reasoning, as stated by Diderot leaves the subject of natural, and, I may add, of revealed religion, precisely on the same footing as before, without invalidating, in the very smallest degree, the evidence for any one of the doctrines connected with either? nay more, superadding to this evidence, a mathematical demonstration of the possible truth of all those articles of belief which it was the object of Diderot to subvert from their foundation. It might be easily shown, that these principles, if pushed to their legitimate consequences, instead of establishing the just authority of reason in our constitution, would lead to the most unlimited credulity on all subjects whatever; or (what is only another name for the same thing) to that state of mind, which, in the words of Mr. Hume," does not consider any one proposition as more certain, or even as more probable, than another." The following curious and (in my opinion) instructive anecdote has a sufficient connexion with the subject of this note, to justify me in subjoining it to the foregoing observations. I transcribe it from the Notes annexed to the Abbé de Lille's poem, entitled La Conversation. (A Paris, 1812.) "Dans la société du Baron d'Holbach, Diderot proposa un jour, de nommer un avocat de Dieu, et on choisit l'Abbé Galiani. Il s'assit et débuta ainsi : "Un jour à Naples, un homme de la Basilicate prit devant nous, six dés dans un cornet, et paria d'amener rafle de six. Je dis cette chance étoit possible. Il l'amena sur le champ une seconde fois; je dis la même chose. Il remit les dés dans le cornet trois, quatre, cinq fois, et toujours rafle de six. Sangue di Bacco, m'écriai-je, les dés sont pipés; et ils l'étoient. "Philosophes, quand je considère l'ordre toujours renaissant de la nature, ses lois immuables, ses révolutions toujours constantes dans une variété infinie; cette chance unique et conservatrice d'un univers tel que nous le voyons, qui revient sans cesse, malgré cent autres millions de chances de perturbation et de destruction possibles, je m'ecrie, Certes la nature est pipée !" The argument here stated strikes me as irresistible, nor ought it at all to weaken its effect, that it was spoken by the mouth of the Abbé Galiani. Of this extraordinary person I shall have occasion afterwards to speak as a political economist. Whatever his own professed principles may have been, this theory of the loaded die appears evidently, from the repeated allusions to it in his familiar correspondence, to have produced a very deep impression on his mind. (See Correspondance inédite de l'Abbé Galiani, &c. Vol. I. pp. 18, 42, 141, 142, à Paris, 1818.)* As the old argument of the atomical atheist is plainly that on which the school of Diderot are still disposed to rest the strength of their cause, I shall make no apology for the length of this note. The sceptical suggestions on the same subject which occur in Mr. Hume's Essay on the Idea of Necessary Connexion, and which have given occasion to so much discussion in this country, do not seem to me to have ever produced any considerable impression on the French philosophers. Note (Qq.) page 346. Among the contemporaries of Diderot, the author of the Spirit of Laws is entitled to particular notice, for the respect with which he always speaks of natural religion. A remarkable instance of this occurs in a letter to Dr. Warburton, occasioned by the publication of his View of Bolingbroke's Philosophy. The letter, it must be owned, savours somewhat of the political religionist; but how fortunate would it have been for France, if, during its late revolutionary governments, such sentiments as those here expressed by Montesquieu had been more generally prevalent among his countrymen ! “ Celui qui attaque la religion révélée, n'attaque que la religion révélée; mais celui que attaque la religion naturelle, attaque toutes les religions du monde. ... Il n'est pas impossible d'attaquer une religion révélée, parce qu'elle existe par des faits particuliers, et que les faits par leur nature peuvent être une matière de dispute; mais il n'en est pas de même de la religion naturelle; elle est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la religion révélée en Angleterre? On l'y a tellement purgé de tout préjugé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut faire de mal, et qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité de biens. Je sais, qu'un homme en Espagne ou en Portugal que l'on va brûler, ou qui craint d'être brûlé, parce qu'il ne croit point de certains articles dépendans ou non de la religion révélée, a un juste sujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir quelque espérance de pourvoir à sa défense naturelle: mais il n'en est pas de même en Angleterre, où tout homme qui attaque la religion révélée l'attaque sans intérêt, et où cet homme, quand il réussiroit, quand même il auroit raison dans le fond, ne feroit que détruire une infinité de biens pratiques, pour établir une vérité purement spéculative." (For the whole letter, see the 4to edit. of Montesquieu's Works. Paris, 1788. Tome V. p. 391. Also Warburton's Works, by Hurd, Vol. VII. p. 553. London, 1758.) In the foregoing passage, Montesquieu hints more explicitly than could well have been expected from a French Magistrate, at a consideration which ought always to be taken