sure to find some occupation for their thoughts; some prayers or other offices of devotion, something to hear, and see, and do. "The transitions from one office of devotion to another, from confession to prayer, from prayer to thanksgiving, from thanksgiving to hearing of the word,' are contrived, like scenes in the drama, to supply the mind with a succession of diversified engagements." * "* These diversified engagements, I say, attract some who would not otherwise attend; and it is better that they should go from imperfect motives than that they should not go at all. It must, however, be confessed, that the groundwork of this species of utility is similar to that which has been urged in favour of the use of images by the Romish Church. "Idols," say they, "are laymen's books; and a great means to stir up pious thoughts and devotion in the learnedest." Indeed, if it is once admitted that the prospect of advantage is a sufficient reason for introducing objects addressed to the senses into the public offices of worship, it is not easy to define where we shall stop. If we may have magnificent architecture, and music, and chanting, and paintings; why may we not have the yet more imposing pomp of the Catholic worship? I do not say that this pomp is useful and right, but that the principle on which such things are introduced into the worship of God furnishes no satisfactory means of deciding what amount of external observances should be introduced, and what should not. If figures on canvass are lawful because they are useful, why is not a figure in marble or in wood? Why may we not have images by way of laymen's books, and of stirring up pious thoughts and devotion? But it is to be apprehended of such things, or of "contrivances like scenes in a drama," that they have much less tendency to promote devotion than some men may suppose. No doubt they may possess an imposing effect, they may powerfully interest and affect the imagination; but does not this partake too much of that factitious devotion of which we speak? Is it certain that such things have much tendency to purify the mind, and raise up within it a power that shall efficiently resist temptation? Even if some benefits do result from the employment of these appendages of worship, they are not without their dangers and their evils. With respect to those which are addressed to the senses, whether to the eye or ear, there is obviously a danger that like other sensible objects they will withdraw the mind from its proper business-the cultivation of pure religious affections towards God. And respecting the formularies of devotion, it has been said by a writer, whom none will suspect of overstating their evils, "The arrogant man, as if like the dervise in the Persian fable, he had shot his soul into the character he assumes, repeats, with complete self-application, Lord, I am not high-minded: the trifler says, I hate vain thoughts: the irreligious, Lord, how I love thy law: he who seldom prays at all, confidently repeats, All the day long I am occupied in thy staiutes." These are not light considerations: here is insincerity and untruths; and insincerity and untruths, it should be remembered, in the place and at the time when we profess to be humbled in the presence of God. The evils too are inseparable from the system. Wherever preconcerted formularies are introduced, there will always be some persons who join in the use of them without propriety, or sincerity, or decorum. Nor are the evils much extenuated by the hope which has been suggested, that "the holy vehicle of their hypocrisy • Mor. and Pol. Phil, b, 5, c, 5, may be made that of their conversion." It is very Christian-like to indulge this hope, though I fear it is not very reasonable. Hypocrisy is itself an offence against God; and it can scarcely be expected that any thing so immediately connected with the offence will often effect such an end. It is not, however, in the case of those who use these forms in a manner positively hypocritical, that the greatest evil and danger consists: "There is a kind of mechanical memory in the tongue, which runs over the form without any aid of the understanding, without any concurrence of the will, without any consent of the affections; for do we not sometimes implore God to hear a prayer to which we are ourselves not attending ? "* We have sufficient reason for knowing that to draw nigh to God with our lips whilst our hearts are far from him, is a serious offence in his sight; and when it is considered how powerful is the tendency of oft-repeated words to lose their practical connexion with feelings and ideas, it is to be feared that this class of evils, resulting from the use of forms, is of very wide exNor is it to be forgotten, that as even religious persons sometimes employ "the form without any aid of the understanding," so others are in danger of substituting the form for the reality, and of imagining that, if they are exemplary in the observance of the externals of devotion, the work of religion is done. tent. Such circumstances may reasonably make us he sitate in deciding the question of the propriety of these external. things, as a question