here with that ambiguous question, whether a man has power to will contrary to his predominant affections and desires. I inquire after that which is matter of fact in human nature. Did any man ever will to do one thing or another, except in accordance with his affections and desires? And will any one ever do it? Was there ever an instance in past time, or will there ever be an instance in time to come, in which the supposed power was or will be exercised? If we learn what has always been and always must be fact in this case, we discover the law of the mind; and this is all that true philosophy aims at. Whether a man has power in this case to act contrary to the laws of his mind, that is, power to will and choose contrary to his affections and desires, I am willing to leave to others, being content myself to ascertain what are the facts in the case, and what are the laws of mental action. If any one should think there is such a power, he will, I hope, remember, that it is a power never developed,-a power which has always lain and always I will lie still and dormant in some unseen chamber of the mind. And he will, I hope, tell us, when he finds it convenient, of what use a power is, which never was and never will be used, and which, if it should be used, would occasion a good deal of trouble.

If it is alleged that we do in fact frequently will to do an act which is disagreeable to us, and is thus contrary to our desires, I maintain that the fact is not in the least contrary to the abovementioned law of the mind. For, when the case referred to is examined, it appears at once that the volition follows a desire for an ultimate good, and the disagreeable act which is chosen, is not chosen for its own sake, but as a means to that good on which the predominant desire is fixed. So that volition in this case, as much as in any other, is in accordance with the predominant desire. Indeed, what is volition but affection and desire acted out in reference to its object?

Now for the application of this to the subject. If the government which God maintains over moral agents in respect to their volitions is always correspondent with this settled principle or law of their mental constitution-if he so influences them, that all the acts of their will are conformed to their inclinations and desires; it is clear that the agency he exercises in his government is so far from infringing their moral agency, that it preserves it entire, and gives it efficacy.

My conclusion then is the same as before;-that there is

nothing in free moral agency which is at all interfered with or disturbed by the universal and controlling agency of God ;-but on the contrary, that the superintending and almighty agency of God effectually sustains our free, accountable agency, and secures it against infringement from all possible causes.

But can the will be free, or rather, can man be free in his volitions, on the principle above laid down? I reply, that man is free in all the respects in which freedom is desirable. To be compelled to act against my will, or to be hindered from acting according to my will, or to be forced, if it were possible, to will contrary to my inclinations and desires, would certainly be a very unwelcome servitude. The liberty which I crave is liberty to act as I please, or according to my will, and liberty to will according to the predominant inclinations of my heart. But if you speak of being free from dependence on God, and free from his sovereign dominion and control,-what Christian does or can desire such freedom as this? What Christian does not regard his condition of dependence on the wise and powerful and benevolent agency of God, and subjection to his per fect dominion, as the best of all blessings? What good man would not be distressed, and sink in discouragement, were it not for the belief, that God works and will work in him both to will and to do? To be free from this gracious agency of God's Spirit, or rather, to be destitute of it, would be instant ruin to the soul.

See how the word freedom is used in other cases, particularly in regard to citizens who are said to be free, or to enjoy civil liberty. Are they free in all respects? Certainly they are not free from the common laws of nature. Nor are they free from the authority of civil rulers or civil laws. They are not at liberty in all cases to use their own property as they would choose to do, but must use it, or abstain from using it, as the laws require. Nor have all free citizens actually chosen to be under such a government. They are born under it, and are held to submit to it, though to some of them it is exceedingly disagreeable. And in some circumstances they may, by compulsion, be made to act contrary to their wills, and yet they may be under a free government, and may be free men. They may be free, not absolutely, but, what is better, in a qualified sense; free in various and most important respects. They may have freedom in comparison with what is enjoyed elsewhere; freedom from oppression; freedom from unjust laws, and the arbitrary dicta

tion of a despot, and security to their persons and rights; in short, they may have freedom in the sense in which it is desirable and consistent. Now who will say that citizens, in order to be considered free, must be free in all respects, or in any respects, except so far as they may be so without injury to themselves or to their fellow-creatures?

These remarks apply to the subject of free moral agency. The freedom which may properly be predicated of man, is the freedom which is found actually to belong to him as an intelligent, responsible being. Experience and consciousness show what it is, and how it is exercised, and what are its limitations. Limitations it has; but they are those, which necessarily result from the nature of the subject, and from which no reasonable man would wish to be exempt. Certainly no reasonable man can wish, that human freedom should pass beyond the limits assigned to it, so as to curtail the power of God, or hinder the execution of his holy purposes. No reasonable man can wish for any other freedom than that which God has given him. We turn then to ourselves, and listen to the testimony of our own experience and consciousness, to ascertain what is the kind and degree of freedom which belongs to us. And what I maintain is, that such freedom as this exists unimpaired, under the constant, wise, and all-controlling agency of God, and the supposition, that this divine agency interferes with the proper freedom of man, is totally groundless.

