mind of man hath a near affinity to God: there is a divine ruler in him.”—Plutarch: "The light of truth is a law, not written in tables or books but dwelling in the mind, always as a living rule which never permits the soul to be destitute of an interior guide." Hieron says that the universal light, shining in the Conscience, is "a domestic God, a God within the hearts and souls of men."- Epictectus: "God has assigned to each man a director, his own good genius, a guardian whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false reasonings can deceive. So that when you have shut your door, say not that you are alone, for your God is within.-What need have you of outward light to discover what is done, or to light to good actions, who have God or that genius or divine principle for your light ?" Such citations might be greatly multiplied; but one more must suffice. Seneca says, "We find felicity—in a pure and untainted mind, which if it were not holy were not fit to entertain the Deity." How like the words of an apostle !" If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are." The philoso. pher again: " There is a holy spirit in us; and again the apostle: "Know ye not that" the "Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" §

*

Now respecting the various opinions which have been laid before the reader, there is one observation that will generally apply—that they unite in assigning certain important attributes or operations to some principle or power existent in the human mind. They affirm that this principle or power possesses wisdom to direct us aright-that its directions are given instantaneously as the individual needs themthat it is inseparably attended with unquestionable authority to command. That such a principle or power does, therefore, actually exist, can need little further proof; for a concurrent judgment upon a question of personal experience cannot surely be incorrect. To say that individuals express their notions of this principle or power by various phraseology, that they attribute to it different degrees of superhuman intelligence, or that they refer for its origin to contradictory causes, does not affect the general argument. The great point for our attention is, not the designation or the supposed origin of this guide, but its attributes; and these attributes appear to be divine.

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

I. That every reasonable human being is a moral agent-that is, that every such human being is responsible to God, no one perhaps denies. There can be no responsibility where there is no knowledge: "Where there is no law there is no transgression." So then every human being possesses, or is furnished with, moral knowledge and a moral law. "If we admit that mankind, without an outward revelation, are nevertheless sinners, we must also admit that mankind, without such a revelation, are nevertheless in possession of the law of God." ||

Whence then do they obtain it ?-a question to which but one answer can be given;-From the Creator himself. It appears therefore to be almost demonstratively shown, that God does communicate his will immediately to the minds of those who have no access to the external expression of it. It is always to be remembered that, as the majority of mankind do not possess the written communication of the will of God, the question, as it respects them, is between an Immediate Communication and none; beLib. 1, c. 14.

De Benef. c. 17, &c.

Gurney: Essays on Christianity, p. 516.

+1 Cor. iii. 17. § 1 Cor. iii. 16.

tween such a communication, and the denial of their responsibility in a future state; between such a conmunication, and the reducing them to the condition of the beasts that perish.

II. No one perhaps will imagine that this arge ment is confined to countries which the exterm light of Christianity has not reached. "Whoever expects to find in the Scriptures a specific direction for every moral doubt that arises, looks for more than he will meet with :"* so that even in Christia: countries there exists some portion of that necessity for other guidance, which has been seen to exist in respect of pagans. Thus Adam Smith says that there are some questions which it "is perhaps alte gether impossible to determine by any precise rules." and that they "must be left altogether to the de cision of the man within the breast."-But, indeed, when we speak of living in Christian countries, and of having access to the external revelation, we are likely to mislead ourselves with respect to the actu condition of" Christian" people. Persons talk of possessing the Bible, as if every one who lived in a protestant country had a Bible in his pocket an could read it. But there are thousands, perhaps millions, in Christian and in protestant countries who know very little of what Christianity enjoins They probably do not possess the Scriptures, or i they do, probably cannot read them. What they de know they learn from others-from others who may be little solicitous to teach them, or to teach then aright. Such persons therefore are, to a considerable extent, practically in the same situation as those who have not heard of Christianity, and there is therefore to them a corresponding need of a direct communication of knowledge from heaven. But i we see the need of such knowledge extending itse. thus far, who will call in question the doctrine, that it is imparted to the whole human race?

