in Providence. Either alternative is intelligible and logical, but half-and-half measures such as are now in vogue only court destruction by irritating the powers of the world, while trusting in their forbearance for existence.' Sir Lintorn Simmons, from whose pamphlet we have quoted the foregoing words, proposes to obtain the men for the army by voluntary enlistment. Considering that 40,000 men between the ages of twenty and twenty-four are required each year, he thinks it possible to obtain them on the principle of offering a fair day's wages for a fair day's work." He would therefore give 28. 2d. a day to each private, stopping 6d. a day from the pay, and lodging it in the savings-bank, so that at the end of three years a sum of 281. would accumulate, which should be handed to the soldier on discharge; and he would offer a retaining fee in the form of 101. a year for nine years, during which term the soldier would serve in the reserve, and be liable to join the colours in case of war. He proposes that battalions for India and the Colonies should be made up of volunteers for six years' service. His scheme would give a force of about 250,000 men in the Army and its Reserves fit for immediate service. We do not hesitate to say that the whole plan is a very admirable one, but it depends on so many contingencies that we doubt its practical efficacy. These contingencies are:-1. Could 40,000 men between twenty and twenty-four years be obtained annually, who would enlist on the proposed terms? 2. Would 5000 to 6000 of these men volunteer for service in India and the Colonies? 3. Would ninety per cent. of the discharged men engage for nine years' service in the Reserve?

These questions can only be answered by the light of past experience; and we find that in July, 1856, nearly a year after the Crimean war, the Army was 45,000 men below its establishment the bounty being 101. for the cavalry and 87. for the infantry. And this at a time when every exertion was made to keep the small British force, never exceeding 60.000 men, supplied with recruits, when India and all the Colonies were drained of regular troops, and the Mediterranean Stations garrisoned by militia.*

Again, recruiting for the army was stopped entirely on the 1st of January, 1870. Between that date and last July nearly 20,000 men were discharged. Last July the army

* Those people who believe the army is composed entirely, or even largely, of bad characters, are strangely in error. Bad characters do not enlist unless with a high bounty; and doing away with bounty is one great improvement introduced by Mr. Cardwell.

was 4500 men below its authorised establishment; and although every effort has been used to obtain recruits, although the winter has been a very hard and severe one, only 14,000 men have been added to the army, the total number of recruits being 26,000 and the loss during the period we have named being 7500 men. And this although the labour market was glutted, not only by the discharged soldiers, but also by the cessation of enlistment during the early part of the year, while at the same time the standard of height was reduced to 5 feet 44 inches, a reduction which experience has shown increases the number of recruits by about one-fourth. We are therefore compelled to come to the conclusion that Sir Lintorn Simmons' scheme would break down at the very point where all such proposals break down, the actual supply of the individual man.

Turning to Lord Elcho's 'Letters on Military Organisation,' which we have taken as affording a representation of the second great class into which army reformers have split, we find Lord Elcho proposes :

modes of enlistment, the system of long enlist'That without interfering with the present ment should also be tried, divided into three or more periods of service, with different liabilities and increasing pay attached to each period, until the completion of the whole engagement, when the reserve pay would be succeeded by a life pension. Thus, a soldier engaged, say for twenty-one years, might serve five years with liable at any time to join a regiment at home the colours, seven years in the First Reserveor abroad, if necessity arose-completing the term of his engagement in the Second Reserve, attached to the Militia, which would thus gain a permanent nucleus of trained soldiers. That the army "Militia Reserve" should be increased, and that a certain number of Militia regiments should be mobilised, that is, placed on a permanent active list, and be at all times ready for service anywhere along with the regular

army.

'Secondly, as regards the Regular or Sedentary Militia for home service only. That it should be increased; that individual volunteering for army service from the Militia should be forbidden, except into the Army "Militia Reinto it, another should be raised for the Militia; serve"; that for every man who volunteered that the Militia for home service should be raised by ballot, no substitute being allowed, and voluntary enlistment in the Militia being confined to the mobilised regiments.

