formulating rules and regulations applying to bouts of every character.

Opinion to Mr. Wm. H. Rocap, Chairman, Pennsylvania Athletic Commission, Philadelphia, Penna.

GEO. W. WOODRUFF, ATTY. GEN., January 8, 1924:

Pursuant to a telephone conversation between us at the time of the meeting of the Athletic Commission, I hereby reaffirm my verbal opinion to the effect that it is contrary to Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States for the Pennsylvania Athletic Commission to attempt to enforce a general regulation prohibiting mixed bouts, namely, bouts or sparring exhibitions in which the opposing contestants are one white and the other colored.

Article XIV of the Federal Constitution provides:

*** No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Moreover Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution provides :

"No State shall * * * obligation of contracts."

pass any

**** law impairing the

If a general regulation forbidding the carrying on of “mixed” boxing or sparring bouts is adopted, it, to begin with, deprives some persons of their property, (their right to carry on legally the business of taking part in boxing or sparring exhibitions) without due process of law. It also must in many instances impair obligations of contracts entered into for such mixed boxing or sparring bouts.

A regulation of the Athletic Commission under the power granted to it by the State law has the effect of a law passed by the State, otherwise, the regulation has no force or effect.

If the trouble aimed at is the danger of brutality or riot the cure of that danger should be sought not by a general prohibition of "mixed bouts" but by a rule which will insure as far as possible that all "bouts" shall be free of brutality, and that the clubs or associations or persons conducting such bouts must insure that bouts shall be free of riot or unseemly disorder of any kind.

Finally, it is my affirmed opinion that you should rescind absolutely, if you have not done so already, your rule against "mixed bouts," and if you desire, substitute for it a general rule to prevent disorder, riot, brutality and the like.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

ANNA ELKINS v. CAMBRIA LIBRARY ASSN., ET AL.

Workmen's compensation-Limitation-No claim petition filed within one year of date of accident or within one year after receiving payment of compensation.

Where no claim petition has been filed within one year from the date of the accident and no compensation has been received within the year preceding the fixing of a claim petition, the claim is barred by limitation. Payments made by way of salary to an employe who though previously injured continued to work cannot be construed as payments of compensation in the absence of evidence tending to show such an intent.

In the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. No. 7, April Term, 1924. Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. Reversed.

PORTER, J., November 19, 1923:

The Cambria Library Association and the State Workmen's Insurance Fund of Pennsylvania appeal from the judgment of the court below affirming the findings of the referee and the Workmen's Compensation Board and directing payment to be made by defendant or the insurance carrier for the disability of plaintiff. But one question for decision is presented by the record in this case, viz: Was the claim barred by section 315 of the Compensation Act,

The accident had occurred on November 15, 1919, and the plaintiff took no steps to secure compensation until March 16, 1921, when she filed her petition with the Workmen's Compensation Board and notice was given to the State Workmen's Insurance Fund. More than a year having elapsed without the parties having agreed upon the compensation payable and no peti

tion having been filed as provided by the statute, the claim was barred, unless there had been a "payment of compensation' within the purview of the concluding language of section 315, which is as follows: "Where, however, payments of compensation have been made in any case, said limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time of the making of the last payment." The referee and the Workmen's Compensation Board found that there had been a payment of compensation within one year prior to the filing of the petition, and awarded compensation to the plaintiff. Our duty is to ascertain whether there was any evidence to sustain this finding.

There is no conflict of testimony in this case. The employment of the plaintiff was upon a monthly salary of forty dollars. The accident occurred on November 15, 1919 and resulted in an injury to her knee which rendered her unable to work for three weeks, during which period she remained at her home but was not attended by any physician. She was paid her full monthly salary, without deduction for the three weeks during which she did not work. She resumed work on December 7th and worked up until July 1920 and received regular payment of her monthly salary. The testimony of the plaintiff as to the manner in which she did her work, during this period of seven months after her return was very meager, when asked the questions: "Q. And during the time that you were back at work did your injury interfere in any way with your work? A. Well, I think it did; of course I wasn't well; I still did my work. Q. Did your knee give you any trouble? A. It did." The only reference to "payment of compensation" in the testimony of the plaintiff was in her reply to a single question: Q. Were you ever paid compensation for your injury? A. Only paid my wages. Miss Drew, first assistant librarian of the Cambria Library Association, was called as a witness by the plaintiff and testified as to the happening of the accident, and was asked, by counsel for plaintiff: "Q. Do you know whether Mrs. Elkins was paid compensation during period? A. Not that I know of. Q. Was she paid Salary? A. Yes, paid by month; customary when off sick. Q. Was she paid salary but

no compensation during that period that the was off, in 1919? A. Yes, sir." Miss Berkey, the librarian, was called as a witness by the plaintiff and the following testimony elicited: Was Mrs. Elkins paid compensation as such by you? A. Not at all; she was being paid by the month and I thought she being unable to work her salary was due her; I simply paid her her salary. Q. Was this payment of salary to compensate her for loss due to injury? A. I didn't consider it from that standpoint; I viewed it from the standpoint that I would have paid one of my assistants as salary due her; paid by month, and I told Mr. Moore what I had done." The witness was interrogated as to the manner in which plaintiff worked during the period from December 1919 to July 1920 as follows: "Q. Did she work regularly following her return? A. Well, no, I don't believe she did, not every day; I have record of her going right along at intervals, but she didn't work every day. Q. Did she make complaint of this injury? A. Not to me." The last named witness as well as the plaintiff testified that when plaintiff left the employ of the Library Association in July 1920, she said nothing about being incapacitated because of the injury to her knee in the preceding November. This is all the evidence in the case which has any bearing upon the payments which were made to the plaintiff, within one year prior to the filing of her claim petition. It may be that when an employe suffers an injury and receives, during the period that he is totally incapacitated and not doing any work, regular payments which in amount equal what his wages would be if he were at work; this fact would warrant an inference that the payment was compensation for the injury, but that question we are not now called upon to decide. This plaintiff did not file her petition within one year after the date when she resumed work. The only payments which she received within the year prior to the filing of her petition were those for the months of March, April, May and June, for which she was paid her regular monthly salary, but during that period she was working. The plaintiff testifies that she "did her work" and Miss Berkey testifies that plaintiff was working, although not every day during the period.