therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, 60. If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations as those imposed by her Compensation Statute, other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded. A far more serious injury would result to commerce than could have been inflicted by the Washington statute authorizing a materialman's lien, condemned in The Roanoke. The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to extend the statute under consideration to conditions like those here disclosed."

In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (pp. 163, 164, 166), where claim was made under the New York Act on account of the death of a bargeman who fell into the Hudson River and drowned, this was said

"We conclude that [by the Act of October 6, 1917] Congress undertook to permit application of Workmen's Compensation Laws of the several States to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and to save such statutes from the objections pointed out by Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. It sought to authorize and sanction action by the States in prescribing and enforcing, as to all parties concerned, rights, obligations, liabilities and remedies designed to provide compensation for injuries suffered by employees engaged in maritime work.

"And so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement, arises from the Constitution, as above indicated. The definite object of the grant was to commit direct control to the Federal Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union.

"Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that in their characteristic features and essential international and interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended or changed except by legislation which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its discretion— not for delegation to others. To say that because Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it could authorize the States to do so as they might desire, is false reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated but actually established-it would defeat the very purpose of the grant. See Sudden & Christenson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 188 Pac. Rep. 803.

"Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the Statesby nature this is non-delegable.

"Here, we are concerned with a wholly different constitutional provision-one which for the purpose of securing harmony and uniformity, prescribes a set of rules, empowers Congress to legislate to that end, and prohibits material interference by the States. Obviously, if every State may freely declare the rights and liabilities incident to maritime employment, there will at once arise the confusion and uncertainty which framers of the Constitution both foresaw and undertook to prevent.' In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, a proceeding begun in admiralty to recover damages for death of a stevedore fatally injured while working in the hold of a vessel then anchored and discharging her cargo, we held (p. 242)-"As the logical result of prior decisions we think it follows that, where death upon such waters results from a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a State whose statutes give a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such right is given. The subject is maritime and local in character and the specified modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts when following the com

mon law, will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.'

Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde was a proceeding in admiralty to recover damages from the ship-builder for injuries which the carpenter received while working on an unfinished vessel moored in the Willamette River at Portland, Oregon. The contract for constructing The Ahala was nonmaritime, and although the incompleted structure upon which the accident occurred was lying in navigable waters, neither Rohde's general employment nor his activities at that time had any direct relation to navigation or commerce." We held the matter was only a local concern and that to permit the rights and liabilities of the parties to be determined by the local law would not interfere with characteristic features of the general maritime rules. We also pointed out the conclusion was in entire accord with prior cases.

Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co. related to a claim based upon death which resulted from injuries received by the longshoreman while on the dock-a matter never within the admiralty jurisdiction. "Insana was injured upon the dock, an extension of the land (Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316), and certainly, prior to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer's liability for damages would have depended upon the common law and the state statutes. Consequently, when the Compensation Act superseded other state laws touching the liability in question, it did not come into conflict with any superior maritime law. And this is true whether awards under the act are made as upon implied agreements or otherwise. The stevedore's contract of employment did not contemplate any dominant Federal rule concerning the master's liability for personal injuries received on land."

None of the latter causes depart from the doctrine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, and,

we think, the provisions of the Act of 1922 cannot be reconciled therewith.

Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several States. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity; otherwise wide discretion is left to Congress. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. Exercising another power-to regulate commerce-Congress has prescribed the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for damages to employees (Act April 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65) and thereby abrogated conflicting local rules. New York Central R. R. C. v Winfield, 244 U. S. 147.

This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt to prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest purpose was to permit any State to alter the maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent this result the Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of maritime rights and obligations. The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port, are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the States may prefer local rules; but the Union was formed from intolerable restrictions incident to such control. The subject is national. Local interests must yield to the common welfare. The Constitution is supreme.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES. The reasoning of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, and cases following it never has satisfied me and therefore I should have been glad to see a limit set to the principle. But I must leave it to those who think the principle right to say how far it extends.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, dissenting.

A concern, doing a general upholstering business in New York, directs one of its regular employees, resident there, to make repairs on a vessel lying alongside a New York dock. The ship, then temporarily out of commission, is owned and enrolled in New York, and when used is employed only within the State. While on the vessel engaged in making the repairs, the employee is injured without the fault of anyone and is disabled for life. A statute of New York provides that, in such a case, he and his dependents shall receive compensation out of funds which employers are obliged to provide. To such state legislation Congress has, in express terms, given its sanction. Under the rule announced by the Court, the Federal Constitution prohibits recovery. If, perchance, the accident had occurred while the employee so engaged was on the dock, the Constitution would permit recovery." Or, if happily he had been killed and the accident had been due to the employer's negligence, recovery (which is provided for by another state statute) would likewise be permitted under the Constitution, even though the accident had occurred on board the vessel.

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The Constitution contains, of course, no provision which, in terms, deals, in any way, with the subject of workmen's compensation. The prohibition found by the Court rests solely upon a clause in Section 2 of Article III: "The judicial power [of the

'Compare Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121, a stevedore; also, Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Danielson, 235 N. Y. 439; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756; Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Warren, 235 N. Y. 445; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756; Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Connelly, 235 N. Y. 602; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756, all drydock employes. In Industrial Accident Com. v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., 218 Pac. 563; certiorari denied Jan. 28, 1924, the injury occurred in connection with the operations of a harbor dredger, not engaged in commerce or navigation. In Industrial Accident Com. v. Alaska Packing Association, 218 Pac. 561; certiorari denied Jan. 28, 1924, the accident occurred on an Alaska fishing vessel while laid up for the winter at San Francisco, alongside the dock.

'State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263, a stevedore.

"Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479, a member of the crew; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, a stevedore. See also Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398.

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