barding range. At Antwerp, for instance, they have been placed so far in advance of the enciente, that so long as the besiegers are kept well in front of them, the town is quite safe, and no engineer officer has yet explained how it is possible to sap up to a fort or line of forts, defended by modern artillery, with 50,000 or 100,000 men lying behind them ready to sally on the besiegers. The Prussians did not dare to attempt it at Metz, nor have they yet done so at Paris. Strasburg and the towns they did bombard were all fortified à la Vauban, and without detached defences. With scarcely an exception, all the modern strategical fortresses of Western Europe enclose important towns, while Russia alone seems to have adopted the other view of the case. Sebastopol was practically only a military town, and Modlin is absolutely so. Its inner keep is a bombproof barrack, capable of giving shelter to from 20,000 to 25,000 men, and there is abundance of space within its outer enceinte for the encampment of 70,000 or 80,000 more, but not necessarily for one single civilian. Those at present there are only so on sufferance. In this country Portsmouth and Plymouth are so fortified that their advanced works are at such a distance as to protect the dockyards and the towns in which they are situated from any damage from bombardment, even with the present improved rifled ordinance. Up to the present time, however, no siege of any place fortified on the modern system has occurred since the introduction of rifled siege guns, and it is in consequence difficult to predicate whether the invention will prove advantageous to the defence or to the attack. There is no doubt but that walls can be breached and parapets destroyed at greater distances than before, but it is on the other hand difficult to foresee how parapets of loose earth can be thrown up, and embrasures maintained in the face of such guns. One advantage for the defence seems clear, which is that the fire of the forts can cover a much larger area than before, and command wider channels at sea than has hitherto been deemed possible, so that, on the whole, it is probable that the improvements in artillery are in favour of the defence--but this can only be proved by experience, which has not yet been obtained.

Unless London can be so fortified as to render it safe from this dreadful means of attack, it is utterly useless to moot the question. It could not and should not be for one moment entertained. It may not be possible to protect such a town from the danger of being bombarded, but there is so much prima facie evidence that it could be

done, that, at all events, it is well worth while inquiring into; this, however, cannot be accomplished by any individual. The evidence of surveyors and experts is necessary as to the value of the land to be acquired; that of engineers as to the site and extent of the forts, and also of military men of experience as to the advisability of the project. All this could only be elicited by a Royal Commission, but whether or not it is worth while instituting one for such a purpose Government must decide. The public, at all events, would probably think that they have a right to be informed on a question so closely bearing on the national safety.

Assuming for the nonce that the plan of fortifying London by a circle of detached forts is found to be either impracticable or inexpedient, there is another form of the problem which is free from many of the objections which may be urged against that proposal; but one which may still be deemed sufficient. Portsmouth is fortified so as to form a great entrenched camp, and may be made stronger than it now is, by a few additional works. Chatham would have been fortified had not the ill-timed parsimony of the Cabinet induced them to reject the recommendations of the Commission of 1860, but it might still be done at no great expense. Between these two places there is Aldershot, which, from an open encampment, might easily be converted into a strongly fortified post, capable on an emergency of sheltering from 20,000 to 30,000 men. Here the land belongs to the Government, and there are no civilian inhabitants to compensate, while the erection of the necessary works ought not to be expensive. The situation of Aldershot is, however, too far to the westward to have much direct influence on an army advancing from the south coast on London, and it would consequently be necessary to have as large and as important a fortified place at or near Reigate, if this line is to be taken up for the defence of the capital. Here, however, comes in a difficulty which it may be difficult to surmount. Of late years Reigate has grown into an important and extensive town-every knoll or point of vantage, where a Dugald Dalgetty would like to erect a sconce, is occupied by a villa, and the valleys between are filled with streets of houses. To purchase all these would be very expensive, and to fortify the place, in spite of these, would expose the camp to all the inconveniences of joint civil and military occupation, which is so inconvenient both in peace and in war time. this case the expense would be so great as to defeat the object sought to be attained, if it were attempted to fortify a perimeter suf

In

ficiently extensive to protect the town from bombardment. Perhaps these objections might be obviated, or some other site found in that neighbourhood as advantageous for the camp, and free from the encumbrance of a town.