of expediency. They may reasonably make us do more than this; for does Christianity allow us to invent a system, of which some of the consequences are so bad, for the sake of a beneficial end? Forms of prayer have been supposed to rest on an authority somewhat more definite than that of other religious forms. "The Lord's Prayer is a precedent, as well as a pattern, for forms of prayer. Our Lord appears, if not to have prescribed, at least to have authorized the use of fixed forms, when he complied with the request of the disciple who said unto him, Lord, teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples." If we turn to Matt. vi., where the fullest account is given of the subject, we are, I think, presented with a different view. Our Saviour, who had been instituting his more perfect laws in place of the doctrines which had been taught of old time, proceeded to the prevalent mode of giving alms, of praying, of fasting, and of laying up wealth. He first describes these modes, and then directs in what manner Christians ought to give alms, and pray and fast. Now, if it be contended that he requires us to employ that particular form of prayer which he then dictated, it must also be contended that he requires us to adopt that particular mode of giving money which he described, and those particular actions, when fasting, which he mentions. If we are obliged to use the form of prayer, we are obliged to give money in secret; and when we fast, to put oil upon our heads. If these particular modes were not enjoined, neither is the form of prayer; and the Scriptures contain no indication that this form was ever used at all, either by the apostles or their converts. But if the argument only asserts that fixed forms are "authorized" by the language of Christ, the question becomes a question merely of expediency. Supposing that they are authorized, they are to be employed only if they are useful. Even in this view, it may be remarked that there is no reason to suppose, from the Christian Scriptures, that either Christ himself or his apostles ever used • More's Moral Sketches, 3d Ed. p. 327. Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3. b. 5. c. 5. a fixed form. If he had designed to authorize, and therefore to recommend, their adoption, is it not probable that some indications of their having been employed would be presented? But instead of this, we find that every prayer which is recorded in the volume was delivered extempore, upon the then occasion, and arising out of the then existing circumstances. Yet after all, the important question is not between preconcerted and extempore prayer as such, but whether any prayer is proper and right but that which is elicited by the influence of the Divine power. The enquiry into this solemn subject would lead us too wide from our general business. The truth. however, that "we know not what to pray for as we ought,” is as truly applicable to extempore as to formal prayer. Words merely do not constitute prayer, whether they be prepared beforehand, or conceived at the moment they are addressed. There is reason to believe that he only offers perfectly acceptable supplications, who offers them "according to the will of God," and "of the ability which God giveth:"and if such be indeed the truth, it is scarcely compatible either with a prescribed form of words, or with extempore prayer at prescribed times. Yet if any Christian, in the piety of his heart, believes it to be most conducive to his religious interests to pray at stated times or in fixed forms, far be it from me to censure this the mode of his devotion, or to assume that his petition will not obtain access to the Universal Lord. Finally, respecting uncommanded ceremonials and rituals of all kinds, and respecting all the appendages of public worship which have been adopted as helps to devotion, there is one truth to which perhaps every good man will assent-that if religion possessed its sufficient and rightful influence, if devotion of the heart were duly maintained without these things, they would no longer be needed. He who enjoys the vigorous exercise of his limbs, is encumbered by the employment of a crutch. Whether the Christian world is yet prepared for the relinquishment of these appendages and "helps"-whether an equal degree of efficacious religion would be maintained without them-are questions which I presumed not to determine but it may nevertheless be decided, that this is the state of the Christian church to which we should direct our hopes and our endeavours—and that Christianity will never possess its proper influence, and will not effect its destined objects, until the internal dedication of the heart is universally attained. To those who may sometimes be brought into contact with persons who profess scepticism respecting Christianity, and especially to those who are conscious of any tendency in their own minds to listen to the objections of these persons, it may be useful to observe, that the grounds upon which sceptics build their disbelief of Christianity, are commonly very slight. The number is comparatively few whose opinions are the result of any tolerable degree of