hours of physical work for which one is engaged to serve is not necessarily controlling. It must be determined, from all the facts and circumstances, whether the employe's presence on the premises was required by the nature of his service, for, unless this appear, compensation is not permissible, though the injury occur on property controlled and used by the employer in his business: Rotolo v. Furnace Company, 277 Pa. 70. In this instance, the board found lodging elsewhere impracticable, because of the feeling engendered by the strike. If, therefore, the performance of the work contemplated was to be accomplished, it became necessary to keep the employe on the ground. Further, to assure the continuance of the operations, it was requisite that outside interference be prevented, for efforts to have the strike breakers abandon their tasks were naturally to be expected, if the miners went at large. So that work could be carried on, the employer desired to control the movements of his men during the entire twenty-four hours, and, to insure a supply of necessary labor, the holding of the employes in their off time at a point to which access by others was at least made difficult, was required. As said by the court below: "The conclusion is inevitable, that the defendant was fully aware that, if the union men whom they were taken there to supplant, by virtue of the strike, were permitted to talk to the employes, they would leave their employment, either as a result of persuasion or intimidation, and, the company would be less able to operate its mine, and, to obviate this contingency, the men were confined to their quarters, so that all contact with outsiders would be avoided."

The carrying of the employe to and from work, indirectly of benefit to the master, may be within "the course of employment," while the transportation continues, as heretofore noticed: Knorr v. C. R. R. of N. J. supra. With like reason, it should be held that the occupancy of a house on the premises, under the peculiar circumstances appearing here, provided so that the employe might be on hand during working hours, was of advantage to the employer, and, when injury occured thereon, the loss should be compensable. In Lawton v. Diamond C. & C. Co., 272 Pa. 74, an award was made under a similar state of

facts, without discussion of the point here involved. There, the claimant was superintendent of a landing, and lived with his family in a house-boat attached. After regular hours, but while engaged about the wharf, an injury occured.

It is but a fair inference from the evidence to conclude that the presence of Malky was in furtherance of the needs of the master who was enabled by the segregation of the men to secure help for the actual mining which continued from seven until four. That the company believed this necessary is clearly indicated by its action in furnishing sleeping quarters, the necessary provisions, and the employment of a watchman to prevent the approach of those from the outside. It was for the employer's interest the arrangement was effected, so that the digging and removal of the coal could be made possible, and the compensation board was justified in so holding. The injury occured on the premises, where, in view of the attending circumstances, the presence of the employe was required, and brings the claim within the scope of the act.

The judgment is affirmed.

ALFRED MEUCCI v. GALLATIN COAL CO., ET AL.

Workmen's compensation-Accident in course of employment— During working hours-On public highway-Maintained by employer-Presence required-Struck by foreman— Personal enmity-Quarrel arising from employment.

The claimant was struck by the foreman of the defendant and lost the sight of his eye. The place where the blow was struck was on a public highway maintained by the defendant and beside its tipple. The claimant was called to said point by the foreman who had a dispute with him in regard to the number of cars loaded by the claimant. There was no evidence that the

quarrel was purely a personal matter unrelated to the employ

ment.

Held: The highway where the accident occurred was used by the defendant in its business and the presence of the claimant was required by the nature of his employment. The blow of the foreman was directed against the claimant because of his employment and not for personal reasons. The injury, is therefore compensable.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, No. 12, October Term, 1923. Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Affirmed.

SADLER, J., January 7, 1924:

Defendant and its insurance carrier have appealed from an award of compensation to claimant, Meucci, for the loss of an eye. The right to any judgment is denied because, it is averred, the accident did not take place on the premises of the employer, and, further, was the result of a personal altercation between plaintiff and his foreman.

