but he quite properly put away the crown; he had higher intentions than they surmised. To all this as a source of his power must be added his exquisite skill in the strategy of a Press campaign. He had a winsome way with the journalists and was in continuous communication with them. Of only two does he speak ill, Lord Northcliffe and Horatio Bottomley. At a meeting in Downing Street, Mr Bottomley talked much vain nonsense' (II, 161). Lord Northcliffe was not much better. He could not get him to talk sense. He would not consider my offensive of two Sommes. Haig and Robertson were perfect' (1, 297). Many persons thought one Somme was enough.

All created things fall into categories according to their kind. A species when true to itself, however humble, is admirable. A creature with the characteristics of separate species is abhorrent; it has the worst features of both. The dog, the ape, the man, the politician, the soldier are as God made them. Sir Henry Wilson was politician and soldier at the same time. But he did not understand that a politician like Asquith, Lloyd George, Milner, Grey, has long views and far aims, that they are in reality like the captain of a ship who alters his course to avoid perils hidden from the casual observer, so that he may bring his ship into the desired haven. The politician in Sir Henry Wilson in time became open and predominant, and landed him in the House of Commons. But he was always of the opposition, and that is the stigma upon the politician who has failed. His mind never penetrated below the 'gossip' of the day. His political and military perceptions were governed by his personal likes and dislikes. Even his choice of colleagues, and public loyalty, were determined by his own private hatreds. His deepest hatred was towards Southern Ireland, and it extended to all who refused to share that hatred with him, to members of the Government, and to the English people as a whole. The English are without hatred. For that reason he bewailed, the English are never serious about anything.' Right or wrong, Mr Asquith, the Cabinet, and Lord Kitchener, considered Wilson's conduct in the Curragh mutiny to be 'dangerous' to civil government. The place for a staff officer in time of war, repugnant to the Cabinet, and considered

'dangerous' by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War, is in obscurity. Instead, he was allowed to go to France to instil his dangerous ideas of Mr Asquith into the mind of Clemenceau, as he afterwards instilled the same ideas of Lloyd George into the mind of Foch. As a result, Clemenceau 'fully realises about Asquith and the terrible danger we run from keeping him as Prime Minister' (1, 281).

At the beginning of the War and at the end Sir Henry Wilson was the official military adviser of the British Government. At the same time and especially in the earlier period he was the secret adviser of the Opposition. During both periods he was doing his political best to destroy the Governments he served. From the first, he was equally hopeless of the Empire and of the various Imperial Conferences that were to set it right. Asquith was incapable of taking a strong, straight line; he thought the Empire would go before long. Canada was already gone in 1911, that is, if Sir Wilfrid Laurier really represented Canadian opinion. What a crowd, what beauties! was his comment on the Dominion Premiers who assembled at the Imperial Conference in 1921; but in that year the Empire was doomed; in one week, it was going, going, gone. It finally disappeared on the day the agreement with Ireland was concluded. How these Irishmen appear to hate one another has always been an astonishment to the English mind. Hatred of the Southern Irish and love of himself was the dominating principle of Sir Henry Wilson's political and military career. Every thought and action was governed by those two twin passions. They poisoned his nature and gave a distorted view of every event. It is doubtful if Sir Henry Wilson, holding these opinions, was the best liaison officer. is doubtful if liaison of any kind with the French ever did any good. Sir Douglas Haig at last found it possible, and necessary, to dispense with all intermediaries, and deal direct with them. Complaisance in the wrong place and at the wrong time begets arrogance. Stiffness has virtue as well as suppleness. The French were led astray by Wilson, so far astray that they came to look upon England as a mere source of supply for material and men, the British Government not as an ally but as

It

a vassal State, the British Army as an appanage of mercenary troops who did not even require to be paid.

6

In the end Sir Henry Wilson himself came to see the result of his complaisant liaison. 'These funny little Frenchmen' were not as funny as he supposed. In May 1918, he sees that they mean to take us over body and soul, militarily and economically, numberless signs of interference' (II, 99). Lloyd George was compelled to declare that he would not be bullied by Clemenceau and Foch' (II, 118). In October, Wilson admits, 'It sounds to me as if Haig was right. Foch wants us to do all the work. The French are not fighting at all, and the Americans don't know how, so all falls to us' (II, 142). In August he was obliged to remind his friend Foch that he did not command the British Army (II, 121). To Clemenceau in April he sent a formal message, that I was under the Prime Minister of England and was not under the Prime Minister of France' (II, 91). And all this was the outcome of the Versailles Council arranged by Wilson and Clemenceau who 'patted me on the head and said I was un bon garçon.' A Good Boy to the French is a new rôle for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The position of liaison officer between the French and English armies he developed into the position of emissary between the two Governments, and gained full scope for his peculiar talents. He was in both camps and in both Cabinets; and one who sits in the temple soon comes to show himself as the god. He entertained the belief that men will agree to anything if they are properly handled.' He knew when to persist and when to draw back. This was the suppleness that Sir Almeric Fitzroy observed, and the cleverness which he mistook for praise from Lord Milner (1, 327). By a partial statement of any given case, he could persuade the British Government to agree, and with that agreement in hand he would exercise pressure upon the French. In another case he would reverse the process, with so much success that Painlevé accused him of having tried to take charge of the French Government also' (1, 361).

