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ticulars to which this Essay might have been extended, he has therefore made a selec tion; and in making it, has chosen those subjects which appeared peculiarly to need the enquiry, either because the popular or philosophical opinions respecting them appeare to be unsound, or because they were commonly little adverted to in the practice of life Form has been sacrificed to utility. Many great duties have been passed over, since no one questions their obligation; nor has the author so little consulted the pleasure & the reader as to expatiate upon duties simply because they are great. The reader wil also regard the subjects that have been chosen as selected, not only for the purpos of elucidating the subjects themselves, but as furnishing illustration of the General Pric ciples as the compiler of a book of mathematics proposes a variety of examples, no merely to discover the solution of the particular problem, but to familiarize the applic tion of his general rule.

Of the THIRD ESSAY, in which some of the great questions of Political Rectitud have been examined, the subjects are in themselves sufficiently important. The application of sound and pure Moral Principles to questions of Government, of Legis lation, of the Administration of Justice, or of Religious Establishments, is manifestly of great interest; and the interest is so much the greater because these subjects har usually been examined, as the writer conceives, by other and very different standards.

The reader will probably find, in each of these Essays, some principles or some con clusions respecting human duties to which he has not been accustomed-some opinion called in question which he has habitually regarded as being indisputably true, and some actions exhibited as forbidden by morality which he has supposed to be lawfu and right. In such cases I must hope for his candid investigation of the truth, and that he will not reject conclusions but by the detection of inaccuracy in the reasonings from which they are deduced. I hope he will not find himself invited to alter his opinions or his conduct without being shown why; and if he is conclusively shown this, that he will not reject truth because it is new or unwelcome.

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With respect to the present influence of the Principles which these Essays illus trate, the author will feel no disappointment if it is not great. It is not upon expectation of such influence that his motive is founded or his hope rests. His motive is, to advocate truth without reference to its popularity; and his hope is, to promote, by these feeble exertions, an approximation to that state of purity, which he believes it is the design of God shall eventually beautify and dignify the condition of mankind.

ESSAY I.

PART I.

PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER I.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

Foundation of Moral Obligation.

THERE is little hope of proposing a definition of Moral Obligation which shall be satisfactory to every reader; partly because the phrase is the represen. tative of different notions in individual minds. No single definition can, it is evident, represent various notions; and there are probably no means by which the notions of individuals respecting Moral Obligation can be adjusted to one standard. Accordingly, whilst attempts to define it have been very numerous, all probably have been unsatisfactory to the majority of mankind.

Happily this question, like many others upon which the world is unable to agree, is of little practical importance. Many who dispute about the definition, coincide in their judgments of what we are obliged to do and to forbear; and so long as the individual knows that he is actually the subject of Moral Obligation, and actually responsible to a superior power, it is not of much consequence whether he can critically explain in what Moral Obligation consists.

The writer of these pages, therefore, makes no attempts at strictness of definition. It is sufficient for his purpose that man is under an obligation to obey his Creator; and if any one curiously asks "Why?" -he answers, that one reason at least is, that the Deity possesses the power, and evinces the intention, to call the human species to account for their actions, and to punish or reward them.

OF MORALITY.

Most men, or most of those with whom we are concerned, agree that this Standard consists in the Will of God. But here the coincidence of opinion stops. Various and very dissimilar answers are given to the question, How is the Will of God to be discovered? These differences lead to differing conclusions respecting human duty. All the proposed modes of discovering his Will cannot be the best nor the right; and those which are not right are likely to lead to erroneous conclusions respecting what his Will is.

It becomes therefore a question of very great interest-How is the Will of God to be discovered? and if there should appear to be more sources than one from which it may be deduced-What is that source which, in our investigations, we are to regard ▾ as paramount to every other?

THE WILL OF GOD.

When we say that most men agree in referring to the Will of God as the Standard of Rectitude, we do not mean that all those who have framed systems of moral philosophy have set out with this proposition as their fundamental rule; but we mean that the majority of mankind do really believe (with whatever indistinctness) that they ought to obey the Will of God; and that, as it respects the systems of philosophical men, they will commonly be found to involve, directly or indirectly, the same belief. He who says that the "Understanding" is to be our moral guide, is not far from saying that we are to be guided by the Divine Will; because the understanding, however we define it, is the offspring of the Divine counsels and power. When Adam Smith resolves moral obligation into propriety aris

There may be, and I believe there are, higher grounds upon which a sense of Moral Obligation may be founded; such as the love of goodness for its own sake, or love and gratitude to God for his being from feelings of "Sympathy," the conclusion neficence: nor is it unreasonable to suppose that such grounds of obligation are especially approved by the universal Parent of mankind.

