صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

had probably confounded the doctrine with the conduct of some who supported it. The reader should practise a little of the power of abstraction, and detach accidental associations from truth itself.

In reality, it cannot be asserted that the people do not rightfully possess the supreme power, without asserting that governors may do what they will, and be as tyrannical as they will. Who may prevent them? The people? Then the people hold the sovereign power.

Many political constitutions have existed in which the governor was held to be absolutely the supreme power. The antiquity of such constitutions, or the regular succession of the existing governor, does not make his pretensions to this power just, because the principles on which it is ascertained that the people are supreme, are antecedent to all questions of usage, and superior to them. No injustice, therefore, is done-nothing wrong is done-in diminishing or taking away the power of an absolute monarch, notwithstanding the regularity of his pretensions to it. Yet other principles have been held: and it was said of Louis the Sixteenth, that as he "was the sole maker and executor of the laws," and as this power "had been exercised by him and by his ancestors for centuries without question or control, it was not in the power of the states to deprive him of any portion of it without his own consent." So that we are told that many millions of persons ought to be subject for ever to the vices or caprices of one man, in compliment to the fact that their predecessors had been subject before them. * He who maintains such doctrine, surely forgets for what purpose government is instituted at all.

The rule that "Political Power is rightly possed only when it is possessed by consent of the community," necessarily applies to the choice of the person who is to exercise it. No man, and no set of men, rightly govern unless they are preferred by the public to others. It is of no consequence that a people should formally select a president or a king. They continually act upon the principle without this. A people who are satisfied with their governor make, day by day, the choice of which we speak. They prefer him to all others; they choose to be served by him rather than by any other; and he, therefore, is virtually, though not formally, selected by the public. But, when we speak of the right of a particular person or family to govern a people, we speak, as of all other rights, in conditional language. The right consists in the preference which is given to him; and exists no longer than that preference exists. If any governor were fully conscious that the community preferred another man or another kind of government, he ought to regard himself in the light of an usurper if he nevertheless continues to retain his power. Not that every government ought to dissolve itself, or every governor to abdicate his office, because there is a general but temporary clamour against it. This is one thing-the steady deliberate judgment of the people is another. Is it too much to hope that the time may come when governments will so habitually refer to the purposes of government, and be regulated by them, that they will not even wish to hold the reins longer than the

We do not here defend the conduct of the states, or censure that of Louis: we speak merely of the political Truth. That atrocious course of wickedness, the French Revolution, was occasioned by the abuses of the old government and its ramifications. The French people, unhappily, had neither virtue enough nor political knowledge enough, to reform these abuses by proper means. A revolution of some kind, and at some period, awaits, I doubt not, every despotic government in Europe and in the world. Happy will it be for those rulers who timely and wisely regard the irresistible progress of Public Opinion! And happy for those communities which endeavour reformation only by virtuous means.

people desire it; and that nothing more will be needed for a quiet alteration than that the public judgment should be quietly expressed?

Political revolutions are not often favourable to the accurate illustration of political truth; because, such is the moral condition of mankind, that they have seldom acted in conformity with it. Revolutions have commonly been the effect of the triumph of a party, or of the successes of physical power. Yet, if the illustration of these principles has not been accurate, the general position of the right of the people to select their own rulers has often been illustrated. In our own country, when James II. left the throne, the people filled it with another person, whose real title consisted in the choice of the people. James continued to talk of his rights to the crown; but if William was preferred by the public, James was, what his son was afterwards called, a Pretender. The nonjurors appear to have acted upon erroneous principles, (except indeed on the score of former oaths to James; which, however, ought never to have been taken.) If we acquit them of motives of party, they will appear to have entertained some notions of the rights of governors independently of the wishes of the people. At William's death, the nation preferred James's daughter to his son; thus again elevating their judgments above all considerations of what the Pretender called his rights. Anne had then a right to the throne, and her brother had not. At the death of Anne, or rather in contemplation of her death, the public had again to select their governor; and they chose, not the immediate representative of the old family, but the Elector of Hanover; and it is in virtue of the same choice, tacitly expressed at the present hour, that the heir of the Elector now fills the throne.

