vern themselves, would prevent others from wishing | probation-these measures must be rejected, or they to retain the reins. Purer motives than the love of greatness, of power, or of wealth, would influence them in the choice of their political conduct. They might have no motive so powerful as the promotion of the general weal. As no limit can be assigned to that degree of excellence which it may please the Universal Parent eventually to diffuse through the world, so none can be assigned to the simplicity and purity of the form in which government shall be carried on. In truth, the mind, as it passes onward and still onward in its anticipations of purity, stops not until it arrives at that period when all government shall cease; when there shall be no wickedness to require the repressing arm of power; when terror to the evil-doers and praise to them that do well, shall no longer be needed, because none will do evil though there be no ruler to punish, and all will do well from higher and better motives than the praise of man.' In speaking of political constitutions, it is not sufficiently remembered in how great a degree good government depends upon the character and the virtue of those who shall conduct it. There is much of truth in the political maxim, that "whatever is best administered is best." But how shall good administration be secured except by the good dispositions of the administrators? The great present concern of mankind, in the selection of their legislators, respects their political opinions rather than their moral and Christian character. This exclusive reference to political biasses is surely unwise, because it leaves the passions and interests to operate without that control which individual virtue only can impart. Thus we are obliged to contrive reins and curbs for the public servants, as the charioteer contrives them for an unruly horse; too much forgetting that the best means of securing the safety of the vehicle of state, are found in the good dispositions of those who move it onward. Political tendencies are important; but they are not the most important point; moral tendencies are the first and the greatest. The question in England should be, less, "ministerialist or oppositionist?" in America, less," federalist or republican?" than in both, "a good or a bad man?" Rectitude of intention is the primary requisite; and whatever preference I might give to superiority of talents and to political principles, above all, and before all, I should prefer the enlightened Christian; knowing that his character is the best pledge of political uprightness, and that political uprightness is the best security of good government. CHAPTER VII. POLITICAL INFLUENCE.-PARTY.-MINISTERIAL UNION. Influence of the crown-Effects of influence-Incongruity of public notions-Patronage-American States-Dependency on the mother country-Party-Ministerial Union-"A party man"-The council board and the senate-Resignation of offices. THE system of governing by influence appears to be a substitute for the government of force-an intermediate step between awing by the sword and directing by reason and virtue. When the general character of political measures is such, that reason and virtue do not sufficiently support them to recommend them, on their own merits, to the public ap | must be supported by foreign means: and when, by the political institutions of a people, force is necessarily excluded, nothing remains but to have recourse to some species of Influence. There is another ground upon which Influence becomes, in a certain sense, necessary-which is, that there is so much imperfection of virtue in the majority of legislators-they are so much guided by interested or ambitious or party motives, that for a measure to be recommended by its own excellence, is sometimes not sufficient to procure their concurrence; and thus it happens that Înfluence is resorted to, not merely because public measures are deficient in purity, but because there is a deficiency of uprightness in public men. Whilst political affairs continue to be conducted on their present, or nearly on their present, principles, I believe influence is necessary to the stability of almost all governments. How else shall they be supported? They are not sufficiently virtuous to bespeak the general and unbiassed support of the nations, and without support of some kind, they must fall. That which Hume says of England is perhaps true of all civilized states-" The influence which the crown acquires from the disposal of places, honours, and preferments, may become too forcible, but it cannot altogether be abolished without the total destruction of monarchy, and even of all regular authority."* A mournful truth it is! because it necessarily implies one of two things-either that the acts" of authority" do not recommend themselves by their own excellences, or that subjects are too little principled to be influenced by such excellences alone. When Whilst the generality of subjects continue to be what they are, Influence is ins parable from the privilege of appointing to offices. With whomsoever that privilege is entrusted, he will possess influence, and consequently power. Multitudes are hoping for the gifts which he has to bestow; and they accom modate their conduct to his wishes, in order to propitiate his favour, and to obtain the reward. they have obtained it, they call themselves bound in gratitude to continue their deference; and thus the influence and the power is continually possessed. Now, there is no way of destroying this influence but by making men good; for until they are good, they will continue to sacrifice their judgments to their interests, and support men or measures, not because they are right, but because the support is attended with reward. It matters little in morals by whom the power of bestowing offices is possessed, unless