صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

and were thus restored to at least nominal freedom. A similar revolution occurred a few years later at Syracuse, where, on the death of Hieron (B. c. 467), the power passed into the hands of Thrasybulus, whose violent and tyrannical proceedings quickly excited an insurrection among the Syracusans. This became the signal for a general revolt of all the cities of Sicily, who united their forces with those of the Syracusans, and succeeded in expelling Thrasybulus from his strongholds of Ortygia and Achradina (Diod. xi. 67, 68), and thus driving him from Sicily.

[ocr errors]

which were threatened by their more powerful Doric neighbours. But the operations of these commanders, as well as of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who followed them in B. C. 425 with a large force, were of an unimportant character, and in B. C. 424 a general pacification of the Greek cities in Sicily was brought about by a congress held at Gela (Thuc. iv. 58, 65). But the peace thus concluded did not remain long unbroken. The Syracusans took advantage of the intestine dissensions at Leontini to expel the democratic party from that city: while the Selinuntines were engaged in war with their non-Hellenic neighbours the Segestans, whom they pressed so hard that the latter were forced to apply for assistance to Athens. The Leontine exiles also sued for aid in the same quarter, and the Athenians, who were at this time at the height of their power, sent out an expedition on the largest scale, nominally for the protection of their allies in Sicily, but in reality, as Thucydides observes, in hopes of making them

The fall of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse (B. C. 466) became for a time the occasion of violent internal dissensions in most of the Sicilian cities, which in many cases broke out into actual warfare. But after a few years these were terminated by a general congress and compromise, B. C. 461; the exiles were allowed to return to their respective cities: Camarina, which had been destroyed by Gelon, was repeopled and became once more a flou-selves masters of the whole island (Thuc. vi. 6). rishing city; while Catana was restored to its original Chalcidic citizens, and resumed its ancient name (Diod. xi. 76). The tranquillity thus reestablished was of unusual permanence and duration; and the half century that followed was a period of the greatest prosperity for all the Greek cities in the island, and was doubtless that when they attained (with the exception of Syracuse) their highest degree of opulence and power. This is distinctly stated by Diodorus (1. c.) and is remarkably confirmed by the still existing monuments,-all the greatest architectural works being referable to this period. Of the form of government established in the Sicilian cities at this time we have little information, but it seems certain that a democratic constitution was in almost all instances substituted for the original oligarchies.

But prosperous as this period (B. c. 461-409) undoubtedly was, it was by no means one of unbroken tranquillity. It was disturbed in the first instance by the ainbitious schemes of Ducetius, a Siculian chief, who endeavoured to organise all the Sicels of the interior into one confederacy, which should be able to make head against the Greek cities. He at the same time founded a new city, to which he gave the name of Palice, near the sacred fountain of the Palici. But these attempts of Ducetius, remarkable as the only instance in the whole history of the island in which we find the Sicels attempting to establish a political power of their own, were frustrated by his defeat and banishment by the Syracusans in B. C. 451; and though he once more returned to Sicily and endeavoured to establish himself on the N. coast of the island, his projects were interrupted by his death, B. C. 445. (Diod. xi. 88, 90-92, xii. 8, 29.) He found no successor; and the Sicels of the interior ceased to be formidable to the Greek cities. Many of their towns were actually reduced to subjection by the Syracusans, while others retained their independent position; but the operation of Hellenic influences was gradually diffusing itself throughout the whole island.

The next important event in the history of Sicily is the great Athenian expedition in B. c. 415. Already, at an earlier period, soon after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had interfered in the affairs of Sicily, and, in B. C. 427, had sent a squadron under Laches and Charoeades to support the Ionic or Chalcidic cities in the island,

It is impossible here to relate in detail the proceedings of that celebrated expedition, which will be more fully noticed in the article SYRACUSAE, and are admirably related in Grote's History of Greece, vol. viii. ch. 58-60. Its failure may be attributed in great measure to the delays and inactivity of Nicias, who lingered at Catana, instead of proceeding at once to besiege Syracuse itself, and thus gave the Syracusans time to strengthen and enlarge their fortifications, at the same time that they revived the courage of their allies. The siege of Syracuse was not actually commenced till the spring of 414 B. C., and it was continued till the month of September, 413 B. C., with the most unremitting exertions on both sides. The Syracusans were supported by the chief Dorian cities in the island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which stood aloof from the contest, as well as by a portion of the Sicel tribes: but the greater part of those barbarians, as well as the Chalcidic cities of Naxos and Catana and the Segestans, furnished assistance to the Athenians (Thuc. vii. 57, 58).