investigation. They embraced sceptical notions through the means which they now take of diffusing them amongst others not by arguments but jests; not by objections to the historical evidence of Christianity, but by conceits and witticisms; not by examining the nature of religion as it was delivered by its Founder, but by exposing the conduct of those who profess it. Perhaps the seeming paradox is true, that no men are so credulous, that no men accept important propositions upon such slender evidence, as the majority of those who reject Christianity. To believe that the religious opinions of almost all the civilized world are founded upon im posture, is to believe an important proposition; a proposition which no man, who properly employs his faculties, would believe without considerable weight of evidence. But what is the evidence upon which the "unfledged witlings who essay their wanton efforts" against religion, usually found their notions? Alas! they are so far from having rejected Christianity upon the examination of its evidences, that they do not know what Christianity is. To disbelieve the religion of Christianity upon grounds which shall be creditable to the understanding, involves no light task. A man must investigate and scrutinize; he must examine the credibility of testimony; he must weigh and compare evidence; he must enquire into the reality of historical facts. If, after rationally doing all this, he disbelieves in Christianity-be it so. I think him, doubtless, mistaken, but I do not think him puerile and credulous. But he who professes scepticism without any of this species of enquiry, is cre dulous and puerile indeed; and such most sceptics actually are. "Concerning unbelievers and doubters of every class, one observation may almost universally be made with truth, that they are little acquainted with the nature of the Christian religion, and still less with the evidence by which it is supported."* In France, scepticism has extended itself as widely perhaps as in any country in the world, and its philosophers, forty or fifty years ago, were ranked amongst the most intelligent and sagacious of mankind. And upon what grounds did these men reject Christianity? Dr Priestly went with Lord Shel burne to France, and he says, "I had an opportunity of seeing and conversing with every person of eminence wherever we came :" I found "all the philosophical persons to whom I was introduced at Paris, unbelievers in Christianity, and even professed athiests. As I chose on all occasions to appear as a Christian, I was told by some of them that I was the only person they had ever met with, of whose understanding they had any opinion, who professed to believe in Christianity. But on interrogating them on the subject, I soon found that they had given no proper attention to it, and did not really know what Christianity was. This was also the case with a great part of the company that I saw at Lord Shelburne's." If these philosophical men rejected Christianity in such contemptible and shameful ignorance of its nature and evidences, upon what grounds are we to suppose the ordinary striplings of infidelity reject it? How then does it happen that those who affect scepticism are so ambitious to make their scepticism known? Because it is a short and easy road to distinction; because it affords a cheap means of gratifying vanity. To "rise above vulgar prejudices and superstitions"-"to entertain enlarged and liberal opinions," are phrases of great attraction, especially to young men; and how shall they show that they rise above vulgar prejudices, how shail they so easily manifest the enlargement of their views, as by rejecting a system which all their neighbours agree to be true? They feel important to themselves, and that they are objects of curiosity to others: and they are objects of curiosity, not on account of their own qualities, but on account of the greatness of that which they contemn. The peasant who reviles a peasant, may revile him without an auditor, but a province will listen to him who vilifies a king. I know not that an intelligent person should be advised to reason with these puny assailants: their no tions and their conduct are not the result of reasoning What they need is the humiliation of vanity and the exposure of folly. A few simple interrogations would expose their folly; and for the purposes of humiliation, simply pass them by. The sun that shines upon them, makes them look bright and large. Let reason and truth withdraw their rays, and these seeming stars will quickly set in silence and in dark ness. More contemptible motives to the profession of infidelity cannot perhaps exist, but there are some which are more detestable. Hartley says that "the strictness and purity of the Christian religion in respect to sexual licentiousness, is probably the chief thing which makes vicious men first fear and hate, and then vilify and oppose it.” * Whether therefore we regard the motives which lead to scepticism, or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which it is commonly founded, there is surely much reason for an ingenious young person to hold in contempt the jests, and pleasantries, and