you can ensure the virtue of the bestower. Politicians may talk of taking the power from crowns and vesting it in senates: but it will be of little avail to change the hands who distribute, if you cannot change the hearts. If a man should ask whether the Influence of the crown in this country might not usefully be transferred to the House of Commons, I should answer, No. Not merely because it would overthrow (for it certainly would overthrow) the monarchy, but because I know not that any security would be gained for a better employment of this influence than is possessed already. In all but arbitrary governments it appears indispensable that much of the privilege of appointing to offices should rest with the executive power. It is the peculiar source of its authority. In our own government, the peers possess power independently of their political character, and the commons possess it as representatives of the public mind; but where, without Influence, would be the power of the king? • History of England. So it is in America. They have two representative bodies, and a third estate in the office of their president. But that president could not execute the functions of a third estate, nor the office of an executive governor, without having the means of influencing the people. I do not know whether it was with the determinate object of giving to the president a competent share of power that the Americans invested him with the privilege of appointing to offices; but it is not to be questioned, that if they had not done it, the fabric of their government would speedily have fallen. The degree of this influence, which may be required to give stability to an executive body, (and therefore to a constitution,) will vary with the character of its own policy. The more widely that policy deviates from rectitude, the greater will be the demand for Influence to induce concurrence in its measures. The degree of influence that is actually exerted by a government, is therefore no despicable criterion of the excellence of its practice. In the United States the degree is less than in England; and it may therefore be feared that we are inferior to them in the purity of the general administration of the affairs of state. the judgment, is wrong." Of the moral offence which this influence implies, many are guilty who oppose governments, as well as those who support them, or as governments themselves. It is evi dently not a whit more virtuous to exert influence in opposing governments than in supporting them: nor, indeed, is it so virtuous. To what is a man influenced? Obviously, to do that which, without the influence, he would not do ;-that is to say, he is induced to violate his judgment at the request or at the will of other men. It can need no argument to show that this is vicious. In truth, it is vicious in a very high degree; for to conform our conduct to our own sober judgment, is one of the first dictates of the Moral Law: and the viciousness is so much the greater, because the express purpose for which a man is appointed to legislate, is that the community may have the benefit of his uninfluenced judgment. Breach of trust is added to the sacrifice of individual integrity. A nation can gain nothing by the knowledge or experience of a million of "influenced" legislators. It is curious, that the submission to influence which men often practise as legislators, they would abhor as judges. What should we say of a judge or a juryman who accepted a place or a promise as a bribe for an unjust sentence? We should prosecute the juryman and address the parliament for a removal of the judge. Is it then of so much less consequence in what manner affairs of state are conducted than the affairs of individuals, that that which would be disgraceful in one case, is reputable in another? No account can be given of this strange incongruity of public notions, than that custom has in one case blinded our eyes, and in the other has taught us to see. Let the legislator who would abhor to accept a purse to bribe him to write Ignoramus upon a true bill, apply the principle upon which his abhorrence is founded to his political conduct. When our moral principles are consistent these incon But let it be constantly borne in mind, that when we thus speak of the "necessity" for influence to support governments, we speak only of governments as they are, and of nations as they are. There is no necessity for influence to support good government over a good people. All influence but that which addresses itself to the judgment, is wrong-wrong in morals, and therefore indefensible upon whatever plea. Influence is in part necessary to a government in the same sense that oppression is necessary to a slave trader-not because the captain is a man, but because he has taken up the trade in slaves-not because the government is a government, but because it conducts so many political affairs upon unchristian principles or in an unchristian manner. The cap-gruities will cease. When uniform truth takes the tain says, I cannot secure my slaves without oppression-Let them go free. The government says, I cannot conduct my system without Influence-Make the system good. place of vulgar practice and opinion, these incongruities will become wonderful for their absurdity; and men will scarcely believe that their fathers, who could see so clearly, saw so ill. The same sort of stigma which now attaches to Lord Bacon, wili attach to multitudes who pass for honourable persons in the present day. A man may lawfully, no doubt, take a more active part in political measures, in compliance with the wishes of another, than he might otherwise incline to do; but to support the measures of an opposition or an administration, because they are their measures, can never be lawful.