Now it must be observed that the sense in which we speak of other hypothetical systems as being superior to our own, is by no means identical with that in which we speak of our own as being superior to that of other people. Looking back over history we perceive a change and development of the moral ideas of the race in the direction of the systems which now pervail; and this change we rightly term an improvement. But if, arguing from the past, we suppose that this improvement will continue through the indefinite future, we are misled by a false analogy. The change may very well continue; the improvement certainly will not. And the reason is clear. What we mean, or ought to mean, by an improvement in the past is an approach to our own standard, and since any change at all corresponding in magnitude to this in the future must involve a departure from that standard, it must necessarily be a change for the worse.

This is

In other words, when we speak of another system as being superior (in matter) to our own, we speak of a possible system which we should accept if we knew it. When we speak of our own system being superior to that of some other person, we assert the superiority unconditionally, and quite irrespectively of the possible acceptance of it by that other person, supposing him to be acquainted with it. If then we believe that development will proceed in the future as it has done in the past, we must suppose that a time will come when the moral ideas of the world will be as much out of our reach, supposing them presented to us, as ours would be out of reach of primitive man. also true of scientific ideas: but there is this difference between them, that whereas the change in scientific ideas may be an improvement, that in moral ideas must be a degradation. The grounds of this distinction, of course, are obvious; viz., that the standard of excellence in the case of scientific ideas is, or is supposed to be, conformity to an infinitely complex external world-a conformity which may increase with every change in the ideas. The standard of excellence, on the other hand, in moral ideas must necessarily be conformity to our actual ideal, and this conformity must diminish with every change in the ideas.

This point would not perhaps have been worth dwelling on, if it was not that the discussion brings into strong relief the nature, so far as form is concerned, of the criterion of Right, and has also some bearing on current theories of optimistic Evolution, with which I confess it does not seem possible easily to reconcile it. ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

VI.-PHILOSOPHY IN THE DUTCH UNIVERSITIES.

THE history of Philosophy among the Dutch has never yet been written. It would have little to record beyond a long series of infiltrations of foreign thought into the science, theology and literature of the Northern Netherlands. Its one great name would be that of Spinoza; and him we can scarcely consider a fair representative of the native habit of thinking. In the average learned Dutchman there is much less of his speculative daring than of the sceptical conservatism of old Erasmus. Born of a race of thrifty citizens and husbandmen, he fully appreciates the value of accurate knowledge and sound scholarship, but pure theory he generally distrusts, as likely to unsettle the even balance of his mind, and endanger the peaceful progress of human affairs. As the late Professor van Heusde puts it: "in philosophising we ask for simplicity, good sound sense, and especially good principles, that should in no wise disagree with those of our religious doctrine". Hence philosophy is valued rather as a mental exercise to be taken with moderation than as a pursuit for life after fundamental truth. For the purpose in view a summary acquaintance with existing theories and their shortcomings is commonly thought sufficient, while strict consistency is given up as a hopeless pretension, and people on their own part acquiesce in some mild and tolerant variety of Protestantism.

On the other hand there is a steady demand for French, German, and English literary productions. And in the nation itself we find a considerable admixture of foreign elements from the most different parts, to which it is indebted for much more discrepancy of opinion than one might be inclined to look for in so small and so untroubled a community. Ultramontanism, Calvinism, and Positivism, Toryism and Radicalism, all have their steadfast adherents, and there can hardly be a party in the civilised world without its sympathisers in the present kingdom of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, as in England, while everybody is speaking his mind and it frequently comes to sharp altercations, this very continuance of verbal strife has proved conducive to independence of opinion and, in the main, to a prudent forbearance from extremes.

In the present slight sketch-which will be strictly confined. to Dutch Academical Philosophy-it would take us too far to give an account of anything anterior to the Reformation. There were a few creditable schools, founded chiefly by Gerardus Magnus and his brotherhood since the fourteenth century, but the higher order of education, and all academical degrees, had to

be sought for abroad. When the change of religion made Popish universities unavailable, William of Orange persuaded the Provincial States of Holland to provide for the establishment at Leyden of a complete set of Faculties, namely Theology, Law, Medicine and Arts. To the new university a charter was granted by the Prince Stadholder under the legal fiction of an order from the nominal sovereign, King Philip II. of Spain (1575). Ten years after this, the Frisian States, on their own authority, founded a similar institution at Franeker, and their example was followed in time by those of the town and country of Groningen (1614). Harderwijk on the Zuider-Zee had a college added to its old established grammar-school by the district authorities of the Veluwe (1600), and this was afterwards endowed with the privileges of a university by the States of Gelderland (1648). The old episcopal town of Utrecht, long desirous of the same advantages, succeeded in establishing a college of its own (1634), which received academical prerogatives from the Provincial States in 1636. About the same period (1630 and 1632) identical measures were adopted by the cities of Deventer (in Overijssel) and Amsterdam. In both those cases, however, the Athenæa or Illustrious Schools, as they were called, have never been empowered by the supreme authorities to confer degrees, until, by the University Law of 1876, one has been suppressed altogether, and the other promoted to the rank of a municipal university. Meanwhile, after various accidents, Harderwijk and Franeker had been finally abrogated in 1818 and 1843 respectively. Other Athenæa had existed for some time at Nimeguen, Dordrecht, Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Middelburg.

