less fulfilment is expedient; but there is a shorter and a safer road to truth. To promise and not to perform, is to deceive; and deceit is peculiarly and especially condemned by Christianity. A lie has been defined to be "a breach of promise; and, since the Scriptures condemn lying, they condemn breaches of promise.

Persons sometimes deceive others by making a promise in a sense different from that in which they know it will be understood. They hope this species of deceit is less criminal than breaking their word, and wish to gain the advantage of deceiving without its guilt. They dislike the shame but perform the act. A son has abandoned his father's house, and the father promises that if he returns, he shall be received with open arms. The son returns, the father "opens his arms" to receive him, and then proceeds to treat him with rigour. This father falsifies his promise as truly as if he had specifically engaged to treat him with kindness. The sense in which a I promise binds a person, is the sense in which he knows it is accepted by the other party.

It is very possible to promise without speaking. Those who purchase at auctions frequently advance on the price by a sign or a nod. An auctioneer, in selling an estate says, "Nine hundred and ninety pounds are offered." He who makes the customary sign to indicate an advance of ten pounds, promises to give a thousand.--A person who brings up his children or others in the known and encouraged expectation that he will provide for them, promises to provide for them. A shipmaster promises to deliver a pipe of wine at the accustomed port, although he may have made no written and no verbal engagement respecting it.

Parole, such as is taken of military men, is of imperative obligation. The prisoner who escapes by breach of parole, ought to be regarded as the perpetrator of an aggravated crime: aggravated, since his word was accepted, as he knows, because peculiar reliance was place upon it, and since he adds to the ordinary guilt of breach of promise, that of casting suspicion and entailing suffering upon other men. If breach of parole were general, parole would not be taken. It is one of the anomalies which are presented by the adherents to the law of honour, that they do not reject from their society the man who impeaches their respectability and his own, whilst they reject the man who really impeaches neither the one nor the other.-To say I am a man of honour and therefore you may rely upon my word; and then, as soon as it is accepted, to violate that word, is no ordinary deceit. An upright man never broke parole.

Promises are not binding if performance is unlawful. Sometimes men promise to commit a wicked act—even to assassination; but a man is not required to commit murder because he has promised to commit it. Thus, in the Christian Scriptures, the son who had said, "I will not" work in the vineyard, and "afterwards repented and went," is spoken of with approbation: his promise was not binding, because fulfilment would have been wrong. Cranmer, whose religious firmness was overcome in the prospect of the stake, recanted; that is, he promised to abandon the protestant faith. Neither was his promise binding. To have regarded it would have been a crime. The offence both of Cranmer and of the son in the parable, consisted not in violating their promises but in making them.

Some scrupulous persons appear to attach a needless obligation to expressions which they employ in the form of promises. You ask a lady if she will join a party in a walk; she declines, but presently recollecting some inducement to go, she is in doubt

whether her refusal does not oblige her to stay at home. Such a person should recollect, that her refusal does not partake of the character of a promise: there is no other party to it; she comes under no engagement to another. She only expresses her present intention, which intention she is at liberty to alter.

Many promises are conditional though the conditions are not expressed. A man says to some friends, I will dine with you at two o'clock; but as he is preparing to go, his child meets with an accident which requires his attention. This man does not violate a promise by absenting himself, because such promises are in fact made and accepted with the tacit understanding that they are subject to such conditions. No one would expect, when his friend engaged to dine with him, that he intended to bind himself to come, though he left a child unassisted with a fractured arm. Accordingly, when a person means to exclude such conditions he says, "I will certainly do so and so if I am living and able."

Yet, even to seem to disregard an engagement is an evil. To an ingenuous and Christian mind there is always something painful in not performing it. Of this evil the principal source is gratuitously brought upon us by the habit of using unconditional terms for conditional engagements. That which is only intention should be expressed as intention. It is better, and more becoming the condition of humanity, to say, I intend to do a thing, than, I will do a thing. The recollection of our dependency upon uncontrollable circumstances should be present with us even in little affairs-" Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to-morrow we will go into such a city and buy and sell and get gain: whereas ye know not what shall be on the morrow.-Ye ought to say, If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." Not indeed that the sacred name of God is to be introduced to express the conditions of our little engagements; but the principle should never be forgotten-that we know not what shall be on the morrow.

