fords him bare neceffaries, is worse than the denying him protection: it starves him. Hence the following propofition may be laid down as the corner-stone of taxation-building, "That every man ought

to contribute to the public revenue, not in proportion to his "fubftance, but to his ability." I am forry to obferve, that this rule is little regarded in British taxes; tho' nothing would contribute more to fweeten the minds of the people, and to make them fond of their government, than a regulation fraught with fo much equity.

Taxes were long in ufe before it was difcovered, that they could be made fubfervient to other purposes, befide that of fupporting government. In the fifteenth century, the states of Burgundy rejected with indignation a demand made by the Duke of a duty on falt, tho' they found no other objection, but that it would opprefs the poor people, who lived moftly on falt meat and falt fifh. It did not occur to them, that fuch a tax might hurt their manufactures, by raising the price of labour. A tax of two fhillings on every hearth, known by the name of hearth-money, was granted to Charles II. his heirs and fucceffors, for ever. It was abrogated by an act of William and Mary, ann. 1688, on the following preamble," That it is not only a great oppreffion upon the poorer fort, but a badge of slavery upon the whole people, expofing every man's houfe to be entered into and fearched at "pleasure by perfons unknown to him." Had the harm done by fuch a tax to our manufactures been at that time understood, it would have been urged as the capital reafon against the tax. Our late improvements in commercial politics have unfolded an important doctrine, That taxes are feldom indifferent to the public good; that frequently they are more oppreffive to the people, than beneficial to the fovereign; and, on the other hand, that they may be fo contrived, as to rival bounties in promoting industry, ma3 M 2 nufactures,

nufactures, and commerce. These different effects of taxes, have rendered the fubject not a little intricate.

It is an article of importance in government, to have it ascertained, what proportion of the annual income of a nation may be drawn from the people by taxes, without impoverishing them. An eighth part is held to be too much: husbandry, commerce, and population, would fuffer. Davenant fays, that the Dutch pay to the public annually the fourth part of the income of their country; and he adds, that their strict economy enables them to bear that immenfe load, without raifing the price of labour fo high as to cut them out of the foreign market. It was probably fo in the days of Davenant; but of late matters are much altered: the dearness of living and of labour, has excluded all the Dutch manufactures from the foreign market. Till the French war in King William's reign, England paid in taxes but about a twentieth part of its annual income.

THat to impofe taxes belongs to the fovereign, and to him only, is undoubted. But it has been doubted, whether even King and parliament, who poffefs the fovereign authority in Britain, can legally impofe a tax without consent of the people. The celebrated Locke, in his essay on government (a), lays down the following propofition as fundamental. " "Tis true, governments

cannot be fupported without great charge, and 'tis fit every one "who enjoys his share of protection should pay out of his estate "his proportion for the maintenance of it. But ftill it must be "with his own confent, i. e. the confent of the majority, giving "it either by themfelves, or their representatives chofen by them; "for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority, and without fuch confent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, "and fubverts the end of government. For what property have "I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to "himself?" No author has reflected more honour on his native country, and on mankind, than Mr Locke. Yet no name is above truth; and I am obliged to obferve, tho' with regret, that in the foregoing reasoning the right of impofing taxes is laid upon a very crazy foundation. It may indeed be faid with fome colour, that the freeholders virtually impower their representatives to tax them. But their vaffals and tenants, who have no vote in electing members of parliament, empower none to tax them: yet they are taxed like others; and fo are the vassals and tenants of peers. Add to these an immense number of artifans, manufacturers, day-labourers, domeftics, &c. &c. with the whole female fex; and it will appear on calculation, that those who are represented in parliament make not the hundredth part of the taxable people. But further, it is acknowledged by our author, that the majority of the Lords and Commons must bind the minority. This circumstance alone might have convinced him of his error: for furely the minority in this cafe are bound without their confent; nay, against their confent. That a state cannot tax its fubjects without their confent, is a rafh propofition, totally fubverfive of government. Locke himself has fuggested the folid foundation of taxes, tho' inadvertently he lays no weight on it. I borrow his own words: "That every one who enjoys his fhare of protection, should pay

out of his eftate his proportion for the maintenance of the go"vernment." The duties of fovereign and of fubject are reciprocal; and common juftice requires, that a fubject, or any perfon who is protected by a government, ought to pay for that protection. Similar instances without number of fuch reciprocal duties, occur in the laws of every civilized nation. A man calls for meat and drink in a tavern: is he not bound to pay the bill, tho' he made no agreement beforehand? A man is wafted over a river in a ferry-boat: muft he not pay the common fare, though he made no promife? Nay, it is every man's interest to pay for protection: government cannot fubfift without a public fund; and what will become of individuals when no longer protected, either in their perfons or goods? Thus taxes are implied in the very nature of government; and the interpofition of fovereign authority is only neceffary for determining the expediency of a tax; and the quota, if found expedient.

Many writers, misled by the refpectable authority of Locke, boldly maintain, that a British parliament cannot legally tax the American colonies, who are not represented in parliament. This propofition, which has drawn the attention of the public of late years, has led me to be more explicit on the power of impofing taxes, than otherwife would be neceffary. Those who favour the independence of our colonies urge, "That a man ought to have "the difpofal of what he acquires by honeft industry, fubject to no control: whence the neceffity of a parliament for impofing taxes, where every individual is either perfonally present, or by a representative of his own election. The aid accordingly given to a British fovereign is not a tribute, but a free and voluntary gift." What is said above will bring the dispute within a very narrow compass. If our colonists be British subjects, which hitherto has not been controverted, they are fubjected to the British legislature in every article of government; and as from the begin

ning they have been protected by Britain, they ought like other fubjects to pay for that protection. There never was a time lefs favourable to their claim of freedom from taxes, than the clofe of the late war with France. Had not Britain seasonably interpofed, they would have been swallow'd up by France, and become slaves to defpotifm.

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If it be queftioned, By what acts is a man understood to claim protection of a government; I answer, By setting his foot on the territory. If, upon landing at Dover, a foreigner be robbed, the law interpofes for him as for a native. And as he is thus protected, he pays for protection when he purchases a pair of fhoes, or a bottle of beer. The cafe is clear with respect to a man who can chufe the place of his refidence. But what fhall be faid of children, who are not capable of choice, nor of confent? They are protected; and protection implies the reciprocal duty of paying taxes. As foon as a young man is capable of acting for himself, he is at liberty to chufe other protectors, if those who have hitherto protected him be not agreeable.

If a legal power to impose taxes without consent of the people, did neceffarily imply a legal power to impose taxes at pleasure, without limitation, Locke's argument would be invincible, in a country of freedom at least. A power to impose taxes at pleasure, would indeed be an invasion of the fundamental law of property; because, under pretext of taxing, it would subject every man's property to the arbitrary will of the fovereign. But the argument has no weight, where the fovereign's power is limited. The reciprocal duties between fovereign and fubject imply, that the people ought to contribute what fums are neceffary for the fupport of government, and that the fovereign ought not to demand more. It is true, that there is no regular check against him, when he tranfgreffes his duty in this particular: but there is an effectual check in the nature of every government that is not legally defpotic, viz. a ge

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