'Thirdly, as regards the Volunteer force. ent by constituting a certificate of efficiency in That it should be maintained and made efficia Volunteer Corps an exemption from the Militia Ballot, and that continuous efficiency should further be required for five years.

'Thus, every youth on attaining the age of twenty years, no matter what his rank or position, would have to risk the chance of service

n the Militia, or give five years' continuous efficient service in the Volunteer force; and if during any one of these five years he failed to become efficient, or was dismissed his corps, he would in the year following, although past the ordinary ballot age, have to run the chance of Militia service.'

Pension and ballot are the keystones of these proposals, which are in the main sound, but are open to some very serious objections. 1. If we have the ballot and continuous

service with a pension working together, the nation will be weighted both in person and purse.

so as to enable it to meet the changes introduced in the art of war? If an affirmative answer can be given to these questions, then the country owes Mr. Gladstone's Government a deep debt of gratitude.

The proposals contained in Mr. Cardwell's speech, and embodied in 'the Army Regula

tion Bill' are seven in number.

I. The abolition of purchase.

II. To withdraw from the Lieutenants of gard to the auxiliary forces. Counties the power they now have with re

3. There is no proposal for localising regiments, which we conceive takes the sting out of the ballot system.

4. There is no fusion together of the different armies of which the military force of the country consists.

Such was the general type of the various proposals for army reform laid before the country shortly before Parliament met; and then it was announced in her Majesty's Speech that Army Reform would be brought prominently before the House of Commons, and that her Majesty's Ministers would propose a scheme suitable for the wants of the country. It is not too much to say that so stirred were the people of this country by the events taking place in France, that rarely

have the utterances of a minister been more anxiously expected than were those of Mr. Cardwell, when he rose to address the House on the 16th of February last. And the views which he stated as having actuated the Government are undoubtedly correct :

'We have,' said Mr. Cardwell, on the part of the community at large an interest in the subject, which in former years it has been very difficult to evoke; and it is the opinion of the

Government that if we are to deal at all with a question of this magnitude and importance, we ought not to deal with it in a superficial and partial manner, but to take a broad and comprehensive review of the subject, and endeavour to lay the deep foundations of a system which may render danger or the apprehension of danger in the future, altogether unknown.'

Words such as these must ever command the sympathy and respect of Englishmen. But there are things which command the respect and sympathy of Englishmen still more than words, and those are deeds. Are the proposals of the Government such as will remove all apprehension of danger in the future'? Does the Government propose to re-organise the military force of the country

on.

IV. The militia to be raised by voluntary for a period of six months, at the option of enlistment, and the period of drill extended the Secretary of State for War.

V. The laws of the ballot are altered. It

is to be used only in cases of great emergency; then Parliament must be summoned, and the Sovereign, by an Order in Council, may direct the militia to be recruited by the ballot.

the Volunteers when under arms for a review. VI. The Articles of War to be applied to

VII. The Government to have power on an emergency to take possession of the rail

ways.

Let us now try and examine each of these the national defences; how far they meet the seven heads, and test how far they improve altered condition of war; and how far they will enable England to occupy her proper position in the world. On each of these proposals we would offer a few remarks.

I. There are few subjects that have been more misunderstood, and we are sorry to say misrepresented than the purchase system. It is a bargain between the officers and the State, a most onesided bargain, it is true, for the former gain little and lose much, while the latter gains everything. Mr. Cardwell asks the nation to get rid of this bargain, to destroy a system that exists and gives satisfaction to the officers of the army; and he states that the cost of putting an end to it will be 8 millions. No detailed estimate of this large sum is furnished. Many well informed people say the cost will be 12 millions. Assume it, however, at 8 millions, what system is proposed in its place?-simply none. What estimate is furnished of the cost of carrying out efficiently what purchase now does without cost?-simply none. The proposal then is to destroy an existing system by the transfer of an unknown sum, varying from 8 to 12 millions, from the pockets of the tax-payers to the pockets of the officers of the cavalry