These are offered as considerations involving an antecedent probability of the truth of our argument. The reader is not required to give his assent to it s to a dogma of which he can discover neither the resson nor the object. Here is probability very strong; here is usefulness very manifest, and very great ;— so that the mind may reasonably be open to the reception of evidence, whatever Truth that evidence shall establish.

If the written revelation were silent respecting the immediate communication of the Divine Wil that silence might perhaps rightly be regarded as conclusive evidence that it is not conveyed; because it is so intimately connected with the purposes to which that revelation is directed, that scarcely any other explanation could be given of its silence than that the communication did not exist. That the Scriptures declare that God has communicated light and knowledge to some men by the immediate exertion of his own agency, admits not of dispute: but this it is obvious is not sufficient for our purpose: and it is in the belief that they declare that God imparts some knowledge to all men, that we thus appeal to their testimony.

Now here the reader should especially observe, that where the Christian Scriptures speak of the existence and influence of the Divine Spirit on the mind, they commonly speak of its higher operations; not of its office as a moral guide, but as a purifier, and sanctifier. and comforter of the soul. They speak of it in reference to its sacred and awful operations in connexion with human salvation: and thus it hap pens that very many citations which, if we were writing an essay on religion, would be perfectly ap propriate, do not possess that distinct and palpable application to an argument, which goes no further Mor, and Pol. Pi il. b. 1, c. 4,

than to affirm that it is a moral guide. And yet it may most reasonably be remarked, that if it has pleased the Universal Parent thus, and for these awful purposes, to visit the minds of those who are obedient to his power-he will not suffer them to be destitute of a moral guidance. The less must be supposed to be involved in the greater.

Our argument does not respect the degrees of illumination which may be possessed, respectively, by individuals, or in different ages of the world. There were motives, easily conceived, for imparting a greater degree of light and of power at the introduction of Christianity than in the present day accordingly there are many expressions in the New Testament which speak of high degrees of light and power, and which, however they may affirm the general existence of a Divine Guidance, are not descriptive of the general nor of the present condition of mankind. Nevertheless, if the records of Christianity, in describing these greater "gifts," inform us that a gift, similar in its nature but without specification of its amount, is imparted to al men, it is sufficient. Although it is one thing for the Creator to impart a general capacity to distinguish right from wrong, and another to impart miraculous power; one thing to inform his accountable creature that lying is evil, and another to enable him to cure a leprosy; yet this affords no reason to deny that the nature of the gift is not the same, or that both are not divine. The degree of light may vary according as one man has a greater measure than another. But the light of an apostle is not one thing and the light of the heathen another thing, distinct in principle. They differ only in degree of power, distinctness, and splendour of manifestation."†

So early as Gen. vi. there is a distinct declaration of the moral operation of the Deity on the human mind; not upon the pious and the good, but upon those who were desperately wicked, so that even every imagination of the thoughts of their heart was only evil continually."-" My spirit shall not always strive with man." Upon this passage a good and intelligent man writes thus: "Surely, if His spirit had striven with them until that time, until they were so desperately wicked, and wholly corrupted, that not only some, but every imagination of their hearts was evil, yes, only evil, and that continually, we may well believe the express Scripture assertion, that a manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.' "‡

6

66

Respecting some of the prophetical passages in the Hebrew Scriptures, it may be observed that there appears a want of complete adaptation to the immediate purpose of our argument, because they speak of that, prospectively, which our argument assumes to be true retrospectively also. After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts; "§ from which the reader may possibly conclude that before those days no such internal law was imparted. Yet the preceding paragraph might assure him of the contrary, and that the prophet indicated an increase rather than a commencement of internal

⚫ I am disposed to offer a simple testimony to what I believe to be a truth; that even in the present day, the divine illumination and power is sometimes imparted to individuals in a degree much greater than is necessary for the purposes of mere moral direction; that on subjects connected with their own personal condition or that of others, light is sometimes imparted in greater brightness and splendour than is ordinarily enjoyed by mankind, or than is necessary for our ordinary direction in life.