There would then only remain Chatham. Few would now probably deny that the recommendation to fortify this important arsenal was a wise one. Not only would such a place have had great influence in the defence of the capital, but it might have supplemented, almost supplied the place of Woolwich, with practically nearly all its advantages of proximity to the metropolis. In its present condition, it is as open to an enemy occupying the country between it and London, as Woolwich itself. There is nothing to prevent a position being taken up on the left bank of the Medway, within rifle range of the dockyard and arsenal, and even with field guns, the whole being laid in ruins, and all the stores burnt which they contain. The estimate for the complete defence of Chatham by the Commission of 1860, amounted to 1,300,000l., but as an improved line from the Medway to the Thames, in front of that proposed, viû Gad's Hill, would probably have to be taken up, the cost would amount to about 1,500,000l. Besides this a tête-du-pont in front of Tilbury would form an indispensable part of this scheme, and would cost half a million at least. Some additional fortifications would also be required at Harwich, but they need not be expensive, and with an efficient torpedo equipment would be sufficient to close that harbour against an enemy.

To make the scheme quite complete, one would, of course, like to see a citadel on Banstead Downs, in rear of the first line of defence, and at least one entrenched camp to the north of London, which the enemy must leave behind him when he advanced from the capital to subdue the rest of the country, and from which the defending force would be able to act on his communications. But leaving these out of consideration for the present, the state of our defences by fortifications would be, that on a line from Portsmouth to Chatham, there would be a strong nucleus of defence every twenty-five miles, where our troops could muster and organize themselves, and where they ought to be able to find the stores and ammunition necessary for a campaign. At present, in the event of an invasion no one would know whither to go, where to muster, or where to find anything; but if our forces were collected in these four camps, one or two marches of twenty-five miles would enable them to concentrate on any given point that

was threatened, with their right or left resting on a fortress, which would at all events prevent a retreat being converted into a rout. This position also presents this peculiar advantage, that along the whole line from Aldershot to Chatham there extends a range of hills, which presents throughout its whole extent better strategic positions for defence than probably any range of hills elsewhere in England. It forms, in fact, a natural rampart, resting on Chatham on the east, and with two such bastions as those proposed at Reigate and Aldershot, ought to be easily made impregnable. Where the rampart fails is only between Aldershot and Portsmouth, which is also the longest gap, but it is the one which the enemy is least likely to avail himself of. No enemy landing on the south coast would attempt to turn the line by passing to the westward of Aldershot, leaving Portsmouth in his rear, and Aldershot on his flank, when attempting to advance on London by the valley of the Thames.

To take up such a line of defence would probably cost about five or six millions of money, but it would certainly render the invasion of England, and the attack of its capital, an operation infinitely more difficult and dangerous than it is at present. It would be too dangerous in the face of such a line of defence to land either on the beach or in any of the small harbours of the south coast; and the enemy would consequently be thrown as far north as the Humber, on the east coast, and as far west probably as the Exe on the south. He would then have to advance by a long route against the defending force, possessing four strong fortresses in the neighbourhood of its capital, more than sufficient to shelter the débris of the army if defeated. This is a very different operation from advancing two or three short marches from its base against an untried army in such a position that, if defeated, it must disintegrate and leave the capital at the mercy of the invader.

Neither this, however, nor any other system of national defence can be considered complete without the establishment of some central fortified points, in order to secure in the first instance a depôt of arms and stores, and a place where guns and munitions, of war can be manufactured, after those of the capital have fallen into the enemy's hands. It would be even more important, however, as constituting a place where raw levies, or volunteers from the north, could muster and be organized, and where the débris of a beaten army might be reformed. wanted, in fact, to form what may be called a keep to our national system of defence.