As all these places of education depended on different sovereign powers, there was no perfect similarity in their laws and customs. The statutes of Leyden, framed by a far-sighted statesman like William the Silent, were the most liberal of all, enacting no religious or philosophical restrictions. At Franeker all the professors had to subscribe to the confessional symbols of the established Presbyterian Church, and Groningen at least did not abandon this point until 1801. Utrecht copied Groningen in one more respect. The statutes of both contain the following article: "Philosophi ab Aristotelis philosophia non recedunto, propugnatores absurdorum paradoxorum et inventores dogmatum novorum ab Aristotelica doctrina discrepantium non feruntor". In practice we shall presently find public opinion more powerful than either the liberty allowed in some places or the prohibition enacted in others.

*Utrecht added the clause "neque publice neque privatim". All the old academical statutes were superseded by the Royal Decree of 1815.

Unlike all other continental universities, those of the United Netherlands were always subjected to boards of Curators, men of rank and note, who often wielded the power of appointing and even discharging professors. They never belonged to the body of the university, but acted as delegates of the sovereign who provided for its wants. By their prudence, and the resistance they offered to clerical dictation, they were of great service in preserving freedom and peace. Of course the Calvinist clergy, inspired by zealous refugees from France and Belgium, kept struggling for influence upon the teaching at least of their own Faculty, and more than once, when they got for a moment the upper hand in public affairs, they obtained some temporary advantage. Yet the town corporation of Leyden declared from the first, that they were not willing to admit the inquisition of Geneva while making war against that of Spain. And when the famous Synod of Dordrecht demanded an ecclesiastical Curator to look after the theological faculty, its resolution remained a dead letter, and the regular Curators prevented the local synod from meddling with academical government. But the interests of their position forbade their giving countenance to very small minorities; and Spinoza, perhaps, was not far wrong when in the Tractatus Politicus he wrote: "Academiae, quae sumptibus reip. fundantur, non tam ad ingenia colenda quam ad eadem coercenda instituuntur ".

Of college life as in England and at Cologne or Louvain, there was no question except in the case of certain exhibitioners, nearly all destined for the Church. Each university had its bursa or œconomia; at Leyden the States' College subsisted from 1592 to 1810, the Collegium Gallo-Belgicum (for preachers in the French language) from 1606 to 1703. Even within these the "regenting or tutorial system" found no favour. The Principal (called Regens) and his vicegerent merely repeated with the alumni what they learnt from the Professors common to all; and other undergraduates found plenty of private

At Leyden, Franeker, Harderwijk, they were separate boards commissioned by the Provincial States and the Stadholder. At Groningen, where the sovereignty was divided between the town and the country district, each appointed its own half of the board. At Utrecht the civic authorities were themselves the Curators, who took care not to allow any academical jurisdiction, whereas at Leyden the burgomasters sat with the Curatorial board, and also in the Rector's tribunal. From 1815 the burgomaster (or mayor) of each university-town was ex officio one of the Curators, but the new Law contains no such stipulation. Of course under the present Constitution the board is in its turn subordinate to the Minister of the Interior, there being no separate department of Education. The idea of the office was evidently suggested by the Conservatores privilegiorum of older universities,

teachers ready to help them on in the same way. On Wednesdays and Saturdays there were no public lectures, but men went to hear Extraordinary Professors and licensed Readers, and, under the superintendence of any official teacher, tried their own powers in disputation.

The oldest Leyden Faculty of Arts (or Philosophy as it was surnamed) consisted of six Ordinary Professors, for Logic, Physics, Mathematics, and the three learned languages. Ethics was commonly regarded with some suspicion on account of its heathenish tendency; and Metaphysics also because of the Humanists' and Protestants' natural aversion from mediaeval subtleties. Still both were admitted as extraordinary subjects from the first, and before the middle of the seventeenth century they had obtained their place in the regular curriculum. Everyone, especially the candidate for orders, was expected to begin his studies with Humanities and Philosophy, although a degree in Arts was by no means looked on as indispensable. Nor do we find the degree of Bachelor taken except in a very few instances. To the title of Artium Liberalium Magister that of Philosophiae Doctor was superadded at a very early period, so as to put the graduates markedly on a level with the "Doctors" of the other Faculties; the celebrated Gerardus Vossius became the first A.L.M., Ph. D. of Leyden in 1598.

As might be presumed, the official philosophy was the mitigated Scholasticism adopted in the Protestant schools of the time. Of Ramism there is hardly a trace.† Jac. Arminius the divine and Rud. Snellius the mathematician, both Hollanders from Oudewater, who had taught the dialectic of Ramus in Switzerland and Germany, were called to other duties at Leyden. Two occupants of philosophical chairs, Corn. de Groot (Leyden 1575) and Henr. de Veno (Franeker 1602-13) are mentioned as inclined to Platonic doctrines, meaning apparently some form of modernising eclecticism. As far as I know, de Groot's successor Nic. van Dam (1575-79) was an Aristotelian, and so were three Belgian professors at the same place, Alex. de Ratlo (1578-87), Ant. Trutius (1582-93), and Adr. Damman (1586-88). After these and the insignificant Westerhovius (1583-84) came a Frenchman the elder Pierre du Moulin (Molinaeus, 1593-98), afterwards a minister at Paris, and

* At Bologna the Bachelor's degree was altogether unknown.

† Prof. Jo. Hachting of Franeker (1622-30), published a Dialectica Petri Rami in 1626. In mere grammar-schools the doctrine appears to have found more favour.

Ratlo had been in England, and Damman is probably the same who was called to Scotland by Geo. Buchanan, and wrote to Lipsius from Leith, in 1590.