+ Hancock Essay on Instinct, &c., p. 2, c. 7, s. 1. I take this opportunity of acknowledging the obligations I am under to this work, for many of the "Opinions" which are cited in the last section. Jer. xxxi. 33.

Job Scott's Journal, c. i.

guidance. Under any supposition it does not affect the argument as it respects the present condition of the human race; for the prophecy is twice quoted in the Christian Scriptures, and is expressly stated to be fulfilled. Once the prophecy is quoted almost at length, and in the other instance the important clause is retained, "I will put my laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write them."*

"And all thy children," says Isaiah, "shall be taught of the Lord." Christ himself quotes this passage in illustrating the nature of his own religion : "It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God."†

"Thine eyes shall see thy teachers: and thine ears shall hear a word behind thee, saying, This is the way, walk ye in it; when ye turn to the right hand, and when ye turn to the left."

The Christian Scriptures, if they be not more explicit, are more abundant in their testimony, Paul addresses the " foolish Galatians." The reader should observe their character; for some Christians who acknowledge the Divine influence on the minds of eminently good men, are disposed to question it in reference to others. These foolish Galatians had turned again to "weak and beggarly elements," and their dignified instructor was afraid of them, lest he had bestowed upon them labour in vain. Nevertheless, to them he makes the solemn declaration, "God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts."§

John writes a General Epistle, an epistle which was addressed, of course, to a great variety of characters, of whom some, it is probable, possessed little more of the new religion than the name. apostle writes--" Hereby we know that he abideth in us by the Spirit which he hath given us." ||

The

The solemn declarations which follow are addressed to large numbers of recent converts, of converts whom the writer had been severely reproving for improprieties of conduct, for unchristian contentions, and even for greater faults: "Ye are the temple of the living God, as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them."-" What, know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you?" T "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are,'

And with respect to the moral operations of this sacred power:-" As touching brotherly love, ye need not that I write unto you: for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another;"tt that is, taught a duty of morality.

Thus also: The Grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world; " or in other words, teaching all men moral laws-1.ws both mandatory and prohibitory, teaching both what to do and what to avoid.

"I am the

And very distinctly :-" The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal."§§ "A Light to lighten the Gentiles."|||| Light of the world." PP "The true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.”***

"When the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law are a law unto themselves, which

show the work of the law written in their hearts." -written, it may be asked by whom but by that Being who said, "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts?"+

all

To such evidence from the written revelation, I know of no other objection which can be urged than the supposition that this Divine instruction, though existing eighteen hundred years ago, does not exist now. To which it appears sufficient to reply, that it existed not only eighteen hundred years ago, but before the period of the Deluge; and that the terms in which the Scriptures speak of it are incompatible with the supposition of a temporary duration : taught of God:" "in you all:' "hath appeared unto all men :" "given to every man :' 99 66 every man that cometh into the world." Besides, there is not the most remote indication in the Christian Scriptures that this instruction would not be perpetual; and their silence on such a subject, a subject involving the most sacred privileges of our race, must surely be regarded as positive evidence that this instruction would be accorded to us for ever.

How clear soever appears to be the evidence of reason, that man, being universally a moral and accountable agent, must be possessed, universally, of a moral law; and how distinct soever the testimony of revelation, that he does universally possess it-objections are still urged against its existence.

Of these, perhaps the most popular are those which are founded upon the varying dictates of the "Conscience." If the view which we have taken of the nature and operations of the conscience be just, these objections will have little weight. That the dictates of the conscience should vary in individuals respectively, is precisely what, from the circumstances of the case, is to be expected; but this variation does not impeach the existence of that purer ray which, whether in less or greater brightness, irradiates the heart of man.