The total defeat of the Athenian armament (by far the most formidable that had been seen in Sicily since that of the Carthaginians under Hamilcar), seemed to give an irresistible predominance to the Dorian cities in the island, and to Syracuse especially. But it was not long before they again found themselves threatened by a still more powerful invader. The Selinuntines immediately took advantage of the failure of the Athenians to renew their attacks upon their neighbours of Segesta, and the latter, feeling their inability to cope with them, now applied for protection to Carthage. It is remarkable that we hear nothing of Carthaginian intervention in the affairs of Sicily from the time of the battle of Himera until this occasion, and they seem to have abandoned all ambitious projects connected with the island, though they still maintained a footing there by means of their subject or dependent towns of Panormus, Motya, and Soluntum. But they now determined to avail themselves of the opportunity offered them, and sent an armament to Sicily, which seemed like that of the Athenians, calculated not so much for the relief of Segesta as for the conquest of the whole island. Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar who had been slain at Himera, landed at Lilybaeum, in B. C. 409, with an arıny estimated at 100,000 men, and marching straight upon Selinus, laid siege at once to the city. Selinus was at this

time, next to Agrigentum and Syracuse, probably the most flourishing city in Sicily, but it was wholly unprepared for defence, and was taken after a siege of only a few days, the inhabitants put to the sword or made prisoners, and the walls and public buildings razed to the ground (Diod. xiii. 54-58). From thence Hannibal turned his arms against Himera, which was able to protract its resistance somewhat longer, but eventually fell also into his power, when in order to avenge himself for his grandfather's defeat, he put the whole male population to the sword, and so utterly destroyed the city that it was never again inhabited (Id. xiii. 59-62).

communities of the interior. It was not till he had effected these conquests, as well as made vast preparations for war, by enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Syracuse and building an enormous fleet, that he proceeded to declare war against Carthage, B. c. 397. His first successes were rapid and sudden : almost all the cities that had recently been added to the Carthaginian dominion declared in his favour, and he carried his victorious arms to the extreme W. point of Sicily, where Motya, one of the chief strongholds of the Carthaginian power, fell into his hands after a long siege. But the next year (B. C. 396) the state of affairs changed. Himilco, who landed in Sicily with a large army, not only recovered Motya and other towns that had been taken by Dionysius, but advanced along the N. coast of the island to Messana, which he took by assault and utterly destroyed. Dionysius was even compelled to shut himself up within the walls of Syracuse, where he was closely besieged by Himilco, but a sudden pestilence that broke out in the Carthaginian camp reduced them in their turn to such straits that Himilco was glad to conclude a secret capitulation and retire to Africa (Diod. xiv. 47

After these exploits Hannibal returned to Carthage with his fleet and army. But his successes had now awakened the ambition of the Carthaginian people, who determined upon a second invasion of Sicily, and in B. C. 406 sent thither an army still larger than the preceding, under the command of Hannibal. Agrigentum, at this time at the very highest point of its power and opulence, was on this occasion the first object of the Carthaginian arms, and though the citizens had made every preparation for defence, and in fact were enabled to prolong their resistance for a period of eight months-76). Hostilities with Carthage were renewed in they were at length compelled by famine to surrender. The greater part of the inhabitants evacuated the city, which shared the fate of Selinus and Himera (Diod. xiii. 81, 91).

B. C. 393, but with no very decisive result, and the peace concluded in the following year (B. C. 392) seems to have left matters in much the same state as before. In B. c. 383 war again broke out between Dionysius and the Carthaginians, but after two great battles, with alternate success on both sides, a fresh treaty was concluded by which the river Halycus was established as the boundary between the two powers. The limit thus fixed, though often infringed, continued to be recognised by several successive treaties, and may be considered as forming from henceforth the permanent line of demarcation between the Carthaginian and the Greek power in Sicily (Diod. xv. 17).