Purchase has conferred the following benefits on the nation :

1st. It has given a rapid flow of promotion without cost to the taxpayer. Out of 127,000l. voted for full-pay retirements, 61,000l. go to the cavalry and infantry, and 66,000l. to the artillery and engineers. If purchase is destroyed, and a sum equivalent to that which the artillery and engineers now get is voted for the cavalry and infantry, this sum of 127,000l. must be increased to 700,000l. If the retirements be placed on the footing that the Special Committee of the House of Commons, presided over by Mr. Childers, declared was requisite for the artillery and engineers, this sum must be increased to 1,700,000l.

2nd. In every profession, where men enter young, numbers must come in who are put there by their friends and who are unsuited, from many causes, for the duties. Purchase gets rid of these men rapidly and quietly. Out of 1000 men who enter the army as ensigns, it appears that 442, or twofifths, leave before they become captains, and 185, or nearly one-fifth more, leave as captains. Thus, more than three-fifths of the whole number leave before they become Field-officers. Hence the State is no longer burdened with either employing or pensioning men whose tastes and feelings are not adapted to a military life. Compare this with the non-purchase corps, the artillery and engineers, in which officers enter to serve for their lives, and in which the Duke of Cambridge said the service suffered because it was almost impossible to get rid of inefficient officers.

3rd. Independent officers are obtained. In the present state of the art of war independent officers are all-important. The opinions of the author of The Prussian Infantry, 1869,' are at least worthy of respect, and he tells us, speaking of peace reviews, An officer does not act according to his own military view, but according to the principles which he knows are held by the superior officer, with whom the final decision lies.' The anomalies perpetrated 'sink deep into the minds of the troops, and poison the judgment of the officer who is not intellectually self-dependent.'

4th. Purchase is an admirable bargain for the nation. Mr. Clode, in his book, The Military Forces of the Crown,' tells us

'The purchasing officers of the line have done more than provide a retirement for nonpurchasing officers of their own branch of the service, they have given a retirement to officers of the non-purchase corps (i.e. Artillery and Engineers), and to others who have never been contributors. Their fund has been diminished

on several occasions, by direct payments to the Exchequer, and by indirect payments to the same account, that is by buying up the commissions of officers whose half-pay then ceased to be a charge on the Treasury.'

Mr. Cardwell assured the House of Commons, in a quotation from Shakespeare, that honour, not gold, is the soldier's guerdon. Assuredly honour, not gold, has been the purchasing officer's guerdon.

When purchase is abolished, what' prospect is there that a better or any system at all will be substituted? Purchase acts now as a kind of natural selection. Those men who are unsuited for the army go away, without expense to the country; those men who are suited remain. But it is said that promotion is to be by selection. How can selection be exercised in an army like the English army, scattered all over the world? Is it not more than likely that promotion will fall to the fortunate men who can remain at home, and hang about London? What portion of our military arrangements has always proved successful? The regimental: therefore break it down. What portion has usually failed? The staff, founded on selection: Therefore introduce selection generally.

We freely admit that the very name of purchase' creates a prejudice against the system, which the majority of persons don't take the trouble to understand, and when a powerful ministry purposes its abolition we consider that it is doomed. But let the country clearly understand the cost. In addition to the eight or twelve millions, which are required for the purchase of commissions, another million must be provided annually for retirement, representing an enormous permanent cost. For a small portion of this sum London might be fortified, and the Forth, Clyde, Mersey, Tyne, and Humber secured from a foreign foe. Which would render the country most secure? Which, in Mr. Cardwell's own words, 'is the most likely to render danger or the apprehension of danger in the future altogether unknown?'