-Nor can it ever be lawful to magnify the advantages or to expatiate upon the mischiefs of a measure, beyond his secret estimate of its demerits or its merits. That legislator is viciously influenced, who says or who does any thing which he would think it not proper to say or do if he were an independent man. And here arises the observation, that if a government should faithfully act upon moral principles, that demand for influence which is occasioned by the ill principles of senators or the public, would be diminished or done away. The opposition which governments are wont to experience-indefensible as that opposition frequently is-is the result, principally, of the general character of political systems. Men, seeing that integrity and purity are sacrificed by a government to other considerations, adopt kindred means of opposing it. If I reason with a man upon the impropriety of his conduct, he will probably listen; if I use violence, he will probably use violence in return. There is no reason to doubt that, if political measures were more uniformly conformable with the sober judgments of a community, respect and affection would soon become so general and powerful, that that clamorous opposition which it is now attempted to oppose by influence, would be silenced by the public voice. Besides, the very fact that influence is exercised, animates opposition to measures of state. The possession of power- that is, in a great degree, of Influence-is a tempting bait; and it cannot be doubted that some range themselves against an executive body, not so much from objections to its measures as from desire of its power. Take away the influence, therefore, and you take away one operative cause of opposition-needless; and, as a needless thing, it would be done one great obstacle to the free progress of the vessel of state. "All influence but that which addresses itself to But it will be said, Since influence is inseparable from the possession of patronage, and since patronage must be vested somewhere, what is to be done! or how are the evils of Influence to be done away! -a question which, like many other questions in political morality, is attended with accidental rather than essential difficulties. Patronage, in a virtuous state of mankind, would be small. There would be none in the church and little in the state. Men would take the oversight of the Christian flock, not for filthy lucre but of a ready mind. If the ready mind existed, the influence of patronage would be away. And as to the state, when we consider how much of patronage in all nations results from the vicious condition of mankind-especially for military and naval appointments-it will appear that much of this class of patronage is accidental also. Take away that wickedness and violence in which hostile measures originate, and fleets and armies would no longer be needed; and with their dissolution there would be a prodigious diminution of Patronage and of Influence. So, if we continue the enquiry, how far any given source of influence arising from patronage is necessary to the institution of civil government, we shall find, at last, that the necessary portion is very small. We are little accustomed to consider how simple a thing civil government is-nor what an unnumbered multiplicity of offices and sources of patronage would be cut off, if it existed in its simple and rightful state. Supposing this state of rectitude to be attained, and the little patronage which remained to be employed rather as an encouragement and reward of public virtue than of subserviency to purposes of party, we should have no reason to complain of the existence of Influence or of its effects. Swift said of our own country, that "while the prerogative of giving all employments continues in the crown, either immediately or by subordination, it is in the power of the prince to make piety and virtue become the fashion of the age, if, at the same time, he would make them necessary qualifications for favour and preferment."< But unhappily, in the existing character of political affairs in all nations, piety and virtue would be very poor recommendations to many of their concerns. "The just man," as Adam Smith says, "the man who, in all private transactions would be the most beloved and the most esteemed, in those public transactions is regarded as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his business." It would be as absurd to think of making "piety and virtue, qualifications" for these offices, as to make idiocy a qualification for understanding the Principia.-But the position of Swift, although it is not true whilst politics remain to be what they are, contains truth if they were what they ought to be. We should have, I say, no reason to complain of the existence of influence or of its effects, if it were reduced to its proper amount, and exerted in its proper direction. It has, I think, been justly observed that one of the principal causes of the separation of America from Britain, consisted in the little influence which the crown possessed over the American States. They had popular assemblies, guided, as such assemblies are wont to be, by impatience of control, as well as by zeal for independence; and the government possessed no patronage that was sufficient to counteract the democratic principles. Occasion of opposition was ministered; and the effect was seen. The American assemblies, and the corresponding temper of the people, were more powerful than the little influence which the crown possessed. What was to be done? It was necessary either to relinquish the government, which could no longer be maintained without force, or to employ force to retain it. The latter was attempted; and, as was to be expected, it failed. I say failure was to be expected; because the state of America, and of England too, was such, that a government of force could not be supposed likely to stand. Henry VIII. and Elizabeth governed England by a species