Respecting the often discussed question, whether extorted promises are binding, there has been, I suspect, a general want of advertence to one important point. What is an extorted promise? If by an extorted promise, is meant a promise that is made involuntarily, without the concurrence of the will; if it is the effect of any ungovernable impulse, and made without the consciousness of the party-then it is not a promise. This may happen. Fear or agitation may be so great that a person really does not know what he says or does; and in such a case a man's promises do not bind him any more than the promises of a man in a fit of insanity. But if by an "extorted" promise it is only meant that very powerful inducements were held out to making it, inducements however which did not take away the power of choice-then these promises are in strictness voluntary, and like all other voluntary engagements, they ought to be fulfilled. But perhaps fulfilment is itself unlawful. Then you may not fulfil it. The offence consists in making such engagements. It will be said, a robber threatened to take my life unless I would promise to reveal the place where my neighbour's money was deposited. Ought I not to make the promise in order to save my life? No. Here, in reality, is the origin of the difficulties and the doubts. To rob your neighbour is criminal; to enable another man to rob him is criminal too. Instead therefore of discussing the obligation of "extorted" promises, we should consider whether such promises may lawfully be made. The prospect of saving life is one of the utmost inducements to make them, and yet, amongst those things which

we are to hold subservient to our Christian fidelity, is our "own life also." If, however, giving way to the weakness of nature, a person makes the promise, he should regulate his performance by the ordinary principles. Fulfil the promise unless fulfilment be wrong: and if, in estimating the propriety of fulfilling it, any difficulty arises, it must be charged not to the imperfection of moral principles, but to the entanglement in which we involve ourselves by having begun to deviate from rectitude. If we had not unlawfully made the promise we should have had no difficulty in ascertaining our subsequent duty. The traveller who does not desert the proper road, easily finds his way; he who once loses sight of it, has many difficulties in returning.

The history of that good man John Fletcher (La Flechere) affords an example to our purpose. Fletcher had a brother, De Gons, and a nephew, a profligate youth. This youth came one day to his uncle De Gons, and holding up a pistol, declared he would instantly shoot him if he did not give him an order for five hundred crowns. De Gons in terror gave it; and the nephew then, under the same threat, required him solemnly to promise that he would not prosecute him; and De Gons made the promise accordingly. That is what is called an extorted promise, and an extorted gift. How, in similar circumstances, did Fletcher act? This youth afterwards went to him, told him of the "present" which De Gons had made, and showed him the order. Fletcher suspected some fraud, and thinking it right to prevent its success, he put the order in his pocket. It was at the risk of his life. The young man instantly presented his pistol, declaring that he would fire if he did not deliver it up. Fletcher did not submit to the extortion: he told him that his life was secure under the protection of God, refused to dehver up the order, and severely remonstrated with his nephew on his profligacy. The young man was restrained and softened; and before he left his uncle, gave him many assurances that he would amend his life. De Gons might have been perplexed with doubts as to the obligation of his "extorted" promise: Fletcher could have no doubts to solve.

LIES.

THE guilt of lying, like that of many other offences, has been needlessly founded upon its ill effects. These effects constitute a good reason for adhering to truth, but they are not the greatest nor the best. Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour."* "Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another."+ "The law is made for unholy and profane, for murderers-for liars." It may afford the reader some instruction, to observe with what crimes lying is associated in Scripture-with perjury, and murder, and parricide. Not that it is necessary to зuppose that the measure of guilt of these crimes is equal, but that the guilt of all is great. With respect to lying, there is no trace in these passages that its guilt is conditional upon its effects, or that it is not always, and for whatever purpose, prohibited by the Divine Will,

A lie is, uttering what is not true when the speaker professes to utter truth, or when he knows it is expected by the hearer. I do not perceive that any looser definition is allowable, because every looser definition would permit deceit.