Facts found by the referee, approved by the board and court below, show the Gallatin Coal Company operated a mine, and employed one Crompton as boss, and Meucci as a miner. Its entrance was on the hillside with the tipple below, partly constructed on a township road, used by the company for its business purposes in loading and unloading, and kept in repair and maintained by it. On September 11, 1920, a dispute arose as to the number of cars taken out by the claimant, he insisting on credit for thirty-three instead of thirty, as indicated by the foreman's record. Words ensued in the morning, but the discussion was abandoned for the time, and Meucci remained at his work in the mine until afternoon. He came from the shaft between two and three o'clock to await the disappearance of smoke caused by the blasting within, but had not terminated his task for the day. The foreman was then on the roadway beside the tipple, and called for Meucci to come down. When he did so, further argument followed as to the amount due for coal mined,

.

and, in its course, Crompton used offensive language, whereupon he was struck by claimant, and, in turn, hit the latter, knocking him down, causing a loss of the sight of his only remaining eye. It was for this injury compensation was given.

The first objection to an allowance rests on the assertion that the accident took place on the highway, and not on the property of the company. The referee found the fight to have been "on the public road used and maintained by the defendant for the operation of its business and affairs," and, in so holding, he was amply justified by the evidence. The word "premises," as meant by the compensation act, does not include all property owned by the employer, but does embrace that used in connection with the actual place of work where the employer carries on the business in which the employee is engaged: Tolen v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 270 Pa. 12. This principle was later recognized in Schickley v. P. & R. C. & I Co., 274 Pa. 360, though recovery was there denied on the facts appearing. Proof that the property was employed by defendant, in the conduct of its affairs, is not enough by itself, however to justify an award, and the claimant must establish his presence thereon at the time of injury was required by the nature of his employment (Rotolo v. Punxsutawney Furnace Co., 277 Pa. 70), a burden which was successfully met in the present case.

There must be considered, further, whether the injury to Meucci was "caused by an act of a third person intended to injury the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe, or because of his employment," (Act June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, art. III, sec. 301), for, if the accident is attributable to an assault, the result of enmity existing between those engaged, apart from the service, there can be no recovery under the terms of the act; Cawley v. American Express Co., 276 Pa. 160. In that case, the dispute arose concerning a matter having no connection with the employment, and while the workmen were on the way from work, though still on the company's property. Here, the referee has found the claimant lost the use of his right eye from a blow of the foreman "directed against him because of his employment, and not

for personal reasons, and that the accident occurred upon the premises occupied by the defendant." In the proof of the latter fact, this case is distinguished from Maguire v. Less & Sons, Co., 273 Pa. 85, the quarrel there relating to a matter connected with the master's business, the assault not occurring, however, on property where the presence of the employe was required by the nature of the employer's affairs, but after working hours on a public street, 500 feet distant.

The burden rested on defendant to show the claim came within the exception to liability, as defined by the act, and that the injury resulted from an attack arising from personal difficulties (Keyes v. N. Y., O. & W. Ry. Co., 265 Pa. 105; O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 278 Pa. 52), and this it failed to meet. On the contrary it clearly appeared the quarrel developed from the claim of payment for labor performed, the amount of which was in dispute. That anger was excited by the controversy, between those engaged is doubtless true, but the trouble had its origin in the service, and was therefore compensable, the attack having been upon property used by the company in the carrying on of the particular business. It is to be kept in mind that it is not necessary to hold the accident arose from the employment, but the claim is compensable if shown to have occurred in the course thereof, other essential requirements of the act being proven: Hale v. Savage Fire Brick Co., 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 454.

Under circumstances such as here appear, awards have frequently been made by the compensation board, but the only appellate cases, where the right to recover for injuries so occasioned is discussed, are those hereinabove cited. Similar facts appeared in Lawton v. Diamond Coal & Coke Company, 272 Pa. 74, the decedent having been killed with a knife during a controversy, but the decision, affirming an award, turned on another question. In other states, though the compensation acts are more stringnt in their requirements, recoveries have been sustained where the disputes as to working condition, or claims, as here, led to the fight which ended in harm: Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission 301 Ill. 548, 134 N. E. 172; Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern Son, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126; Janschewsky v.