as much, practically at least, when he comes to classify the pleasures and pains finding little help here in purely subjective considerations, he proceeds to arrange his phenomena according to the nature of the objects to which they stand related. But why should this be necessary if these phenomena are bonâ-fide facts apart from all objects? Were M. Bouillier to carry out his theory to its legitimate extent, with a full knowledge of all that the simplest act of consciousness includes, he would be led to apply his conception to all the objective elements inseparably linked to the most primitive facts of sensibility, and thus to ground the phenomena of pleasure and pain in the very nature of things, instead of confining them to the conscious activities of living beings-an extension which would make the theory philosophical in the highest sense, as embracing the facts of all existence instead of narrowing itself to a consideration of those only to which it has hitherto pleased most thinkers to attach the conceptions of consciousness and life. He and M. Dumont would then be at one in their last issues, although, in all other respects, the theory of the work before us will be found to cover the facts of experience most completely, and to be most coherent throughout.

ALEXANDER MAIN.

Die Lehre Spinoza's. Von THEODOR CAMERER. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1877. Pp. 300.

THIS is an exposition of Spinoza's thought in its matured and final form, that is, an analysis of the Ethica merely, leaving untouched the dark but interesting problem of the origins and growth of the great philosopher's system-a problem to which it is to be hoped the author will now apply himself. And it is an exposition merely, the author avowedly restricting himself to just so much of criticism as is necessary for a thorough characterisation of the doctrines under examination. It is perhaps the most thorough and penetrating analysis of Spinoza's system ever written. Much of the exposition is of course debarred from any claim to newness; but, even when on well-trodden ground, the thorough grasp of his subject and careful statement that the author everywhere maintains would suffice to make his work useful; whilst in not a few instances we find a new light cast upon dark places. The chief novelty is in the treatment of the "essentia" and the "two divine causalities". Props. 21 to 23 of Eth. I. deal with an "infinite divine causality," whose object is "infinite modi”; whilst Prop. 28 deals with a "finite divine causality," whose object is "finite modi". Camerer shows very instructively that amongst the infinite modi we have to place the essentiæ rerum, the essences, or Wesenheiten, of things. Throughout his exposition of Spinoza's ontology, of his doctrine of cognition, of his theory of the passions, and of his ethics proper, Camerer never loses sight of this principle, that the essentiee of things are infinite modi-a method of exposition which seems to articulate the system more closely than it has ever been articulated before; whilst in some cases, as in the treatment of Eth. V., 23, it affords standing-ground for a new point of

view. The ground is now quite cut from beneath the feet of those critics, of superior penetration, who would like to make us believe that they have here caught Spinoza in the uncandid act of setting up a merely specious immortality of the soul. The "aliquid æternum that survives the body is the "essentia" that we meet with on the very threshold of the Ethica; it is an inherent and indispensable part of the system. Moreover, not only does this essence of the man survive the destruction of the body: it remains self-conscious toowith a self-consciousness that is personal and individual; (and this for more reasons than one, for which we must refer the reader to pp. 121 to 123 of Camerer's essay). The Ethica may, and does, contain obscurities and inconsistencies and faulty reasoning, but from the beginning to the end it certainly does not contain an uncandid word.

As regards criticism, Camerer's exposition gives, of itself, the following chief results :-(1) The Unity of the Attributes in the Substance, and the consequent relations of the products of the different Attributes, are not thinkable in the manner in which Spinoza requires us to think them. (2) The Unity of "the two divine causalities "infinite and finite-and of their products, is not demonstrated, and the relations of the Infinite and Finite in the world remain a mystery. (3) The relation of the Personal to the Universal, of the individual to the species, remains obscure. Though not possessing the point and brilliancy of style of Kuno Fischer's essay, Camerer's style is clear and precise; his book is a most thorough piece of work, and cannot be too warmly recommended to all who care to understand Spinoza perfectly. ARTHUR BOLLES LEE.

VII.-REPORTS.