CHAPTER II.

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

The Will of God-Notices of Theories-The communication of the Will of God-The supreme authority of the expressed Will of God-Causes of its practical rejection The principles of expediency fluctuating and inconsistentApplication of the principles of expediency-DifficultiesLiability to abuse-Pagans.

Ir is obvious that to him who seeks the knowledge of his duty, the first enquiry is, What is the Rule of Duty? What is the Standard of Right and Wrong?

is not very different; for these feelings are manifestly the result of that constitution which God gave to man. When Bishop Butler says that we ought to live according to nature, and make conscience the judge whether we do so live or not, a kindred observation arises; for the existence and nature of conscience must be referred ultimately to the Divine Will. Dr Samuel Clarke's philosophy is, that moral obligation is to be referred to the eternal and necessary differences of things. This might appear less obviously to have respect to the Divine Will, yet Dr Clarke himself subsequently says, that the duties which these eternal differences of things impose, are also the express and unalterable will, command, and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect should be observed by them in obedience to his supreme authority." Very similar is the

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Dr Price: Review of Principal Questions in Morals. Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion.

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practical doctrine of Wollaston. His theory is, that moral good and evil consist in a conformity or disagreement with truth—“ in treating every thing as being what it is." But then he says, that to act by this rule" must be agreeable to the Will of God, and if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it, and, since there must be perfect rectitude in his will, certainly wrong.”* It is the same with Dr Paley in his far-famed doctrine of Expediency. "It is the utility of any action alone which constitutes the obligation of it;" but this very obligation is deduced from the Divine Benevolence; from which it is attempted to show, that a regard to utility is enforced by the Will of God. Nay, he says expressly, Every duty is a duty towards God, since it is his will which makes it a duty."+

Now there is much value in these testimonies, direct or indirect, to the truth-that the Will of God is the Standard of Right and Wrong. The indirect testimonies are perhaps the more valuable of the two. He who gives undesigned evidence in favour of a proposition, is less liable to suspicion in his motives.

But, whilst we regard these testimonies, and such as these, as containing satisfactory evidence that the Will of God is our Moral Law, the intelligent enquirer will perceive that many of the proposed Theories are likely to lead to uncertain and unsatisfactory conclusions respecting what that Will requires. They prove that His Will is the Standard, but they do not clearly inform us how we shall bring our actions into juxtaposition with it.

tures in which important decisions must instantly be made, the computation of tendencies to general hap piness is wholly impracticable.

Besides these objections which apply to the sys tems separately, there is one which applies to them all-That they do not refer us directly to the Will of God. They interpose a medium; and it is the inevitable tendency of all such mediums to render the truth uncertain. They depend not indeed upon hearsay evidence, but upon something of which the tendency is the same. They seek the Will of God not from positive evidence but by implication; and we repeat the truth, that every medium that is interposed between the Divine Will and our estimates of it, diminishes the probability that we shall estimate it rightly.

These are considerations which, antecedently to all others, would prompt us to seek the Will of God directly and immediately; and it is evident that this direct and immediate knowledge of the Divine Will, can in no other manner be possessed than by his own Communication of it.

THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

That a direct communication of the Will of the

Deity respecting the conduct which mankind shall pursue, must be very useful to them, can need little proof. It is sufficiently obvious that they who have had no access to the written revelations, have commonly entertained very imperfect views of right and wrong. What Dr Johnson says of the ancient One proposes the Understanding as the means; epic poets, will apply generally to pagan philosobut every observer perceives that the understand-phers: They " were very unskilful teachers of virings of men are often contradictory in their decisions. Indeed many of those who now think their understandings dictate the rectitude of a given action, will find that the understandings of the intelligent pagans of antiquity came to very different conclusions.

A second proposes Sympathy, regulated indeed and restrained, but still Sympathy. However ingenious a philosophical system may be, I believe that good men find, in the practice of life, that these emotions are frequently unsafe, and sometimes erroneous guides of their conduct. Besides, the emotions are to be regulated and restrained; which of itself intimates the necessity of a regulating and restraining, that is, of a superior power.