[The habitual consciousness on the part of a legislature, that its authority is possessed in order to make it an efficient guardian and promoter of the general welfare and the general satisfaction, would induce a more mild and conciliating system of internal policy than that which frequently obtains. Whether it has arisen from habit resulting from the violent and imperious character of international policy, or from that tendency to unkindness and overbearing which the consciousness of power induces, it cannot be doubted that measures of government are frequently adopted and conducted with such a high hand as impairs the satisfaction of the governed, and diminishes, by example, that considerate attention to the claims of others, upon which much of the harmony, and therefore the happiness, of society consists. Governments are too much afraid of conciliation. They too habitually suppose that mildness or concession indicates want of courage or want of power-that it invites unreasonable demands, and encourages encroachment and violence on the part of the governed. Man is not so intractable a being, or so insensible of the influence of candour and justice. In private life, he does not the most easily guide the conduct of his neighbours, who assumes an imperious, but he who assumes a temperate and mild demeanour. The best mode of governing, and the most powerful mode too, is to recommend state measures to the judgment and the affections of a people. If this had been sufficiently done in periods of tranquillity, some of those conflicts which have arisen between governments and the people had doubtless been prevented; and governments had been spared the mortification of conceding that to violence which they refused to concede in periods of quiet. We should not wait for times of agitation to do that which Fox advised even at such a time, because at other periods it may be

done with greater advantage, and with a better grace. "It may be asked," says Fox, "what I would propose to do in times of agitation like the present? I will answer openly :-If there is a tendency in the Dissenters to discontent, what should I do? I would instantly repeal the corporation and test acts, and take from them thereby all cause of complaint. If there were any persons tinctured with a republican spirit, I would endeavour to amend the representation of the Commons, and to prove that the House of Commons, though not chosen by all, should have no other interest than to prove itself the representative of all. If men were dissatisfied on account of disabilities or exemptions, &c., I would repeal the penal statutes, which are a disgrace to our law-books. If there were other complaints of grievance, I would redress them where they were really proved; but, above all, I would constantly, cheerfully, patiently listen; I would make it known, that if any man felt, or thought he felt, a grievance, he might come freely to the bar of this House and bring his proofs. And it should be made manifest to all the world that where they did exist they should be redressed; where not, it should be made manifest."*

We need not consider the particular examples and measures which the statesman instanced. The temper and spirit is the thing. A government should do that of which every person would see the propriety in a private man; if misconduct was charged upon him, show that the charge was unfounded; or, being substantiated, amend his conduct.]

[merged small][ocr errors]

This proposition is consequent of the truth of the last. The community, which has the right to withhold power, delegates it, of course, for its own advantage. If in any case its advantage is not consulted, then the object for which it was delegated is frustrated; or, in simple words, the measure which does not promote the public welfare is not right. It matters nothing whether the community have delegated specifically so much power for such and such purposes; the power, being possessed, entails the obligation. Whether a sovereign derives absolute authority by inheritance, or whether a president is entrusted with limited authority for a year, the principles of their duty are the same. The obligation to employ it only for the public good, is just as real and just as great in one case as in the other. The Russian and the Turk have the same right to require that the power of their rulers shall be so employed as the Englishman or American. They may not be able to assert this right, but that does not affect its existence nor the ruler's duty, nor his responsibility to that Almighty Being before whom he must give an account of his stewardship. These reasonings, if they needed confirmation, derive it from the fact that the Deity imperatively requires us, according to our opportunities, to do good to

man.

But, how ready soever men are to admit the truth of this proposition, as a proposition, it is very commonly disregarded in practice; and a vast variety of motives and objects direct the conduct of governments which have no connexion with the public weal. Some pretensions of consulting the public weal are, indeed, usual. It is not to be supposed that when public officers are pursuing their own schemes and

• Fell's Memoirs of the Public Life of C. J. Fox.

interests, they will tell the people that they disregard theirs. When we look over the history of a Christian nation, it is found that a large proportion of these measures which are most prominent in it, had little tendency to subserve, and did not subserve the public good. In practice, it is very often forgotten for what purpose governments are instituted. If a man were to look over twenty treaties, he would probably find that a half of them had very little to do with the welfare of the respective communities. He might find a great deal about Charles's rights, and Frederick's honour, and Louis's possessions, and Francis's interests, as if the proper subjects of international arrangements were those which respected rulers rather than communities. If a man looks over the state papers which inform him of the origin of a war, he will probably find that they agitate questions about Most Christian and Most Catholic Kings, and High Mightinesses, and Imperial Majesties-questions, however, in which Frenchmen, and Spaniards, and Dutch, and Austrians, are very little interested or concerned, or at any rate much less interested than they are in avoiding the quarrel.