Three of the principal Greek cities in Sicily had thus already fallen, and in the spring of B. c. 405, Himilco, who had succeeded Hannibal in the command, advanced to the attack of Gela. Meanwhile the power of Syracuse, upon which the other cities had in a great degree relied for their protection, had been in great measure paralysed by internal dissensions and Dionysius now availed himself of these to raise himself to the possession of despotic power. But his first operations were not more successful than those of the generals he replaced, and after an ineffectual attempt to relieve Gela, he abandoned both that city and Camarina to their fate, the inhabitants of both emigrating to Leontini. Dionysius was able to fortify himself in the supreme power at Syracuse, and hastened to conclude peace with Himilco upon terms which left the Carthaginians undis-origin from the reign of the elder Dionysius and the puted masters of nearly half of Sicily. In addition to their former possessions, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum were to be subject to Carthage, while the inhabitants of Gela and Camarina were to be allowed to return to their native cities on condition of becoming tributary to Carthage (Diod. xiii. 114.)

From this time Dionysius reigned with undisputed authority at Syracuse for a period of 38 years (B. C. 405-367), and was able at his death to transmit his power unimpaired to his son. But though he raised Syracuse to a state of great power and prosperity, and extended his dominion over a large part of Sicily, as well as of the adjoining part of Italy, his reign was marked by great and sudden changes of fortune. Though he had dexterously availed himself of the Carthaginian invasion to establish his power at Syracuse, he had no sooner consolidated his own authority than he began to turn his thoughts to the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the island. His arms were, however, directed in the first instance against the Chalcidic cities of Sicily, Naxos, Catana, and Leontini, all of which successively fell into his power, while he extended his dominions over a great part of the Sicel

(For a more detailed account of the reign of Dionysius and his wars with the Carthaginians, see the article DIONYSIUS in the Biogr. Dict. Vol. I. p. 1033. The same events are fully narrated by Mr. Grote, vol. x. ch. 81, 82, and vol. xi. ch. 83.)

Several important towns in Sicily derived their

revolutions which then took place in the island. Among these were TAUROMENIUM, which arose in the place and not far from the site of the ancient Naxos, which had been finally destroyed by Dionysius: TYNDARIS, founded by the Syracusan despot on the N. coast of the island, with a body of colonists principally of Messenian origin; ALAESA, in the same part of Sicily, founded by the Sicel chief Archonides; and LILYBAEUM, which grew up adjoining the port and promontory of that name, a few miles S. of Motya, the place of which it took as one of the principal Carthaginian ports and strongholds in the island.

The power of Syracuse over the whole of the eastern half of Sicily appeared to be effectually consolidated by the elder Dionysius, but it was soon broken up by the feeble and incompetent government, of his son. Only ten years after the death of the father (B.C. 357), Dion landed in Sicily at the head of only a few hundred mercenary troops, and raised the standard of revolt; all the dependent subjects of Syracuse soon flocked around it, and Dion was welcomed into the city itself by the acclamations of the citizens. Dionysius himself was absent at the time, but the island-citadel of Ortygia was held by

his garrison, and still secured him a footing in Sicily. It was not till after a long blockade that his son Apollocrates was compelled to surrender it into the hands of Dion, who thus became master of Syracuse, B. C. 356. But the success of Dion was far from restoring liberty to Sicily, or even to the Syracusans: the despotic proceedings of Dion excited universal discontent, and he was at length assassinated by Callippus, one of his own officers, B. C. 353. The period that followed was one of great confusion, but with which we are very imperfectly acquainted. Successive revolutions occurred at Syracuse, during which the younger Dionysius found means to effect his return, and became once more master of Ortygia. But the rest of the city was still held by a leader named Hicetas, who called in the assistance of the Carthaginians. Ortygia was now besieged both by sea and land by a Carthaginan fleet and army. It was in this state of things that a party at Syracuse, equally opposed to Hicetas and Dionysius, had recourse to the parent city of Corinth, and a small force of 1200 soldiers was sent to their assistance under Timoleon, B. C. 344. His successes were rapid and brilliant; and within less than two months from his landing in Sicily, he found himself unexpectedly in the possession of Ortygia, which was voluntarily surrendered to him by Dionysius. Hicetas and the Carthaginians were, however, still masters of the rest of the city; but mistrust and disunion enfeebled their defence: the Carthaginian general Magon suddenly withdrew his forces, and Timoleon easily wrested the city from the hands of Hicetas, B. C. 343.