of force. They induced parliamentary compliance by intimidation. This intimidation has given place to influence. But every man will perceive that it would be impossible to return to intimidation again. And it was equally impossible to adopt it permanently in the case of America. • Project for the Advancement of Religion. Theo. of Mor. Sent. And here it may be observed, in passing, that the separation from a mother country of extensive and remote dependencies, is always to be eventually expected. As the dependency increases in population, in intelligence, in wealth, and in the various points which enable it to be, and which practically constitute it, a nation of itself-it increases in the tendency to actual separation. This separation may be delayed by the peculiar nature of the parent's government, but it can hardly be in the end prevented. It is not in the constitution of the human species to remain under the supremacy of a foreign power, to which they are under no natural subordination, after the original causes of the supremacy have passed away. Accordingly, there is reason to expect that, in days to come, the possessions of the European powers on the other quarters of the globe will one after another lapse away. Happy will it be for these powers and for the world, if they take counsel of the philosophy of human affairs, and of the experience of times gone by:-if they are willing tranquilly to yield up a superiority of which the reasonableness and the propriety is passed-a superiority which no efforts can eventually maintain and a superiority which really tends not to the welfare of the governing, of the governed, or of the world. PARTY. The system of forming Parties in governments, is perfectly congruous with the general character of political affairs, but totally incongruous with political rectitude. Of this incongruity considerate men are frequently sensible; and accordingly we find that defences of party are set up, and set up by men of respectable political character.* To defend a custom is to intimate that it is assailed. What does the very nature of party imply? That he who adheres to it speaks and votes not always according to the dictates of his own judgment, but according to the plans of other men. This sacrifice of individual judgment violates one of the first and greatest duties of a legislator-to direct his separate and unbiassed judgment to the welfare of the state. There can be no proper accumulation of individual experience and knowledge amongst those who vote with a party. But, indeed, the justifications which are attempted do not refer to the abstract rectitude of becoming one of a party, but to the unfailing ground of defending political evil-Expediency. An administration, it is said, would not be so likely to stand, or an opposition to prevail, when each man votes as he thinks rectitude requires, as when he ranges himself under a leader. The difference is like that which subsists in war between a body of irregular peasan try and a disciplined army: each man's arm is as strong in the one case as in the other, but each man's is not equally effective. Very well. If we are to be told that it is fitting, or honest, or decent, that senates and cabinets should act upon the principles of conflicting armies, parties may easily be defended, but surely legislators have other business and other duties. It only exhibits the wideness of the general departure from the proper modes of conducting government and legislation, that such arguments are employed. It will be said, that there are no means of expelling a bad administration from office but by a systematic opposition to its measures. If this were true, it would be nothing to the question of rectitude, unless it can be shown that Fox, I believe, was one of them, and the present Lord John Russell, in his Life of Lord Russell, is another. the end sanctions the means. The question is not whether we shall overthrow an administration, but whether we shall do what is right. But, even with respect to the success of political objects, it is not very certain that simple integrity would not be the most efficacious. The man who habitually votes on one side, loses, and he ought to lose, much of the confidence of other members and of the public. At what value ought we to estimate the mental principles of a man, who foregoes the dictates of his own judgment, and acts in opposition to it in order to serve a party? What is the ground upon which we can place confidence in his integrity? Facts may furnish an answer. The speeches, and statements, and arguments, of such persons, are listened to with suspicion; and a habitual and large deduction is made from their weight. This is inevitable. Hearers and the public cannot tell whether the speaker is uttering his own sentiments or those of others: they cannot tell whether he believes his own statements, or is convinced by his own reasoning. So that, even when his cause is good and his advocacy just, he loses half his influence because men are afraid to rely upon him, and because they still do not know whether some illusion is not underneath. The mind is kept so constantly jealous of fallacies, that it excludes one half of the truth. But when the man stands up, of whom it is known that he is sincere, that what he says he thinks, and what he asserts he believes, the mind opens itself to his statements without apprehension of deceit. No deductions are made for the overcolourings of party. Integrity carries with it its proper sanction. Now if, generally, the measures of a party are good, the individual support of upright men would probably more effectually recommend them to a senate and to a nation, than the ranked support of men whose uprightness must always be questionable and questioned. If the measures are not good, it matters not how inefficiently they are supported. Let those who now