6

Sir Henry Wilson, whilst he was making military plans with the French prior to the War, whilst he was liaison officer with the Expeditionary Force, and later

military member at Versailles, and Chief of the General Staff, was a representative of the British Government. His opinions of that Government were governed by their Irish policy alone. Holding such, he was a dangerous emissary; and that danger is proved by the confidences he gave as well as received. To General Pershing he exposed his whole mind about Lloyd George and Ireland, and the American was 'terribly upset' (II, 310). But it was with Marshal Foch the most complete confidences were given and received. It was about this time Lloyd George was so unsatisfactory to the French.' Sir Henry Wilson had long since complicated his military dealings with the French by definitely constituting himself a political agent. When the Irish crisis was at its worst in 1914, before the War, he thought it his duty to go to France for the express purpose' of explaining the political situation to the French Command (1, 146). Had the Foreign Office or the Cabinet been informed of this intention, they would probably have chosen an agent with less settled opinions and more sympathetic mind. The French-speaking Irishman crossing and re-crossing the Channel has been a figure of ill-omen as far back as the time of the phantom court of St Germain. The British Government had an accredited ambassador of English breed, through whom all necessary knowledge could be conveyed.

During the War, it seems that, in their temerity, a proposal had been made to Millerand by Lord Kitchener, Mr Churchill, Sir Edward Grey, and Mr Asquith for the co-operation of the Fleet, a business of which the English might be assumed to have some knowledge. Foch came to see Wilson, Dec. 11, 1914 (1, 190), with the precious document. Foch much amused. Of course Foch treats it with the greatest contempt.' This emissary does not seem to have conveyed to the French the impression that the English are a proud, if patient, people. But neither Wilson nor the French valued the British Navy very highly. In the year before the War, Wilson thought it might be worth 500 bayonets. Castelnau and Joffre did not value it at one bayonet. Foch was exactly of the same opinion (1, 122).

In January 1915, still during the War, he had 'a long visit and a long talk' with Foch. Considering the

time and the place, the subject was a strange one, namely, the 'marked deterioration of the English,' as compared to the French and Germans, which they agreed was due to the voluntary system (1, 200). After the War, Wilson in Paris was so despairing of his country, that Foch simply threw up his hands, "Pauvre Angleterre, pauvre Angleterre," he kept on repeating. Then he said a thing to me that he would not have said to any other Englishman. "You break your written word. You cower under the assassin and the Jew. Your friendship is no longer worth seeking. We must go elsewhere' (II, 310). Sir Henry would have been more correct in his surmise if he had omitted the word 'other' before Englishman,' for there was no Englishman living to whom the French Marshal would have ventured such an opinion. There was another Englishman' who would even more gladly have received his confidenceRoger Casement-but he was long since dead.

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Marshal Foch supplies the book with a commendatory preface. Marshal Foch might well be called upon to explain his conduct in putting his name and stamp of approval upon a book that is one continuous diatribe against British institutions, methodical defamation of English and Dominion statesmen, and derogation from Imperial soldiers, especially when some of that defamation is published in the book as coming from Marshal Foch's own mouth. It may be at some future time that France will stand in sore need of English alliance. The utterances of Marshal Foch, and of Clemenceau too, if unexplained, will be remembered in that hour. It may then be that the saying ascribed to Marshal Foch will have come true, 'We must go elsewhere' (II, 310). In the meantime, it may be suggested in defence of Marshal Foch, that he assumed he was dealing with a bonhomme, sincere though boisterous, serious though comical, frank because free in speech. The two had been friends for twelve years. They were intimate and playful. They exchanged headgear and ran around the garden. Wilson wore Foch's képi. Foch wore Wilson's 'billycock, sitting low on his brow as it was too big for him,' as the observer is careful to remark (11, 205). In an excess of playfulness, Foch is reported to have kicked Wilson around the room. Here was an Englishman one could