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to the hedonistic rule. Habit, whether individual or ancestral, operates in my view to transfer on the one hand the pleasurable idea from the end to the means, from the object to the action which secures it; and to fuse together on the other hand, or psycho-chemically' combine, a number of elemental feelings into a compound feeling or emotion. Thus as new organs or faculties, physical, mental, or moral, are evolved, their exercise becomes directly or in itself pleasurable or painful and it is by this process and not by any supposed nonhedonistic preference' that I would explain the phenomenon of the fixed idea, and the other phenomena which Mr. Edgeworth thinks call for explanation. At the same time I gladly admit that the question is "to be decided by careful observation, not off-hand by definition"; and if my comparison of a thermometer (MIND VI., p. 173) had been put forward as an à priori proof that desire or action followed the .greatest pleasure, I think Mr. Edgeworth's criticism of it, as open to refutation by a discovery similar to that of water not expanding as its temperature is raised from 32° to 39°, would be decisive. It was suggested not as an inflexible standard, but as "the only practical measure" which we have; and if any man can show a clear instance of non-hedonistic preference' I shall be quite ready to correct the measure, and register the exception. But I say that the phenomenon of axparía is not such an exception, because what the measure pretends to register is not pleasures-in-themselves (if I may so speak), that is, considered as all equally distant and equally certain; but their motive force under particular circumstances, namely those of the actor at the moment of action. Of this latter motive force it seems to me, as I said, that in fact the only practical measure which we have "is

Mr. Edgeworth says that I suppose motive force "to diminish, like the attraction of bodies, with the distance, in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance in time," and naturally appends a note of admiration.~ But I specially pointed out that, time having extension in one dimension only, the function involved was probably that of the simple inverse; and what I suggested was that the attraction of pleasure might vary not with the inverse distance alone, but according to some law involving some function of that quantity together with other quantities, one of which I mentioned (MIND VI., p. 174). However on reconsideration I see that the hypothesis, even as so stated, is incorrect; for it expresses a law of equal distribution of force not in one, but in two dimensions, in which the equidistant points form a circular line, just as the Newtonian law expresses it in space, which is of three dimensions, and in which the equidistant points form a spherical surface. For extension in one dimension there are no equidistant points, the force is theoretically independent of distance; and I come therefore to the conclusion that to a perfect or omniscient mind of infinite duration the motive power of foreseen pleasure would not vary with its distance in time, and that the effect of 'perspective,' which experience points to, is due to our mental imperfection and finiteness, and depends primarily on difference of probability, and only mediately (because of the uncertainty of life and the shortness of foresight) on remoteness in time. This correction however does not affect my explanation of deparía; whatever be the cause why remote pleasures have less motive power than proximate, there can be no doubt of the fact.

in ourselves the resultant desire, in others the resultant action," and that it is prima facie a good measure is shown by the acknowledged general correspondence of desire and idea of pleasure. Until an exception to this correspondence is proved, the measure must be taken to be as good a measure as a pair of scales: should such an exception be proved it may turn out to be no more or even less trustworthy than a water-thermometer.

As I have been led to mention Mr. Edgeworth's essay, I should like to make two remarks on his Calculus of Hedonics,' which seems to me both ably conceived and interesting. The first is that the mere statement of the problem to divide a certain quantity of material of pleasure among a number of men so as to produce a maximum of pleasure' is sufficient to show that it is a problem of Politics not of Ethics. The State only can apply the problem: the State only is concerned in solving it. My second observation is that to make the problem at all practical, pain-stuff, or labour, as well as pleasure-stuff, must be included in the distribuend,* and if the problem as modified be 'to make such a distribution as to produce a maximum surplus of pleasure over pain,' the conclusion reached is favourable to Egoism. For if I do my sum accurately (as to which I am not sufficiently at home in the Hedonic Calculus to feel very confident), the answer to the problem, supposing the capacity for pleasure and pain to be constant, would be that the labour must be concentrated as much as possible, or at least up to a certain limit, and the means of pleasure applied first in alleviating the pain of labour, and then equally divided; and supposing the capacity to vary, those who have the least capacity should be made to do the work, and the pleasure-stuff after paying a certain amount of wages to the workers, should go to those who have the greatest capacity for pleasure. This then, if the calculation bet correct, is the meaning of Exact Utilitarianism' when the principle is applied as nearly as may be to actual facts. Now if we assume, as seems (speaking generally) to be the fact, that the higher a being in the scale of evolution, the higher its capacity for pleasure, the result pointed out is just that which is produced by the 'struggle for existence,' or Egoism; but is not that which would be produced if moral practice followed ordinary Utilitarian principles: for in that case the best individuals would be those who would most readily do more than their share of work and give up their share of pleasure to the rest, so that the lower natures would monopolise the pleasure-stuff and the

