that when a line is apparently straight, our mental image of it is not perfectly straight, this image will not serve the purpose of the direct mental experimentation advocated by Mill; but if the image is that of a perfectly straight line, then Mill denies its existence, saying, "Since, then, neither in nature, nor in the human mind, do there exist any objects exactly corresponding to the definitions of geometry -&c." (Book II., chap. 5, section 1, beginning of third paragraph.) Nobody ever undertook a more hopeless task than to try and reconcile Mill's statements. His principal doctrine is that we can empirically learn the properties of geometrical figures, although there are no such figures to apply our eyes and minds to.

After thus showing that Mill might have said and meant what he did not say nor apparently mean, the Editor suddenly disclaims any desire to defend Mill:-" However it is no affair of mine to defend Mill's positions. I, for one, cannot think of basing the knowledge of geometrical principles on individual experience, least of all on that kind of passive experience, received by way of the senses, which Mill, without making proper use of the psychology he accepted, generally was content to assume." It seems, then, that the Editor approves neither of the substance of Mill's doctrines, nor of the manner in which he expounded them; he has always been familiar with the inconsistencies which I point out, and moreover there are discrepant assertions which Lange has established. I fail to see then on what grounds the Editor objects so much to my attack. If Mill's doctrine is really wrong and his exposition often self-contradictory, surely the worst I can do is to waste powder and shot-a matter for my own consideration.

Finally, the Editor gives me a few words of advice, and hints that I shall not retain my place, unless after criticising Mill, or rather, I suppose, while criticising Mill, I imitate him in reconstructing the damaged edifice of philosophy. The Editor asks (p. 144): "Will he then, for once in a way, tell us quite plainly what he considers are all the elements of a true empirical philosophy?" To which I answer, plainly enough-certainly not! Is no man to be a critic, unless he is prepared at once to propose a complete system of philosophy? Is a mathematician not to point out the blunders of a brother mathematician, unless he presents at the same time a mathematical theory of the Universe? Such a demand would render all criticism impossible, and without criticism we should still be speculating about the philosopher's stone, alchemy, realism, and all the absurdities of the scholastic age. In philosophy as well as physical science, truth has continually arisen from the freedom of criticism, and from conflict of opinion.

But I may be allowed to point out that I can hardly be charged with avoiding the labour of constructive writing. In the Principles of Science, the second edition of which is noticed and criticised in two separate parts of the same number of MIND,* I have given my view

The acute objections of Mr. George Bruce Halsted, of the John Hopkins University, to my criticism of Boole's Logic (MIND, No. IX., p. 134) certainly demand a careful answer. While admitting that I may have

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of the true forms of reasoning, both deductive and inductive. typographical extent my book amounts to about two thirds of Mill's System; moreover, it is almost wholly constructive. I purposely avoided Mill's manner of mixing up controversy with exposition, because it is not calculated to lead to clearness of vision. Much of the mystification which overcomes the readers of Mill's works, arises from the fact that Mill is always controversial. He never lays down the bases of a scientific position in a colourless and impartial manner. In almost every paragraph he has a fling at some real or imaginary opponent; indeed the whole "system" is an avowed piece of polemical writing. In the Autobiography (pp. 225-227) he candidly explains that the purpose of his book was to overthrow the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. Now I respectfully decline to follow Mill's example, or the Editor's advice. Principles of Science I have done as much constructive logical work as I feel able to do at present, and now I intend to do some destructive work, without mixing together two utterly distinct kinds of composition.

In the

It is true that I have never attempted to assign "all the elements of a true empirical philosophy". The Editor, while asking whether I will do it, knows that I shall not accept the challenge, since I have in fact, in the Principles (and anew in replying to his critique in the preface to the second edition) disclaimed any attempt to get to the basis of reasoning. Whether in future years I shall do anything more satisfactory to the Editor, depends upon length of life, and upon various circumstances over which no one has control. My own belief is that false philosophy generally arises from premature attempts to solve what is yet far beyond our ken. Thales was a very wise man, no doubt, but he made the mistake of propounding a philosophy of nature. Moisture, he held, was the origin of all things. This grand doctrine seems to me to bear about the same relation to the present bodies of physical science, as the metaphysical doctrines of a Mill, or a Kant, or a Hegel, will bear to the true philosophy of a future age. I decline to meddle with Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, or with such lofty themes as the Knowable and Unknowable, the Absolute, the Unconditioned and the like. Even "all the elements of a true empirical philosophy" are beyond my comprehension. Enough for me if I can firmly plant a few footsteps in the ground already trodden by John Herschel, by Boole, or by De Morgan. But however this may be, I claim the right to expose the mystification and the bad logic of Mill, independently of any efforts at constructive thought. W. STANLEY JEVONS.