into the account, in judging of the works of his countrymen, when they touch on the subject of religion; I mean, the corrupted and intolerant spirit of that system of faith which is immediately before their eyes. The eulogy bestowed on the church of England is particularly deserving of notice; and should serve as a caution to Protestant writers against making common cause with the defenders of the church of Rome. With respect to Voltaire, who, amidst all his extravagancies and impieties, is well known to have declared open war against the principles maintained in the Système de la Nature, it is remarked by Madame de Staël, that two different epochs may be distinguished in his literary life; the one, while his mind was warm from the philosophical lessons he had imbibed in England; the other, after it became infected with those extravagant principles which, soon after his death, brought a temporary reproach on the name of Philosophy. As the observation is extended by the very ingenious writer to the French nation in general, and draws a line between two classes of authors who are frequently confounded together in this country, I shall transcribe it in her own words. 66 "Il me semble qu'on pourroit marquer dans le dix-huitième siècle, en France, deux époques parfaitement distinctes, celle dans laquelle l'influence de l'Angleterre s'est fait sentir, et celle où les esprits se sont précipités dans la destruction: Alors les lumières se sont changées en incendie, et la philosophie, magicienne irritée, a consumé le palais où elle avoit étalé ses prodiges. "En politique, Montesquieu appartient à la première époque, Raynal à la seconde ; en religion, les écrits de Voltaire, qui avoit la tolérance pour but, sont inspirés par l'esprit de la première moitié du siècle; mais sa misérable et vaniteuse irréligion a flétri la seconde." (De l'Allemagne, Tome III. pp. 37, 38.) Nothing, in truth, can be more striking than the contrast between the spirit of Voltaire's early and of his later productions. From the former may be quoted some of the sublimest sentiments any where to be found, both of religion and of morality. In some of the latter, he appears irrecoverably sunk in the abyss of fatalism. Examples of both are so numerous, that one is at a loss in the selection. In making choice of the following, I am guided chiefly by the comparative shortness of the passages. "Consulte Zoroastre, et Minos, et Solon, Et le sage Socrate, et le grand Cicéron : Ils ont adoré tous un maître, un juge, un père ;— Le premier fondement de la sainte équité; Le frein du scélérat, l'espérance du juste. Si les cieux depouillés de leur empreinte auguste Si Dieu n'existoit pas, il faudroit l'inventer."* Nor is it only on this fundamental principle of religion that Voltaire, in his better days, delighted to enlarge. The existence of a natural law engraved on the human heart, and the liberty of the human will, are subjects which he has repeatedly enforced and adorned with all his philosophical and poetical powers. What can be more explicit, or more forcible, than the following exposition of the inconsistencies of fatalism? A thought approaching very nearly to this occurs in one of Tillotson's Sermons. "The being of God is so comfortable, so convenient, so necessary to the felicity of Mankind, that, (as Tully admirably says,) Dii immortales ad usum hominum fabricati penè videantur.-If God were not a necessary being of himself, he might almost be said to be made for the use and benefit of Man." For some ingenious remarks on this quotation from Cicero, see Jortin's Tracts, Vol. I. p. 371. "Vois de la liberté cet ennemi mutin, Il le croyoit donc libre?-Oui sans doute, et lui-même Il agit comme libre et parle comme esclave." This very system, however, which Voltaire has here so severely reprobated, he lived to avow as the creed of his more advanced years. The words, indeed, are put into the mouth of a fictitious personage; but it is plain, that the writer meant to be understood as speaking his own sentiments. "Je vois une chaîne immense, dont tout est chaînon; elle embrasse, elle serre aujourd'hui la nature," &c. &c. "Je suis donc ramené malgré moi à cette ancienne idée, que je vois être la base de tous les systèmes, dans laquelle tous les philosophes retombent apres mille détours, et qui m'est démontré par toutes les actions des hommes, par les miennes, par tous les événemens que j'ai lus, que j'ai vus, et aux-quelles j'ai eu part; c'est le Fatalisme, c'est la Nécessité dont je vous ai déjà parlé." (Lettres de Memmius à Cicéron. See Œuvres de Voltaire, Mélanges, Tome IV. p. 358. 4to. Edit. Genève, 1771) Notwithstanding, however, this change in Voltaire's philosophical opinions, he continued to the last his zealous opposition to atheism.