On the Theory of Logic: An Essay. By CARVETH READ. London: Kegan Paul, 1878. Pp. 258.

The readers of MIND had a foretaste of this Essay in No. VI., and later on it will receive the critical notice which its importance deserves. It is a fruit of the studies made by the author three or four years ago, when holding a travelling scholarship from the Hibbert Trust The Elements of Inductive Logic, designed mainly for the use of Students in the Universities. By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford. Third Edition, corrected and revised. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876. Pp. xxviii., 360.

This new Edition of Prof. Fowler's well-known and useful Manual (appearing only now, though dated 1876), is prefaced by some pointed observations on the "inconsistencies and paradoxes" into which Professor Jevons has fallen in his Principles of Science, when treating of the validity of inductive inferences, of the relation of Induction to Deduction, &c. Various alterations and additions have been made throughout the work, rendering it still more effective than hitherto for students' purposes.

BACON'S Novum Organum, Edited with Introductions, Notes, &c., by THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., Prof. of Logic in the University of Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1878. Pp. 619.

A very elaborately annotated edition, replacing the older Clarendon Press edition by Mr Kitchin. The Notes and Introduction together are intended as "a commentary which, besides explaining the difficulties of the work (by no means few or small), should also present Bacon in his relations to the History of Philosophy, Logic, and Science". Prof. Fowler has put into the seventeen distinct sections of his Introduction (amounting in all to 151 pp.) the results of much inquiry, which it may be possible on another occasion to appreciate with due care.

A Candid Examination of Theism. By PHYSICUS. (Vol. IX. of the English and Foreign Philosophical Library.) London : Trübner & Co., 1878. Pp. 197.

An essay of marked ability, that does not belie its title. It examines in six chapters-(1) various Illogical arguments in favour of Theism, (2) the argument from the existence of the Human Mind, (3) the argument from Design, (4) the argument from General Laws, (5) the logical standing of the question of the being of a God, (6) the argument from Metaphysical Teleology; and in a final chapter sums up to a conclusion mainly negative. The essay was written several years ago, before the publication of Mill's posthumous treatise. An Appendix, expository of a fallacy in Locke's use of the argument against the possibility of matter thinking on the ground of its being inconceivable that it should, is followed by four supplementary essays: (1) examining Mr Spencer's Theistical argument with reference to Mr Fiske's

"Cosmic Theism" built upon it; (2) examining Prof. Flint's Theism; (3) on the speculative standing of Materialism; (4) on the Final Mystery of Things.

Insanity in Ancient and Modern Life, with chapters on its Prevention. By DANIEL HACK TUKE, M.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1878.

Pp. 226.

The author deals in Part I. with the Prevalence of the Causes of Insanity among the Nations of Antiquity,' and enumerating as general causes-intoxication, defective nourishment, inter-marriage, emotional disturbance, and intellectual strain, finds evidence that, if not largely active in primitive races, they became distinctly so among such cultured peoples as Egyptians, Jews, Greeks, and Romans. In Part II., treating of Insanity in relation to Modern Life,' he finds, after making every possible deduction, "that there is reason to fear some real increase of occurring insanity" in this country. In Part III. he gives practical advice with a view to Self-prevention of Insanity'.

The Final Philosophy, or, System of Perfectible Knowledge issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion. By CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS, D.D., Professor in Princeton College (New Jersey, U.S.). London: Trübner & Co., 1878. Pp. 609.

The scope of this large treatise will be understood from the following Table of Contents:

"Introduction-The academic study of Christian Science. Part I. The philosophical parties as to the relations between Science and Religion— Early conflicts between them, or the historical causes of their present disturbed relations-Modern Antagonism between them, or the battle of Infidels and Apologists in each of the sciences, in philosophy, and in civilisation-Modern Indifferentism between them, or the truces of Sciolists and Dogmatists in the sciences, &c.-Modern Eclecticism between them, or the exploits of Religious Eclectics in the sciences, &c.-Modern Scepticism between them, or the surrender of Religious Sceptics in the sciences, &c. Part II. The philosophical theory of the Harmony of Science and Religion-The Umpirage of Philosophy between Science and Religion -The Positive Philosophy, or theory of Science as ignoring RevelationThe Absolute Philosophy, or theory of Omniscience as superseding Revelation-The Final Philosophy, or Theory of Perfectible Science as concurring with Revelation-Philosophia Ultima: project of the perfected Sciences and Arts."