To say we should act according to the "eternal and necessary differences of things," is to advance a proposition which nine persons out of ten do not understand, and of course cannot adopt in practice; and of those who do understand it, peruaps an equal majority cannot apply it, with even tolerable facility, to the concerns of life. Why indeed should a writer propose these eternal differences, if he acknowledges that the rules of conduct which result from them are "the express will and command of God?"

To the system of a fourth, which says that virtue consists in a "conformity of our actions with truth," the objection presents itself what is truth? or how, in the complicated affairs of life, and in the moment perhaps of sudden temptation, shall the individual discover what truth is?

Similar difficulties arise in applying the doctrine of Utility in "adjusting our actions so as to promote, in the greatest degree, the happiness of mankind." It is obviously difficult to apply this doctrine in practice. The welfare of mankind depends upon circumstances which, if it were possible, it is not easy to foresee. Indeed in many of those conjunc

• Religion of Nature Delineated.
Moral and Political Philosophy.

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tue," because "they wanted the light of revelation." Yet these men were inquisitive and acute, and it may be supposed they would have discovered moral truth if sagacity and inquisitiveness had been sufficient for the task. But it is unquestionable, that there are many ploughmen in this country, who possess more accurate knowledge of morality than all the sages of antiquity. We do not indeed sufficiently consider for how much knowledge respecting the Divine Will we are indebted to his own Communication of it. Many arguments, many truths, both moral and religious, which appear to us the products of our understandings and the fruits of ratiocination, are in reality nothing more than emanations from Scripture; rays of the Gospel imperceptibly transmitted, and as it were conveyed to our minds in a side light.' Of Lord Herbert's book, De Veritate, which was designed to disprove the validity of Revelation, it is observed by the editor of his " Life," that it is "a book so strongly embued with the light of revelation relative to the moral virtues and a future life, that no man ignorant of the Scriptures or of the knowledge derived from them, could have written it."† A modern system of moral philosophy is founded upon the duty of doing good to man, be. cause it appears, from the benevolence of God himself, that such is his Will. Did those philosophers then, who had no access to the written expression of his will, discover with any distinctness this seemingly obvious benevolence of God? No. "The heathens failed of drawing that deduction relating to morality, to which, as we should now judge, the most obvious parts of natural knowledge, and such 2s certainly obtained among them, were sufficient to lead them, namely, the goodness of God." —We are, I say, much more indebted to revelation for moral

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light, than we commonly acknowledge or indeed commonly perceive.

But if in fact we obtain from the communication of the Will of God, knowledge of wider extent and of a higher order than was otherwise attainable, is it not an argument that that communicated Will should be our supreme law, and that, if any of the inferior means of acquiring moral knowledge lead to conclusions in opposition to that Will, they ought to give way to its higher authority?

Indeed the single circumstance that an Omniscient Being, and who also is the Judge of mankind, has expressed his Will respecting their conduct, appears a sufficient evidence that they should regard that expression as their paramount rule. They cannot elsewhere refer to so high an authority. If the expression of his Will is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong, it can only be on the supposition that his Will itself is not the ultimate standard; for no other means of ascertaining that Will can be equally perfect and authoritative.

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Another consideration is this, that if we examine those sacred volumes in which the written expression of the Divine Will is contained, we find that they habitually proceed upon the supposition that the Will of God being expressed, is for that reason our final law. They do not set about formal proofs that we ought to sacrifice inferior rules to it, but conclude, as of course, that if the Will of God is made known, human duty is ascertained. "It is not to be imagined that the Scriptures would refer to any other foundation of virtue than the true one, and certain it is that the foundation to which they constantly do refer is the Will of God."* Nor is this all they refer to the expression of the Will of God. We hear nothing of any other ultimate authority-nothing of "Sympathy"-nothing of the "eternal fitness of things"-nothing of the " duction of the greatest sum of enjoyment;" but we hear, repeatedly, constantly, of the Will of God; of the voice of God; of the commands of God. To "be obedient unto his voice,"† is the condition of favour. To hear the "sayings of Christ and do them," is the means of obtaining his approbation. To" fear God and keep his commandments, is the whole duty of man."§ Even superior intelligences are described as "doing his commandments, hearkening unto the voice of his word." In short, the - whole system of moral legislation, as it is exhibited in Scripture, is a system founded upon authority. The propriety, the utility of the requisitions are not made of importance. That which is made of importance is, the authority of the Being who legislates. "Thus saith the Lord," is regarded as constituting a sufficient and a final law. So also it is with the moral instructions of Christ. "He put the truth of what he taught upon authority." In the sermon on the mount, I say unto you, is proposed as the sole, and sufficient, and ultimate ground of obligation. He does not say, "My precepts will promote human happiness, therefore you are to obey them:" but he says, They are my precepts, therefore you are to obey them." So habitually is this principle borne in mind, if we may so speak, by those who were commissioned to commumicate the Divine Will, that the reason of a precept is not often assigned. The assumption evidently was, that the Divine Will was all that it was necessary for us to know. This is not the mode of enforcing duties which one man usually adopts in addressing another. He discusses the reasonableness of his advices and the advantages of following them,

• Pearson: Theory of Mor. c. 1.
t Matt. vii. 24.
Ps. ciii. 20.