Syracuse was now restored to liberty and a democratic form of government; and the same change was quickly extended to the other Greek cities of Sicily. These had thrown off the yoke of Syracuse during the disturbed period through which they had recently passed, but had, with few exceptions, fallen into the hands of local despots, who had established themselves in the possession of absolute power. Such were, Hicetas himself at Leontini, Mamercus at Catana, and Hippon at Messana, while minor despots, also of Greek origin, had obtained in like manner the chief power in the Siculian cities of Apollonia, Centuripa and Agyrium. Timoleon now turned his arms in succession against all these petty rulers, and overthrew them one after another, restoring the city in each case to the possession of independent and free self-government. Meanwhile the Greeks had been threatened with a more general danger from a fresh Carthaginian invasion; but the total defeat of their generals Hasdrubal and Hamilcar at the river Crimisus (B. C. 340), one of the most brilliant and decisive victories ever gained by the Greeks over the Carthaginians, put an end to all fears from that quarter and the peace that followed once more established the Halycus as the boundary between the two nations (Diod. xv. 17).

The restoration of the Sicilian Greeks to liberty by Timoleon, was followed by a period of great prosperity. Many of the cities had suffered severely, either from the exactions of their despotic rulers, or from the troubles and revolutions that had taken place, but these were now recruited with fresh colonists from Corinth, and other cities of Greece, who poured into the island in vast numbers; the exiles were everywhere restored, and a fresh impulse seemed to be given to the development of Hellenic influences in the island. Unfortunately this period

twenty three years after the battle of the Crimisus, a despotism was again established at Syracuse by Agathocles (B. C. 317), an adventurer who raised himself to power by very much the same means as the elder Dionysius, whom he resembled in energy and ability, while he even surpassed him in sanguinary and unsparing severity. The reign of Agathocles (B. C. 317 289) was undoubtedly a period that exercised the most disastrous influence over Sicily; it was occupied in great part with internal dissensions and civil wars, as well as by long continued struggles between the Greeks and Carthaginians. Like Dionysius, Agathocles had, in the first instance, made use of Carthaginian support, to establish himself in the possession of despotic power, but as he gradually extended his aggressions, and reduced one Greek city after another under his authority, he in his turn came into fresh collision with Carthage. In B. C. 310, he was defeated at the river Himera, near the hill of Ecnomus, by the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, in so decisive a battle that it seemed to extinguish all his hopes : his allies and dependent cities quickly threw off his yoke, and Syracuse itself was once more blockaded by a Carthaginian fleet. In this extremity Agathocles adopted the daring resolution of transporting his army to Africa, and carrying on the war at the very gates of Carthage. During his absence (which was protracted for nearly four years, B. c. 310-307) Hamilcar had brought a large part of Sicily under the dominion of Carthage, but was foiled in all his attempts upon Syracuse, and at length was himself taken prisoner in a night attack, and put to death. The Agrigentines, whose name had been scarcely mentioned for a long period, but whose city appears to have been revived under Timoleon, and now again appears as one of the most considerable in Sicily, made a fruitless attempt to raise the banner of freedom and independence, while the Syracusan exile Deinocrates, at the head of a large army of exiles and mercenaries, maintained a sort of independent position, aloof from all parties. But Agathocles, on his return from Africa, concluded peace with Carthage, and entered into a compromise with Deinocrates, while he established his own power at Syraouse by a fearful massacre of all that were opposed to him. For the last twelve years of his reign (B. C. 301-289), his dominion seems to have been firmly established over Syracuse and a great part of Sicily, so that he was at liberty to follow out his ambitious schemes in the south of Italy and elsewhere.