I am, however, disposed here to notice the objections that may be founded upon national derelictions of portions of the Moral Law. "There is," says Locke, " scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others."And Paley: "There is scarcely a single vice which, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion: in one country it is esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their aged parents, in another to dispatch them out of the way: suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another felony; theft which is punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded: you shall hear dueiling alternately reprobated and applauded according to the sex, age, or station of the person you converse with the forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another, meanness,"§

Upon all which I observe, that to whatever purpose these reasonings are directed, they are defective in an essential point. They show us indeed what the external actions of men have been, but give no proof that these actions were conformable with the secret internal judgment: and this last is the only important point. That a rule of virtue is "slighted and condemned by the general fashion," is no sort of evidence that those who joined in this

Rom. ii. 14. + Jer. xxxi. 33. Not urged specifically, perhaps, against the Divine Guidance; but they will equally afford an illustration of the truth. Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 1. c. 5.

general fashion did not still know that it was a rule of virtue. There are many duties which, in the present day, are slighted by the general fashion, and yet no man will stand up and say that they are Tot duties. "There is scarcely a single vice which has not been countenanced by public opinion;" but where is the proof that it has been approved by private and secret judgment? There is a great deal of dif ference between those sentiments which men seen to entertain respecting their duties when they give expression to " public opinion," and when they rest their heads on their pillows in calm reflection." Suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another felony;" but it is not every action which a man says is heroic, that he believes is right. "Forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another, meanness;" and yet they who thus vulgarly employ the word meanness, do not imagine that forbearance and placability are really wrong.

I have met with an example which serves to confirm me in the judgment, that public notions or rather public actions are a very equivocal evidence of the real sentiments of mankind. "Can there be greater barbarity than to hurt an infant? Its helplessness, its innocence, its amiableness, call forth the compassion even of an enemy.--What then should we imagine must be the heart of a parent who would injure that weakness which a furious enemy is afraid to violate? Yet the exposition, that is, the murder of new-born infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the States of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians." This seems a strong case against us. But what were the grounds upon which this atrocity was defended?" Philosophers, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility."*

By far-fetched considerations of public utility! Why had they recourse to such arguments as these! Because they found that the custom could not be reconciled with direct and acknowledged rules of virtue because they felt and knew that it was wrong. The very circumstance that they had recourse to "far-fetched arguments," is evidence that they were conscious that clearer and more immediate arguments were against them. They knew that infanticide was an immoral act.

I attach some importance to the indications which this class of reasoning affords of the comparative uniformity of human opinion, even when it is nominally discordant. One other illustration may be offered from more private life. Boswell in his Life of Johnson, says that he proposed the question to the moralist, "Whether duelling was contrary to the laws of Christianity?" Let the reader notice the essence of the reply: "Sir, as men become in a high degree refined, various causes of offence arise which are considered to be of such importance that life must be staked to atone for them, though in reality they are not so. In a state of highly-polished society, an affront is held to be a serious injury. It must therefore be resented, or rather a duel must be fought upon it, as men have agreed to banish from their society one who puts up with an affront without fighting a duel. Now, Sir, it is never unlawful to fight in self-defence. He then who fights a duel, does not fight from passion against his antagonist, but out of self-defence, to avert the stigma of the world, and to prevent himself from being driven from society. While such notions prevail, no doubt a man may lawfully fight a duel." The question was, the consistency of duelling with the laws of Christianity; and there is not a word about Christianity in

Theory Mor. Sent. p. 5, c. 2.

the reply. Why? Because its laws can never be shown to allow duelling; and Johnson doubtless knew this. Accordingly, like the philosophers who tried to justify the kindred crime of infanticide, he had recourse to "far-fetched considerations,"-to the high polish of society-to the stigma of the worldto the notions that prevail. Now, whilst the readers of Boswell commonly think they have Johnson's authority in favour of duelling, I think they have his authority against it. I think that the mode in which he justified duelling, evinced his consciousness that it was not compatible with the Moral Law.

And thus it is, that with respect to Public Opinions, and general fashions, and thence descending to private life, we shall find that men very usually know the requisitions of the Moral Law better than they seem to know them; and that he who estimates the moral knowledge of societies or individuals by their common language, refers to an uncertain and fallacious standard.