* But in what respects it is more pernicious than fatalism, it is not easy to discover. A reflection of La Harpe's, occasioned by some strictures of Voltaire's upon Montesquieu, applies with equal force to the numberless inconsistencies which occur in his metaphysical speculations. "Les objets de méditation étoient trop étrangers à l'excessive vivacité de son esprit. Saisir fortement par l'imagination les objets qu'elle ne doit montrer que d'un côté, c'est ce qui est du Poëte; les embrasser sous toutes les faces, c'est ce qui est du Philosophe, et Voltaire étoit trop exclusivement l'un pour être l'autre." (Cours de Littérat. Tome XV. pp. 46, 47.) A late author has very justly reprobated that spiritual deification of Nature, which has been long fashionable among the French; and which, according to his own account, is at present not unfashionable in Germany. It is proper, however, to observe, that this mode of speaking has been used by two very different classes of writers; by the one, with an intention to keep as much as possible the Deity out of their view, while studying his works; by the other, as a convenient and well understood metaphor, by means of which the frequent and irreverent mention of the name of God is avoided in philosophical arguments. It was with this last view, undoubtedly, that it was so often employed by Newton, and other English philosophers of the same school. In general, when we find a writer speaking of the wise or of the benevolent intentions of nature, we should be slow in imputing to him any leaning towards atheism. Many of the finest instances of Final Causes, it is certain, which the eighteenth century has brought to light, have been first remarked by inquirers who seem to have been fond of this phraseology; and of these inquirers, it is possible that some would have been less forward in bearing testimony to the truth, had they been forced to avail themselves of the style of theologians. These speculations, therefore, concerning the intentions or designs of Nature, how reprehensible soever and even absurd in point of strict logic the language may be in which they are expressed, may often be, nay, have often been, a step towards something higher and better; and, at any rate, are of a character totally different from the blind chance of the Epicureans, or the conflicting principles of the Manicheans. See the Dict. Philosophique, Art. Athéisme. See also the Strictures on the Système de la Nature in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie; the very work from which the above quotation is taken. ↑ Frederick Schlegel. Lectures on the History of Literature. Vol. II. p. 169. (Edinburgh, 1818.) Note (R r.) page 368. "In the attempt, indeed, which Kant has made to enumerate the general ideas which are not derived from experience, but arise out of the pure understanding, Kant may well lay claim to the praise of originality." The object of this problem is thus stated by his friend, Mr. Schulze, the author of the Synopsis formerly quoted. (The following translation is by Dr. Willich, Elements, &c. p. 45.) "To investigate the whole store of original notions discoverable in our understanding, and which lie at the foundation of all our knowledge; and at the same time to authenticate their true descent, by showing that they are not derived from experience, but are pure productions of the understanding. "1. The perceptions of objects contain, indeed, the matter of knowledge, but are in themselves blind and dead, and not knowledge; and our soul is merely passive in regard to them. 2. If these perceptions are to furnish knowledge, the understanding must think of them, and this is possible only through notions (conceptions) which are the peculiar form of our understanding, in the same manner as space and time are the form of our sensitive faculty. "3. These notions are active representations of our understanding faculty; and as they regard immediately the perceptions of objects, they refer to the objects themselves only mediately. "4. They lie in our understanding as pure notions a priori, at the foundation of all our knowledge. They are necessary forms, radical notions, categories, (predicaments,) of which all our knowledge of them must be compounded: And the table of them follows. Quality; reality, negation, limitation. "Relation; substance, cause, reciprocation. Modality; possibility, existence, necessity. "5. Now, to think and to judge is the same thing; consequently, every notion contains a particular form of judgment concerning objects. There are four principal genera of judgments: They are derived from the above four possible functions of the understanding, each of which contains under it three species; namely, with respect to "Quantity, they are universal, particular, singular judgments. "Quality, they are affirmative, negative, infinite judgments. "Relation, they are categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive judgments. 66 Modality, they are problematical, assertory, apodictical judgments." These tables speak for themselves without any comment. Note (S s.) page 369. Kant's notions of Time are contained in the following seven propositions : "1. Idea temporis non oritur sed supponitur a sensibus. 2. Idea temporis est singularis, non generalis. Tempus enim quodlibet non cogitatur, nisi tanquam pars unius ejusdem temporis immensi. 3. Idea itaque temporis est intuitus, et quoniam ante omnem sensationem concipitur, tanquam conditio respectuum in sensibilibus obviorum, est intuitus, non sensualis, sed purus. 4. Tempus est quantum continuum et legum continui in mutationibus universi principium. 5. Tempus non est objectivum aliquid et reale, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio, sed subjectiva conditio per naturam mentis humanæ necessaria, quælibet sensibilia, certâ lege sibi co-ordinandi, et intuitus purus. 