sophistries respecting revelation with which he may be assailed. CHAPTER II. PROPERTY. Foundation of the Right to Property-Insolvency: Perpetual obligation to pay debts: Reform of public opinion: Examples of integrity-Wills, Legatees, Heirs: Informal Wills: Intestates Charitable Bequests-Minor's debts-A Wife's debts-Bills of Exchange-Shipments-Distraints-Unjust defendants-Extortion-Slaves-Privateers- Confiscations -Public money-Insurance-Improvements on estatesSettlements--Houses of infamy- Literary property-Re wards. DISQUISITIONS respecting the Origin of Property appear to be of little use; partly because the origin can scarcely be determined, and partly because, if it could be determined, the discovery would be little applicable to the present condition of human affairs. In whatever manner an estate was acquired two thousand years ago, it is of no consequence in enquiring who ought to possess it now. The foundation of the Right of Property is a more important point. Ordinarily, the foundation is the law of the land. Of Civil Government-which institution is sanctioned by the divine will-one of the great offices is, to regulate the distribution of property; to give it, if it has the power of giving; or to decide, between opposing claimants, to whom it shall be assigned. The proposition therefore, as a general rule, is sound;-He possesses a right to property to whom the law of the land assigns it. This however is only a general rule. It has been sufficiently seen that some legal possessions are not permitted by the Moral Law. The occasional opposition between the moral and the legal right to property, is inseparable from the principle on which law is founded-that of acting upon general rules. It is impossible to frame any rule, the application of which shall, in every variety of circumstances, effect the requisitions of Christian morality. A rule which in nine cases proves equitable, may prove utterly unjust in the tenth. A rule which in nine cases promotes the welfare of the citizen, may in the tenth outrage reason and humanity. It is evident that in the present state of legal institutions, the evils which result from laws respecting property must be prevented, if they are prevented at all, by the exercise of virtue in individuals. If the law assigns a hundred pounds to me, which • Observations on Man. every upright man perceives ought in equity to have been assigned to another, that other has no means of enforcing his claim. Either therefore the claim of equity must be disregarded, or I must voluntarily satisfy it. There are many cases connected with the acquisition or retention of property, with which the decisions of law are not immediately connected, but respecting which it is needful to exercise a careful discrimination, in order to conform to the requisitions of Christian rectitude. The whole subject is of great interest, and of extensive practical application in the intercourse of life. The reader will therefore be presented with several miscellaneous examples, in which the Moral Law appears to require greater purity of rectitude than is required by statutes, or than is ordinarily practised by mankind. That INSOLVENCY.-Why is a man obliged to pay his debts? It is to be hoped that the morality of few persons is lax enough to reply-Because the law compels him. But why, then, is he obliged to pay them? Because the Moral Law requires it. this is the primary ground of the obligation is evident; otherwise the payment of any debt which a vicious or corrupt legislature resolved to cancel, would cease to be obligatory upon the debtor. The Virginian statute, which we noticed in the last Essay, would have been a sufficient justification to the planters to defraud their creditors. A man becomes insolvent and is made a bankrupt: he pays his creditors ten shillings instead of twenty, and obtains his certificate. The law, therefore, disThe charges him from the obligation to pay more. bankrupt receives a large legacy, or he engages in business and acquires property. Being then able to pay the remainder of his debts, does the legal discharge exempt him from the obligation to pay them? No: and for this reason, that the legal discharge is not a moral discharge; that as the duty to pay at all was not founded primarily on the law, the law cannot warrant him in withholding a part. ness. As to It is however said, that the creditors have relinquished their right to the remainder by signing the certificate. But why did they accept half their demands instead of the whole? Because they were obliged to do it; they could get no more. granting the certificate, they do it because to withhold it would be only an act of gratuitous unkindIt would be preposterous to say that creditors relinquish their claims voluntarily; for no one would give up his claim to twenty shillings on the receipt of ten, if he could get the other ten by refusing. It might as reasonably be said that a man parts with a limb voluntarily, because, having incurably lacerated it, he submits to an amputation. It is to be remembered, too, that the necessary relinquishment of half the demand is occasioned by the debtor himself: and it seems