After the death of Agathocles (B. C. 289), Sicily seems to have fallen into a state of great confusion; Syracuse apparently still retained its predominant position among the Greek cities, under a despot named Hicetas: but Agrigentum, which had also fallen into the hands of a despot named Phintias, was raised to a position that almost enabled it to dispute the supremacy. Phintias extended his dominion over several other cities, and having made himself master of Gela, utterly destroyed it, in order to found and people a new city at the mouth of the river Himera, to which he gave the name of Phintias. This was the last Greek city founded in Sicily. Meanwhile the Carthaginians were becoming more and more preponderant in the island, and the Greeks were at length led to invoke the assistance of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who was at this time carrying on war in Italy against the Romans. He

the island in the autumn of B. C. 278. Phintias | ters of Panormus, for a long time the capital of the was at this time dead, and Hicetas had not long before been expelled from Syracuse. Pyrrhus therefore had no Greek adversaries to contend with, and was able to turn all his efforts against the Carthaginians. His successes were at first rapid and decisive he wrested one town after another from the dominion of Carthage, took Panormus, which had long been the metropolis of their Sicilian possessions, and had never before fallen into the hands of a Greek invader, and carried by assault the strong fortresses of Ercte and Eryx: but he was foiled in an attack on Lilybaeum; jealousies and dissensions now arose between him and his Sicilian allies, and after little more than two years he was fain to return to Italy (B. C. 276), abandoning all his projects upon Sicily (Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxii. 10, pp. 497-499).

The departure of Pyrrhus left the Sicilian Greeks without a leader, but Hieron, who was chosen general by the Syracusans, proved himself worthy of the occasion. Meanwhile a new and formidable enemy had arisen in the Mamertines, a band of Campanian mercenaries, who had possessed themselves by treachery of the important city of Messana, and from thence carried their arns over a considerable part of Sicily, and conquered or plundered many of its principal towns. Hieron waged war with them for a considerable period, and at length obtained so decisive a victory over them, in the immediate neighbourhood of Messana, that the city itself must have fallen, had it not been saved by the intervention of the Carthaginian general Hannibal. Hieron was now raised to the supreme power at Syracuse, and even assumed the title of king, B. C. 270. A few years after this we find him joining his arms with the Carthaginians, to effect the expulsion of the Mamertines, an object which they would doubtless have accomplished had not that people appealed to the protection of Rome. The Romans, who had recently completed the conquest of Italy, gladly seized the pretext for interfering in the affairs of Sicily, and espoused the cause of the Mamertines. Thus began the First Punic War, B. C. 264.

It is impossible here to relate in detail the events of that long-protracted struggle, during which Sicily became for twenty-three years the field of battle between the Romans and Carthaginians. Hieron, who had found himself at the beginning engaged in active hostilities with Rome, after sustaining several defeats, and losing many of his subject towns, wisely withdrew from the contest, and concluded in B. c. 263 a separate peace with Rome, by which he retained possession in full sovereignty of Syracuse and its territory, including the dependent towns of Acrae, Helorus, Netum, Megara, and Leontini, together with Tauromenium (Diod. xxiii. Exc. H. p. 502). From this time to the day of his death Hieron remained the faithful ally of the Romans, and retained the sovereign power at Syracuse undisturbed. In the rest of Sicily all trace of independent action on the part of the several Greek cities disappears: Agrigentum was indeed the only one of these cities in the island which appears to have retained any considerable importance: it was not taken by the Roman consuls till after a long and obstinate siege, B. C. 262, and was severely punished for its protracted resistance, the inhabitants being sold as slaves. Agrigentum indeed at a later period fell again into the hands of the Carthaginians, B. C. 255, but on the other hand the Romans made themselves mas

Carthaginian dominion in the island, which was thenceforth occupied by a strong Roman garrison, and never again fell into the hands of its former masters. For several years before the conclusion of the war, the possessions of the Carthaginians in Sicily were confined to the mountain of Eryx, occupied by Hamilcar Barca, and to the two strongly fortified seaports of Lilybaeum and Drepanum, the former of which defied all the attacks of the Romans, as it had previously done those of Pyrrhus. The siege, or rather blockade, of Lilybaeum was continued for nearly ten years, until the destruction of the Carthaginian fleet off the islands of the Aegates, B. C. 241, compelled that people to purchase peace by the surrender of all their remaining possessions in Sicily.