After all, the uniformity of human opinion respecting the great laws of morality is very remarkable. Sir James Mackintosh speaks of Grotius, who had cited poets, orators, historians, &c., and says, "He quotes them as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race, on the great rules of duty and fundamental principles of morals.”*

From poets and orators we may turn to savage life. In 1683, that is, soon after the colonization of Pennsylvania, the founder of the colony held a "council and consultation" with some of the Indians. In the course of the interview it appeared that these savages believed in a state of future retribution; and they described their simple ideas of the respective states of the good and bad. The vices that they enumerated as those which would consign them to punishment, are remarkable, inasmuch as * Disc. on Study of Law of Nature and Nations.

they so nearly correspond to similar enumerations in the Christian Scriptures. They were "theft, swearing, lying, whoring, murder, and the like;" "* and the New Testament affirms that those who are guilty of adultery, fornication, lying, theft, murder, &c., shall not inherit the kingdom of God. The same writer having on his travels met with some Indians, stopped and gave them some good and serious advices. "They wept," says he, "and tears ran down their naked bodies. They smote their hands upon their breasts and said, 'The Good Man here told them what I said was all good.""†

But reasonings such as these are in reality not necessary to the support of the truth of the Immediate Communication of the Will of God; because, if the variations in men's notions of right and wrong were greater than they are, they would not impeach the existence of that communication. In the first place, we never affirm that the Deity communicates all his law to every man and in the second place, it is sufficiently certain that multitudes know his laws, and yet neglect to fulfil them.

If, in conclusion, it should be asked, what assistance can be yielded, in the investigation of publicly authorized rules of virtue, by the discussions of the present chapter? we answer, Very little. But when it is asked, Of what importance are they as illustrating the Principles of Morality? we answer, Very much. If there be two sources from which it has pleased God to enable mankind to know his Willa law written externally, and a law communicated to the heart-it is evident that both must be regarded as Principles of Morality, and that, in a work like the present, both should be illustrated as such. It is incidental to the latter mode of moral guidance, that it is little adapted to the formation of external rules; but it is of high and solemn importance to our species for the secret direction of the individual

By this general sanction of civil government, a multitude of questions respecting human duty are at once decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom the magistrate imposes a law, needs not to seek for knowledge of his duty upon the subject from a higher source. The divine will is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the magistrate commands. Obedience to the Law is obedience to the expressed will of God. He who, in the payment of a tax to support the just exercise of government, conforms to the Law of the Land, as truly obeys the divine will, as if the Deity had regulated questions of taxation, by express rules.

In thus founding the authority of civil government upon the precepts of revelation, we refer to the ultimate, and for that reason to the most proper sanction. Not, indeed, that if revelation had been

silent, the obligation of obedience might not have been deduced from other considerations. The utility of government-its tendency to promote the order and happiness of society-powerfully recommend its authority; so powerfully, indeed, that it is probable that the worst government which ever existed, was incomparably better than none; and we shall hereafter have occasion to see that considerations of Utility involve actual moral obligation.

The purity and practical excellence of the motives to civil obedience which are proposed in the Christian Scriptures, are especially worthy of regard. "Submit for the Lord's sake." "Be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." Submission for wrath's sake, that is, from fear of penalty, implies a very inferior motive to submission upon grounds of principle and duty; and as to practical excellence, who cannot perceive that he who regulates his obedience by the motives of Christianity, acts more worthily, and honourably, and consistently, than he who is influenced only by fear of penalties? The man who obeys the laws for conscience' sake, will obey always; alike when disobedience would be unpunished and unknown, as when it would be detected the next hour. The magistrate has a security for such a man's fidelity, which no other motive can supply. A smuggler will import his kegs if there is no danger of a seizure-a Christian will not buy the brandy though no one knows it but himself.

It is to be observed, that the obligation of civil obedience is enforced, whether the particular command of the law is in itself sanctioned by morality or not. Antecedently to the existence of the law of the magistrate respecting the importation of brandy, it was of no consequence in the view of morality whether brandy was imported or not; but the prohibition of the magistrate involves a moral obligation to refrain. Other doctrine has been held; and it has been assserted, that unless the particular law is enforced by morality, it does not become obligatory by the command of the state. But if this were true if no law was obligatory that was not previously enjoined by morality, no moral obligation would result from the law of the land. Such a question is surely set at rest by, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man."