Governments commonly trouble themselves unnecessarily and too much with the politics of other nations. A prince should turn his back towards other countries and his face towards his own-just as the proper place of a landholder is upon his own estates and not upon his neighbour's. If governments were wise, it would erelong be found that a great portion of the endless and wearisome succession of treaties, and remonstrances, and embassies, and alliances, and memorials, and subsidies, might be dispensed with, with so little inconvenience and so much benefit, that the world would wonder to think to what futile ends they had been busying, and how. needlessly they had been injuring themselves.

No doubt, the immoral and irrational system of international politics which generally obtains, makes the path of one government more difficult than it would otherwise be; and yet it is probable that the most efficacious way of inducing another government to attend to its proper business, would be to attend to our own. It is not sufficiently considered, nor indeed is it sufficiently known, how powerful is the influence of uprightness and candour in conciliating the good opinion and the good offices of other men. Overreaching and chicanery in one person, induce overreaching and chicanery in another. Men distrust those whom they perceive to be unworthy of confidence. Real integrity is not without its voucher in the hearts of others; and they who maintain it are treated with confidence, because it is seen that confidence can be safely reposed. Besides, he who busies himself with the politics of foreign countries, like the busy bodies in a petty community, does not fail to offend. In the last century, our own country was so much of a busy body, and had involved itself in such a multitude of treaties and alliances, that it was found, I believe, quite impossible to fulfil one, without, by that very act, violating another. of course, would offend. In private life, that man passes through the world with the least annoyance and the greatest satisfaction, who confines his attention to its proper business, that is, generally, to his own: and who can tell why the experience of nations should in this case be different from that of private men? In a rectified state of international affairs, half a dozen princes on a continent would have little more occasion to meddle with one another than half a dozen neighbours in a street.

This,

But indeed, Communities frequently contribute to their own injury. If governors are ambitious, or resentful, or proud, so, often, are the people;-and the public good has often been sacrificed by the public, with

astonishing preposterousness, to jealousy or vexation, Some merchants are angry at the loss of a branch of trade; they urge the government to interfere; memorials and remonstrances follow to the state of whom they complain;-and so, by that process of exasperation which is quite natural when people think that high language and a high attitude is politic, the nations soon begin to fight. The merchants applaud the spirit of their rulers, while in one year they lose more by the war than they would have lost by the want of the trade for twenty; and before peace returns, the nation has lost more than it would have lost by the continuance of the evil for twenty centuries. Peace at length arrives, and the government begins to devise means of repairing the mischiefs of the war. Both government and people reflect very complacently on the wisdom of their measures-forgetting that their conduct is only that of a man who wantonly fractures his own leg with a club, and then boasts to his neighbours how dexterously he limps to a surgeon.

Present expedients for present occasions, rather than a wide-embracing and far-seeing policy, is the great characteristic of European politics. We are hucksters who cannot resist the temptation of a present sixpence, rather than merchants who wait for their profits for the return of a fleet. Si quæris monumentum, circumspice! Look at the condition of either of the continental nations, and consider what it might have been if even a short line of princes had attended to their proper business-had directed their solicitude to the improvement of the moral, and social, and political condition of the people. Who has been more successful in this huckster policy than France? and what is France, and what are the French people at the present hour? -Why, as it respects real welfare, they are not merely surpassed, they are left at an immeasurable distance by a people who sprung up but as yesterday -by a people whose land, within the memory of our grandfathers, was almost a wilderness-and which actually was a wilderness long since France boasted of her greatness. Such results have a cause. It is not possible that systems of policy can be good, of which the effects are so bad. I speak not of particular measures, or of individual acts of ill policythese are not likely to be the result of the condition of man-but of the whole international system; a system of irritability, and haughtiness, and temporary expedients; a system of most unphilosophical principles, and from which Christianity is practically almost excluded. Here is the evidence of fact before us. We know what a sickening detail the history of Europe is; and it is obvious to remark, that the system which has given rise to such a history must be vicious and mistaken in its fundamental principles. The same class of history will continue to after generations unless these principles are changed-unless philosophy and Christianity obtain a greater influence in the practice of government; unless, in a word, governments are content to do their proper business, and to leave that which is not their business undone.

