1446. Too fervile a fubmiffion to the books and opinions of the antients hath spoiled many an ingenious man; and plagued the world with abundance of extravagant and abfurd notions.

1447. Wrangling about frivolous criticisms in words, tho' it is a great part of the business of a school, is too pedantic and low for a generous converfe; while he that is well grown in knowledge may perhaps forget, or not so much respect, the first rudiments of letters; it being more grateful to the mind to contemplate the structures of learning, as they stand finished and adorned, than to discuss the low materials of their foundations.

1448. True eloquence is good fense, delivered in a natural and unaffected way, without the artificial ornaments of tropes and figures. Our common eloquence is ufually a cheat upon the understanding; it deceives us with appearances, instead of things, and makes us think we see reason, whilst it is only tickling our sense.

1449. It was an idle fancy of fome, to run out perpetually upon fimilitudes, confounding their fubject by the multitude of likeneffes, and making it like fo many things, that it is like nothing at all.

1450. The reason of things lies in a narrow compass, if the mind could at any time be fo happy as to light upon it. Most of the writings and difcourfes in the world are but illustration and rhetorick, which fignifies as much as nothing to a mind in pursuit after the philofophical truth of things.

1451. Though it may be an argument of a great wit, to give ingenious reafons for many wonderful appearances

in

in nature; yet it is an evidence of fmall judgment, to be pofitive in any thing but the knowledge of our own ignorance.

1452. It paffes for an ornament to borrow from other tongues, where we may be better furnished in our own. 1453. Suppofe a man knows what is Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, or Italian for a Horfe; this makes the man no more the wifer, than the Horfe the better.

1454. Languages are not to be despised, but things are ftill to be preferred.

1455. The most refplendent ornament of man, is judgment; here is the perfection of his innate reafon; here is the utmost power of reafon joined with knowledge.

1456. It was a faying of Cicero, That oratory was but his ornament as a commonwealth's man, and that philosophy and reafon were his profeffion as a man.

1457. Such books as teach fapience and prudence, and ferve to eradicate errors and vices, are the most profitable writings in the world, and ought to be valued and studied more than all others whatsoever.

1458. The wisdom of the antients, as to the government of life, was no more than certain precepts, what to do, and what not; and men were much better in that fimplicity; for as they came to be more learned, they grew lefs careful of being good: that plain and open virtue is now turned into a dark and intricate fcience, and we are taught to difpute, rather than to live.

1459. Wife men are inftructed by reafon; men of lefs understanding, by experience; the moft ignorant, by neceffity; and beafts, by nature.

1460. Our

1460. Our controverfies about religion have brought, at laft, even religion itself into controverfy. The schoolmen have spun the thread too fine, and made christianity look liker a course of philosophy, than a system of faith, and fupernatural revelation: fo that the spirit of it evaporates into niceties, and exercifes of the brain; and the contention is not for truth, but victory.

1461. Knowledge, that is of ufe, must be allowed to be the greatest and noblest acquest that man can gain: but to run on in difputations, whether privation be a principle; whether any thing can be made of nothing; whether there be an empty space in the compass of nature; or whether the world fhall have an end, and such like, is without end, and to no end.

1462. True philofophy, fays Socrates, confifts more in fidelity, conftancy, juftice, fincerity, and in the love of our duty, than in a great capacity.

1463. The primitive chriftians excelled us in goodness as much as we do them in learning; and were better without those advantages, than we are with them.

1464. It was a usual saying of M. Pascal, that sciences produced no confolation in the times of affliction; but the knowledge of christianity was a comfort, both in adverfity, and defect of all other knowledge.

1465. He that knows what belongs to his falvation, has learned what is fufficient.

1466. Contentment is only to be found within ourfelves. A man that is content with a little, has enough; he that complains, has too much.

1467. Were matters fo managed, that men turned their

fpeculation into practice, and took care to apply their reading to the purposes of human life, the advantage of learning would be unfpeakable; and we fee how illuftriously fuch perfons fhine in the world: and, therefore, nothing can be faid to the prejudice of learning in general, but only to fuch a falfe opinion of it, as depends upon this alone for the most eligible and only qualification of the mind of man; and so rests upon it, and buries it in inactivity.

1468. Socrates rightly faid of contentment, oppofing it to the riches of fortune and opinion, that it is the wealth of nature; for it gives every thing that we want, and really need.

1469. Profperity hath always been the cause of far greater evils to men, than adverfity; and it is easier for a man to bear this patiently, than not to forget himself in the other.

1470. He who thinks no man above him but for his virtue, none below him but for his vice, can never be obfequious or affuming in a wrong place.

1471. Many afflictions may befal a good man, but no evil; for contraries will never incorporate. All the rivers in the world are never able to change the taste and quality of the sea.

1472. "The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; neither bread to the wife, nor riches to men of understanding, nor favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all."

1473. Wealth and titles are only the gifts of fortune, but peace and content are the peculiar endowments of a well

well-difpofed mind; a mind that can bear affliction without a murmur, and the weight of a plentiful fortune without vain glory; that can be familiar without meanness, and reserved without pride.

1474. I find it a very hard thing, fays Montaigne, to undergo misfortunes; but to be content with a competent measure of fortune, and to avoid greatness, I think a very eafy matter.

1475. Solon being asked by Crafus, Who in the whole world was happier than he? he anfwered, Tellus, who, though he was poor, was a good man, and content with what he had, and died in a good old age.

1476. The best need afflictions, for trial of their virtue. How can we exercise the grace of contentment, if all things fucceed well? Or that of forgiveness, if we have no enemies?

1477. A good confcience is to the foul, what health is to the body; it preferves a conftant ease and serenity within us, and more than countervails all the calamities and afflictions which can poffibly befal us.

1478. He that needs leaft, faid Socrates, is most like the Gods, who need nothing.

1479. When Alexander faw Diogenes fitting in the warm fun, and asked what he should do for him? He defired no more, than that he would ftand out of his funshine, and not take from him what he could not give.

1480. A quiet and contented mind is the fupreme good, the utmost felicity man is capable of in this world, and the maintaining fuch an uninterrupted tranquillity of spirit, is the very crown and glory of wisdom.

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1481. This

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