range themselves under political leaders of whatever party, throw away their unworthy shackles; let them convince the legislature and the public that they are absolutely sincere men; and it is probable that a vicious policy would not be able to stand before them. For other motives to opposition than actual viciousness of measures, 1 have nothing to say. He whose principles allow him to think that other motives justify opposition, may very well vote against his understanding. principles and the conduct are congenial; but both are bad. MINISTERIAL UNION. The tions about expediency-are sophistical and impertinent. "The necessity for the co-operation" (I use political language) results from the general impurity of political systems-systems in which not reason, simply, and principle, direct, but influence also, and the spirit of party-and the love of power. Where influence is to be employed, union amongst a cabinet is likely to urge it in fuller force :- Where the spirit of party is to be employed, this union is necessary to the object:-Where the love of power is the guide, consistency and integrity must be sacrificed to its acquisition or retention. But take away this influence-which is bad; and this spirit of partywhich is bad; and this love of power-which is bad; and the minister may speak and act like a consistent and a virtuous man. It is with this, as with unnumbered cases in life, that what is called the necessity for a particular vicious course of action is quite adventitious, resulting in no degree from the operation of sound principles, but from the diffused impurity of human institutions. But, indeed, the necessity is not perhaps so obvious as is supposed. The same reasons as those which make the support of a partisan comparatively inefficient, operate upon the ministerial advocate. He is regarded as a party man; and as the exertions of a party man his arguments are received. People say or think, when such arguments are urged, as some men say and think of the labours of the clergy "What they say is a matter of course;"-" It is their business; their trade." No one disputes that these feelings have a powerful effect in diminishing the practical effect of the labours of the pulpit; and they have the same effect with respect to the labours of a ministry. We listen to a minister rather as a pleader than as a judge; and every one knows what disproportionate regard is paid to these. Why should not ministers be judges? Why should not senates confide in their integrity, believe their statements, give candid attention to their reasoningsas we attend to, and believe, and confide in, what is uttered from the bench? And does any man think so ill of mankind as to believe that if an administration acted thus, they would not actually possess a greater influence upon the minds of men, than they do now? Even now, when men are so habituated to the operation of influence and party, I believe that a minister is listened to with much greater confidence and satisfaction when he dissents from his colleagues, than when he makes common cause. We then insensibly reflect, that he is no longer the pleader but the judge. The independence of his judgment is unquestioned; and we regard it therefore as the judgment of an honest man. Uniformity of opinion or more properly, unity of exertion-is not at all necessary to the stability of a cabinet. Several recent administrations in our own country have been divided in sentiment upon great questions of national policy, and their mem The unanimous support or opposition which ordinarily is given to a measure by the members of an administration, whatever be their private opinions, is a species of party. Like other modes of party, it results from the impure condition of political affairs; like them, it is incongruous with sound poli-bers have opposed one another in parliament. With tical rectitude and, like them, it is defended upon pleas of expediency. The immorality of this custom is easily shown; because it sacrifices private judgment, involves a species of hypocrisy, and defrauds the community of that uninfluenced judgment respecting public affairs for which all public men are appointed. "Ministers have been known, publicly and in unqualified terms, to applaud those very measures of a coadjutor which they have freely condemned in private." Is this manly? Is it honest? Is it Christian? If it is not, it is vicious and criminal; and all arguments in its defence-all disquisi Gisborne: Duties of Men what ill effects? Nay, has not that very contrariety recommended the reasonings of all, as those of sincere integrity? It is usual with some politicians to declaim vehemently against "unnatural coalitions in cabinets." As to individuals, they, no doubt, may be censurable for political tergiversation; but as to cabinets being composed of men of different sentiments of sentiments so different as their respective judgments may occasion-it is both allowable and expedient. It is just what a wise community would wish, because it affords a security for that canvass of public measures which is likely to illustrate their character and tendencies. But it is a sorrowful and a sickening sight, to contemplate a number of per is frankly urging their various and disagreeing inions at a council board, and as soon as some reution is come to, all proceeding to a senate, and > half urging the very arguments against which y have just been contending, and by which they › not yet convinced. Is freedom of canvass for reasons useful and right at the council board? it not, for the very same reasons, useful and right a senate? The answer would be, yes, if public asures were regarded as the measures of the commity, and not of the administration; because then › desire and judgment of the community would be ught by the public and independent discussion of e question. Here, then, at last is one great