[Nobody could have a better right than the distinguished author of the Principles of Science to reclaim against the observations that I pre

formerly interpreted Boole's use of the word Algebra too narrowly, I do not allow the correctness of Mr. Halsted's other objections. The points at issue cannot be dismissed in an off-hand manner, and involve questions of depth and difficulty.

sumed to make on the opening scene of his campaign against Mill, and with his rejoinder the incident might well be regarded as closed, so far as this journal is concerned. I shall hardly, however, be thought to abuse an editor's proverbial privilege if, after he has thus formally dedicated himself to the work of destruction, I add one last word' or two. I see no occasion to recur to his criticism on Mill's view of geometrical science, being content to leave that matter as it stood between him and Mill, and to leave the particular point I formerly noted as it now stands between him and me. (How little careful he was at another point in the original attack is noted by a different hand on a previous page.) Neither will I enter upon his second article: I have seen already in print two pointed exposures of his misreading of Mill's plain meaning as to the relation of Resemblance, and what is the use of a third? But I say (or repeat) of his enterprise generally that it betrays a serious want of perception. Whatever Mill's philosophic sins may be, he does not wield anything like the kind of despotic sway that could alone excuse this violence of attack; and Prof. Jevons ought to know it. Or if he does not know it, and is really convinced that no more pressing work lies to hand to be done, then it cannot be amiss to give him warning that he must not be astonished if he finds his labour disregarded by philosophical workers who, while thankful to have learned from Mill, do not need now to be told that his theory of knowledge was insufficient and landed him in conclusions not always consistent either among them. selves or with fact. At the end of his second paper in the Contemporary Review, Prof. Jevons says, not without a touch of pathos, that intensely believing as he does that the philosophy of the Mills, both father and son, is a false one, he claims, almost as a right, the attention of those who have sufficiently studied the matters in dispute to judge the arduous work of criticism he has felt it his duty to undertake. I can only remark that I am surprised at this time of day that he should expect it, and I do not think he will get it.

He, on his side, appears to be surprised that those whom he styles "admirers" of Mill should concede the presence of inconsistencies in that thinker, and not see that there is an end of his character as a logician. But suppose one should say that the writer who makes the contradictory statements noted in MIND, No. II., p. 212, or those noted at p. 216, and again (on their repetition in a new edition of his work) in No. IX., p. 148, with many more like them, cannot have done admirable work in logic. The saying would be obviously unjust. Suppose one went still farther and said that such a writer could be no logician. The saying would refute itself by its extravagance. Yet both sayings would be exactly in the manner of Prof. Jevons as regards Mill.

Concerning "destructive work" in Philosophy there is, finally, this remark to make. Prof. Jevons will find it hard to show that the cause of truth has ever been advanced by such purely negative criticism as he is now attempting. The Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz was a very effective piece of negation, but chiefly by reason of the positive doctrine suggested or expressed at every step of the discussion. So with Mill's own Examination of Hamilton, as I have before observed. Whether Prof. Jevons is right in what he now says about Mill's manner of writing generally, must be left to the judgment of the impartial reader. It is quite true that Mill had an essentially dialectical mind and emerged into clearness of view through conflict; but it was only for the sake of clearness that he engaged in conflict, and he did emerge. In his way he was a constructive thinker. He had thought out his philosophy. Prof. Jevons fancies that if a man has written with a constructive intention about

logical forms, scientific method and the like, he has purchased the right to do nothing but destroy in the philosophical field. But this is to mistake. No man really constructs in logic who does not lay a philosophical basis; and so far from knowing that Prof. Jevons would decline the challenge to declare himself on fundamental questions, I desire once more in all earnestness to urge upon him that nothing so nearly concerns his reputation. He has gone much too far already in these matters to have it in his power to affect all this modesty of purpose. Or is it seriously meant that he must "decline to meddle with" questions of philosophy? Why then meddle with the philosophy of Mill? The able specialists in whose steps he professes to tread were wiser in their generation.-EDITOR.]