Detection of Colour-Blindness.-A little work by Dr. J. Stilling, Die Prüfung des Farbensinnes beim Eisenbahn- und Marinepersonal (Cassel, Fischer, 1877), though published for a purely practical purpose, to test the Colour-Sense of railway servants and pilots, and so avert the danger which arises from mistakes with reference to signals, has still considerable interest for all psychological students whose investigation lead them into the region of analytical inquiry on actual sense-perceptions. It consists of a few pages of letterpress, in German and English (the latter not always very intelligible), accompanying three chromo-lithographic plates, which form the real raison d'etre of the publication. The plates are extremely ingenious, and admirably adapted for the purpose which they are intended to serve. The first contains four rectangular figures, made up of small chequered squares, in alternate shades of light and dark green; amongst which a few dull red squares are arranged in the form of certain alphabetical letters, printed in exactly equivalent shades, so as to be quite indiscriminable by any difference save that of colour. Had the letters been simply lithographed on a uniform green gronnd, the overlapping of pigment and the variation of light and shade might have afforded a

clue by which the colour-blind subject could decipher the figures. But the device of definite squares, enclosed by thin black lines, deprives the observer of all such aid, and throws him back upon the pure colour-perception of red and green. The second plate contains similar figures in brown and red; while the third rings the changes upon certain arbitrary symmetrical shapes, so as to supply a device for testing children or adults who cannot read. These tables are useful only for the detection of red-green colour blindness. Another set, sold separately, affords like means for discovering the existence of that rarer abnormality, blue-yellow colour-blindness. It is much to be desired that a few competent psychologists should use these plates for a series of careful observations, noting the results numerically. The currently accepted statistics as to colour-blindness are by no means free from doubt; and many useful experiments might be tried on young children, very illiterate rustics, and inhabitants of various outlying parts of Britain, such as Cornwall, Wales, the Highlands, and Connemara. But this is a work which of course demands co-operation. At the present moment, when so much interest is felt in the question of primitive colour-perception, might not the Anthropological Institute do something to promote or suggest the employment of these or similar tests by travellers amongst low-type savages? We are still sadly ignorant with regard to the actual sense-perceptions of the human race generally, and a little inquiry in this direction on the part of those who have the opportunity, might throw much fresh light on many disputed questions.

G. A.

A contribution to the Theory of Sleep.-Dr. A. Strümpell communicates to Pflüger's Archiv XV., p. 573, the following short note:

"In the autumn of 1876 a lad of sixteen was admitted into the clinical ward at Leipsic, in whom a number of sense-disturbances became gradually developed to an extent that is very rarely observed. The skin over the whole body was in every respect perfectly insensible. The strongest electric currents, or a burning taper held to the skin, could not excite pain or any kind of tactile sensation. A like insensibility was shown by almost all the accessible mucous membranes of the body. The sensations comprised under the name of muscular feeling' were also entirely wanting. The patient, when his eyes were shut, could be carried about the room, and his limbs could be placed in the most uncomfortable positions, without his knowing anything about it. Even the feeling of muscular fatigue was lost. There was also complete loss of taste and smell, with amaurosis of the left eye, and deafness of the right ear.

"In short here was an individual possessing only two channels of commu. nication with the outer world-the right eye and the left ear. These two last channels could also at any time be easily closed, and thus the effects of completely isolating the brain from all external sensible stimuli could be observed.

"I have frequently made the following experiment, and often showed it to others, always with the same result. The patient's seeing eye being bandaged and his hearing ear stopped, after a few (generally two or three) minutes the expressions of surprise and the uneasy movements at first excited would die away, his breathing would become quiet and regular, and he would be fast asleep. The possibility was thus realised of sending one

artificially to sleep, merely by withholding from the brain all stimulation through the senses.

"The awaking of the patient was as interesting as his going to sleep. He could be roused only by some auditory stimulation, as a shout into his hearing ear, or by letting light fall upon his seeing eye: no pulling or shaking had any effect upon him. When left alone, he would wake of himself' in the course of the day-only after a sleep of many hours—either through some internal stimulation' or (as the brain gradually became more excitable) through slight external stimuli that could not be kept from acting upon the senses still remaining to him.”

Dr. Strümpell promises to give elsewhere a circumstantial account of this most interesting case, and the observations it suggests are better deferred till the fuller information is supplied. The present short note was furnished at the request of Prof. Pflüger, to whose view of sleep (Archiv X. 468; see MIND I. 134) it lends support.