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Deut. iv. 20.

Eccl. xii. 13.

¶ Paley: Evid. of Chris. p. 2, c. 2.

as well as, perhaps, the authority from which he derives them. The difference that exists between such a mode and that which is actually adopted in Scripture, is analogous to that which exists between the mode in which a parent communicates his instructions to a young child, and that which is employed by a tutor to an intelligent youth. The tutor recommends his instructions by their reasonableness and propriety: the father founds his upon his own authority. Not that the father's instructions are not also founded in propriety, but that this, in respect of young children, is not the ground upon which he expects their obedience. It is not the ground upon which God expects the obedience of man. We can, undoubtedly, in general perceive the wisdom of his laws, and it is doubtless right to seek out that wisdom; but whether we discover it or not, does not lessen their authority nor alter our duties.

In deference to these reasonings, then, we conclude, that the communicated Will of God is the Final Standard of Right and Wrong-that wheresoever this will is made known, human duty is determined -and that neither the conclusions of philosophers, nor advantages, nor dangers, nor pleasures, nor sufferings, ought to have any opposing influence in regulating our conduct. Let it be remembered that in morals there can be no equilibrium of authority. If the expressed will of the Deity is not our supreme rule, some other is superior. This fatal consequence is inseparable from the adoption of any other ultimate rule of conduct. The Divine law becomes the decision of a certain tribunal-the adopted rule, the decision of a superior tribunal-for that must needs be the superior which can reverse the decisions of the other. It is a consideration, too, which may reasonably alarm the enquirer, that if once we assume this power of dispensing with the divine law, there is no limit to its exercise. If we may supersede one precept of the Deity upon one occasion, we may supersede every precept upon all occasions. Man becomes the greater authority, and God the less.

If a proposition is proved to be true, no contrary reasonings can show it to be false; and yet it is necessary to refer to such reasonings, not indeed for the sake of the truth, but, for the sake of those whose conduct it should regulate. Their confidence in truth may be increased if they discover that the reasonings which assail it are fallacious. To a considerate man it will be no subject of wonder that the supremacy of the expressed Will of God is often not recognized in the writings of moralists or in the practice of life. The speculative enquirer finds, that of some of the questions which come before him, Scripture furnishes no solution, and he seeks for some principle by which all may be solved. This indeed is the ordinary course of those who erect systems, whether in morals or in physics. The moralist acknowledges, perhaps, the authority of revelation; but in his investigations he passes away from the precepts of revelation, to some of those subordinate means by which human duties may be discovered-means which, however authorized by the Deity as subservient to his great purpose of human instruction, are wholly unauthorized as ultimate standards of right and wrong. Having fixed his attention upon these subsidiary means, he practically loses sight of the Divine law which he acknowledges; and thus without any formal, perhaps without any conscious, rejection of the expressed Will of God, he really makes it subordinate to inferior rules. Another influential motive to pass by the Divine precepts, operates both upon writers and upon the public-the rein which they hold upon the desires

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and passions of mankind, is more tight than they are willing to bear. Respecting some of these precepts we feel as the rich man of old felt: we hear the injunction and go away, if not with sorrow yet without obedience. Here again is an obvious motive to the writer to endeavour to substitute some less rigid rule of conduct, and an obvious motive to the reader to acquiesce in it as true without a very rigid scrutiny into its foundation. To adhere with fidelity to the expressed Will of Heaven, requires greater confidence in God than most men are willing to repose, or than most moralists are willing to recommend.

But whatever have been the causes, the fact is indisputable, that few or none of the systems of morality which have been offered to the world, have uniformly and consistently applied the communicated Will of God in determination of those questions to which it is applicable. Some insist upon its supreme authority in general terms; others apply it in determining some questions of rectitude: but where is the work that applies it always? Where is the - moralist who holds every thing, Ease, Interest, Reputation, Expediency, "Honour, "-personal and national,-in subordination to this Moral Law?