*

But the authority of civil government is a subordinate authority. If, from any cause, the magistrate enjoins that which is prohibited by the Moral Law, the duty of obedience is withdrawn. "All human authority ceases at the point where obedience becomes criminal." The reason is simple; that when the magistrate enjoins what is criminal, he has exceeded his power: "the minister of God" has gone beyond his commission. There is, in our day, no such thing as a moral plenipotentiary.

Upon these principles, the first teachers of Christianity acted when the rulers "called them, and commanded them not to speak at all nor teach in the name of Jesus." Whether," they replied, "it be right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." They accordingly "entered into the temple early in the morning and taught:" and when, subsequently, they were again brought before the council and interrogated, they replied, "We ought to obey God rather than men;" and not withstanding the renewed command of the council, "daily in the temple and in every house, they ceased not to teach and preach Jesus Christ."-Nor let any one suppose that there is any thing religious in the motives of the apostles, which involved a peculiar obligation upon them to refuse obedience: we have already seen that the

• See Godwin's Political Justice.

+ Acts iv. 18.

Acts v. 29, 42.

obligation to conform to religious duty and to moral duty, is one.

But E.

To disobey the civil magistrate is however not à light thing. When the Christian conceives that the requisitions of government and of a higher law are conflicting, it is needful that he exercise a strict scrutiny into the principles of his conduct. upon such scrutiny, the contrariety of requisitions appears real, no room is left for doubt respecting his duty, or for hesitation in performing it. the consideration of consequences he has then ne concern: whatever they may be, his path is plain before him.

With

It is sufficiently evident that these doctrines respect non-compliance only. It is one thing not tə comply with laws, and another to resist those whe make or enforce them. He who thinks the payment of tithes unchristian, ought to decline to pay them; but he would act upon strange principles of morality, if, when an officer came to distrain upon his property, he forcibly resisted his authority.*

If there are cases in which the positive injunctions of the law may be disobeyed, it is manifest that the mere permission of the law to do a given action, conveys no sufficient authority to perform it. There are, perhaps, no disquisitions, connected with the present subject, which are of greater practical utility than those which show, that not every thing which is legally right is morally right; that a man may be entitled by law to privileges which morality forbids him to exercise, or to possessions which me rality forbids him to enjoy.

As to the possession, for example, of property: the general foundation of the right to property is the Law of the Land. But as the Law, of the Land is itself subordinate, it is manifest that the right to property must be subordinate also, and must be held in subjection to the Moral Law. A man who has a wife and two sons, and who is worth fifteen hundred pounds, dies without a will. The widow possesses no separate property, but the sons have received from another quarter ten thousand pounds a-piece. Now, of the fifteen hundred pounds which the intestate left, the law assigns five hundred to the mother, and five hundred to each son. Are these sons morally permitted to take each his five hundred pounds, and to leave their parent with only five hundred for her support? Every man I hope will answer, No: and the reason is this; that the Moral Law, which is superior to the Law of the Land, forbids them to avail themselves of their legal rights. The Moral Law requires justice and benevolence, and a due consideration for the wants and necessities of others; and if justice and benevolence would be violated by availing ourselves of legal permissions, those permissions are not sufficient authorities to direct our conduct.

It has been laid down, that " so long as we keep within the design and intention of a law, that law will justify us, in foro conscientiæ as in foro humano, whatever be the equity or expediency of the law itself." From the example which has been offered, I think it sufficiently appears that this maxim is utterly unsound: at any rate, its unsoundness will appear from a brief historical fact. During the Revolutionary war in America, the Virginian Legislature passed a law, by which " it was enacted, that all merchants and planters in Virginia who owed money to British merchants, should be exonerated from their debts, if they paid the money due into the public treasury instead of sending it to Great

We speak here of private obligations only. Respecting the political obligations which result from the authority of civil government, some observations will be found in the chapter on Civil Obedience. Ess. iii. c. v.

Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. iii. p. 1, c. 4.