When such principles are acted upon, we may reasonably expect a rapid advancement in the whole condition of the world. Domestic measures which are now postponed to the more stirring occupations of legislators, will be found to be of incomparably greater importance than they. A wise code of criminal law, will be found to be of more consequence and interest than the acquisition of a million square miles of territory :-a judicious encouragement of general education, will be of more value than all the "glory" that has been acquired from the days of Alfred till now. Of moral legislation, however, it

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

Such

It has been said by a Christian writer, that "the science of politics is but a particular application of that of morals;" and it has been said by a writer who rejected Christianity, that "the morality that ought to govern the conduct of individuals and of nations, is in all cases the same." If there be truth in the principles which are advanced in the first of these Essays, these propositions are indisputably true. It is the chief purpose of the present work to enforce the supremacy of the Moral Law; and to this supremacy there is no exception in the case of nations. In the conduct of nations this supremacy is practically denied, although, perhaps, few of those who make it subservient to other purposes would deny it in terms. With their lips they honour the doctrine, but in their works they deny it. procedures must be expected to produce much selfcontradiction, much vacillation between the truth and the wish to disregard it, much vagueness of notions respecting political rectitude, and much casuistry to educe something like a justification of what cannot be justified. Let the reader observe an illustration: A moral philosopher says, "The Christian principles of love, and forbearance, and kindness, strictly as they are to be observed between man and man, are to be observed with precisely the same strictness between nation and nation." This is an unqualified assertion of the truth. But the writer thinks it would carry him too far, and so he makes exceptions. "In reducing to practice the Christian principles of forbearance, &c., it will not be always feasible, nor always safe, to proceed to the same extent as in acting towards an individual." Let the reader exercise his skill in casuistry, by showing the difference between conforming to laws with "precise strictness," and conforming to them in their "full extent."-Thus far Christianity and Expediency are proposed as our joint governors.-We must observe the Moral Law, but still we must regulate our observance of it by considerations of what is feasible and safe. Presently afterwards, however, Christianity is quite dethroned, and we are to observe its laws only" so far as national ability and national security will permit."*-So that our rule of political conduct stands at length thus: obey Christianity with precise strictness-when it suits your interests.

The reasoning by which such doctrines are supported, is such as it might be expected to be. We are told of the "caution requisite in affairs of such magnitude-the great uncertainty of the future conduct of the other nation," and of "patriotism."So that, because the affairs are of great magnitude, the laws of the Deity are not to be observed! It is all very well, it seems, to observe them in little matters, but for our more important concerns we want rules commensurate with their dignity-we cannot

• Gisborne's Moral Philosophy.

then be bound by the laws of God! The next rea- Tt has been upon Expediency that European politics son is, that we cannot foresee "the future conduct" | have so long been founded, with such lamentably inexof a nation. Neither can we that of an individual. pedient effects. We consult our interests so anxiously Besides this, inability to foresee inculcates the very that we ruin them. But we consult them blindly: lesson that we ought to observe the laws of Him who we do not know our interests, nor shall we ever know can foresee. It is a strange thing to urge the limi- them whilst we continue to imagine that we know tation of our powers of judgment, as a reason for them better than He who legislated for the world. substituting it for the judgment of Him whose powers Here is the perpetual folly as well as the perpetual are perfect. Then " patriotism" is a reason: and crime. Esteeming ourselves wise, we have, emphawe are to be patriotic to our country at the expense tically, been fools-of which no other evidence is of treason to our religion! necessary than the present political condition of the Christian world. If ever it was true of any human being, that by his deviations from rectitude he had provided scourges for himself, it is true at this hour of every nation in Europe.

The principles upon which these reasonings are founded, lead to their legitimate results: "In war and negotiation," says Adam Smith, "the laws of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded. Treaties

are violated, and the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds scarce any dishonour upon the violator. The ambassador who dupes the minister of a foreign nation, is admired and applauded. The just man, the man who in all private transactions would be the most beloved and the most esteemed, in those public transactions is regarded as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his business; and he incurs always the contempt, and sometimes even the detestation, of his fellow citizens."

[ocr errors]

Now, against all such principles-against all endeavours to defend the rejection of the Moral Law in political affairs, we would with all emphasis protest. The reader sees that it is absurd :-can he need to be convinced that it is unchristian? Christianity is of paramount authority, or another authority is superior. He who holds another authority as superior, rejects Christianity; and the fair and candid step would be avowedly to reject it. He should say, in distinct terms-Christianity throws some light on political principles; but its laws are to be held subservient to our interests. This were far more satisfactory than the trimming system, the perpetual vacillation of obedience to two masters, and the perpetual endeavour to do that which never can be done-serve both.