Live Questions in Psychology and Metaphysics. By Prof. W. D. WILSON. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877. Pp. 164. Six lectures, selected from the author's Courses on Psychology and Metaphysics with History of Philosophy, as delivered to his classes in Cornell University. The first three are psychological, and treat of Sensation, Consciousness, Volition; the special aim of the author being to sift the various explanations that have been given of these fundamental facts, in the hope of clearing them of some confusion and error. Thus in regard to Sensation he remarks on the absence of any clear definition of its meaning, whether as referring to

an act fundamentally distinct from perception, or as implying that along with the latter it goes to make up one complex act. He himself proposes to limit the signification of the term to "any state of either of the two lower nerve-centres, which has been recently produced ". Perception, on the other hand, is an act of the mind, consequent on a sensation reaching the hemispheres of the brain. So in regard to Consciousness he observes that several different and conflicting interpretations have been given to the term, and then proceeds to argue that consciousness is not essential to sensation, either as an element or as a sign. The last three lectures are devoted to the consideration and proposed solution of the three great questions in Metaphysicsthe Nature and Origin of Knowledge, the Ground and Extent of Certainty or Absolute Truth, and the Nature and Limits of Real Causes. L'Imagination. Etude psychologique. Par HENRI JOLY, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Dijon. Paris: Hachette, 1877. Pp. 264. M. Joly's work, written with delightful facility of style and with fine pyschological insight, contains a very thorough study of the various forms of Imagination in health and disease. Opening with a chapter on the relation between Sensations and the Images formed from them, M. Joly puts forward as explanation of the production of images the general law that each organ struggles to live its own life, to develop and maintain itself, and to continue its normal activity even under unfavourable circumstances. Thus the organs which under external stimulus are concerned in the production of sensations tend in the absence of these conditions to resume the mode of action to which they have become accustomed. The various forms of Imagination are then traced under three heads: (1) Where the images mingle with our ordinary intelligent life without disturbing it or suspending its normal activity (Imagination in health); (2) Where the image does not put an end to the activity of sense or reason, but so interferes with them that their normal order is reversed (Hallucinations, Madness); (3) When the image is so powerful that it veritably suspends in whole or part the exercise of the other mental functions, even of the senses; our mental life is replaced by a secondary mode of existence, dominated throughout by some fixed image or idea (Somnambulism, Ecstasy). These three forms are then treated with considerable detail. Beginning with Somnambulism, M. Joly points out how the remarkable phenomena of intensified sensibility, manifested even in the absence of the normal conditions of experience, may be explained by the action of the image which is dominating the mental life of the somnambulist. The receptivity to impressions in such circumstances is determined to one definite direction, that which harmonises with the ruling idea. Numerous illustrations of this principle are given, and the facts of induced somnambulism or magnetic sleep are brought forward in support of it. In the following chapter (iv.) the author lays down as the conditions. of Hallucination, cerebral excitement, suspension of external impressions, and the involuntary exercise of memory and imagination. He

shows very clearly how the fixed idea comes to be projected and objectified through the withdrawal of corrective impressions and the enfeeblement of attention and volition. Chapters v. and vi., on Dreams, Unreflective Imitation, and Credulity, are pleasantly written, but contain nothing of importance. Chapter vii. deals fully with the action of the senses as determining the number, quality, and peculiarity of the images, and conversely with the action of images as leading to imitation of observed movements, to the actual experience of imagined sensations and motions, and to the production of states of feeling corresponding to expressive acts. The remaining four chapters contain remarks on imagination as manifested in Natural Expression, in Art, Literature, and Science.