Milton's definition, considering the general tenor of his character, was very lax. He says, "Falsehood is incurred when any one, from a dishonest mo † Lov. xix. II. 1 Tim. i. 9, 10,

⚫ Eph. iv. 25.

tive, either perverts the truth or utters what is false to one to whom it is his duty to speak the truth.” * To whom is it not our duty to speak the truth? What constitutes duty but the will of God? and where is it found that it is his will that we should sometimes lie?-But another condition is proposed: In order to constitute a lie, the motive to it must be dishonest. Is not all deceit dishonesty; and can any one utter a lie without deceit? A man who travels in the Arctic regions comes home and writes a narrative, professedly faithful, of his adventures, and decorates it with marvellous incidents which never happened, and stories of wonders which he never saw. You tell this man he has been passing lies upon the public. Oh no, he says, I had not "a dishonest motive." I only meant to make readers wonder.— Milton's mode of substantiating his doctrine, is worthy of remark. He makes many references for authority to the Hebrew Scriptures, but not one to the Christian. The reason is plain though perhaps he was not aware of it, that the purer moral system which the Christian Lawgiver introduced, did not countenance the doctrine. Another argument is so feeble that it may well be concluded no valid argument can be found. If it had been discoverable would not Milton have found it? He says, "It is universally admitted that feints and stratagems in war, when unaccompanied by perjury or breach of faith, do not fall under the description of falsehood. -It is scarcely possible to execute any of the artifices of war, without openly uttering the greatest untruths with the indisputable intention of deceiving."+ And so, because the " greatest untruths" are uttered in conducting one of the most flagitious departments of the most unchristian system in the world, we are told, in a system of Christian Doctrine, that untruths are lawful!

Paley's philosophy is yet more lax: he says that we may tell a falsehood to a person who "has no right to know the truth." What constitutes a right to know the truth, it were not easy to determine. But if a man has no right to know the truthwithhold it; but do not utter a lie. A man has no right to know how much property I possess. If, however, he impertinently chooses to ask, what am I to do? Refuse to tell him, says Christian morality. What am I to do? Tell him it is ten times as great as it is, says the morality of Paley.

To say that when a man is tempted to employ a falsehood, he is to consider the degree of "inconveniency which results from the want of confidence in such cases," and to employ the falsehood or not as this degree shall prescribe, is surely to trifle with morality. What is the hope that a man will decide aright, who sets about such a calculation at such a time? Another kind of falsehood which it is said is lawful, is that "to a robber, to conceal your property." A man gets into my house, and desires to know where he shall find my plate. I tell him it is in a chest in such a room, knowing that it is in a closet in another. By such a falsehood I might save my property or possibly my life; but if the prospect of doing this be a sufficient reason for violating the Moral Law, there is no action which we may not lawfully commit. May a person, in order so to save his property or life, commit parricide? Every reader says. No. But where is the ground of the distinction? If you may lie for the sake of such advantages, why may you not kill? What makes murder unlawful but that which makes lying unlawful too? No man surely will say that we must make distinctions in the atrocity of such actions, and that, though it is not

lawful for the sake of advantage to commit an act of a certain intensity of guilt, yet it is lawful to commit one of a certain gradation less. Such doctrine would be purely gratuitous and unfounded: it would be equivalent to saying that we are at liberty to disobey the Divine Laws when we think fit. The case is very simple: If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose; for lying and parricide are placed together and jointly condemned in the revelation from God.

Then we are told that we may "tell a falsehood to a madman for his own advantage," and this because it is beneficial. Dr Carter may furnish an answer: he speaks of the Female Lunatic Asylum, Saltpetriere, in Paris, and says, "The great object to which the views of the officers of La Saltpetriere are directed, is to gain the confidence of the patients; and this object is generally attained by gentleness, by appearing to take an interest in their affairs, by a decision of character equally remote from the extremes of indulgence and severity, and by the most scrupulous observance of good faith. Upon this latter, particular stress seems to be laid by M. Pinel, who remarks that insane persons, like children, lose all confidence and all respect if you fail in your word towards them; and they immediately set their ingenuity to work to deceive and circumvent you.'"† What then becomes of the doctrine of "telling falsehoods to madmen for their own advantage?" It is pleasant thus to find the evidence of experience enforcing the dictates of principle, and that what morality declares to be right, facts declare to be expedient.

Persons frequently employ falsehoods to a sick man who cannot recover, lest it should discompose his mind. This is called kindness, although an earnest preparation for death may be at stake upon their speaking the truth. There is a peculiar inconsistency sometimes exhibited on such occasions: the persons who will not discompose a sick man for the sake of his interests in futurity, will discompose him without scruple if he has not made his will. Is a bequest of more consequence to the survivor, than a hope full of immortality to the dying man?

It is curious to remark how zealously persons reprobate "pious frauds;" that is, lies for the religious benefit of the deceived party. Surely if any reason for employing falsehood be a good one, it is the prospect of effecting religious benefit. How is it then that we so freely condemn these falsehoods, whilst we contend for others which are used for less important purposes?