very manifest that when a man, by his own act, deprives another of his property, he cannot allege the consequences of that act as a justification of withholding it after restoration is in his power. The mode in which an insolvent man obtains a discharge, does not appear to affect his subsequent duties. Compositions, and bankruptcies, and discharges by an insolvent act are in this respect alike. The acceptance of a part instead of the whole is not voluntary in either case; and neither case exempts the debtor from the obligation to pay in full if he upon which the debtor is obliged to pay. The debtor always engages to pay, and the engagement is enforced by morality: the engagement therefore is binding, whatever risk another man may incur by relying upon it. The causes which have occasioned a person's insolvency, although they greatly affect his character, do not affect his obligations; the duty to repay when he has the power, is the same whether the insolvency were occasioned by his fault or his misfortune. In all cases, the reasoning that applies to the debt, applies also to the interest that accrues upon it; although, with respect to the acceptance of both, and especially of interest, a creditor should exercise a considerate discretion.-A man who has failed of paying his debts ought always to live with frugality, and carefully to economize such money as he gains. He should reflect that he is a trustee for his creditors, and that all the needless money which he expends is not his, but theirs. The amount of property which the trading part of a commercial nation loses by insolvency, is great enough to constitute a considerable national evil. The fraud, too, that is practised under cover of insolvency, is doubtless the most extensive of all species of private robbery. The profligacy of some of these cases is well known to be extreme. He who is a bankrupt to-day, riots in the luxuries of affluence to-morrow; bows to the creditors whose money he is spending, and exults in the success and the impunity of his wickedness. Of such conduct, we should not speak or think but with detestation. We should no more sit at the table, or take the hand, of such a man, than if we knew he had got his money last night on the highway. There is a wickedness in some bankruptcies to which the guilt of ordinary robbers approaches but at a distance. Happy, if such wickedness could not be practised with legal impunity!* Happy, if Public Opinion supplied the deficiency of the law, and held the iniquity in rightful abhorrence !† Perhaps nothing would tend so efficaciously to diminish the general evils of insolvency, as a sound state of public opinion respecting the obligation to pay our debts. The insolvent who, with the means of paying, retains the money in his own pocket, is, and he should be regarded as being, a dishonest man. If Public Opinion held such conduct to be of the same character as theft, probably a more powerful motive to avoid insolvency would be established than any which now exists. Who would not anxiously (and therefore, in almost all cases, successfully) struggle against insolvency, when he knew that it would be followed, if not by permanent poverty, by permanent disgrace? If it should be said that to act upon such a system would overwhelm an insolvent's energies, keep him in perpetual inactivity, and deprive his family of the benefit of his exertionsI answer, that the evil, supposing it to impend, would be much less extensive than may be imagined. The calamity being foreseen, would prevent men from becoming insolvent; and it is certain that the majority might have avoided insolvency by sufficient care. Besides, if a man's principles are such that he would rather sink into inactivity than exert himself in order to be just, it is not necessary to mould public opinion to his character. The question too is, not whether some men would not prefer indolence to the calls of justice, but whether the public should judge accurately respecting what those calls are. The state, and especially a family, might lose occasionally by this reform of opinion--and so they do by sending a man to New South Wales; but who would think this a good reason for setting criminals + Id. See the 3d Essay. at large? And after all, much more would be gained by preventing insolvency, than lost by the ill consequences upon the few who failed to pay their debts. It is cause of satisfaction that, respecting this rectified state of opinion, and respecting integrity of private virtue, some examples are offered. There is one community of Christians which holds its members obliged to pay their debts whenever they possess the ability, without regard to the legal discharge. By this means, there is thrown over the character of every bankrupt who possesses property, a shade which nothing but payment can dispel. The effect (in conjunction we may hope with private integrity of principle) is good-good, both in instituting a new motive to avoid insolvency, and in inducing some of those who do become insolvent, subsequently to pay all their debts. Of this latter effect many honourable instances might be given: two of which have fallen under my observation, I would briefly mention.