LIFE OF WASHINGTON.

CHAPTER XIX.

Campaign of 1781.

THE Revolutionary War was now fast approaching its crisis. The union between the French and American armies was complete, and both parties felt that the opening season could not fail to bring with it decisive events and results. And so it proved. What were the plans of operation of the British Commanders, it is difficult to determine, with positiveness. It seems to have been their chief aim, to divide the forces, and distract the attention, of the American Commander-in-chief, by simultaneous, vigorous invasions and movements, in different and distant parts of the country. It was the purpose of Washington, to call forth the energies of the Colonies to the utmost possible extent, to meet and withstand the enemy, wherever he might show himself; but, while he sought to do this, at the same time he resolved to strike some signal blow, by concentrating as large a force as could be spared from other assailed or assailable points, and, by utterly overwhelming one of the larger divisions of the British army, bring the war to a close. The following extracts from a letter, addressed by Washington to General Knox, show the views of the Commanders of the American and French allied armies, in entering upon the campaign of 1781.

"SIR,-In the conference between Count de Rochambeau and myself, it was agreed, that, if, by the aid of our allies, we can have a naval superiority through the next campaign, and an army of thirty thousand men, or

double the force of the enemy at New York and its de pendencies, early enough in the season to operate in that quarter, we ought to prefer it to every other object, as the most important and decisive. And applications have been made to the court of France, in this spirit, which, it is to be hoped, will produce the desired effect.

"I give you this communication of what is in prospect, that you may take your measures accordingly, by making such estimates, demands, and other arrangements, as may appear to you best calculated to produce what we want. And you may rely upon all the assistance and support, it will be in my power to give. In your calculations, you will estimate the force on our side at about twenty thousand men. The remainder, with a proportionate field and siege apparatus, are to be supposed to be furnished by our allies. You are well acquainted with New York, and its defences, and you can, therefore, judge of the means requisite for its reduction by a siege.

The general idea of the plan of operations, if we are able to procure the force we count upon, is, to make two attacks; one against the works on York Island, and the other against the works of Brooklyn, on Long Island. The latter will, probably, be conducted by our allies. Ulterior operations must depend on circumstances. If we should find ourselves unable to undertake this more capital expedition, and if we have means equal to it, we shall attempt, as a secondary object, the reduction of Charleston; and Savannah, Penobscot, and other places, may come successively into contemplation. Your dispositions will refer to these different objects; though, indeed, a preparation for the principal one will substantially comprehend the less."

In the meanwhile, circumstances seemed to favor an attempt to concentrate a sufficient land and naval force in Virginia, and in the Chesapeake, to surround and cut off General Arnold, who was operating, at the head of a British force, in that quarter. It was natural, that a very strong desire should have been cherished to get possession of Arnold; and, in making arrangements to this end, some delay was interposed to a meeting, which had been agreed

upon, of the American and French Commanders, at New port, in Rhode Island. Washington thus writes t Count de Rochambeau, on the 19th of February, 1781

"The destruction of the corps, under the command of Arnold, is of such immense importance to the welfare of the southern States, that I have resolved to attempt it, with the detachment I now send, in conjunction with the militia, even if it should not be convenient for your Excellency to detach a part of your force, provided M. Destouches is able to protect our operation, by such a disposition of his fleet, as will give us the command of the Bay, and prevent succors being sent from New York. By a letter I have just received from Baron Steuber, who commands in Virginia, it appears we may expect every thing, from the temper of the militia, of which militia are capable; but an additional regular force to that I am sending would, no doubt, make the success much more prompt and certain."

These measures did not meet with the desired success. The French squadron, despatched to the Chesapeake, after having attempted, in vain, to reach Arnold, put to sea, and returned to Newport. The attention of Washington continued to be fixed upon his favorite project of an attack upon New York, as appears from the following passage of a letter to the President of Congress.

"Upon General Knox's return from the eastward, I desired him to form an estimate of the artillery and ordnance stores, necessary for an operation upon the largest scale, which would be that against New York. He has accordingly furnished one, a copy of which I do myself the honor to enclose, for the information of Congress, that application may be made, in time, to the States possessed of the heaviest cannon, for the loan of them, and other stores, should they be wanted, and that directions may be given to the Board of War, and those Boards whose business it is to provide ammunition and other articles, to endeavor to procure the deficiency of the estimate. We Dught, without doubt, to be prepared for an operation against New York. Should circumstances make it requisite to lessen the object, the overplus stores would,

nevertheless, form not only a valuable magazine, but such a one as we ought ever to have in reserve. The impossibility of crossing the North River with horses, and some unforeseen business, have hitherto prevented my journey to Newport, and make the time of my setting out precarious."

The following extract is from a letter, written by Washington to Count de Rochambeau, Feb. 24.

"The flattering distinction, paid to the anniversary of my birthday, is an honor, for which I dare not attempt to express my gratitude. I confide in your Excellency's sensibility, to interpret my feelings for this, and for the obliging manner in which you are pleased to announce it. The measures we have been taking for the expedition to Virginia will delay, some time, my visit to Rhode Island. I wait to see, whether Sir Henry Clinton may form any new projects in consequence. When this is ascertained, and the additional precautions we are taking for security here are completed, I shall yield to my impatience for testifying, personally, my attachment to your Excellency and your army."

On the 1st March, Washington writes to Lafayette, thus: "MY DEAR MARQUIS,I have just received letters from the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier Destouches, informing me of their intention to operate in the Chesapeake Bay, with their whole fleet, and a detachment of eleven hundred French troops, grenadiers and chasseurs included. The Chevalier expects to sail, the 5th of this month, so that you will arrive at the Head of Elk, before he appears in the Bay.

"The Count de Rochambeau requests me to send an aid-de-camp to the commanding officer in Virginia, to assemble the militia, and have every thing else ready against the arrival of the fleet. You know all the necessary directions have been given; but, to gratify the Count, I am to desire you will send Colonel Gouvion, without delay, to Baron Steuben, to communicate this latter intelligence, and press the preparations, directing the Baron, on the arrival of the French troops, to enter, immediately, into their views. You know the infi

nite value of secrecy in an expedition circumstanced like this. The Baron de Viomenil will command the French detachment. I shall set out in the morning for Rhode Island, where I hope to arrive before the fleet sails, to level all difficulties and be in the way to improve circumstances.

"Since writing the above, I have received a letter from General Greene, by which it appears, that Cornwallis, with twenty-five hundred men, was penetrating the country with very great rapidity, and Greene, with a much inferior force, retiring before him, having determined to pass the Roanoke. This intelligence, and an apprehension that Arnold may make his escape before the fleet can arrive in the Bay, induces me to give you greater latitude than you had in your original instructions. You are at liberty to concert a plan with the French general and naval commander for a descent into North Carolina, to cut off the detachment of the enemy which had ascended Cape Fear River, intercept if possible Cornwallis, and relieve General Greene and the southern States. This, however, I think ought to be a secondary object, and only attempted in case of Arnold's retreat to New York, or in case you should think his reduction would be attended with too much delay, and that the other enterprise would be more easy, and, from circumstances, more necessary. There should be strong reasons to induce a change of our first plan against Arnold, if he is still in Virginia. With a view to the second enterprise, you must be making your arrangement for transportation and supplies, and must endeavor to gain all the information you can about the country, which may be the scene of your operations.

"Continuing your march, after the fleet has withdrawn itself from the Bay, may excite suspicions of their intended return. You can cover your design by saying you are going to the assistance of General Greene. You will remember, that your corps is a part of this army, and will let this idea have proper weight in your determinations. I am, &c."