Dei Concetti direttivi di John Stuart Mill nella Logica e nella Psicologia. Nota del Prof. ALESSANDRO PAOLI. Roma: 1877. Pp. 23. The author divides his essay into two parts. In the first, examining Mill's estimate of the value of names and the nature of general ideas, he maintains that names cannot be held to signify things or to refer directly to physical facts, and further that they cannot be taken as the data of Logic. For the purposes of thought a sensation has no other value than what it derives from its relation to other sensations, and the knowledge of any object or physical fact is moulded by the conditions in which it is presented to the mind. The true foundation, therefore, for the rules of Logic is to be found not in names, but in the conceptions which are acquired in the process of scientific thought. When Mill attributes the decline of Logic within the last two centuries to the mistake of comparing two ideas instead of two phenomena in a proposition, he seems to the author to fall himself into a mistake. The older logicians erred, not in seeking to establish a relation between two ideas instead of two phenomena, but in adopting traditional ideas instead of following the advance of thought and recognising that Logic is subject to modification and correction from the progress of knowledge. In the second part of his essay Prof. Paoli discusses Mill's psychological doctrines. He contends that Mill by giving undue regard to phenomena and their laws has landed himself in contradictions, and misconceived the nature of the connexion existing between Logic and Psychology. The belief in the External World, the conceptions of time and space, and knowledge generally, are not to be explained by a mere fusion and union of representations; there must also be the perception of their contiguity, and the exercise of judgment.

Die Ethik David Hume's in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung. Nebst einem Anhang über die universelle Glückseligkeit als oberstes Moralprincip. Von Dr. GEORG VON GIŻYCKI. Breslau: L. Köhler, 1878. Pp. xvii., 357.

"In this treatise the author seeks to contribute to the due appreciation and true historical understanding of Hume's ethics in Germany. The Introduction deals with the doctrines of the most important English moral philosophers, viz., Bacon, Hobbes, Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Cumberland,

Locke, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson (pp. 1-30). Next follows the exposition with detailed criticism of Hume's ethics (pp. 31-196). In conclusion, a short survey is taken of the chief ethical theorists after Hume, viz., Smith, Hartley, Mackintosh, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Darwin. The essay appended (pp. 245-357) is only loosely connected with the main treatise. The contents are :-I. Arguments for the Principle of Universal Happiness (1) from the comparative study of morals and moral systems, (2) from the notion of an ultimate scientific principle, (3) from the fundamental constitution of will, (4) from general considerations pertaining to natural philosophy; II. Denomination of the Principle; III. The Nature of Happiness; IV. Why Ethics cannot rest upon the mere feeling of Duty V. Vindication of the Principle against misunderstandings and objections."

KANT'S Prolegomena, &c. Herausgegeben und historisch erklärt. Von BENNO ERDMANN. Leipzig: Voss, 1878.

"This edition is based on the view that the Prolegomena is composed of two parts essentially different in origin and tendency. Kant first intended a mere extract from the K. d. r. V. This was in great part completed, when he was moved by the Göttingen criticism to make insertions and additions of a historical and polemical cast. The different parts are separated accordingly in this edition. The Introduction (pp. 128), besides justifying the division, gives an outline of Kant's development from 1780 to '82, with a minute investigation of the relation of the Prolegg. to the first edition of the K. d. r. V., resulting in conclusions not a little different from the views hitherto prevalent as to the doctrine of the Ding-an-sich and Kant's relation to Hume. (1) It is shown that Kant in 1781 connects his idealism exclusively with the result of the Esthetic, and employs it in the Dialectic only against the psychological paralogisms and cosmological antinomies. The conclusions of the Analytic are conceived in an empiristic sense only. Owing this to the Göttingen criticism and other attacks, there takes place in the Prolegg. a change of doctrine, the attempt now being made to combine in a new way the assumption of active things-in-themselves, never doubted by Kant, with the conclusions of the Analytic. (2) It is shown, by a reference to Kant's own acount of his development in the Dorpat MSS., that his veering-round in 1769 was not determined by Hume but by the doctrine of the Antinomy, and that the emancipative influence of Hume was not felt till 1772 (after the letter to Herz). Kant regarded himself therefore not as the opponent but as the follower of Hume."

Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik.

Kritische Beiträge.

Von

GEORG ELIAS MULLER. Berlin: Grieben, 1878. Pp. 425. "The first section treats of the psychophysical methods of measurement; the author, among other things, trying to show that the method of mean errors' can give no trustworthy results, and also that the method of just observable differences' and the 'method of true and false cases' must be otherwise applied than hitherto. The second section subjects to a detailed consideration and critical sifting the whole series of experiments as yet undertaken in relation to E. H. Weber's law; and the third is occupied with its interpretation. It is shown, against Hering, Langer, Brentano, Delboeuf, and others, that the approximate validity of Fechner's formula of measurement follows as a more or less probable consequence from the facts of Weber's law; but that Fechner's psychophysical conception of the formula is far less probable than a physiological interpretation, and cannot be maintained without modification. The fourth section treats of the practical value of Weber's law."