Teleological Mechanics of Life.-Professor Pflüger of Bonn has recently published in his Archiv (XV. 57) a memoir under the above title, continuing the series of wider speculations for which he has long been distinguished among physiologists. One noteworthy feature of the memoir is the repeated reference which the author makes to the biological doctrines of Aristotle as embodying ideas of permanent scientific value. The paper also contains, among the illustrations or evidence bearing on its main thesis, some suggestions of independent worth on particular questions of physiological psychology.

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22

With regard to the vital processes in general, Pfliiger starts from the position that, as a rule, only those combinations of causes are realised that are most favourable to the animal's welfare, and he proceeds first to consider the general phenomena of mind and instinct as exhibited by the lower animals and men. Consciousness of some sort, however obscure, must be ascribed to the lower animals when it is seen how in them, as well as in men, action varies with circumstances for the greatest possible benefit of the system. Whether every cell in the body has its beneficial or purposive (and therefore rational) work guided by some faint glimmer-as the work of the ganglion-cells of the central nervous system proceeds in the full light— of consciousness, is a question not to be answered. But at all events there is no need to assume (as Aristotle did) a psyche as the immediate cause of the vital phenomena, if all purposive acts of the system can be referred to "an absolute mechanics". Indeed, it will then rather become a question whether "the conscious psyche" itself is not a natural phenomenon analogous to the "rational" work of all vital organs. As a matter of fact many processes go on in the central nervous system which, while either unknown to the ego, or at any rate performed without foresight and calculation, have yet as their direct and necessary result conscious perceptions and volitions which the wisest reflection could not make more effective for their ends. Such are the so-called instincts of animals. According to Pflüger, "a rational instinctive act is willed by the conscious ego, but not

motived or induced by foregone conscious reflection," and the selective action which astonishes us so much in the apparent actions of animals would, he thinks, if we had more exact knowledge of the relations of atoms and molecules in the living cell, be found everywhere in the organism. As one remarkable example of instinct observed by himself, he mentions the case of a young turkey hen which, though never fertilised, laid sixteen eggs, and then beginning to brood went on sitting steadily on her nest, or if forcibly removed returned passionately to it for weeks after all the eggs had gradually been taken away. Here the instinctive act of brooding was not only consciously willed, but vehemently maintained, though the proper aim of the act was frustrated from the first, and at last (by removal of the eggs) was no longer present to consciousness. So in like manner, continues Pflüger, in man too there arise thoughts and wishes that result in the most rational and really purposive acts, while yet the true ends are not the motives present to consciousness. Changes of diet with the seasons, changes of occupation, the shrinking (with dizziness) from precipitous places, the aversion to contact with the dead or diseased or to creeping things, the shivering from cold, the craving for light, the curious scanning of new objects and surroundings -are some of the instinctive acts in man occasioned by present feeling, but having for their real ground the self-conservation of the individual. Other instincts subserve the continuance or improvement of the species, such as personal adornment with reference to the sensibilities of the other sex, the sense of shame. (found also in lower animals) involving selective choice of partners, dislike of deformed individuals, &c. The new-born child sucks by an instinct, i.e., voluntarily and with pleasure, not as a reflex-machine (which is the common physiological opinion). Maternal love is another instinct; and indeed, from birth to death man (as well as the lower animals) is far more dependent on instincts than is commonly supposed. All of them, as introspection shows, proceed from some internal or external excitation of the senses, with which are joined images and dispositions that determine the will according as they are agreeable or the reverse. When there is no past experience that can be subjectively revived, as in the first flight of the butterfly, we must suppose a motor impulse determined by muscular feeling-a volitional energy of definite quality followed by definite movements, like the impulse to stretch the limbs on awaking from sleep. There is of course no intention in the insect to fly or in the suckling to drink-only a determinate impulse, with a feeling of pain till the ego re-acts in a determinate way. The effects of the particular acts are matter of experience, but the "first voluntary acts" themselves are conditioned by the organisation in such manner as is necessary and advantageous for the animal's well-being.

After the lengthy excursus thus summarised-an excursus which contains many interesting observations, but which is not marked by much precision in the use of psychological terms-Pflüger proceeds to enunciate what he calls the Teleological Law of Causation,' implied in these actions of all the obscure forces :-The cause of every want