It is

As the Commissioners of 1860, after what

either as a conquered country or annexed to some larger and wealthier community with whom they must, if they are to be a people, make common cause. Of late years some have hoped that by conciliation and justice the Irish may be made loyal subjects of the English crown, and it may be so, though a disease of such long standing cannot probably be cured in a generation. But be this as it may, it cannot be doubted that at present the Irish would welcome an invasion, from whatever quarter it might come; and it would be a serious complication of our difficulties, if when engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with any Continental power, Ireland were taken possession of by our enemies. Hitherto the English Government has always been, and always felt itself strong enough to repress any rebellion that might occur in Ireland without the aid of fortifications. Even in the event of our getting into trouble with the United States, though a Fenian army would certainly be thrown on the west coast of Ireland, and be aided by money and arms, still it is not probable the Americans would risk many of their troops or their prestige so far from their base, by depending on such allies as they would find in the island. If we were not at the time engaged in war with some European nation, an American or Fenian invasion is not a danger that need frighten us. What is to be feared is the superiority of an enemy's fleet in our waters, rendering the invasion of England possible, and our consequently being forced to withdraw every soldier from Ireland, and to employ them in the defence of our own shores. In such a case 10,000 men, with means for arming the population, might overrun the island, and there is not-except in Cork harbour-a single fort or fortified barrack in the whole island, where any loyal men or any remnant of troops that might remain, could find shelter, or where they could hold out for a week if attacked by artillery. Still less is there any place that could be expected to hold out till we had leisure to succour it, or any securely fortified harbour under the protection of whose guns we could land troops when it became necessary to reconquer the island. To attempt to fortify Dublin or Belfast or any large city for this purpose, would only aggravate the evil, for their fortifications would certainly be used against ourselves. In Cork Harbour, however, a commencement has been made, which at no great expense might be converted into a fortified position that might meet the difficulty. Forts Carlisle and Camden, at the mouth of the harbour, have been designed. more to deny the use of anchorage to an enemy's ships, and the fort on Spike Island is in the worst style of old-fashioned forts,

and too weak and too small to resist any regular attack by artillery. If Government had the courage to purchase 'Great Island,' on which Queenstown is situated, and to erect upon it the works requisite to convert it into an intrenched camp, this deficiency might be supplied to a great extent, while, owing to its singularly favourable position for defence, the whole scheme ought not to be at all disproportionately expensive.

The absence of any such place of refuge, or any rallying point in the whole of Ireland, might lead to catastrophes, the extent of which it is difficult to calculate in the event of any insurrection, aided by foreigners, being successful. What is even worse, strategically, is the want of any secure harbour, by means of which communication can be kept open with the island in war time. To make Cork Harbour quite secure, it ought to be fortified all round, as Portsmouth and Plymouth are; but that would in a disaffected country require a garrison of regular troops, the abstraction of which would be almost as great an evil as the one it is intended to remedy. The fortification of Great Island might not accomplish all that is required, but it would be an immense gain to the defence of Ireland, and is probably as much as it is now desirable to attempt.

It may be argued that the invasion of Ireland by a foreigner, combined with operations against England, would be merely the neutralisation of a portion of his troops, who might otherwise be employed against ourselves; and, as Ireland must be restored to us when peace was made, unless we are utterly beaten, we ought not to concern ourselves about her fate. On the contrary, it may be urged that nothing would be so likely to cure her of her inveterate disloyalty as twelve months' occupation by a foreign army, with its requisitions, its shootings, and the stronghanded repression in which it would certainly indulge. He must be a hardened cynic who would argue thus. We, if we are a great people, are bound to protect Ireland even against her own follies, and it is impossible to contemplate the misery and the disorganisation that would result from the invasion of Ireland by a foreigner without feeling that we ought to shrink from no sacrifice to arrest it. How this can be accomplished without securing some points by permanent fortification is a problem which we must some day face, though it has not hitherto been studied with any attention at all proportioned to its importance.