-A man had become insolvent, I believe in early life; his creditors divided his property amongst them, and gave him a legal discharge. He appears to have formed the resolution to pay the remainder, if his own exertions should enable him to do it. He procured employment, by which however he never gained more than twenty shillings a-week; and worked industriously and lived frugally for eighteen years. At the expiration of this time, he found he had accumulated enough to pay the remainder, and he sent the money to his creditors. Such a man, I think, might hope to derive, during the remainder of his life, greater satisfaction from the consciousness of integrity, than he would have derived from expending the money on himself. It should be told that many of his creditors, when they heard the circumstances, declined to receive the money, or voluntarily presented it to him again. One of these was my neighbour : he had been little accustomed to exemplary virtue, and the proffered money astonished him: he talked in loud commendation of what to him was unheardof integrity; signed a receipt for the amount, and sent it back as a present to the debtor. The other instance may furnish hints of a useful kind. It was the case of a female who had endeavoured to support herself by the profits of a shop. She however became insolvent, paid some dividend, and received a discharge. She again entered into business, and in the course of years had accumulated enough to pay the remainder of her debts. But the infirmities of age were now coming on, and the annual income from her savings was just sufficient for the wants of declining years. Being thus at present unable to discharge her obligations without subjecting herself to the necessity of obtaining relief from others; she executed a will, directing that at her death the creditors should be paid the remainder of their demands: and when she died they were paid accordingly. WILLS, LEGATEES, AND HEIRS.-The right of a person to order the distribution of his property after "Where any have injured others in their property, the greatest frugality should be observed by themselves and their families; and although they may have a legal discharge from their creditors, both equity and our Christian profession demand, that none, when they have it in their power, should rest satisfied until a just restitution be made to those who have suffered by them." "And it is the judgment of this meeting, that monthly and other meetings ought not to receive collections or bequests for the use of the poor, or any other services of the Society, of persons who have fallen short in the payment of their just debts, though legally discharged by their creditors: for until such persons have paid the deficiency, their possessions can. not in equity be considered as their own." Official Documents of the Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends. death, is recommended by its Utility; and were this less manifest than it is, it would be sufficient for us that the right is established by civil government. It however happens in practice, that persons sometimes distribute their property in a manner that is both unreasonable and unjust. This evil the law cannot easily remedy; and consequently the duty of remedying it, devolves upon those to whom the property is bequeathed. If they do not prevent the injustice, it cannot be prevented. This indicates the propriety, on the part of a legatee or an heir, of considering, when property devolves to him in a manner or in a proportion that appears improper, how he may exercise upright integrity, lest he should be the practical agent of injustice or oppression. Another cause for the exercise of this integrity consists in this circumstance:-When the right of a person to bequeath his property is admitted, it is evident that his intention ought in general to be the standard of his successor's conduct and accordingly the law, in making enactments upon the subject, directs much of its solicitude to the means of ascertaining and of fulfilling the testator's intentions. These intentions must, according to the existing systems of Jurisprudence, be ascertained by some general rules-by a written declaration perhaps, or a declaration of a specified kind, or made in a prescribed form, or attested in a particular manner. But in consequence of this it happens, that as through accident or inadvertency a testator does not always comply with these forms, the law, which adheres to its rules, frustrates his intentions, and therefore, in effect, defeats its own object in prescribing the forms. Here again the intentions of the deceased and the demands of equity cannot be fulfilled, except by the virtuous integrity of heirs and legatees. L. If my father, who had one son besides myself, left nine-tenths of his property to me, and only the remaining tenth to my brother, I should not think the will, however authentic, justified me in taking so large a proportion, unless I could discover some reasonable motive which influenced my father's mind. If my brother already possessed a fortune and I had none; if I were married and had a numerous family, and he