Practically the problem is still more complex, for the sum of pleasurestuff and pain-stuff is itself not constant but must be determined so as to supply a maximum answer to the problem stated in the text. It may be that more labour might be applied so as to produce more pleasure than the pain it cost the labourer. If so, it must be exacted, and so on until the turning-point be reached at which this is no longer the case. Further, it is evident that the higher pleasures, such as those of affection and virtue, can hardly be said to come from pleasure-stuff at all, certainly not to be proportional to it; and similarly with pains: so that the problem as stated is only a small portion of the real problem of producing a total maximum surplus of pleasure.

higher the pain-stuff, the most infelicific instead of the most felicific arrangement. The moral I would draw is this: If Exact Utilitarianism' be the end of Politics (as is plausible), it is best attained by noninterference with nature to any extent further than to secure fair play in the struggle for existence by eliminating, so far as they do not affect merit, the accidents of wealth, rank and so forth and confining the struggle to merit only, and so to hasten the course of development: if it be the end of Ethics (which I deny), Utilitarian Ethics will best attain its end by practising its own preachment' of self-abnegation, and doing all it can to forward that vulgar form of Egoism of which the maxim is success. If it continue to urge men to sacrifice their interests to others otherwise than as the best means to their own success, the best men (who alone will obey) will get less than their proper share, and the total maximum will be spoilt. Thus it would seem that the exact' application of the principle of Utility to Ethics is possible only through some method of Egoism.

ALFRED BARRATT.

J. S. Mill's Philosophy tested by Prof. Jevons.-In Prof. Jevons's review of Mill's arguments respecting the ground of our belief in the axioms of Geometry, there occurs a very extraordinary misapprehension. The proposition which Mill seeks to establish (Logic, Book II., c. v., §§ 4, 5), is that these axioms are "experimental truths; generalisations from observation. The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space-or in other words, Two straight lines which have once met, do not meet again, but continue to diverge is an induction from the evidence of our senses". With his usual clearness, he proceeds to state the objection most likely to be made to this view. His theory being that "we see a property of straight lines to be true by merely fancying ourselves to be looking at them," this probable objection is that, if such be the case, "the ground of our belief cannot be the senses or experience; it must be something mental," for "experience must be real looking ". This statement of objections is continued thus :

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"To this argument it might be added in the case of this particular axiom that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is not only unnecessary, but unattainable. What says the axiom? That two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that after having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation? We may follow the lines to any distance we please; but we cannot follow them to infinity for aught our senses can testify, they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which we have traced them, begin to approach and at last meet. Unless, therefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than observation affords us, we should have no ground for believing the axiom at all."

I must call attention to the fact that the whole of this passage is contained in a single paragraph. The first sentence of the next paragraph runs thus :

"To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of understating, a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms."

Can any one having these two paragraphs before his eyes doubt that the whole of the first is a representation of the arguments of a supposed objector? If proof of so palpable a fact be required, is it not sufficiently furnished by the words which I have italicised, which distinctly imply that what has gone before is the objection? This exposition closely followed by criticism is eminently characteristic of Mill. Now observe Prof. Jevons's reading of this very clear passage which he himself quotes in full at p. 174. He claims to have convicted Mill of gross inconsistency. For was it not said that the axioms are inductions from the evidence of our senses? And are we not now told that we "must have some further proof than observation affords us"? Unfortunately, of the two statements quoted in proof of the charge of inconsistency, one is not a statement of Mill's opinion at all. He quotes it as the statement of a supposed opponent, and immediately proceeds to reply to it. Prof. Jevons mistakes the exposition for the reply, supposing the latter to begin with the words, "What says the axiom," etc. Yet surely this is a mistake which a moment's glance at the context, and especially at the words which I have italicised, ought to have prevented.