The whole island was now reduced into the condition of a Roman province, with the exception of the territory still governed by Hieron as an allied, but independent sovereign. The province thus constituted was the first that had ever borne that name (Cic. Verr. ii. 1): it was placed under the government of a praetor, who was sent annually from Rome (Appian, Sic. 2). On the first outbreak of the Second Punic War (B. C. 218), the consul Seinpronius was at first sent to Sicily as his province, to guard against any threatened invasion from Africa; but he was soon recalled to oppose Hannibal in Italy, and for some years Sicily bore but an unimportant part in the war. A great change, however, occurred in the fourth year of the war (B. C. 215), in consequence of the defection of Hieronymus, the grandson and successor of Hieron at Syracuse, who abandoned the alliance of Rome to which Hieron had continued constant throughout his long reign, and espoused the Carthaginian cause. Hieronymus indeed was soon after assassinated, but the Carthaginian party at Syracuse, headed by Hippocrates and Epicydes, still maintained the ascendency, and Marcellus, who had been sent in haste to Sicily to put down the threatened revolt, was compelled to form the siege of Syracuse, B. C. 214. But so vigorous was the resistance offered to him that he soon found himself obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, nor was it till the autumn of B. C. 212 that the city finally fell into his hands. Meanwhile the war had extended itself to all parts of Sicily: many cities of the Roman province had followed the example of Syracuse, and joined the alliance of Carthage, while that power spared no exertions for their support. Even after the fall of Syracuse, the war was still continued: the Carthaginian general Mutines, who had made himself master of Agrigentum, carried on a desultory warfare from thence, and extended his ravages over the whole island. It was not till Mutines had been induced to desert the Carthaginian cause, and betray Agrigentum into the hands of the Romans, that the consul Laevinus was able to reduce the revolted cities to submission, and thus accomplished the final conquest of Sicily, B. c. 210 (Liv. xxvi. 40; xxvii. 5).

From this time the whole of Sicily became united as a Roman province, and its administration was in most respects similar to that of the other provinces. But its lot was anything but a fortunate one. Its great natural fertility, and especially its productiveness in corn, caused it, indeed, to be a possession of the utmost importance to Rome; but these very circumstances seem to have made it a favourite field for

speculators, who bought up large tracts of land, which they cultivated solely by means of slaves, so that the free population of the island became materially diminished. The more mountainous portions of the island were given up to shepherds and herdsmen, all likewise slaves, and accustomed to habits of rapine and plunder, in which they were encouraged by their masters. At the same time the number of wealthy proprietors, and the extensive export trade of some of the towns, maintained a delusive appearance of prosperity. It was not till the outbreak of the Servile War in B. C. 135 that the full extent of these evils became apparent, but the frightful state of things then revealed sufficiently shows that the causes which had produced it must have been long at work. That great outbreak, which commenced with a local insurrection of the slaves of a great proprietor at Enna, named Damophilus, and was headed by a Syrian slave of the name of Eunus, quickly spread throughout the whole island, so that the slaves are said to have mustered 200,000 armed men. With this formidable force they defeated in succession the armies of several Roman praetors, so that in B. C. 134, it was thought necessary to send against them the consul Fulvius Flaccus, and it was not till the year B. C. 132 that their strongholds of Tauromenium and Enna were taken by the consul P. Rupilius. (Diod. xxxiv. Exc. Phot., Exc. Vales.) The insurrection was now finally quelled, but the state of Sicily had undergone a severe shock, and the settlement of its affairs was confided to P. Rupilius, together with ten commissioners, who laid down a code of laws and rules for its internal government which continued to be observed in the days of Cicero (Cic. Verr. ii. 16).