Still, not every expression that is at variance with facts is a lie, because there are some expressions in which the speaker does not pretend, and the hearer does not expect, literal truth. Of this class are hyperboles and jests, fables and tales of professed fiction: of this class too, are parables, such as are employed in the New Testament. In such cases affirmative language is used in the same terms as if the allegations were true, yet as it is known that it does not profess to narrate facts, no lie is uttered. It is the same with some kinds of irony: Cry aloud," said Elijah to the priests of the idol, for he is a god, peradventure he sleepeth." And yet, because a given untruth is not a lie, it does not therefore follow that it is innocent: for it is very possible to employ such expressions without any sufficient justification. A man who thinks he can best inculcate virtue through a fable, may write one: he who desires to discountenance an absurdity, may employ irony. Yet every one should use as little of

1 Tim. i. 9, 10.

† Account of the Principal Hospitals in France, &c

|

such language as he can, because it is frequently dangerous language. The man who familiarizes himself to a departure from literal truth, is in danger of departing from it without reason and without excuse. Some of these departures are like lies; so much like them that both speaker and hearer may reasonably question whether they are lies or not. The lapse from untruths which can deceive no one, to those which are intended to deceive, proceeds by almost imperceptible gradations on the scale of evil and it is not the part of wisdom to approach the verge of guilt. Nor is it to be forgotten, that language, professedly fictitious, is not always understood to be such by those who hear it. This applies especially to the case of children-that is, of mankind during that period of life in which they are acquiring some of their first notions of morality. The boy who hears his father using hyperboles and irony with a grave countenance, probably thinks he has his father's example for telling lies amongst his schoolfellows.

Amongst the indefensible untruths which often are not lies, are those which factitious politeness enjoins. Such are compliments and complimentary subscriptions, and many other untruths of expression and of action which pass currently in the world. These are, no doubt, often estimated at their value: the receiver knows that they are base coin though they shine like the good. Now, although it is not to be pretended that such expressions, so estimated, are lies, yet I will venture to affirm that the reader cannot set up for them any tolerable defence; and if he cannot show that they are right he may be quite sure that they are wrong. A defence has however been attempted: "How much is happiness increased by the general adoption of a system of concerted and limited deceit! He from whose doctrine it flows that we are to be in no case hypocrites, would, in mere manners, reduce us to a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage." We do not enter here into such questions as whether a man may smile when his friend calls upon him, though he would rather just then that he had staid away. Whatever the reader may think of these questions, the "system of deceit which passes in the world cannot be justified by the decision. There is no fear that "a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage" would ensue, if this system were amended. The first teachers of Christianity, who will not be charged with being in "any case hypocrites," both recommended and practised gentleness and courtesy.* And as to the increase of happiness which is assumed to result from this system of deceit, the fact is of a very questionable kind. No society I believe sufficiently discourages it; but that society which discourages it probably as much as any other, certainly enjoys its full average of happiness. But the apology proceeds, and more seriously errs: "The employment of falsehood for the production of good, cannot be more unworthy of the Divine Being than the acknowledged employment of rapine and murder for the same purpose.† Is it then not perceived that to employ the wickedness of man is a very different thing from holding its agents innocent? Some of those whose wickedness has been thus employed, have been punished for that wickedness. Even to show that the Deity has employed falsehood for the production of good, would in no degree establish the doctrine that faisehood is right.

66

The childish and senseless practice of requiring servants to deny" their masters, has had many apologists-I suppose because many perceive that 1 Peter, ii. 1. Tit. ii. 2. 1 Peter, iii. 8.

Edin. Rev. vol. 1, Art. Belsham's Philosophy of the Mind

their wickedness, and if they do not perpetrate it will punish them for their virtue.