In the presence of such astounding events as are now taking place on the Continent, the attention of Parliament during the next

session ought to be almost exclusively absorbed in questions relating to national defence, and the re-organisation of our military forces. But is Parliament, or are the Ministry at all prepared to face them in anything like the spirit demanded by the gravity of the crisis? No temporising half-measures will now suffice. Either we must be prepared to make sacrifices-pecuniary or personal, equal to those to which our neighbours are forced to submit-or we must be prepared to succumb and take up a second rank among nations, and be content to exist on sufferance.

In the last great death grapple in which we were engaged in the beginning of the present century, France only was our equal, and the one power we had to fear. The world, however, has made wonderful progress since those days. The United States of America have grown into a power at least equal-if they chose to exert their strengthperhaps superior, to any European nation. Russia has spread her empire over half a continent, and is full of youth and vigour. Prussia, as we sce, has become a giant, and France may be purified and strengthened by her present adversities. Have we made similar progress and are we now as equal to the struggle with any of these four as we were with the one, sixty years ago? Perhaps not; Lut it may be argued we have no desire to fight. All we want is to be allowed to dwell in peace, to spin our cotton, to manufacture articles for the rest of the world, and to accumulate and enjoy our gains, injuring nobody. We may also plead that we deserve well of the world, for we have developed constitutional freedom and religious liberty, and kept the lamp of civilisation lighted when, but for us, it might have been extinguished in the turmoil of Continental politics. Unfortunately for this Utopian dream, we possess the most extensive and the most scattered empire in the world, and consequently the one least easily defended. What is still more unlucky, America covets Canada, and would like to possess our West Indian Islands. Russia is equally desirous of taking our place in India, and both Germany and France hate us because we are happy and prosperous, and sit quietly looking on, while they are pouring out their blood like water, and their treasure like sand; and all would like to share in our commerce, and to appropriate at least a portion of our gains. Under these circumstances one of two things-Either we must be prepared to face the same expenditure of blood and treasure that any-one of these four giants has incurred or is prepared now to meet, or we must withdraw our pretension to rank as their equal. If, however,

our patriotism is equal to the sacrifice, we may, possibly, be spared the most painful part of it. But on this point there must be no mistake, and the world must be convinced that we are really in earnest, or the catastrophe may be imminent.

It is idle to fancy that, after such a convulsion as that now occurring, affairs can for years subside into even so stable a position as the armed peace which was considered so threatening before the recent outbreak. Whether France comes out of the struggle victorious or defeated, she must be more powerful for warlike purposes than she was before the war; she will probably reorganise her forces on the Prussian model, and, if regenerated by adversity, she may be stronger than ever. Even if Paris falls, and the Prussians dictate the harshest terms of peace, they must send back the French army, three hundred thousand strong, now prisoners in Germany. Provided with arms, they are an army again, and burning with a desire to wipe out the memory of their defeat by fighting anybody, or in any cause. On their return, they will find in France six or seven hundred thousand men, more or less drilled, and with arms in their hands. Many of them are, or have become, regular soldiers, and the bulk of them have become divorced from the pursuits of civil life, while the war has destroyed the means by which many gained a livelihood, and they are consequently unable to resume their industries.· Hatred the most implacable, not only against Prussia, but against every one, who, justly or unjustly, they fancy may have contributed to their reverses, has taken possession of every Frenchman's bosom, and created an undying feeling of irritation on the part of the most sensitive nation in Europe, which must long be the cause of imminent danger of an outbreak with or without any adequate cause. Their fleet, too, is untouched and its efficiency unimpaired by the war, and, with this, while there exists in France a million of men under arms, writhing under a sense of injury and disgrace, who shall say that peace may not be broken at any hour?

There is one other important fact which must be carefully noted, which is, that the organization of the Prussian army is the greatest advance in military science that has been made in modern times. The brilliant strategy of the First Napoleon caused a revolution in military matters that, for a time, rendered him supreme in Europe. His armies were first created by the terrible . discipline of the revolutionary period, but they were moulded into an effective and homogeneous fighting machine by the ge-.