriptures, from whence alone the Chriftian religion is to be learned, with the Stoic writings; and then fairly to confider, whether there is any thing to be met with in the difcourfes of our bleffed Sa⚫viour, in the writings of his Apoftles, or even in the obfcure ft parts of the prophetic books, by which, equitably interpreted, either their fenfes, or their reafon, are contradicted, as they are by the paradoxes of thefe Philofophers: and if not, whether notices from above, of things, in which, though we ⚫ comprehend them but imperfectly, we are poffibly much more intereffed, than at prefent we difcern, ought not to be receiv*ed with implicit veneration; as ufeful exercifes and trials of that duty, which finite understandings owe to infinite wisdom.'

After fuch fpecimens of the Writer's turn of fentiment, and talent for writing, the Tranflation of Epictetus may be thought to need no further recommendation. We, nevertheless, think it incumbent on us to obferve, that fo far as we have had leisure for the comparison, it ftrictly adheres to the fenfe of the original, without lofing the fpirit. The Notes, in many places, fhew the Tranflator's skill in the Greek language; and they very often furnish us with fome entertaining anecdote, or useful il luftration.

Having faid thus much, we fhall not fcruple to take notice of fome fight inaccuracies. We fhall point them out with the less referve, as we are certain that the Writer has too much good fenfe to be offended at, and too much merit to be prejudiced, by the freedom. Our British Bard invites us to the liberty, when he fays,

Fear not the anger of the wife to raise ;

They beft can bear reproof, who merit praise.

We would obferve, that the tranflation, though never fpiritlefs, is, in fome few places, rather languid, for want of using a liberty which the Writer feems well qualified to manage difcreetly. We have, however, fome objection to the propriety of the verfion in a paragraph in the Enchiridion, which begins zhus.

Now

C Now the things in our power are, by nature, free, unre<ftrained, unhindered; but thofe not in our power, weak, fla• vish, restrained, belonging to others.'

The words of Epictetus are,

Και τα μὲν σει ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐςι φυο ἐλεύθερα, ακώλυΐα, ἀπαρεμπό διςα. τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀσθενῆ, δελα, κωλυβα, αλλότρια.

The Adjectives unrestrained and unhindered, în the tranflation, are ftrictly fynonimous, and render the paffage faint. But we apprehend that anageurodira was intended to exprefs fomething different from axaula. We know that they are both often tranflated by the Latin adjective impeditus, but implicitus feems to be moft expreffive of the former: and, in our humble judgment, it would be more agreeable both to the letter and fpirit of Epictetus, to fay, "The things in our power are, by

nature, free, unrestrained, unfettered." araçuródisa is a compound from a priv. and wageμodiw, which is compounded of παρα and εμποδίζω, which again is a compound from ev and as, and ftrictly fignifies to fetter the feet. But the word fettered has always, by metaphorical licence, been likewise applied to the mind; and this ufe of the word, marks the diftinction which Epictetus feems to intend between axaula and arapeμridisa. The one feems to relate to reftraint from without, and the other to restraint from within: in which diftinction he includes every kind of impediment which can poffibly obftruct our actions; and thereby demonftrates, that our actions, by nature, are abfolutely free from all constraint what

ever.

We cannot but obferve, likewife, that the Writer is too fevere upon Seneca. We cannot agree, that he is perpetually wavering; fometimes fpeaking of the Soul as immortal; and, at others, as perifhing with the body.' We know that in many places he speaks with ftrong conviction of the immortality of the foul, but we do not recollect that he any where confiders it as perifhing with the body. It is true, he often reafons upon the latter propofition, as the hypothefis of others, but never, at least that we remember, as a principle of his own. Seneca's philofophy has been thought to approach fo near to the Christian system, that fome of the Fathers have not fcrupled to esteem him a good Chriftian; and St. Hierom inferts him in his catalogue of fa cred Authors. Indeed, how any perfon who believes in a God, can really doubt the immortality of the foul, is beyond our conception.

We are alfo of opinion, that the Writer (peaks too generally in faying, that the Stoics held Logic in the higheft efteem. Ma

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