No doubt, if the "essential illogicality" of Mill's mind can be proved by ascribing to him a statement which he represents as that of an opponent, Prof. Jevons will succeed in his undertaking. It may be some comfort to Mill's disciples to reflect that, on these principles, their revenge is equally easy.

ARTHUR STRACHEY.

Since the publication of my articles on Mill's Logic in the Contemporary Review of December and of January last, I have been puzzled by the position taken up in regard to them by some of Mill's admirers. They were well aware, they say, of Mill's inconsistencies, and they see no reason why such petty criticisms should be brought against a great logician. "They are perfectly familiar," says my friend and colleague, the Editor of MIND (No. IX., p. 142), "with all the inconsistencies that Prof. Jevons would now laboriously bring to light; and yet they can honour the man, &c." This is perplexing; for if the Editor is familiar with the inconsistencies, these must really exist. But, as logicians, surely we are nothing if we are not logical, and if Mill really has fallen into the inconsistencies which I have pointed out, and shall point out, his work may be a suggestive piece of criticism, it may be a powerful polemic, an instructive review of logical doctrines, anything else you like to call it, but not "a system" of logic.

The Editor appears to be annoyed that I have occasionally printed the word "system" between inverted commas, and he wants to know whether I mean anything by it. Of course, I mean a great deal- that what is called by Mill a system, is as far from being a system as it is

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possible to conceive. The Editor says, indeed, "Mill's book is a model of orderly methodical exposition". He must have written this, it is true, before my second article was published, in which I showed that Mill first treats the relation of Resemblance as a minor and exceptional matter of fact; that in the third book he makes it the pivot of his methods of induction; while lastly, in the 24th chapter of his third book, he discovers that it is seldom regarded as a subject of science. Is this orderly methodical exposition? Or is it methodical to make induction rest upon the law of causation, and the law of causation upon induction? Or to make induction consist in inference from particulars to particulars in the second book, and then to discover, in the third book (chapters first and second), that the characteristic quality of induction is to obtain a general result from particular But these and other specimens of systematic thought will

require much analysis.

To turn now to the subject of geometrical reasoning, I deny altogether that the Editor has met even the two cases of inconsistency which he has selected from those I pointed out. I proved by minutely authenticated extracts, that Mill positively denied the existence of real straight lines in nature; he says, nevertheless, that we learn the properties of straight lines by mental experimentation on the images of straight lines in the mind; as we cannot follow straight lines ocularly to any great distance, we follow them in imagination, and try what will happen; these imaginary lines, he says, exactly resemble real ones, a fact which, curiously enough, we learn by observation; it follows unquestionably that, if we discover in these imaginary lines the properties of straight lines, they must be really, that is perfectly straight; if so, the real ones, which they exactly resemble, must be perfectly straight. There is no possibility of escape from Mill's statements. The Editor, indeed, ingeniously suggests, that "in denying (with whatever reason) that straight lines really exist, Mill never says that we have no perception of lines as apparently straight. So, when he comes to deal with the imaginary lines by which he supposes the geometer able to increase his experience indefinitely, he may very well say that these exactly resemble the lines that are perceptibly (without being really) straight." That is to say, Mill after having made geometrical reasoning the crucial test of his philosophy, having written several laborious chapters on the subject, and having had seven opportunities of revising those chapters in new editions, leaves us still to judge of his doctrine, not by what he has so abundantly said, but by what he has left unsaid. He may have meant, in some of his phases of thought, that lines were perceptibly straight to us, when they were not really straight; but, after studying his statements perhaps more closely than any one ever did before, I do not think that the distinction is alluded to by Mill. The Editor gives no reference, and apparently means that Mill might now urge this, if he were alive, because he has not said anything to exclude him from such a position.

This, however, I can hardly admit; because, if the Editor means