who are citizens. It seems to me that we ought not to have one standard for citizenship and another standard for suffrage; but that in all the States, and especially in the event of a national election, there should be one standard for all voters throughout the entire Union. These voters in these States vote for representatives in Congress, for presidential electors, and they, also, vote for members of the Legislature who elect Senators of the United States, thereby making the qualifications of voters unequal in the different States; and, therefore, it may work to the disadvantage of States holding to citizen suffrage. present system To illustrate: Four of these States permit voting after a resi- How the dence of only six months; so that if a foreigner goes to one of those States the first of May, and declares his intention of be- works. coming a citizen, he may at the following November election vote for any officer, State or national. Thus, after a residence of only six months in this country, he becomes entitled to vote, with the same force and effect, and his vote counts for just as much as the vote of a citizen who has resided here five years, or who has been raised in this country and has been compelled to live here twenty-one years. Again, suppose that two brothers come here by the same steamer; one of them goes to one of these States, and the other remains in this State. The one who goes to these States may vote after living there six months, but the one who remains in New York State must live here five years before he is entitled to vote. tional It is this inequality that is aimed at by these resolutions, and A constituthere seems to be no way of remedying this state of affairs except amendment by amending the Constitution of the United States. The Con- the remedy. stitution itself, at the time it was framed, was the creature of compromises. The question of suffrage was left largely to the States themselves. The electors who are entitled to vote for the most numerous branch of the State legislature may vote for representatives in Congress. That, I think, is the only provision in the Constitution on the subject. It seems to me that it is peculiarly proper to take some action upon this matter not in L What are privileges and immunities. the spirit of criticism, but by way of courteous depreciation or protest. We are here representing ten per cent of the population of the entire Union. We are here representing fifteen per cent of the wealth of the entire Union; and when we find that our sister States have placed in their Constitutions provisions which we believe to be inimical to our interests and the interests of the entire country at large, I think it is proper for us to, at least, call their attention to it, and by going to the source of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, ask that the Constitution itself be so amended as to correct this inequality in the right of suffrage. We have a right to be heard. It is our duty to speak, and we would be remiss if we failed to do so. 60. Reciprocal Guarantee of Privileges and Immunities among the Several States One of the fundamental purposes of the federal Constitution was to make a nation in which citizens might move freely about without hindrances from the respective states. To secure this end, its framers embodied in it a clause to the effect that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." This clause has been interpreted by the courts in this fashion: What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such re straints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or reside in any other State, for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union." cannot discriminate citizens of other states. It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to A state place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from against citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property, and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. (Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 607.) Indeed, without A citizen special privi- some provision of the kind, removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in other States, and giving them equality of privilege with the citizens of those States, the republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists. But the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each cannot carry State in the several States by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States, under their constitution and laws, by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer must, therefore, be enjoyed at home unless the assent of other States to their enjoyment therein be given. The constitutional provision. The governor of Iowa asks for advice 61. Interstate Rendition In order that criminals from one state may not be harbored in another state, the Constitution provides that "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." The Supreme Court, however, has decided that there is no way of compelling a state governor to surrender a criminal, should he refuse to do so on demand, and, in actual practice, governors have a wide discretion in the matter. The following report from an attorneygeneral of Iowa illustrates how the requisitions of other states are looked into and on sufficient grounds may be disallowed: SIRI beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th inst., containing a request that I examine the requisition made by the governor of Kentucky for the extradition of on a requisi- J. D. Wurtsbaugh, together with the evidence attached to the requisition, and advise you as governor of the state whether in tion from Kentucky. my opinion such requisition should be honored and Wurtsbaugh returned to the state of Kentucky for trial for the offense claimed to have been committed in that state. In response to such request I beg to submit the following opinion: committed from Ken tucky should be denied. The facts in the case, as disclosed by the undisputed evidence, The crime are these: [Here follows statement of facts]. . . . It is repug- eighteen nant to every sense of justice to say that where a person leaves a years ago. state in the ordinary course of his affairs without any attempt of concealment, and for eighteen years lives an upright life, he may then be arrested and returned to the state where the crime is claimed to have been committed eighteen years before, to be put on trial for that offense, unless he is charged with murder or treason. This view, as it appears to me, is based upon the soundest Why the principles of public policy; that is, if the authorities of a sister request state desire the arrest and return of a fugitive from justice, the application therefore must be made within a reasonable time under all the circumstances of the case after the commission of the offense. The request now made by the governor of Kentucky for the arrest and return of J. D. Wurtsbaugh for an offense committed more than eighteen years ago in that state does not fall within this rule. If the authorities of Kentucky desired to try Mr. Wurtsbaugh for the offense of bigamy, an application for his return to that state should have been made with reasonable promptness after the offense was committed. Under all the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that Wurtsbaugh can not now be held to be a fugitive from justice under the provisions of the federal constitution.. The request of the governor of Kentucky should not, therefore in my opinion, be complied with, and Wurtsbaugh should not be arrested and returned to that state to answer the charge preferred against him. Respectfully submitted, October 26, 1903. To the Honorable A. B. Cummins, Governor of Iowa. CHAS. W. MULLAN, Attorney-General. |