Some

statistics on voting.

guilty of murder or not, and then finding fault with them because
they reached an erroneous decision. The people would not be
to blame for the wrong decision, but those who forced upon
them a method of trying a criminal case which in its very nature
was utterly impossible in practice. Under this bill the people are
to be asked to legislate by saying "yes" or "no" to any question,
no matter how abstract or how complicated, which anyone can
manage to have placed on the ballot. To deal with such questions
by a categorical answer is absurd. It is the easiest thing in the
world to frame a question to which a categorical "yes" or "no"
is impossible. Take the familiar one, "Have you stopped beating
your wife?"
Answer it "yes" or "no" and see where it leaves you.
Abstract questions can just as easily be framed to which a cate-
gorical "yes" or "no" would be utterly misleading, perilous, and
unrepresentative. No people, no matter how intelligent, could
legislate in such a way as this otherwise than disastrously. There
would be no opportunity for modification or amendment, for
repeated votes on different stages, or for debate. There would
be but little chance for discussion, and good legislation without
the opportunity for debate, amendment, and deliberate considera-
tion is an impossibility. Less than one per cent of the voters of
the Commonwealth would have under this bill the power to force
upon ninety-nine per cent of the voters any kind of question they
chose to devise and compel them to say "yes" or "no" to it.
Thousands of voters either through indifference or still more
through lack of opportunity to understand the question would
refrain from voting, and an imperative mandate to the legislature
might be carried by a small minority of the voters.

Let me ask your attention to some figures in order to give you vivid idea of what I mean and to show how imperfectly "yes" and "no" votes, taken in this way, can be relied upon as reflections of the real will and true opinion of the people. These votes, which follow, were given upon constitutional amendments, the most serious questions which can be submitted, because they involve changes in our organic law and were submitted with all the care

and deliberation which the framers of our constitution could provide.

POPULAR VOTES UPON ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF MASSACHUSETTS

These figures show the absolute truth of my assertion that ques- How tions submitted in this way are decided by a majority of a minority, rule is esminority and if this is true of constitutional amendments, fully and plainly tablished. stated, you can imagine what it would be on abstract questions, unknown, blind, uncomprehended, and incomprehensible. These figures show beyond a peradventure that no true public opinion can be obtained in this way, but that on the contrary this bill is a scheme to secure legislation which could not obtain the assent of the voters properly expressed through chosen and responsible representatives. It is a device to enable small and active minorities to obtain legislation which they could not secure by legitimate methods. Representatives represent the whole people. This bill would force upon us a government by a fraction of the

How popular

will is not ascertained.

The

measure

destroys representative

people and would defeat the will of the real majority of the people themselves.

Yet the legislature would have no choice. They would be bound in conscience and in practice, if not by the words of the statute, bound in a manner and forced by a pressure from which there would be no escape, to obey the mandate no matter how obtained, and no man could tell in what form of law the mandate would be finally embodied. The chances are that the law under the pressure of the mandate would be the work of extremists and contrary to the wishes even of those who voted "yes" on the abstract proposition. There could be no greater travesty on popular government than a system which would permit a majority of a minority of the voters to force upon the state any law they chose. It would give an enormous opportunity to the power of money skilfully and corruptly used. It would impair the rights of the people and leave those of the individual naked and defenseless. The result would not be an expression of the popular will, but a mechanical parody of that will so gross that even its authors would gaze upon it with amazement and disgust. ...

Experience has shown us the justice of their opinions. This bill invites us to cast aside all that they did, break down every method of lawmaking which they established, and reject that government. principle which they most valued, the principle of representation. I say, reject the principle of representation, because when you impair it and take from your representatives all power and all responsibility, the principle of representation falls. No men invested with the power to make laws, but relieved of all responsibility for the laws they make, are to be trusted. We may change many things, we may abolish laws and put new ones in their place, but we can not alter the fundamental principles of our government and expect the fabric to stand. If we undermine and overthrow the bulwarks of ordered liberty and individual freedom, the citadel itself will not long survive. Any measure which breaks down free representative government, advances us proportionately on the road to executive government, to the rule of one man. This

Public Opinion Bill will reduce the representative on one question after another to the level of a machine. As the representative principle sinks, the executive power rises. I believe in maintaining both and maiming neither. I am opposed to crippling and extinguishing representative government. I love freedom and hate tyranny, and anything which depresses the one and opens the road to the other will meet with resistance from me. It is for this reason that I oppose this bill.

CHAPTER XXIV

The governor's

in the Constitution of the state.

THE STATE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

171. The Legal Position of the Governor

THE place of the governor in the state administrative system and his relations to the other officers in the executive department are described by Chief Justice Wilson, of Illinois, in a noteworthy decision dealing with the governor's power to remove the secretary of state:

The case then resolves itself into the single question, Does the power found Governor possess the constitutional power of removing from office the Secretary of State, and appointing a successor, at will? In deciding this question, recurrence must be had to the Constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court can be governed. That is the charter of the Governor's authority. All the powers delegated to him by, or in accordance with that instrument, he is entitled to exercise, and no others. The Constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the legislative department of the government; but it is to be regarded as a grant of powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary, therefore, can exercise any authority or power, except such as is clearly granted by the Constitution.

As the right of the Governor to remove the Secretary must be granted by the Constitution, or it does not exist, it therefore devolves upon those who advocate the claim of the executive power to show the grant upon which it is founded; to point out the clause and section of the Constitution from which it is derived. How has this been done? Has any express grant been produced? No; it is not pretended that any express grant is to be found in the Constitution. But it is contended that the power in question is granted to the Governor by implication. That from the grant of