cause the evil-that a large proportion of public acts e the measures of administrations; and, being such, ministrations unitedly support them whatever be e individual opinions of their members. These ings ought not so to be. I would not indeed say at, from the crown of the head to the sole of the ot, there is no soundness in the system-but the il is mingled deplorably with the good. It is metimes in practice almost forgotten, that an adinistration is an Executive rather than a Legislative >dy-that their original and natural business is ther to do what the legislature and constitution rects, than to direct the legislature themselves. y the original and natural business; for, how conenial soever the great influence of administrations public affairs may be with the present tenor of olicy, and especially of international policy, it is ot at all congenial with the original purpose and mple and proper objects of civil government-the elfare of the community, as determined by an enghtened survey of the national mind. I Of the want of advertence to these simple and roper objects, one effect has been that, in this counry, administrations have frequently given up their ffices when the senate has rejected their measures. This is an unequivocal indication of the wrong staion in which cabinets are placed in the legislature -because it indicates, that if a cabinet cannot carry ts point, it is supposed to be unfit for its office. All this is natural enough upon the present system, but it is very unnatural when cabinets are regarded, either in their ministerial capacity, as executive offiers, or in their legislative capacity, as ordinary nembers of the senate. Executive officers are to do what the constitution and the legislature directs :members of a senate are to assist that legislature in directing aright: in all which, no necessity is involved for ministers to resign their offices because the measures which they think best are not thought best by the majority. That a ministry should sometimes judge amiss is to be expected, because it is to be expected of all men: but surely in a sound state of political institutions, their fallibility would not be a necessary argument of unfitness for their offices, nor would the rejection of some of their opinions be à necessary evidence of a loss of the confidence of the public. is satisfactorily indicated by its effects. Without indulging in the ordinary gratulations of our Own country being the first country in the world," it is unquestionably, in almost every respect, amongst the first-amongst the first in liberty, in intellectual and moral excellence, and in whatever dignifies and adorns mankind. A country which thus surpasses other nations, and which has, with little interruption, possessed a nearly uniform constitution for ages, may well rest assured that its constitution is good. To say that it is good, is however very different from saying that it is theoretically perfect, or practically as good as its theory will allow. Under a King, Lords, and Commons, we have prospered; but it does not therefore follow that under a King, Lords, and Commons, we might not have prospered more. Whatever may be the future allotment of our country as to the form of its government, whether at any period, or at what, the progressive advancement of the human species will occasion an alteration, we are not at present concerned to enquire. Of one thing, indeed, we may be assured, that if it should be the good pleasure of Providence that this advancement in excellence shall take place, the practical principles of the government and its constitutional form, will be gradually moulded and modified into a state of adaptation to the then condition of mankind. I. Of the regal part of the British Constitution I would say little. The sovereign is, in a great degree, identified with an administration; and into the principles which would regulate ministerial conduct, the preceding chapters have attempted some enquiry. Yet it may be observed that, supposing ministerial influence to be "necessary" to the constitution, there appears considerable reason to think that its amount may be safely and rightly diminished. As this influence becomes needless in proportion to the actual rectitude of political measures; as there is. some reason to hope that this rectitude is increasing; and as the public capacity to judge soundly of political measures is manifestly increasing also; it is probable that some portion of the influence of the crown might be given up, without any danger to the constitution or the public weal. And, waiving all reference to the essential moral character of influence, it is to be remembered, that no degree of it is defensible, even by the politician, but that which apparently subserves the reasonable purposes of government. It is recorded that in 1741, in Scotland, "sixteen peers were chosen literally according to the list transmitted from court."* Such a fact would con-vince a man, without further enquiry, that there must have been something very unsound in the ministerial politics of the day; or at any rate, (which is nearly the same thing,) something very discordant with the general mind. In 1793, and whilst, of course, the Irish Parlia ment existed, a bill was brought into that parliament to repeal some of the Catholic disabilities. This bill the "parliament loudly, indignantly, and resolutely rejected." A few months afterwards, a similar bill was introduced under the auspices of the government. Pitt had taken counsel of Burke, and wished to grant the Catholics relief: and when the viceroy's secretary accordingly brought in a bill, two members only opposed it; and at the second reading, it was opposed but by one vote. Now, whatever may be said of the "necessity" of ministerial influence for the purposes of state, nothing can be • Smollett: Hist. England, v. 3, p. 71. |