Jesus Christ legislated for man-not for individuals only, not for families only, not for Christian churches only, but for man in all his relationships and in all his circumstances. He legislated for states. In his moral law we discover no indications that states were exempted from its application, or that any rule which bound social did not bind political communities. If any exemption were designed, the onus probandi rests upon those who assert it unless they can show that the Christian precepts are not intended to apply to nations, the conclusion must be admitted that they are. But in reality, to except nations from the obligations is impossible; for nations are composed of individuals, and if no individual may reject the Christian morality, a nation may not. Unless, indeed, it can be shown that when you are an agent for others you may do what neither yourself nor any of them might do separately-a proposition of which certainly the proof must be required to be very clear and strong.

But the truth is that those who justify a suspension of Christian morality in political affairs, are often unwilling to reason distinctly and candidly upon the subject. They satisfy themselves with a jest, or a sneer, or a shrug; being unwilling either to contemn morality in politics, or to practise it: and it is to little purpose to offer arguments to him who does not need conviction, but virtue.

Let us attend to this declaration of a man who, whatever may have been the value of his general politics, was certainly a great statesman here: "I am one of those who firmly believe, as much indeed as a man can believe any thing, that the greatest resource a nation can possess, the surest principle of power, is strict attention to the principles of justice. I firmly believe that the common proverb of honesty being the best policy, is as applicable to nations as to individuals."" In all interference with foreign nations justice is the best foundation of policy, and moderation is the surest pledge of peace."—" If therefore we have been deficient in justice towards other states, we have been deficient in wisdom."*

Here, then, is the great truth for which we would contend to be unjust is to be unwise. And since justice is not imposed upon nations more really than other branches of the Moral Law, the universal maxim is equally true-to deviate from purity of rectitude is impolitic as well as wrong. When will this truth be learnt and be acted upon? When shall we cast away the contrivances of a low and unworthy policy, and dare the venture of the consequences of virtue? When shall we, in political affairs, exercise a little of that confidence in the knowledge and protection of God, which we are ready to admire in individual life?-Not that it is to be assumed as certain that such fidelity would cost nothing. Christianity makes no such promise. But whatever it might cost it would be worth the purchase. And neither reason nor experience allows the doubt that a faithful adherence to the Moral Law would more effectually serve national interests, than they have ever yet been served by the utmost sagacity whilst violating that law,

The contrivances of expediency have become so habitual to measures of state, that it may probably be thought the dreamings of a visionary to suppose it possible that they should be substituted by purity of rectitude. And yet I believe it will eventually be done-not perhaps by the resolution of a few cabinets -it is not from them that reformation is to be expected-but by the gradual advance of sound principles upon the minds of men ;-principles which will assume more and more their rightful influence in the world, until at length the low contrivances of a fluctuating and immoral policy will be substituted by firm, and consistent, and invariable integrity.

The convention of what is called the Holy Alliance, was an extraordinary event; and little as the contracting parties may have acted in conformity with it, and little as they or their people were prepared for such a change of principles, it is a subject of satisfaction that such a state paper exists. It contains a testimony at least to virtue and to recti

Expediency is the rock upon which we split-tude; and even if we should suppose it to be utterly upon which, strange as it appears, not only our principles but our interests suffer continual shipwreck.

Theory of Moral Sentiments.

hypocritical, the testimony is just as real. Hypocrisy commonly affects a character which it ought

+ Fell's Memoirs of the Public Life of C J. Fox.

to maintain: and the act of hypocrisy is homage to the character. In this view, I say, it is subject of some satisfaction that a document exists which declares that these powerful princes have come to a "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Christian religion-the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace:" and which declares that these principles, "far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions, and remedying their imperfections."

The time, it may be hoped, will arrive when such a declaration will be the congenial and natural result of principles that are actually governing the Christian world. Meantime, let the philosopher and the statesman keep that period in their view, and endeavour to accelerate its approach. He who does this, will secure a fame for himself that will increase and still increase as the virtue of man holds its onward course, while multitudes of the great both of past ages and of the present, will become beacons to warn, rather than examples to stimulate us.