IX.-NEW BOOKS.

Life and Letters of James Hinton. Edited by ELLICE HOPKINS, with an Introduction by Sir W. W. Gull. London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1878. Pp. 371.

The short memoir of James Hinton (by Dr. J. F. Payne) that appeared in MIND II. upon his unexpected death, is proved by this most interesting book to have been as correct in its statement of the main incidents of his life as it was clear and accurate in its indication of his point of view in philosophy. Sir W. Gull, one of Hinton's most intimate friends, gives now another admirable presentation, in short compass, of his characteristic manner of thinking. The Editor's part is throughout performed with great tact and discrimination. The book is a worthy record of a life of consuming intellectual activity directed by a nobility of purpose rarely equalled among men.

A Monograph on Sleep and Dream: their Physiology and Psychology. By EDWARD W. Cox. London: Longmans, 1878. Pp. 91.

Sleep and Dream are familiar physical and psychical conditions, disputed by none and which cannot be ascribed to prepossession, dominant ideas or diluted insanity," says the author, apparently having in his mind some others which can be so ascribed. The conclusion he comes to at the end of his investigation is that " Sleep indicates a dual structure that mind and body are not one;" while Dream seems to prove to him farther that there is an 'I,' which, because it" views and remembers the action of the brain (which is the material organ of the mind), cannot be the brain itself nor the mind itself, but must be something distinct from either, although intimately associated with both." Presently, however, this "I" or "Soul" or Spirit" appears, in the author's view, to fall together again with "Mind," for we hear of man as being simply "a living soul clothed with a material body". Anyhow, of this soul "the molecular body is but the incrustation, the atoms agglomerated into molecules at the point of contact with the molecularly constructed world in which the present stage of its existence is passed"; while the existence of soul itself "can be proved in precisely the same manner as the existence of electricity and

magnetism and heat". These views "caused considerable discussion" when set forth by the author to "The Psychological Society of Great Britain," of which he is President.

The Evolution of Morality. Being a History of the Development of Moral Culture. By C. STANILAND WAKE. 2 vols. London: Trübner, 1878. Pp. 505, 474.

The object of this work is to show how far the doctrine of Evolution is applicable to the field of morals. It is assumed that certain principles of man's being are brought into active operation in the particular line or direction named "moral," by influences that are chiefly social. The treatment is as far as possible historical; the moral ideas entertained by peoples of different degrees of culture being first set forth, before the endeavour is made to explain their origin. The morality of all primitive peoples was found to have much in common, and as no general and connected description of it existed, it was determined at the risk of interfering with the general aim of the work to supply this deficiency. The aim, however, was to trace the general progress of moral development, and not to explain completely the special phases of it exhibited by different peoples, as, for example, the more culti vated Mohammedan nations among which no new moral feature emerged. The moral teachings of Greek philosophy are not specially considered, because it is doubtful how far they directly influenced the popular morals. Sexual morality is frequently referred to by the way, but the full treatment of "what has become in modern thought almost a separate branch of morals" is left over, as also the related question of the "Fall". In the later chapters an attempt is made not only to explain the religious and moral phases of modern peoples in the light of the experiences of past ages, but also to forecast the future advance of mankind on the path of religious and moral culture. The ground covered by the author may be judged from the following headings of his chapters: Modern Theories of Morals'; 'The Sense of Right' (a long account of the morality of the uncultured races, in four chapters); Genesis of the Moral Idea' (two chapters); The Altruistic Sentiment'; Special development of Altruism'; Positive Phases of Morals'; Doctrine of Emanations'; Hinduism'; 'Buddhism'; 'Mithraism'; 'Christianity'; 'Positivism'; 'Religion and Morality'. A sufficiently conglomerate production, yet withal a valuable collection of facts.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: His Life and his Works. By HELEN ZIMMERN. London: Longmans, 1878. Pp. 446.

Miss Zimmern's book, long announced and wholly written before the appearance of Mr. Sime's larger biography noticed in the previous number, is a very straightforward and satisfactory presentation of its subject in general, but does not contain much reference to the philosophical thinking of Lessing. There is a curious remark about Spinoza's Ethica on p. 435.