6. Tempus est conceptus verissimus, et, per omnia possibilia sensuum objecta, in infinitum patens, intuitivæ repræsentationis conditio. 7. Tempus itaque est principium formale mundi sensibilis absolute primum." With respect to Space, Kant states a series of similar propositions, ascribing to it very nearly the same metaphysical attributes as to Time, and running as far as possible a sort of parallel between them. "A. Conceptus spatii non abstrahitur a sensationibus externis. B. Conceptus spatii est singularis repræsentatio omnia in se comprehendens, non sub se continens notio abstracta et communis. C. Conceptus spatii itaque est intuitus purus; cum sit conceptus singularis; sensationibus non conflatus, sed omnis sensationis externæ forma fundamentalis. D. Spatium non est aliquid objectivi et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed subjectivum et ideale, e natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens, veluti schema, om nia omnino externe sensa sibi co-ordinandi. E. Quanquam conceptus spatii, ut objectivi alicujus, et realis entis vel affectionis, sit imaginarius, nihilo tamen secius respective ad sensibilia quæcunque, non solum est verissimus, sed et omnis veritatis in sensualitate externâ fundamentum." These propositions are extracted from a Dissertation written by Kant himself in the Latin language.* Their obscurity, therefore, cannot be ascribed to any misapprehension on the part of a translator. It was on this account that I thought it better to quote them in his own unaltered words, than to avail myself of the corresponding passage in Born's Latin version of the Critique of Pure Reason. To each of Kant's propositions concerning Time and Space I shall subjoin a short comment, following the same order in which these propositions are arranged above. 1. That the idea of Time has no resemblance to any of our sensations, and that it is, therefore, not derived from sensation immediately and directly, has been very often observed; and, if nobody had ever observed it, the fact is so very obvious, that the enunciation of it could not entitle the author to the praise of much ingenuity. Whether" this idea be supposed in all our sensations," or (as Kant explains himself more clearly in his third proposition)" be conceived by the mind prior to all sensation," is a question which seems to me at least doubtful; nor do I think the opinion we form concerning it a matter of the smallest importance. One thing is certain, that this idea is an inseparable concomitant of every act of memory with respect to past events; and that, in whatever way it is acquired, we are irresistibly led to ascribe to the thing itself an existence independent of the will of any being what ever. 2. On the second proposition I have nothing to remark. The following is the most intelligible translation of it that I can give. "The idea of Time is singular, not general; for any particular length of Time can be conceived only as a part of one and the same immense whole." 3. From these premises (such as they are) Kant concludes, that the idea of Time is intuitive; and that this intuition, being prior to the exercise of the senses, is not empirical but pure. The conclusion here must necessarily partake of the uncertainty of the premises from which it is drawn, but the meaning of the author does not seem to imply any very erroneous principle. It amounts, indeed, to little more than an explanation of some of his peculiar terms. 4. That Time is a continued quantity is indisputable. To the latter clause of the sentence I can annex no meaning but this, that time enters as an essential element into our conception of the law of continuity, in all its various applications to the changes that take place in Nature. 5. In this proposition Kant assumes the truth of that much contested, and, to me, incomprehensible doctrine, which denies the objective reality of time. He seems to consider it merely as a subjective condition, inseparably connected with the frame of the Human Mind, in consequence of which it arranges sensible phenomena, according to a certain law, in the order of succession. 6. What is meant by calling Time a true conception, I do not profess to understand; nor am I able to interpret the remainder of the sentence in any way but this, that we can find no limits to the range thus opened in our conceptions to the succession of sensible events. 7. The conclusion of the whole matter is, that Time is "absolutely the first formal principle of the sensible world." I can annex no meaning to this; but I have translated the original, word for word, and shall leave my readers to their own conjectures. A. It appears from this, that, in the opinion of Kant, the idea of Space is connate with the mind, or, at least, that it is prior to any information received from the senses. But this doctrine seems to me not a little doubtful. Indeed, I rather lean to the common theory, which supposes our first ideas of Space or Extension to be formed by abstracting this attribute from the other qualities of matter. The idea of Space, however, in whatever manner formed, is manifestly accompanied with an * De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Formâ et Principiis. Dissertatio pro Loco Professionis Log. et Metaph. Ordinariæ rite sibi Vindicando; quam exigentibus statutis Academicis publice tuebitur IMMANUEL KANT.-Regiomonti, 1770. |