Upon every subject of questionable rectitude that is sanctioned by habit and the usages of society, a person should place himself in the independent sitnation of an enquirer. He should not seek for arguments to defend an existing practice, but should simply enquire what our practice ought to be. One of the most powerful causes of the slow amendment of public institutions, consists in this circumstance, that most men endeavour rather to justify what exists than to consider whether it ought to exist or not. This cause operates upon the question of oaths. We therefore invite the reader, in considering the citation which follows, to suppose himself to be one of the listeners at the Mount-to know nothing of the customs of the present day, and to have no desire to justify them.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto you, Swear not at all: neither by heaven for it is God's throne, nor by the earth for it his footstool, neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your communication be yea yea, nay nay; for whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil."* If a person should take a New Testament, and read these words to ten intelligent Asiatics who had never heard of them before, does any man believe that a single individual of them would think that the words did prohibit all oaths? I lay stress upon this consideration: if ten unbiased persons would, at the first hearing, say the prohibition was universal, we have no contemptible argument that that is the real meaning of the words. For to whom were the words addressed? Not to schoolmen, of whom it was known that they would make nice distinctions and curious investigations; not to men of learning, who were in the habit of cautiously weighing the import of words-but to a multitude-a mixed and unschooled multitude. It was to such persons that the prohibition was addressed; it was to such apprehensions that its form was adapted.

"It hath been said of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself." Why refer to what was said of old time? For this reason assuredly; to point out that the present requisitions were different from the former; that what was prohibited now was different from what was prohibited before. And what was prohibited before? Swearing falsely-Swearing and not performing. What then could be prohibited now? Swearing truly-Swearing, even, and performing: that is, swearing at all; for it is manifest that if truth may not be attested by an oath, no oath may be taken. Of old time it was said, "Ye shall not swear by my name falsely."† "If a man swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word." There could be no intelligible purpose in contradistinguishing the new precept from these, but to point out a characteristic difference; and there is no intelligible characteristic difference but that which denounces all oaths. Such were the views of the early Christians. "The old law," says one of them, "is satisfied with the honest keeping of the oath, but Christ cuts off the opportunity of perjury." In acknowledging that this prefatory reference to the former law, is in my view absolutely conclusive of our Christian duty, I would remark as an extraordinary circumstance, that Dr Paley, in citing the passage, omits this introduction and takes no notice of it in his argument.

"I say unto you, Swear not at all." The words are absolute and exclusive.

"Neither by heaven, nor by the earth, nor by Jerusalem, nor by thy own head." Respecting this enumeration it is said that it prohibits swearing by certain objects, but not by all objects. To which a sufficient answer is found in the parallel passage in James: "Swear not," he says; "neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath."* This mode of prohibition, by which an absolute and universal rule is first proposed and then followed by certain examples of the prohibited things, is elsewhere employed in Scripture. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth."† No man supposes that this after-enumeration was designed to restrict the obligation of the law--Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Yet it were as reasonable to say that it was lawful to make idols in the form of imaginary monsters because they were not mentioned in the enumeration, as that it is lawful to swear any given kind of oath because it is not mentioned in the enumeration. Upon this part of the prohibition it is curious that two contradictory opinions are advanced by the defenders of oaths. The first class of reasoners says, The prohibition allows us to swear by the Deity, but disallows swearing by inferior things. The second class says, The prohibition allows swearing by inferior things, but disallows swearing by the Deity. Of the first class is Milton. The injunction, he says, "does not prohibit us from swearing by the name of God--We are only commanded not to swear by heaven, &c."‡ But here again the Scripture itself furnishes a conclusive answer. It asserts that to swear by heaven is to swear by the Deity: "He that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by Him that siteth thereon."§ To prohibit swearing by heaven, is therefore to prohibit swearing by God.Amongst the second class is Dr Paley. He says, "On account of the relation which these things, [the heavens, the earth, &c.] bore to the Supreme Being, to swear by any of them was in effect and substance to swear by Him; for which reason our Saviour says, Swear not at all; that is, neither directly by God nor indirectly by any thing related to him." But if we are thus prohibited from swearing by any thing related to Him, how happens it that Paley proceeds to justify judicial oaths? Does not the judicial deponent swear by something related to God? Does he not swear by something much more nearly related than the earth or our own heads? Is not our hope of salvation more nearly related than a member of our bodies?-But after he has thus taken pains to show that swearing by the Almighty was especially forbidden, he enforces his general argument by saying that Christ did swear by the Almighty! He says that the high priest examined our Saviour upon oath, "by the living God;" which oath he took. This is wonderful; and the more wonderful because of these two arguments the one immediately follows the other. It is contended, within half a dozen lines, first that Christ forbade swearing by God, and next that he violated his own command.

"But let your communication be yea yea, nay nay." This is remarkable: it is positive superadded to negative commands. We are told not only what we ought not, but what we ought to do. It has indeed been said that the expression " your commu