were single and unlikely to marry; if he was incurably extravagant, and would probably in a few weeks or months squander his patrimony; in these, or in such circumstances, I should think myself at liberty to appropriate my father's bequest: otherwise I should not. Thus, if the disproportionate division was the effect of some unreasonable prejudice against my brother, or fondness for me; or if it was made at the unfair instigation of another person, or in a temporary fit of passion or disgust; I could not, virtuously, enforce the will. The reason is plain. The will being unjust or extremely unreasonable, I should be guilty of injustice or extreme unreasonableness in enforcing it. By the English law, the real estates of deceased persons are not available for the payment of debts of simple contract, unless they are made so by the will. The rule is, to be sure, sufficiently barbarous; and he who intentionally forbears to make the estates available, dies, as has been properly observed, with a deliberate fraud in his heart. But this fraud cannot be completed without the concurrence of a second person, the heir. He therefore is under a moral obligation to pay such debts out of the real estate, notwithstanding the deficiency of the will: for if the father was fraudulent in making such a will, the son is fraudulent in taking advantage of his parent's wickedness. He may act with strict legality in keeping the property, but he is condemned as dishonest by the Moral Law. II. A person bequeathes five hundred pounds to some charity-for example, to the Foundling-and directs that the money shall be laid out in land. His intention is indisputably plain: but the law, with certain motives, says, that the direction to lay out the money in land makes the bequest void; and it will not enforce the bequest. But, because the testator forgot this, can the residuary legatee honestly put the five hundred pounds into his own pocket? Assuredly he cannot. The money is as truly the property of the Foundling as if the will had been accurately framed. The circumstance that the law will not compel him to give it up, although it may exempt him from an action, cannot exempt him from guilt. The law, either with reason or without it, prefers that an estate should descend to a brother's son rather than a sister's. Still it permits a man to leave it to his sister's son if he pleases; and only requires that, when he wishes to do this, he shall have three witnesses to his will instead of two. The reader will remark that the object of this legal provision is, that the intention of the party shall be indisputably known. The legislature does not wish to control him in the disposition of his property, but only to ascertain distinctly what his intention is. A will then is made, leaving an estate to a sister's son, and is attested by two witnesses only. The omission of the third is a matter of mere inadvertence: no doubt exists as to the person's intention or its reasonableness. Is it then consistent with integrity for the brother's son to take advantage of the omission, and to withhold the estate from his cousin? I think the conscience of every man will answer no: and if this be the fact, we need enquire no further. Upon such a subject, the concurrent dictates in the minds of men can scarcely be otherwise than true and just. But even critically, the same conclusion appears to follow. The law required three witnesses in order that the person's intention should be known. Now it is known and therefore the very object of the law is attained. To take advantage of the omission is, in reality, to misapply the law. It is insisting upon its letter in opposition to its motives and design. Dr Paley has decided this question otherwise, by a process of reasoning of which the basis does not appear very sound. He says that such a person has no "right" to dispose of the property, because the law conferred the right upon condition that he should have three witnesses, with which condition he has not complied. But surely the "right" of disposing property is recognized generally by the law; the requisition of three witnesses is not designed to confer a right, but to adjust the mode of exercising it. Indeed, Paley himself virtually gives up his own doctrine; for he says he should hesitate in applying it, if "considerations of pity to distress, or duty to a parent, or of gratitude to a benefactor,"* would be disregarded by the application. Why should these considerations suspend the applicability of his doctrine ? Because Christianity requires us to attend to them--which is the very truth we are urging:-we say, the permission of the law is not a sufficient warrant to disregard the obligations of Christianity. A man who possesses five thousand pounds, has two sons, of whom John is well provided for, and Thomas is not. With the privity of his sons he makes a will, leaving four thousand pounds to Thomas and one to John, explaining to both the reason of this division. A fire happens in the house and the will is burnt; and the father, before he has the opportunity of making another, is carried off by a Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 1, c. 23. |