One source of ambiguity and of error in moral philosophy, has consisted in the indeterminate use of the term, "the Will of God." It is used without reference to the mode by which that will is to be ⚫ discovered-and it is in this mode that the essence of the controversy lies. We are agreed that the Will of God is to be our rule: the question at issue is, What mode of discovering it should be primarily adopted? Now the term, the "Will of God," has been applied, interchangeably, to the precepts of Scripture, and to the deductions which have been made from other principles. The consequence has been that the imposing sanction, "the Will of God," has been applied to propositions of very different authority.

To enquire into the validity of all those principles which have been proposed as the standard of rectitude, would be foreign to the purpose of this essay. That principle which appears to be most recommended by its own excellence and beauty, and which obtains the greatest share of approbation in the world, is the principle of directing "very action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." The particular forms of defining the doctrine are various, but they may be conveniently included in the one general term-Expediency.

We say that the apparent beauty and excellence of this rule of action are so captivating, its actual acceptance in the world is so great, and the reasonings by which it is supported are so acute, that if it can be shown that this rule is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong, we may safely conclude that none other which philosophy has proposed can make pretensions to such authority. The truth indeed is, that the objections to the doctrine of expediency will generally be found to apply to every doctrine which lays claim to moral supremacy-which application the reader is requested to make for himself as he passes along.

Respecting the principle of Expediency-the doctrine that we should, in every action, endeavour to produce the greatest sum of human happiness--let it always be remembered that the only question is, whether it ought to be the paramount rule of human conduct. No one doubts whether it ought to influence us, or whether it is of great importance in estimating the duties of morality. The sole question is this: When an expression of the Will of God, and our calculations respecting human happiness, lead to different conclusions respecting the rec

titude of an action-whether of the two shall we prefer and obey?

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We are concerned only with Christian writers. Now, when we come to analyze the principles of the Christian advocates of Expediency, we find precisely the result which we should expect a perpetual vacil lation between two irreconcilable doctrines. Christians, they necessarily acknowledge the autho! rity, and, in words at least, the supreme authority of the Divine Law: as advocates of the universal application of the law of Expediency, they necessarily sometimes set aside the Divine Law, because ther sometimes cannot deduce, from both laws, the same rule of action. Thus there is induced a continual fluctuation and uncertainty both in principles and in practical rules: a continual endeavour to serve two masters."

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Of these fluctuations an example is given in the article, "Moral Philosophy," in Rees's Encyclepædia-an article in which the principles of Hartley are in a considerable degree adopted. "The Scrip ture precepts," says the writer, "are in themselves the rule of life."-" The supposed tendency of action can never be put against the law of God as delivered to us by revelation, and should not therefore be made our chief guide." This is very explicit. Yet the same article says, that the first great rule is, that we should aim to direct every action so as to preduce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." This rule, however, is somewhat difficult of application, and therefore "instead of this most general rule we must substitute others, less general, and subordinate to it:" of which subordinate rules, to "obey the Scripture precepts" is one!I do not venture to presume that these writers do really mean what their words appear to meanthat the law of God is supreme and yet that it is subordinate; but one thing is perfectly clear, that either they make the vain attempt "to serve two masters," or that they employ language very laxly and very dangerously.

The high language of Dr Paley respecting Expediency as a paramount law, is well known :"Whatever is expedient is right."*" The obligation of ev ry law depends upon its ultimate utility."†– "It is the utility of any moral rule alone which exstitutes the obligation of it." Perjury, Robbery, and Murder, "are not useful, and for that reason, and that reason only, are not right."§ It is obvious that this language affirms that utility is a higher authority than the expressed Will of God. If the utility of a moral rule alone constitutes the obliga tion of it, then is its obligation not constituted by the divine command. If murder is wrong only be cause it is not useful, it is not wrong because God has said, "Thou shalt not kill."

But Paley was a Christian, and therefore could neither formally displace the Scripture precepts from their station of supremacy, nor avoid formally seknowledging that they were supreme. Accordingly he says, "There are two methods of coming at the Will of God on any point: First-By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture." || Secondly-By Expediency. And again, When Scripture precepts

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are clear and positive, there is an end to all further deliberation." This makes the expressed Will of God the final standard of right and wrong. here is the vacillation, the attempt to serve two mas ters of which we speak for this elevation of the express declarations of God to the supremacy, is abso

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