CHAPTER II.

CIVIL LIBERTY.

Loss of Liberty-War-Useless laws.

Or personal liberty we say nothing, because its full possession is incompatible with the existence of society. All government supposes the relinquishment of a portion of personal liberty.

Civil Liberty may, however, be fully enjoyed. It is enjoyed, where the principles of political truth and rectitude are applied in practice, because there the people are deprived of that portion only of liberty which it would be pernicious to themselves to possess. If political power is possessed by consent of the community; if it is exercised only for their good; and if this welfare is consulted by Christian means, the people are free. No man can define the particular enjoyments or exemptions which constitute civil liberty, because they are contingent upon the circumstances of the respective nations. A degree of restraint may be necessary for the general welfare of one community, which would be wholly unnecessary in another. Yet the first would have no reason to complain of their want of civil liberty. The complaint, if any be made, should be of the evils which make the restraint necessary. The single question is, whether any given degree of restraint is necessary or not. If it is, though the restraint may be painful, the civil liberty of the community may be said to be complete. It is useless to say that it is less complete than that of another nation; for complete civil liberty is a relative and not a positive enjoyment. Were it otherwise, no people enjoy, or are likely for ages to enjoy, full civil liberty; because none enjoy so much that they could not, in a more virtuous state of mankind, enjoy more. "It is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority, which makes them tyrannical."*

Civil liberty (so far as its present enjoyment goes) does not necessarily depend upon forms of govern

Paley: Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6 c. 5.

ment.

All communities enjoy it who are properly governed. It may be enjoyed under an absolute monarch; as we know it may not be enjoyed under a republic. Actual, existing liberty, depends upon the actual, existing administration.

One great cause of diminutions of civil liberty is War; and if no other motive induced a people jealously to scrutinize the grounds of a war, this might be sufficient. The increased loss of personal freedom to a military man is manifest;-and it is considerable to other men. The man who now pays twenty pounds a-year in taxes, would probably have paid but two if there had been no war during the past century. If he now gets a hundred and fifty pounds a-year by his exertions, he is obliged to labour six weeks out of the fifty-two, to pay the taxes which war has entailed. That is to say, he is compelled to work two hours every day longer than he himself wishes, or than is needful for his support. This is a material deduction from personal liberty and a man would feel it as such, if the coercion were directly applied-if an officer came to his house every afternoon at four o'clock, when he had finished his business, and obliged him, under penalty of a distraint, to work till six. It is some loss of liberty, again, to a man to be unable to open as many windows in his house as he pleases-or to be forbidden to acknowledge the receipt of a debt without going to the next town for a stamp-or to be obliged to ride in an uneasy carriage unless he will pay for springs. It were to no purpose to say he may pay for windows and springs if he will, and if he can.-A slave may, by the same reasoning, be shown to be free; because, if he will and if he can, he may purchase his freedom. There is a loss of liberty in being obliged to submit to the alternative; and we should feel it as a loss if such things were not habitual, and if we had not receded so considerably from the liberty of nature. A housewife on the Ohio would think it a strange invasion of her liberty, if she were told that henceforth the police would be sent to her house to seize her goods if she made any more soap to wash her clothes.

Now, indeed, that war has created a large public debt, it is necessary to the general good that its interest should be paid: and in this view a man's civil liberty is not encroached upon, though his personal liberty is diminished. The public welfare is consulted by the diminution. I may deplore the cause without complaining of the law. It may, upon emergency, be for the public good to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act. I should lament that such a state of things existed, but I should not complain that civil liberty was invaded. The lesson which such considerations teach, is, jealous watchfulness against wars for the future.

There are many other acts of governments by which civil liberty is needlessly curtailed-among which may be reckoned the number of laws. Every law implies restriction. To be destitute of laws is to be absolutely free: to multiply laws is to multiply restrictions, or, which is the same thing, to diminish liberty. A great number of penal statutes lately existed in this country, by which the reasonable proceedings of a prosecutor were cramped, and impeded, and thwarted. A statesman to whom England is much indebted, has supplied their place by one which is more rational and more simple; and prosecutors now find that they are so much more able to consult their own understandings in their proceedings, that it may, without extravagance, be said that our civil liberty is increased.

"A law being found to produce no sensible good effects, is a sufficient reason for repealing it." It Paley: Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6, c. 5.

« السابقةمتابعة »