But the outbreak of the second Servile War, under Salvius and Athenion, less than thirty years after the termination of the former one (B. C. 103), and the fact that the slaves were again able to maintain the contest against three successive consuls till they were finally vanquished by M. Aquilius, in B. C. 100, sufficiently proves that the evils in the state of society had been but imperfectly remedied by Rupilius; nor can we believe that the condition of the island was in reality altogether so flourishing as it is represented by Cicero during the interval which elapsed between this Servile War and the praetorship of Verres, B. C. 73. But the great natural resources of Sicily and its important position as the granary of Rome undoubtedly enabled it to recover with rapidity from all its disasters. The elder Cato had called it the store-room (cella penaria) of the Roman state, and Cicero observes that in the great Social War (B. C. 90-88) it supplied the Roman armies not only with food, but with clothing and arms also (Cic. Verr. ii. 2). But the praetorship of Verres (B. c. 73-70) inflicted a calamity upon Sicily scarcely inferior to the Servile wars that had so recently devastated it. The rhetorical expressions of Cicero must not indeed be always understood literally; but with every allowance for exaggeration, there can no doubt that the evils resulting from such a government as that of Verres were enormous; and Sicily was just in such a state as to suffer from them most severely.

The orations of Cicero against Verres convey to us much curious and valuable information as to the condition of Sicily under the Roman republic as well as to the administration and system of government of the Roman provinces generally. Sicily at that time formed but one province, under the government

of a praetor or pro-praetor, but it had always two quaestors, one of whom resided at Syracuse, the other at Lilybaeum. This anomaly (for such it appears to have been) probably arose from the different parts of the island having been reduced into the form of a province at different periods. The island contained in all above sixty towns which enjoyed municipal rights: of these, three only, Messana, Tauromenium, and Netum, were allied cities (civitates foederatae), and thus enjoyed a position of nominal independence; five were exempt from all fiscal burdens and from the ordinary jurisdiction of the Roman magistrates (civitates immunes et liberae): the rest were in the ordinary position of provincial towns, but retained their own magistrates and municipal rights, as well as the possession of their respective territories, subject to the payment of a tenth of their produce to the Roman state. These tenths, which were paid in kind, were habitually farmed out, according to principles and regulations laid down in the first instance by Hieron, king of Syracuse, and which therefore continued to be known as the Lex Hieronica. For judicial purposes, the island appears to have been divided into districts or conventus, but the number of them is not stated; those of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Lilybaeum, and Panormus are the only ones mentioned.

Sicily took little part in the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey. It was at first held by M. Cato on behalf of the latter, but abandoned by him when Pompey himself had quitted Italy, and was then occupied by Curio, as pro-praetor, with four legions (Caes. B. C. i. 30, 31). Caesar himself visited it previous to his African war, and it was from Lilybaeum that he crossed over with his army into Africa (Hirt. B. Afr. 1.) After the death of Caesar, it fell into the hands of Sextus Pompeius, whose powerful fleet enabled him to defy all the efforts of Octavian to recover it, and was at length secured to hin by the peace of Misenum, B. C. 39, together with Sardinia and Corsica. But Octavian soon renewed his attempts to dispossess him, and though he sustained repeated defeats at sea, and lost a great part of his fleet by a storm, the energy and ability of Agrippa enabled him to triumph over all obstacles; and the final defeat of his fleet at Naulochus compelled Pompeius to abandon Sicily, and take refuge in the east (Appian, B. C. v. 77—122; Dion Cass. xlix. 1—17). There seems no doubt that the island suffered severely from this contest, and from the rapacity or exactions of Sextus Pompeius: Strabo distinctly ascribes its decayed condition in his time principally to this cause (Strab. vi. pp. 270, 272). Augustus made some attempts to relieve it by sending colonies to a few cities, among which were Tauromenium, Catana, Syracuse, Thermae, and Tyndaris (Strab. vi. p. 272; Plin. iii. 8. s. 14); but the effect thus produced was comparatively small, and Strabo describes the whole island as in his time, with few exceptions, in a state of decay, many of its ancient cities having altogether disappeared, while others were in a declining condition, and the interior was for the most part given up to pasturage, and inhabited only by herdsmen (Strab. 1. c.)

Augustus appears to have greatly remodelled the internal administration of Sicily: so that the condition of most of the towns had undergone a change between the time of Cicero and that of Pliny. Caesar had indeed proposed to give Latin rights to all the Sicilians, and M. Antonius even brought

« السابقةمتابعة »