I must defer to another time my remarks on the other topics mentioned near the beginning of this article.

ARTICLE VI.

THE LANGUAGE OF ANCIENT EGYPT.

By Rev. R. D. C. Robbins, Andover, Mass.

EGYFT has been justly called a land of wonders. Its physical peculiarities have been an unfailing source of interest to the traveller who has watched the changes of its sacred river, and to the naturalist who has attempted to explain the formation of its oäses and its delta. The fact of the early cultivation of its inhabitants has excited the mingled wonder, admiration, and

distrust of every generation who have lived since the sages of Greece sat believingly at the feet of the priests of Heliopolis and Memphis, and "studied the wisdom," which was but the echo of an age then long past. The fragments of the history of Egypt, preserved in the inspired volume, give abundant occasion for the unquestioning belief of the Christian and for the cavils of the skeptic. They also furnish an armory from which the champions of some of the hardest doctrines of the Bible select their most effective weapons. The Jewish prophets poured out upon this land the vials of their indignation, and the hail, the locusts and the pestilence, the escape of the Israelites from bondage, and the overthrow of Pharaoh's host in the Red Sea, have been a theme for some of the most lofty and spirited triumphal songs of any age or nation.

The works of the Memphian kings,' "the greatest monuments of fame," have not failed to awaken the astonishment of all beholders, from the father of history' or his predecessor in Egyptian travel, Hecatæus of Miletus, to the last pilgrim who has trodden the soil of the doomed valley. They were long expected to reveal the secrets of olden time. But notwithstanding the enchantments of the magicians and soothsayers of all Christendom, they remained mute, or spoke a jargon which was but "confusion worse confounded." intelligible language. Though hoary with age and just ready They now, however, utter to crumble to dust, they yield up the long concealed secret, and tell us of their origin and design, of those who erected them and dwelt in them, or prepared them for their final home. The manner in which they tell their story, and the reliance to be placed upon it, is what we are particularly occupied with at present.

The ancient Egyptians made use of four different kinds of writing, hieroglyphic, hieratic, demotic, and coptic. The hieroglyphic is termed roάuuara iegά (sacred letters) by Herodotus,* Diodorus,† and on the Rosetta stone, iɛgorgaqıná (sacred writing) by Manetho, and iɛgor2vqızá (sacred engraving) by Clement of Alexandria. This is the character most commonly employed in Egypt for inscription on public edifices. It is also found engraved on coffins of stone and wood, on vessels of terra cotta, and sometimes on parchment and papyrus rolls.

2. 36.

† 3. 3. Both Herodotus and Diodorus include under this ellation hieratic as well as hieroglyphic writing.

ap

Hieroglyphics are divided by Lepsius into ideographic and phonetic hieroglyphics. The former are again divided into hieroglyphics, which are a literal representation of the objects for which they stand (cyriologic or imitative,f) and those which are used with a symbolic or tropical significance. Imitative characters, as a circle for the sun or a crescent for the moon, were without doubt the first means employed for conveying information among the Egyptians, as also among the Mexicans and Chinese. They were much more numerous in Egypt than in China. M. Abel Rémusat, in his Chinese Grammar, p. 2, computes these at only about 200, whilst in Egypt they amounted to about 800. They were, however, much less frequently used by the Egyptians than might be expected. In the whole hieroglyphic text of the Rosetta inscription only seven characters are strictly imitative.

Tropical hieroglyphics are more frequently employed by the Egyptians, and exhibit several varieties of signification. By synecdoche, a part of a thing is put for the whole; as two arms raised towards heaven, for a person offering sacrifice, or a vase with water escaping from it, for a libation. By metonymy, the cause is put for the effect, or the reverse; as two eyes for the act of seeing. On this same principle we see on the Rosetta stone the pencil or reed by which letters are traced, with the palette having on it the colors black and red, to represent the act of writing or the writing itself. Sometimes a little vase, in which the brush is dipped, is added. Metaphor is very often employed, especially in expressing truths which have nothing directly corresponding to them in the material world; as when a picture of the crocodile is put for rapacity, the sparrow-hawk for loftiness, or the fly for impudence; and various more remote resemblances, as when the folds of a serpent represent the course of the stars, or the palm-branch the year. When the relation of the objects represented and the idea to be expressed were entirely imaginary and conventional, and several of them were united into one figure without the intervention of phonetic hieroglyphics, they are sometimes called anaglyphs. Such were

A more common but less philosophical division is into figurative symbolic and phonetic hieroglyphics.

This word is used in this article, as it is thought less objectionable than figurative, which has been more frequently employed by writers on this subject.