II. It is proposed by the Bill to withdraw from the Lieutenants of Counties the powers they now have in regard to the auxiliary forces. This is undoubtedly a wise reform, if it be worked properly. But we are not informed how these forces are to be officered. Taking away a bit of parchment from a militia officer signed by a Lieutenant of a county, and giving him a similar bit of parchment signed by the Queen, does not alter the efficiency of the man. It has been stated that the abolition of purchase will enable the regular Army to be fused with the Militia. How this will be accomplished

we are not informed; but, as we are told by the advocates of the abolition of purchase that it will take thirty years to do away with the obstacle, the process of fusion will be slow. And, in the meanwhile, is the country the stronger for the change? Mr. Trevelyan very properly impressed upon his audience in Edinburgh that 'the organisation must not only begin at once, but it must be complete. On examination, we find that, while the Militia are to be removed from the authority of the Lieutenant, the chief magistrate of the county, they are partially to be placed under the Justices of the Peace, who are to provide the barracks; and the cost of these barracks is to be borne by local rates and not imperial funds. Nothing interferes with the efficiency of the Militia more than the billeting system; yet, while Mr. Cardwell takes the patronage of the regiment out of the hands of the Lieutenant of the County, he vests the provision of barracks, and consequent efficiency of the regiment, in the Justices, and attempts to charge the local rates, already strained to the utmost, with an expenditure for imperial purposes. III. Army Enlistment for a period not exceeding twelve years, to be spent partly in the Reserve and partly with the colours, as the Secretary of State for War and the soldier may agree on.

We are not informed of the effect of these arrangements upon the pension received by the soldier. Will he receive a pension at the end of twelve years or not? How will this affect recruiting? The whole object of short service is to get a large Reserve force. But if the supply of recruits fails, what is to become of the Reserve? The pension a soldier receives, at the end of his service, is usually one great inducement to enlist. We get, or may calculate on getting some 30,000 recruits yearly. Should we obtain so many if there were no pensions? Again, it may be fairly asked, is it right to rest such an important matter as the formation of an army reserve on the wishes or will of the soldiers themselves? There is no proportion fixed between the numbers of men in the active army and the Reserve; and, judging by recent speeches in both Houses of Parliament, there is every likelihood of a large proportion of the army being placed in the Reserve, and still counted as effective by the Minister for War, thus leaving the effective force of the country to be played with, as it ever has been, solely to suit the convenience of the Government of the day.

The proposal to drill the Militia recruits for six months is undoubtedly a good one; but when will the country, so far as its national defence is concerned, be benefited by this proposal? and how will it affect recruiting for the Militia? Will recruits be obtained as easily when they have to be drilled for six months as for one month?

V. The Laws of the Ballot are altered. Instead of being, as now it is, the actual law of the country, it is to be used only in cases of great emergency. Then Parliament must be summoned, and the sovereign, by an Order in Council, may direct the Militia to be recruited by the ballot.

Now, if there is one thing more than another in which modern discovery has revolutionized the art of war, it is the necessitythe paramount necessity-of being ready. To talk of raising the militia by ballot when an emergency has taken place, is simply to talk of insuring the house after the fire breaks out. It has been well said that England, from the fact of being an island, bounds every state, and, consequently, her frontier, or coast-line, is exposed to attack on every point. Her wealthy metropolis, perfectly defenceless, is only two days' march from her frontier; her great commercial cities, equally undefended, are chiefly on her frontier; and, when she is attacked, the game is not the same for the two belligerents: one stakes its fleet and a small portion of its army, the other stakes her existence. emergency' takes place. When can we put the men in line? That is the question. Will it be in three or six months? and what under existing circumstances do three or six months mean?

'An

Again we turn to Mr. G. O. Trevelyan; and he tells us Nothing conduced so much to the ruin of the Emperor Napoleon as his taking one half of a new system without having the determination to accept it in all its parts. He relied on the Mobiles, and did not dare to turn them into soldiers.' Mr. Cardwell does not rely on voluntary enlistment when an army alone is wanted, viz., 'an emergency'; but he does not dare to prepare an army beforehand. He alters one of the oldest laws of this country, the liability to universal service for home defence, and limits it to an emergency.' Is the country any the stronger for this alteration? Is the national defence one whit improved?

VII. The Government has power on an emergency to take possession of the rail